Thursday, June 30, 2016

Vegetative Psyche and Sexuality

The three traditional divisions of the human Psyche can be conceived as interacting as follows--the Vegetative reproduces Life, e. g. replacement cells, the Locomotive secures the means to that reproduction when not immediately available, e. g. walking to where food can be gotten, and the Calculative determines the best means to that end.  Accordingly, the Vegetative is the primary motivator of behavior.  Now, Aristotle classifies sexual reproduction as Nutritive, i. e. his Vegetative, and, so, might accept Freud's concept of it as a fundamental Psychological principle.  However, granting that, the Aristotelian challenge to Freud is to explain the privileging of sexual reproduction over other Vegetative processes, e. g. eating, for which Freud seems to have no clear answer.  One explanation might be that the privileging reflects a general affluence in which the other needs are routinely satisfied, thus exaggerating one that has been long repressed on predominating theological grounds.  That explanation also exposes the distortion involved in Marcuse's reduction of the dehumanization of the worker to the repression of the sex drive.

Wednesday, June 29, 2016

Narcissism and Locomotion

Corresponding to plants, animals, and humans, Aristotle conceives three types of Psyche to be, respectively, Nutritive, Sensitive, and Rational--with the first two sometimes alternatively classified as Vegetative and Animal--in ascending degrees of comprehensiveness, i. e. animal Psyches have both Nutritive and Sensitive parts, and humans, all three.  However, Aristotle overlooks the sensitivity of some plants, e. g. a venus fly-trap, and his rubric 'sensitive' under-represents the other cardinal characteristic in his category--locomotility.  So, the three can be perhaps more distinctively formulated as Vegetative, Locomotive, and Calculative.  Now, one instructive application of this model is to Freud's attempt to conceive and distinguish Primary and Secondary Narcissism.  For, the former, which is constituted by a feeling of apparently paradoxical Ego-Universe unity, is easily explained as a non-paradoxical Vegetative awareness, i. e. in which one is in immediate, dependent, interaction with one's environment, e. g. respiration.  In contrast, Locomotion consists in an independence from the environment that a plant does not enjoy.  So, Secondary Narcissism, in which the Ego splits from the Universe, can likewise be easily explained as a Locomotive awareness.  On that basis, the mere transition from Primary to Secondary is not, in itself, symptomatic of some Psychological disorder, as Freud and Marcuse take it be, a mistake that is avoidable in a broader historical perspective on the history of concepts of the Psyche.

Tuesday, June 28, 2016

Primary Narcissism, Labor, Possession

The peculiarity of Primary Narcissism, which Marcuse does not adequately address, is why an experience of Ego-Universe unity is a variety of 'Narcissism'.  His uncritical acceptance of the rubric preempts a further analysis of the experience into two components.  One is what might be called a Vegetative awareness, namely, an awareness of one's nutritive, respiratory, etc. interaction with one's environment, as contrasted with a Locomotile awareness, namely, that of one's independence from one's environment.  The other is the Narcissistic element--the claiming of one's environment as 'one's own', i. e. asserting possession of it.  Now, the psychological immaturity of this second element is exposed by the Hegelian-Marxist concept of Possession--one's own is one's modification of one's environment, i. e. the effects of one's Labor--a concept that is fundamental to that of Alienation.  So, there is a deep conflict between Primary Narcissism and Socialism, as well as a psychological deficiency of the former, that Marcuse does not even begin to recognize.

Monday, June 27, 2016

Life-Instinct, Labor

A problem with many Vitalist principles, e. g. the Will to Live, is that Living is already entailed in Willing.  But, the problem is more than a merely verbal redundancy; rather, the concept that the formulations typically represent distorts what is concretely a continuum, into a fragmented teleological concatenation, that usually privileges the final stage of the continuum.  Now, Freud's Eros, defined as "life-instinct", similarly distorts Life, since the 'instinct' is already alive.  Hence, one reason why Marcuse has difficulty integrating non-repressive Labor into a society based on Eros is that such Labor is non-alienated, and, as non-alienated, consists in a continuum in which its fruits are the final stage--which cannot be accomodated by a Vitalist principle that inherently ruptures such a continuum into a 'means' and an 'end'.

