Will, Theory, Practice

In #53 of World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer asserts that "all philosophy is always theoretical", and that it ought to "abandon" any effort to become practical.  Now, granting him a Theory-Practice contrast that he seems to presuppose, and overlooking the arbitrariness of his choosing the former over the latter, it can be accepted that the following are in the purview of Theory:  his proposed distinction between Representation and Will; the propositions that the Will-to-Live can be affirmed, and can be denied; and, the arguments in support of the affirmation, and in support of the denial, of the Will-to-Live.  However, to affirm, and to deny, are, themselves, each practical acts, not theoretical propositions.  Thus, Schopenhauer's affirmation of a doctrine of the denial of the Will-to-Live, even granting that its internal incoherence--i. e. it both affirms and denies--is 'paradoxical', not 'contradictory', is outside the purview of Philosophy, on his own definition of it.

Will-to-Live and Eternal Recurrence

Starting at #52 of World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer presents a comparison of the affirmation of the Will-to-Live, with the denial of the Will-to-Live, that leads to his endorsement of the latter.  At one point, he suggests that the former might even entail an affirmation of the "constant recurrence" (p. 284 of the Dover edition) of Life, thereby implying that he would deny it.  Now, it is difficult to believe that among those who have been oblivious to these passages is the philosopher who, for half his career, is an explicitly devoted follower of Schopenhauer.  In other words, any interpretation of Nietzsche's treatment of Eternal Recurrence must begin by conceiving it as a response to Schopenhauer, as part of a diagnosis of the Nihilism that he finds in the latter's doctrine.  On that basis, for example, the depressing 'Soothsayer' that appears in Thus Spoke Zarathustra is a reference to Schopenhauer, while the 'dwarf' who joins Zarathustra in the section 'The Vision and the Riddle' is a reference to anyone who reduces Eternal Recurrence to a mere 'theory of Time'.

Idea, Sufficient Reason, Individuation

According to Schopenhauer, a Platonic Idea is independent of both the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Principle of Individuation.  Now, in #30 of World as Will and Representation, he characterizes the relation between an Idea and any of its instantiations as that of archetype to copy.  However, he does not explain how the archetype-copy relation is not a species of the ground-consequence relation that, according to the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, defines that Principle.  Furthermore, according to one prominent traditional interpretation, a Platonic Idea is the cause of its instantiations, which means that not only is it the ground of which they are the consequences, but that it functions as their Principle of Individuation, as well.  Yet, he does not even entertain the possibility of that interpretation.  So, the independence of the Platonic Ideas from either of those Principles is not a thesis that Schopenhauer adequately defends, to the detriment of his system.

Art, Mimesis, Individualty

In #52 of World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer asserts that "music is by no means like the other arts, namely a copy of the Ideas, but a copy of the will itself."  In #30 he characterizes a Platonic Idea as an "archetype . . . to its copies."  In #36, he attributes to artistic genius an "ability for . . . contemplation" that enables one "to repeat by deliberate art what has been apprehended."  Quite plainly, Mimesis is fundamental to his concept of the Representation of Art, as it is to Aristotle's seminal Aesthetic theory, a well-established legacy that Schopenhauer tries to circumvent in #36.  Thus, the Mimetic analysis of Representation, previously proposed here, is applicable to Schopenhauer's Aesthetic theory, which means, that, so, too, is the entailed demonstration that Aesthetic experience does not effect a detachment from individuality, despite his ambitions for it.

Contemplation, Pleasure, Mimesis

Schopenhauer's concept of Contemplation, as effecting a detachment from individuality, puts his Aesthetic theory at a disadvantage to Kant's in two respects.  First, he sacrifices the possibility of explaining Aesthetic pleasure, because pleasure is private, subjective, individual, phenomenal, and even illusory, according to his system.  Second, the structural simplicity of Contemplation, according to his concept of it, leaves him no room to accommodate any interplay of Understanding and Imagination that might constitute it, according to Kant's.  In contrast, a Mimetic theory of Representation, as previously proposed here, in which the Contemplation of an art object involves an imitation of its internal structural interplay, as well as an interplay of similarity and dissimilarity between subject and object, does accommodate pleasurable play.  It does so by maintaining what is inimical to not only Schopenhauer's concept of Contemplation, but to his entire doctrine--a difference of subject of representation from object of representation, even as they appear to coincide.

Representation and Mimesis

Schopenhauer conceives Representation as entailing a unity of subject and object, with respect to which rival theories are generally one-sided, i. e. they privilege either one or the other, with supporting argumentation thereby basically idle.  However, perhaps because in his system the primary function of that concept is as a stage of detachment from individuality, he does not pursue alternate explanations of that apparent unity.  For example, a clue to one such alternative is in the experience of Music that is other than the one that he privileges, i. e. in dancing, as opposed to his Contemplation.  For, dancing is a fundamentally mimetic response to Music, from which it can be inferred that so, too, is Contemplation mimetic, and, hence, that Representation, in general, is mimetic.  That is, Mimesis entails both subject-object similarity, and subject-object dissimilarity, the systematization of which is the basis of every theory of Representation, including Schopenhauer's, which is Mimesis that privileges subject-object similarity.  However, Schopenhauer must reject such a theory, not on its own merits, but because it undermines the possibility, in Contemplation, of detachment from individuality that is central to his program.

Art, Morality, Play

Schopenhauer's criticism of and alternative to Kantian Morality is based on the premise that Contemplation, not totalizing Reason, is the basis of impersonal experience.  Likewise, his Aesthetic Theory diverges from Kant's in its replacement of universal Communicability with Selflessness.  In other words, regardless of its insights, his Aesthetic Theory, like Kant's, consists in the moralization of an individual's engagement with a certain class of objects.  In contrast, a theory of Art that is free from such prejudices could begin, as Kant does, with the analysis that Aesthetic experience is fundamentally constituted by the exercise of cognitive faculties, with its philosophical systematization proceeding next with an examination of other types of Play, e. g. puzzles and games.