Thursday, March 31, 2016

Vision, Enlightenment, Grasp, Empowerment

His words "mirror" and "point of view", and the etymology of his "perspective", are all indications that Leibniz' model of human experience privileges Vision.  So, because of the systematic relation between Vision and Light, that privileging locates the model in the tradition in which Enlightenment is the experiential ideal.  Now, 'concept' and 'comprehension' are etymologically rooted in 'grasp', but, insofar as, as is traditionally the case, they refer to incorporeal operations, their genealogy is ungrounded.  Even Whitehead's 'prehension', which he equates with mere 'feeling', falls short of a distinctive alternative to the traditional model.  In contrast, in Marxism, with its recognition of tool-wielding as the distinguishing characteristic of the human species, and in Darwinism, according to which the human hand is a decisive factor in its evolutionary ascendancy, there are the rudiments of a more radical alternative.  In that model, Grasp supplants Vision as the privileged experience, and, as the image 'the reins of power' suggests, Empowerment supplants Enlightenment as the goal.

Wednesday, March 30, 2016

Grasp and Transcendence

Via Grasp, one has immediate and concrete access to facets of an object that are beyond one's perspective of it, and are within that of another.  Now, according to Leibniz, a Perspective is a "mirror" of the universe.  But, a human can more than mirror the universe--one can change it, as well.  So, Grasp signifies the transcendence of Perspective in two respects--Cognitively and Practically.

Tuesday, March 29, 2016

Grasp, Theory, Practice

Humans are not the only organisms that can grasp objects due to the possession of a thumb that opposes digits, and their grasp is not necessarily as strong as others.  Instead, what is distinctive in the human grasp is its degree of precision, the result of which is that the human hand can more accurately mold itself to the surface of a held object, and can more easily manipulate an object.  In other words, the human grasp is more highly evolved both as a cognition and as as dexterous, i. e. as a mode both of Theory and of Practice.

Monday, March 28, 2016

Grasp and Prehension

While 'grasp' is frequently used in casual conversation to indicate an act of intelligence, perhaps the closest to a rigorous employment of it is Whitehead's 'prehension'.  However, his usage of the term strays from its literal meaning.  For, first, in his system, a 'prehension' is the analogue of a perception in Leibniz' system, the perspectival character of which, as has been previously discussed, can be transcended by an act of grasping.  Second, his misuse of the term is evident in his classification of a 'feeling' as a 'prehension', i. e. to grasp something is more than to merely have contact with it, just as a feeler is not a claw.  In other words, he shares with Leibniz the shortcoming of excluding from his system physiological actions, one of which is Prehension = Grasp.  And, because also thereby excluded is specifically tool-grasping, the terminological imprecision can be interpreted by a Marxist as an expression of Class-prejudice.

Sunday, March 27, 2016

Perspectivism and Grasp

Perspectivism seems to entail that the objects of Perception can inherently be no more than facets of things.  However, plainly transcending that limitation is the act of grasping something, in which it is possible that all the facets of a thing are simultaneously objects of Perception.  Now, a common Experience in which Grasping is fundamental is that which, according to Marx, is the distinctively Human activity--using an implement.  So, a significant limitation of Perspectivism is that it is inadequate to a very basic, and perhaps cardinal, physiological process.

Saturday, March 26, 2016

Species and Mathematics

There is little evidence that entities other than humans possess Mathematical knowledge.  Now, one traditional explanation of that state-of-affairs is that Mathematics is a divine dimension of Reality, the cognition of which requires the kind of Intellect that only humans among created beings possess.  In contrast, according to the Kantian tradition, the latter clause suffices as an explanation, and there are no grounds for positing the independent existence of Mathematical structures the contemplation of which is a mere mirror.  Furthermore, a post-Kantian thesis asserts that those structures are fundamentally quantificational, of profound use in activities from simple enumeration or distribution, to complicated applied Science.  In other words, on that interpretation, Mathematics is specific to the Species, and is Practical, not, as tradition has it, divine and Theoretical.  Leibniz' projection of a Mathematical language that is "universal" in the Species, locates him at the beginning of the transition to the secularization of Mathematics.

