Reason, Community, Species

Kant does not explicitly apply his category of Community/Reciprocity to Practice.  But it is implicit in his concepts of End-in-Itself and Kingdom of Ends.  So, insofar as those are concepts of Pure Practical Reason, that they are imperatival implies that the Subject that it bears upon is otherwise primarily motivated by instinctual selfishness.  Now, Spinoza does not disagree with the latter psychoanalysis; his dispute with Kant is, rather, because of their Theological differences, as has been previously discussed, that there is no antithesis between Reason and Instinct.  Accordingly, in Spinoza's doctrine, there is no necessity for a category of Community/Reciprocity, i. e. because cooperating with others out of selfisness is sufficiently Rational for Spinoza.  Consequently, Community is only contingently an innate principle, i. e. when derived from specific Theological premises.  Now, lacking in the doctrines of both Spinoza and Kant is a concept that does otherwise ground the principle--Species.  For, in the context of a Species, a Communal instinct can function as promoting the interests of the Species by effecting the coordination of its Members.  So, it is not until the arrival of a concept like Evolutionism, the subject of which is a Species, that the value of Kant's discovery of the Community/Reciprocity category can fully emerge.