Sunday, June 26, 2016

Pleasure Principle and Labor

Insofar as Eros is governed by the Pleasure principle, and Labor by the Reality principle, they are mutually antagonistic, a proposition that presupposes the antagonism of the two principles, a premise accepted by both Freud and Marcuse.  However, the Pleasure principle, conceived as gratification-seeking, entails a distinction between gratification and the means to gratification.  Furthermore, the means to gratification, even when simple and virtually immediate, is determined by some causal relation, e. g. even picking a piece of fruit off of a tree, as a means to satisfying hunger, thirst, or taste buds.  Hence, internal to the Pleasure principle is a Reality principle that the external one presupposes.  Likewise, insofar as Labor is defined as any effort to achieve gratification, e. g. reaching to a tree and picking off a piece of fruit, it, too, is presupposed by the Pleasure principle.  Thus, if Marcuse has difficulty integrating Labor into a society governed by Eros, the root of the problem is his and Freud's concept of the Pleasure principle.

Saturday, June 25, 2016

Eros, Play, Labor

Marcuse's aim in Eros and Civilization is to present a Marxist solution to the problems diagnosed in Civilization and its Discontents.  At the heart of the project is the premise that the elimination of alienation from society suffices to eliminate the repression that is the cause of those discontents.  But, in the Freudian model, the object of repression is not Labor, but gratification-seeking Eros.  Thus, in order for his project to cohere, Marcuse needs to connect Eros and Labor, which is problematic in the absence of a demonstration that the latter is inherently Pleasure-seeking, i. e. because otherwise the two are antagonistic.  However, though he does recognize the value of a "play impulse" in an un-discontented society, he does not adequately explore the possibility of it as mediating between Eros and Labor, thereby leaving his project with a significant lacuna.

Friday, June 24, 2016

Play, Sublimation, Labor

Two weaknesses in Marcuse's proposal that Primary Narcissism can be the fundamental Psychic stratum of a Marxist society are: 1. It is not inherently Practical, as has been previously discussed, and 2. Like many of Freud's concepts, it is completely speculative, lacking in evidence, e. g. that a young child indeed has such an early experience.  In contrast, Play is Practical, and is plainly an early childood experience.  Now, on that basis, some important Marxist structures can be developed.  For example, following Freud by conceiving Sublimation as the channeling of primitive energy to socially useful ends, Labor can be conceived as the Sublimation of Play.  Furthermore, as is implicit in the image 'fruits of one's labor', the possibility of the deferral of gratification is not necessarily extrinsic to Labor, e. g. the delay between agricultural sowing and reaping.  But, deferral is not to be confused with substitution, e. g. the payment of a wage to a worker by the owner of the means of production.  Thus, on this analysis, the repressive impact of alienation on Labor is not in either its sublimation or its deferral, as Marcuse seems to suggest, but primarily in the substitution of its gratification.  Now, he does briefly acknowledge the existence of a "play impulse", but without the recognition that Labor is a sublimation of Play, the integration of such an impulse, which can only be part of the Freudian Id, into a traditional Marxist framework is difficult.

Thursday, June 23, 2016

Sublimation, Labor, Narcissism

Marcuse posits the possibility of a healthy mode of Sublimation--when repression of Pleasure-seeking is not a means, in alienated conditions, to greater productivity.  Implicitly, therefore, a healthy Psyche is one not alienated from Labor and its fruits.  Now, entailed in that condition is a recognition of one's modification of one's environment as one's own.  Thus, on that standard Marxist analysis, it is that recognition that is the Psychic foundation of a Socialist society.  Accordingly, Marcuse's positing of Freudian Primary Narcissism is subject to the Marxist criticism that it abstracts from Labor as the fundamental mode of Being-in-the-World, with which even Heidegger might agree, insofar as his concept is essentially a Practical one.