Friday, March 25, 2016

Egalitarianism and Species

Debates about Egalitarianism tend to be abstract, and, as has been previously discussed, equivocal.  Perhaps the only case in which the issue is concrete is in the determination of whether or not a transfer from A, who has more of something, to B, who has less of it, is justified.  In other words, Egalitarianism is a sub-topic in the topic of Justice.  Now, most of the arguments in the proto-scenario are familiar, though one that is rarely aired in the U. S., i. e. in disputes over taxation, is that the apparently initial inequality is itself the product of an arbitrary distribution.  But, regardless of the merits of arguments on both sides, they tend to share a fundamental premise--that the locus of the dispute is two individuals.  In contrast, if the locus is, instead, the Species, then the terms are completely transformed, and the uncertainty is merely over which arrangement is better for the Species, one resolution of which is simply that it depends on the circumstances.  In other words, the presumed cardinality of the debate over Egalitarianism is completely dissolved by a re-framing of the usual terms of the debate.

Thursday, March 24, 2016

Egalitarianism, Empowerment, Sympathy, Justice

Given A > B, three ways of equalizing them are 1. Increase B until it reaches A; 2. Decrease A until it reaches B; and 3. Increase B and decrease A until they each reach the average between them.  Examples of them in a social context are, respectively, 1. Empowerment; 2. Sympathy; and 3. Distributive Justice.  In Nietzsche's oeuvre, #1 is occasionally advocated, #2 is a prominent target of criticism, while he sometimes seems to not distinguish between #2 and #3.  In contemporary American politics, assistance to the needy is debated as either #2 or #3, while #1 is rarely considered.  More generally, these equivocations tend to go unrecognized in treatments of Egalitarianism.

Wednesday, March 23, 2016

Empowerment and Sympathy

Empowerment and Sympathy are inversely patterned.  If A sympathizes with B, the former experiences a weakening, i. e. a transition from non-suffering to suffering.  In contrast, if A is empowered by B, the former experiences a strengthening.  Nietzsche's critique of Sympathy, on the basis of the Will to Power, can be summarized by that contrast.

Tuesday, March 22, 2016

Sympathy and Suffering

While Hume, the earlier Smith, and Schopenhauer, are among those who recognize Sympathy as the basis of Morality, the later Smith, Spinoza, Kant, and Nietzsche, are prominent opponents of that principle.  While the primary objection of Spinoza and Kant is that Sympathy is a passive condition, Smith's and Nietzsche's concern is that to share in someone's suffering is to become weaker.  Unaddressed in all seven positions is what the physician understands--suffering needs to be alleviated, not either shared, ignored, or resisted.  So, the prominent opponents of it miss that Sympathy is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of Morality.

Monday, March 21, 2016

Perspectivism, Judgment, Sympathy

Perspectivism entails that every judgment is relative to a point of view.  But, as has been previously discussed, not all judgments are equal, since one can be more comprehensive than another.  It also follows that agreement per se has no objective value.  This is one reason why some Philosophers are suspicious of Sympathy, which is no more than an accord between two perspectives.  Nietzsche's critique of Pity, a response to Schopenhauer's ennoblement of it, expresses that suspicion forcefully--he likens it to succumbing to a disease, the effective treatment of which requires detachment, not sharing.

Sunday, March 20, 2016

Perspective and Secondary Qualities

Leibniz is usually associated with Locke with respect to their debate over the existence of Innate Ideas.  However, their significant differences on that topic have overshadowed at least one area of agreement.  For, Leibniz' attribution of a numerical characteristic to all the objects in the universe is equivalent to Locke's classification of that property as a Primary Quality.  Accordingly, therefore, the constituents of a Leibnizian Perspective correspond to Lockeian Secondary Qualities, entailing one important contrast--while the former are 'for me', the latter are 'in me'.  In other words, while Leibniz personalizes experience, Locke privatizes it, the full implications of which become actualized in Smith's Egoism.

Saturday, March 19, 2016

Perspective and Numerology

Leibniz locates himself at the intersection of what might be called Ontological Numerology and Linguistic Numerology.  According to the former, all existence has a fundamental numerical character, while according to the latter, a language that is fundamentally numerical is at least possible, if not actual, e. g. Hebrew, according to some Kabbalists.  The systematic significance to him of each is that it transcends Monadic Perspective, and, hence, is universal, though, as has been previously discussed, that concept is equivocal for him.  Now, while Ontological Numerology continues to intrigue the popular imagination, and is accepted at face value by Physicists, the critiques of Hume and Kant have exposed the naivete in such credence.  In contrast, the binary code that is the fundamental stratum of Internet content demonstrates, at least to date, the primacy of the Linguistic variety, and establishes the latter as the sole basis of the possible unity of a society of Monads.

