Natural Right, Individual, Species

As has been previously discussed, a Political Philosophy based on the interests of the Species can be distinguished from one based on those of the Individual.  An application of the distinction to Spinoza's concept of Natural Right demonstrates how the two projects might diverge.  For, on the standard interpretation of the concept, strongly supported by the text, Spinoza, following Hobbes, attempts to adjudicate between pre-political and political Individual Right, with unclear results, as has been previously discussed.  In contrast, an attribution of Natural Right to the Species asserts the privilege of Power with respect to the rest of Nature, i. e. the Right to adapt the latter to its own interests where it can.  Theoretical establishment of such privilege is necessitated by the combination of his Pantheism and his rejection of Anthropocentrism, which leave Humanity without traditional Theological or Teleological sanction over the rest of Nature.  An example of where the two projects not merely diverge but potentially conflict is the use of manufacturing processes that might benefit each extant Individual, but which pose a long-term threat to the Species.