Wednesday, June 22, 2016

Self-Sublimation, Self-Overcoming, Species

Nietzsche's concept of Self-Sublimation is a special case of that of the Will to Power, in its Self-Overcoming mode, in particular.  Such a concept is unthinkable on the basis of the Prudentialism to which Freud subscribes, i. e. of the combination of the Pleasure Principle, and the Reality Principle which re-directs it to acceptable gratifaction.  Notable in this textual sequence--188-9 of Beyond Good and Evil--is one of the rare attributions in Nietzsche's oeuvre of the Will to Power to the development of the species, rather than to the behavior of individual members.

Tuesday, June 21, 2016

Sexuality, Sublimation, Narcissism

Freud's concept of the Sublimation of Sexuality involves all three principles of his concept of the Psyche--the blind gratification-seeking Id, the repressive Superego, and the Ego that diverts the drive to a socially-acceptable gratification.  In contrast, as has been previously discussed, Nietzsche, in #189 of Beyond Good and Evil, attributes all three factors to Sexuality itself, i. e. his Dionysian principle.  Now, a second distinction between the two concepts of Sexuality emerges when the preceding section, #188, is taken into consideration.  For, while for Freud, the drive is internal to an individual, Nietzsche there plainly attributes it, and its self-sublimation, to the species.  From that perspective, therefore, Freud's concept of Sexuality as Pleasure-seeking, is itself already a symptom of Secondary Narcissism, i. e. because it reduces a species-drive to a private experience, a reduction which Marcuse's attempted purification also accepts.

Monday, June 20, 2016

Sublimation and Sexuality

Kaufmann is among those who trace Freud's concept of Sublimation to the phrase "the sex drive sublimated itself into love", from #189 of Beyond Good and Evil.  But, a more detailed comparison exposes more differences than similarities.  To begin with, in Human, All Too Human, #1, Nietzsche plainly states that he is borrowing the term from Chemistry, likely the transition from a solid to a gas, to illustrate the derivation of apparently 'spiritual' concepts, such as altruism, from material sources.  So, his concept of Sublimation is more general than Freud's, e. g. applicable to concept-formation, and not merely to drives. Now, the topic of #189 is how drives can actually be intensified by their brief cessation, e. g. eating and fasting, with sexuality as another example.  But, the significant element in the latter is the "itself", which ascribes the transition to "love" to sexuality itself, not to external forces, suggesting a ruse on the part of the drive.  So, at minimum, Nietzsche's version of Sexuality, unlike Freud's, is hardly blind, and is aware of external forces.  Accordingly, that versatility tends to undermine a more general tracing of Freud's Id-Ego-Superego model to Nietzsche's Dionysian-Apollonian-Socratic trio, primarily because it suggests that the Dionysian, unlike the Id, is the source of the other two.  Thus, Kaufmann's citation, when further explored, more draws attention to the differences between the two concepts of Sublimation and Sexuality, than reveals their similarities.

Sunday, June 19, 2016

Prudentialism, Psychology, Morality

The combination of Pleasure Principle and Reality Principle marks Freud's theory as the variety of Hedonism often called Prudentialism, because in which the 'ought' is internal, i. e. a function of the Superego, is descriptive, not normative.  In other words, the theory reduces Morality to a Psychological function, a rival in that regard, to Aristotelian Eudaemonism, which, instead, locates the 'ought' in the Ego, as a homeostatic balancing function, independent of social relations, as has been previously discussed.  Now, one shortcoming in this reduction of Morality to Psychology is that while it might attribute the Univeralist dimension of Kantian Reason to the Superego, the imperative to treat an other as an end-in-itself does not as easily derive from mere Prudence.  However, the more fundamental problem for the theory is that Freud fails to consider that it itself is the product of his Superego--that such Prudentialism is not a fact, but is an internalized social norm.  That even the stratum of Primary Narcissism might be an expression of Capitalist ideology is a possibilty that Marcuse does not even consider as he takes it for an immutable fact of human nature.