Friday, March 18, 2016

Language, Universe, Species

Leibniz speaks of a "universal" language, and of a Monad as a mirror of the "universe".  Now, plainly, 'universe' is equivocal in these formulations.  For, in the latter, it includes all objects of perception, while in the former, its scope is the human species.  But, that its language is exclusive to a species suggests that Kant is correct to propose that the cognitive experience that it expresses is also specific to humans.  On that basis, it is the 'universe' that is the mirror--of the human mind, not vice versa, an inversion that Kant calls "Copernican".  Accordingly, whatever universal society results from universal communication facilitated by a universal language, it is not, as Leibniz seems to suggest, a reflection of a universal creator, but of a principle that is specific to the species.

Thursday, March 17, 2016

Universal Commmunication and Binary Numbers

There is no reference in the Monadology to the role of Communication in the unification of Monads.  But, elsewhere, Leibniz conceives the possibility of a universal language that represents what he posits to be the underlying numerical structure of the universe. Subsequently, under the influence of the I Ching, he develops a binary numerical system.  Now, regardless of the truth of the Pythagorean premise, and he likely could not have foreseen all the details, his vision has been approximately actualized.  For, the basis of the most comprehensive communication medium to date, the Internet, is the binary numerical system, aka "code".

Wednesday, March 16, 2016

Perspectivism, Prospectivism, Common World

Absent Leibniz' premise of a creator of a single universe of which the perspective of each Monad is a unique reflection, there are a plurality of Worlds--one per Monad--but no common World.  However, while that cosmic dissolution might be inherent in a Deity-less Perspectivism, the Practical correlate of the latter--Prospectivism--is not so constrained.  For, it includes the possibility of the construction of a common World, under the guidance of someone with a sufficiently comprehensive range, familiar examples of which include composers and conductors of music, playwrights and directors of theater, and coaches of sports teams.  Furthermore, among the most general of those types are Philosophers and political leaders, with Leibniz among the most visionary of the former, even if he does not quite envision himself as such.

Tuesday, March 15, 2016

Perfection, Complexity, Growth

As has been previously discussed, Leibniz' correlation of his concept of Perfection with that of what can be called a Complex, i. e. a unified multiplicity, has problematic implications for his concept of Deity.  Conversely, his restriction of the concept of Complexity to a Theological context prevents him from considering its Vitalist potential. For example, an Organism is a Whole-Part Complex, and the concept of Growth can be defined as an increase in Complexity, i. e. as a transition from a unified lesser Multiplicity, to a unified greater Multiplicity.  Furthermore, free of the constraint of the inherently maximum Perfection of a Deity, it is Growth that is potentially indefinite.  So, these passages in the Monadology evince a fundamental tension between a visionary Vitalism and a traditional Theology that remains unresolved.

Monday, March 14, 2016

Perfection, Deity, Species

In #58 of the Monadology, Leibniz correlates "as great a variety as possible, but with the greatest possible order", with "as much perfection as possible".  In other words, Perfection entails Unity and Multiplicity.  Now, in #48, he characterizes the perfection found in his deity as "absolute", which implies that a maximum Multiplicity is attained in that being.  However, throughout the work, it is creation which is multiple, and creator which is one.  So, the relation in the system between the latter and Perfection is unclear.  In contrast, because an Organism is the Unity of a Multiplicity, there is no such problem in attributing a degree of Perfection to a divine Organism.  Indeed, insofar as a Species is the unity of its Members, it is more 'perfect', on Leibniz definition, than any absolutely simple deity of theirs.

Sunday, March 13, 2016

Experimental Reason and Dialectical Materialism

Unlike Leibniz' deity, a Species is neither eternal, omniscient, nor omnipotent.  Rather, it is governed by a Will to Grow the success of which is not inevitable.  So, the pattern of its principle is Experimental Reason, e. g. a mutation is a failed attempt to increase complexity, i. e. to Evolve, unless the novelty is effectively integrated into the behavior of an organism.  Thus, Dialectical Materialism is erroneous in two respects.  First, it mis-attibutes Necessity to Growth.  Second, it does not reckon that a Species is subject to factors that are other than internal to it, e. g. even granting that Human history is determined by Class-Conflict, it is also subject to other Dialectics, such as that determining its relation to its environment.

Saturday, March 12, 2016

Species, Unity, Harmony

That a Species is the underlying Unity of its members does not imply that a pre-established harmony obtains in it, for two main reasons.  First, unlike that of Leibniz' deity, the scope of that Unity is not universal, so external factors, e. g. drought, can disrupt internal cohesion, e. g. scarcity can breed conflict.  Second, also unlike that deity, the Species is not eternal, but, rather, is a developing phenomenon, one aspect of which can be improvement in internal organization.  A new Political Philosophy can be the articulation of such an improvement.  In other words, Harmony in the Species is not given, but can be an accomplishment.

Friday, March 11, 2016

How vs. