Virtue, Power, Happiness, Acquiescence

Spinoza conceives 'Virtue' as the performance of action determined by Rational Knowledge.  Furthermore, on his analysis, Pleasure signifies an increase in Power (III, xi), and Virtue and Power are identical (IV, def. viii), from which it follows that Virtue and Happiness are one and the same, a thesis not to be confused with 'Virtue is its own reward', which implies a separation of Virtue and Happiness, as Cause and Effect.  Now, as he explains in the long Note in II, xlix, Happiness sufficiently overrides, i. e. "tranquillizes", both the expectation of any reward for Virtue, as well as any concern about adverse fate.  Thus, in this strain of the Ethics is the possibility of a reconciliation of Empowerment and Acquiescence, an otherwise problematic relation in his system, as has been previously discussed--the former pertains to the performance of an action, while the latter pertains to its possible implications.  Now, this derivation bypasses the idea of a disembodied Mode, which initiates the deduction of the idea of Acquiescence in the sequence from V, xxii-vii.  But, given that the traditional Theological value of that idea is to provide the occasion for divine reward or punishment, i. e. an occasion which is implicitly unnecessary on the basis of the identity of Virtue and Happiness, jettisoning the idea disrupts nothing essential in the Ethics.

Mode, Knowledge, Mortality

Spinoza's proposition that the essence of a Mode consists in its effort to persist in its being, entails that any knowledge of its finitude can be derived only from its knowledge of God, i. e. from the self-knowledge that it is no more than a modification of Substance.  In other words, its knowledge of God entails that of its own mortality.  Accordingly, his contention knowledge of God reveals its immortality seems a lapse into the consoling anthropocentrism that he fervently opposes elsewhere, an anomaly in the context comparable to a sudden conclusion from Copernicus that the discovery of Heliocentrism by an inhabitant of Earth proves Geocentrism.  So, Spinoza's concept of Wisdom in the Ethics vacillates from the knowledge that one is mortal, to the knowledge that one is immortal, an apparently irreconcilable vacillation.

Self-Approval, Empowerment, Acquiescence

In #XXV of the Definitions of the Emotions, Spinoza formulates that "Self-approval is pleasure arising from a man's contemplation of himself and his own power of action".  Furthermore, in IV, lii, he notes that Self-approval surpasses fame as the "most powerful of incitements to action".  Now, incitement to action disrupts a state of acquiescence.  Thus, Spinoza's reliance on the concept of Self-approval, in V, xxvii, not only compromises his stated attempt there to prove that Intuition "gives rise to the highest possible mental acquiescence", it demonstrates, to the contrary, that what it gives rise to is Empowerment.  Now, the original Latin confirms that he unequivocally means 'peace of mind' by 'acquiescence'.  So, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the sequence from V, xxii to xxvii, the focus of which is the possibility of a disembodied Mind, expresses Spinoza as straying from most of the rest of the text.  Nevertheless, that sequence has predominated in interpretations of the Ethics, resulting in the prevalent classification of it as 'Stoicism' or 'Rational Theology', rather than as 'Vitalism', or 'Pragmatism', which are supported by the majority of the work.  The emphasis on Acquiescence, as opposed to Empowerment, also tends to obscure the systematic relation between the Ethics and Spinoza's Political theory,

Intuition, Empowerment, Acquiescence

There seem to be two concepts of of 'Intuition' in the Ethics.  One, an alternative means to Reason with the same end (II, xl), has causal relations as its objects, and achieves Empowerment, i. e. since such Knowledge is, at the same time, a "power of action" (II, vii).  Hence, it can be classified as 'Practical', just as Reason often is when serving the same function.  In contrast, is a variety that can be characterized as 'Contemplative', the sole object of which, according to the sequence beginning at V, xxii, is an incorporeal personal essence that is inaccessible to Reason, and that achieves "acquiescence" (V, xxvii).  Whether or not Spinoza recognizes the vacillation is unclear, as is whether or not the two varieties of Intuition are reconcilable within his system.

Deity and Skill

In the Preface to Part V of the Ethics, Spinoza distinguishes between 1. Ethics--which concerns "how far the reason can control the emotions"; 2. Logic--"the true method and means whereby the understanding may be perfected"; and 3. Medicine--"the skill whereby the body may be so tended, as to be capable of the due performance of its functions".  So, since the purview of Logic is the Mind alone, and the scope of Ethics includes phases of human weakness, it is Medicine that best illustrates the Thought-Extension unity of "God's power of thinking" with "his power of realized action" (II, vii)--but not insofar as its object is the body, rather, insofar as it is a 'skill'.  In other words, it follows from II, vii that Know-How is an expression of Deity in a Mode, with respect to which the idea of a disembodied Mode, which is the focus of a lot of Spinoza's subsequent attention in V, seems problematic, at minimum.  Now, Skill may be poor evidence of a divine presence in Theism, according to which a Deity only occasionally intervenes in human affairs, but not in Pantheism, according to which a Deity is eternally ubiquitous.

Parallel, Correspondence, Detachment

'A is parallel to B' entails both 1. 'There is a one-to-one correspondence between A and B', and 2. 'A and B never interact'.  Thus, the possession by a Mode of an Idea in Spinoza's Deity entails the possession of the Deity's "realized power of action" (Ethics, II, vii.)  Accordingly, a Mode's Knowledge of one such Idea, by either Reason or Intuition, is Practical, and its attainment is an occasion of empowerment.  So, the possibility of an 'intuition' of the Idea of a Mind detached from its Body, which dominates Part V of the Ethics, abstracts from #1, and, arguably, expresses a straying from what, to that point, is an unequivocal doctrine of Empowerment.

Reflection and Introspection

The application of Spinoza's distinction between Adequate and Inadequate to his concept of an Idea of an Idea suggests a corresponding contrast between Reflection and Introspection.  Now, an Adequate Idea consists in the understanding of Rational antecedents and consequence, and, is, simultaneously an Adequate Cause.  Thus, the "power of thinking" and the "realized power of action" (Ethics, II, vii) are identical, whether in his Deity or in one of its Modes, i. e. he conceives Understanding and Will as one and the same.  Hence, Logic and Psychology are, likewise, one and the same study in his system.  In contrast, based on the distinction between Logic and Medicine that he draws in the Preface to Part V, he would approve of the contemporary classification of Freudian 'Psychology' as a 'Medical' science.  Regardless, it follows that Introspection is edificatory only as an initial stage in the cultivation of Rational Conduct.