Saturday, June 18, 2016

Primary Narcissism and the Existence of Others

Marcuse's re-connection of an Ego to 'the' universe in Primary Narcissism does not suffice as a bridge to other Egos, only to their outward appearances.  The seemingly unsuperable challenge to such an ambition is that the immediate evidence that would prove the existence of one Subject to another is impossible, for which no hypothesis is an adequate substitute.  However, this standard approach to the problem misconceives it as one of Cognition.  Rather, as Kant and Levinas, among very few, recognize, it is a Moral problem--either one treats another as a subject-in-itself, or one does not, with respect to which conceiving it as an Epistemological problem is an evasion, witting or otherwise.  Likewise, Marcuse's attempt to construct from mere Primary Narcissism a Socialist society, which entails mutual recognition of the Subjectivity of others, is inherently futile.

Friday, June 17, 2016

Intentionality and Ego-in-the-World

Since Marcuse is a student of Heidegger, it might not be surprising if in the Ego-Universe connection of Freud's Primary Narcissism he recognizes the structure of Being-in-the-World.  Nor might it be a coincidence, since, Heidegger's Husserlian Phenomenology is derived from the Intentionality of Brentano, a one-time teacher of Freud.  Intentionality is a variety of Perspectivism, according to which an Object of Consciousness is distinct from the latter, but, as posited by the latter, is also distinct from a physical object.  In other words, the Intentional Object is for-me, and is neither in-me nor in-itself.  But, while Husserl carefully observes the distinction between for-me and in-itself, Heidegger does not.  Most glaring is that his  Being-in-the-World entails a concept of a World that is in-itself, i. e. it should be Being-in-my-World.  More subtle is his conflation of the methodologically proper Being-with-Others, and Being-one-with-Another, the latter of which is abstracted from any Intentional ground.  Such deviations may be of little immediate consequence to Freud, for whom Secondary Narcissism is the focus, but for Marcuse's effort to develop a concept of an integrated society on that of Primary Narcissism, they are significant structural flaws.

Thursday, June 16, 2016

Primary Narcissism, Ego, Universe

According to Freud, Primary Narcissism is constituted by a feeling of "oneness with the universe", only subsequent to which, as a reaction to repression, does there emerge the withdrawal of the Ego, creating an antagonist relation to the world.  However, neither Freud, nor Marcuse, as he develops a vision of an ideal society from it, recognizes the fragmentation implicit in the concept of Primary Narcissism.  What they overlook is that the 'the' in "the universe" is incorrect; rather, it should be 'my'.  In other words, 'the universe' is already an atomized multiverse in this concept, as each Ego is infinitely isolated from each other Ego.  Accordingly, in the absence of a cultivation of an awareness of the existence of similarly Narcissistic Egos, e. g. via Kant's concept of another as an End-in-Itself, the concept of Primary Narcissism does not, contrary to Marcuse's ambition, suffice as a ground of the integrated society that he envisions.

Wednesday, June 15, 2016

Fulfillment: Virtual and Actual

In Freud's concept of the Dream as Wish-Fulfillment, the wish precedes the dream, but the fulfillment is virtual, i. e. an imaginary substitute for actual gratification.  Now, such a concept of gratification is implied in the Marxist critique of Capitalism, e. g. the opiated pleasures of religion, the ersatz satisfactions of demands created by supply-side products, etc.  However, Marcuse's attempt extract a stratum of non-alienated desire from Freud's Psychic model leaves intact a concept of Gratification that does not distinguish Appearance from Reality, i. e. virtual from actual fulfillment.  As a result, the Socialist model that he founds on that stratum retains some vestiges of Capitalism.

