The Evaluation of Pain

In #225 of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche asserts that Pleasure and Pain are "mere epiphenomena and wholly secondary", so that doctrines that "measure the value of things in accordance" with them, e. g. Utilitarianism, are "naivetes".  In contrast, a preceding doctrine, with which he is surely familiar, that similarly conceives Pleasure and Pain as only superficial, is Spinoza's, in which they are signs of strengthening and weakening, respectively.  So, Spinoza's evaluation of Pain as unequivocally 'bad' cannot be as easily dismissed as 'naive' as can be Utilitarianism's.  Likewise, Nietzsche's subsequent attempted justification of Pain requires an adequate explanation of its divergence from Spinoza's position, an argument that is lacking both in this passage, and elsewhere in his oeuvre.