Tuesday, June 14, 2016

Dream, Wish-Fulfillment, Virtual Reality Principle

Granting Freud that a dream is an expression of a wish, that it is also fulfilling seems to obtain exclusively in a specific case--in an erotic dream that terminates in emission.  In other words, his concept of a dream as wish-fulfillment conflates 'oneiric' and 'onanistic'.  It also clarifies what constitutes the satisfaction of the Reality Principle--an internally consistent set of images, e. g. there is no essential distinction between an erotic dream and actual coitus, according to this concept of Fulfillment.  Accordingly, a more accurate term might be the Virtual Reality Principle.

Monday, June 13, 2016

Dream, Wish-Fulfillment, Psyche

Implicit in Freud's concept of a dream as wish-fulfillment are the main constituents of his concept of the Psyche--the Id as the source of the wish, the Superego as the source of the taboo of real fulfillment of the wish, and the Ego as the source of the diversion of the wish to a harmless fulfillment.  In turn, from those components, he develops a theory of society, including concepts of civilization, religion, and history.  However, many dreams are merely vague products of a reflux of images from the day's events, in combination with routine physical sleeptime motions.  Accordingly, the generalization of the concept of dream as wish-fulfillment is inadequate, as is, therefore, the system founded on it.

Sunday, June 12, 2016

Dream and Interpretation

On the rare occasions in which it is even briefy possible to examine the content of a dream experience, in evidence are two main components: images, and a description.  Now, usually in dream interpretation, the relation of the images to the description is conceived as mediated by recognition--an image is taken as resembling some other images that are well-defined, and, so, classified as the latter.  However, the images in a dream are actually very unclear and indistinct, which means that recognition cannot explain how they can be easily associated with any other.  So, it is perhaps possible that the images are the products of the terms, not vice versa.  Anyway, at minimum, the classification is problematic, suggesting that the first stage of 'dream interpretation' is the process of image-classification itself, and, thus, that a study of the experience must first explain that stage.  Once that is established, the task of the psychoanalyst is to diagnose the classification, i. e. to explain why one associates those vague images with specific more definite previous ones, an obviously very difficult task.  In any case, what is commonly conceived by 'dream interpretation' is actually an interpretation of an interpretation of some vague images.  For example, the interpretation of 'someone dreaming about a cigar' is, more fundamentally, that of 'someone calling a dream-image a "cigar"'.  One implication of such an analysis is that it renders more implausible a cardinal Freudian thesis that a dream-image might be the product of symbolization, a difficult implication to refute.

Saturday, June 11, 2016

Narcissism and Others

Egoism vs. Altruism is, contrary to common opinion, a false dichotomy, because Self and Other are not mutually exclusive.  Rather, as can be easily verified in ordinary experience, interest is less or more comprehensive, the object of which can range from oneself, to oneself plus one other, to plus several others, etc., as the Utilitarian calculus recognizes.  Freud presupposes that mutual exclusivity in his derivation of Secondary Narcissism from Primary Narcissism: the latter encompasses the entire world, while the scope of the former is the individual Ego detached from the rest of the world.  But, he fails to consider the possibility of degrees of withdrawal obtaining between the two stages, and, therefore, the possibility of a Narcissism that includes interest in at least some others.  Tha

Friday, June 10, 2016

Conscientiousness, Conscience, Ego

One's awareness that one is dreaming is an instance of Conscientiousness, a homeostatic self-monitoring process that is ingredient in all motility but only becomes salient in certain experiences, e. g. when one is learning to do something new, when extraordinary care is required etc.  In contrast, what is usually called Conscience is Conscientiousness in social contexts, i. e. the former is a special case of the latter.  Now, in terms of Freud's Psychic model, while Conscience is a manifestation of the Superego, Conscientiousness is a function of the Ego.  Thus, the Superego is a special case of the Ego, not, as Freud conceives it, a distinct Psychic principle.  The reason he separates them is that he fails to recognize that there is an immediate Ego-awareness of Motility that is more fundamental than that of the Id, e. g. he fails to analyze the Libido as constituted by a sequence of processes, including some rudimentary motility, which cannot be accomplished without the self-monitoring that manifests Conscientiousness.

Thursday, June 9, 2016

Dream, Reflection, Narcissism

According to Freud, a dream is a medium of wish-fulfillment, either literally or symbolically.  However, one problem for that hypothesis is the perhaps most uncanny of dream-experiences--that in which one is aware that one is dreaming, including the variation in which one dreams of waking up.  The problem is two-fold for Freud, since the content does not reduce to an example of wish-fulfillment, and the subject of the awareness requires, at minimum, a modification of his concept of the function of Ego beyond that of mediating between Id and Superego.  It also suggests an inadequacy in his diagnosis of Narcissism.  For, one traditional characterization of the awareness of what one is doing is Reflection, a term which is also commonly used to describe the object of Narcissus' perception in the water.  Accordingly, Narcissism could be diagnosed as a deficient mode of Reflection.

Wednesday, June 8, 2016

Dream, Image, Motion

The sight of a dog's legs moving while it is sleeping sometimes prompts speculation that it is dreaming of running.  Now, two analyses of that speculation are possible--either that the dream imagery is causing the movement of the legs, or the converse.  Underlying the two analyses are two different Psychic models--either motion requires some image to stimulate it, or images are concomitants, in some respect, of motility.  An example of the latter type attributes to the organism an ever-present homeostatic body image, in which an image of running represents a change of position of the legs, compounded with associated images, e. g. a familiar location that becomes the scene of the running.  But, if two accounts of the structure of the dreams of dogs are possible, then, so, too, are they possible for human dreams.  So, one criticism of Freud's method of interpreting dreams is that it arbitrarily presupposes one of two possible models of the Psyche, i. e. the first of the above two.

Tuesday, June 7, 2016

Psyche and Neurosis

In the past century, and especially in the past half-century, thanks to technological development, Neurology has been growing exponentially, as the direct study of the Nerve has become feasible.  As a result, observable chemical and electrical processes has rendered all previous connotations of 'nerves' and 'nervous' obsolete.  Likewise, the current meaning of 'neurosis'--literally, a disorder of a nerve--bears little resemblence to that of its prominent usage a century ago, as is evidenced by the fact the treatment of such disorders is now universally pharmacological, not psychoanalytical.  In other words, Freud's concept of Neurosis, one of the centerpieces of his practice, is not merely obsolete, but is a reflection of a concept of the Psyche which is Phenomenalist, with no neurological correlate, e. g. an Oedipus Complex absent any corresponding neural malfunctioning.

Monday, June 6, 2016

Psyche and Reason

Plato precedes Aristotle in conceiving Reason as the internal organizing principle of the Psyche.  But, while for his successor the concept is instantiated in only a personal Psyche, for Plato, a Polis, as well as its citizens individually, possesses a Psyche.  Now, Kant's innovation is to bridge the two concepts--to conceive oneself as a member of a Rational whole.  However, absent an understanding of that original intra-Psychic structure, and of Plato's dual application of it, Reason can be, and often is, e. g. in Freud's model of the Psyche, posited as confronting the Ego as a hostile alien force, i. e. as part of the Superego.

Sunday, June 5, 2016

Ego, Happiness Principle, Reality Principle

As has been previously discussed, Freud does not consider the possibility that the Ego is fundamentally governed by the Happiness Principle, which seeks internal harmony.  A homeostatic mechanism such as the inner ear is evidence of such a principle, and that one might resist eating unhealthful food shows that repression that is independent of external factors is likewise an internal factor in behavior.  Accordingly, the Reality Principle mediates relations not between the gratification-seeking of the Id and society, but between the latter and the harmony-seeking of the Ego--even the fear of punishment for tabooed wishes is that which might be localized at a different part of the organism than that which would be the site of gratification if unrepressed.  So, if the Id is a threat to Civilization, it is only because of a failure of the Happiness Principle, which could be due to some internal malfunction, or because social conditions render harmonization impossible.

Saturday, June 4, 2016

Ego, Pleasure, Happiness

According to Freud, the Ego functions to coordinate the Pleasure-seeking of the Id with external conditions.  It is, thus, governed by the Reality Principle, with deferral, e. g. sublimation, as its defining characteristic.  However, this model misses a vital function of those of Aristotle and Spinoza, thereby failing to recognize that the Ego is governed by a different principle.  For, in each of those, the equivalent of the Ego primarily seeks, independent of external influences, a harmonization of the manifold of drives of the organism, that can be called Happiness.  In other words, on this account, the Ego is governed by the Happiness Principle, while the Pleasure Principle governs specific Id drives, and, furthermore, the two can be in conflict, e. g. eating some spicy food can gratify the taste buds, but can cause thirst, and/or upset the stomach, thereby disrupting harmony.  The distinction entails that the Id is not unitary, as Freud generally holds, but a manifold, which may be one reason why he does not, or cannot, recognize that the Ego seeks a satisfaction that is different in kind from Pleasure.

Friday, June 3, 2016

Pleasure, Gratification, Stimulation

In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud infers the existence of a Death Drive from behavior that he calls "repetition compulsion".  The pivotal stage in his reasoning is that such behavior is not Pleasure-seeking, but is motivated by "an urge to restore an earlier stage of things".  In turn, he concludes that the ultimate such stage is inorganic existence, i. e. death.  However, his concept of Pleasure preempts the possibility of a different earlier stage.  For, that concept--Gratification--entails that Pleasure can occur at only the end of some behavioral episode, thereby abstracting from the possibility of Pleasure at the outset of an episode, i. e. excitation.  In other words, he fails to consider that Pleasure can also be Stimulation, which, as occurring at an "earlier stage of things", could explain Repetition Compulsion without need of recourse to a Death Drive.

Thursday, June 2, 2016

Pleasure Principle and Death Drive

Freud moves 'beyond the Pleasure Principle' as follows: 1. The Id is governed by a Life-principle; 2. The Life-principle is the Pleasure-Principle; 3. Some behavior seems to seek suffering; 4. Therefore, in addition to a Life-principle, the Id is also governed by a Death Drive.  Now, the staunchest denier of the existence of a Death Drive, Spinoza, would likely reject #2, on the ground that Pleasure is not equivalent to the Life-principle, but is only a representation of it.  However, that still leaves #3 unchallenged, and, from the pursuit of Pain, #4 still follows.  In contrast, the stronger challenge to #2 is that Pleasure and Pain are not merely representations of obective conditions, but are signals that seek the continuation, or the discontinuation, respectively, of an objective condition, e. g. pain that signals that damage to one's hand will occur if one does not move it from a hot surface.  On that account, the seeking of Pain is the seeking of a stimulus, not the seeking of a deteriorating objective condition, and, hence, even if peculiar, is no evidence of a Death-drive.  So, #3 might lead Freud beyond the Pleasure Principle, but necessarily to a Death Drive.

Wednesday, June 1, 2016

Soul, Body, Pleasure

Behavior that Freud characterizes as 'repetition compulsion' convinces him to abandon the thesis that the Id is governed by the Pleasure Principle, since there seems to be no Pleasure involved in it, and to consider it as evidence of a Death Drive.  However, it can also be interpreted as a different vacillation in his theory.  For, Pleasure is a Phenomenon, i. e. an event in Consciousness, so, when taken as unrelated to some physical event, e. g. gratification in eating vs. the addition of vital nutrients to the organism, it is an indication of a Soul-Body split.  In contrast, Repetition Compulsion is strictly physical, and, hence, if taken as a Psychic event, as evidence of a Soul-Body unity, but not that of a 'death drive'.  So, Freud's historically significant, as has been previously discussed, introduction of the latter, may be based on a faulty inference from the apparent absence of Pleasure in some behavior.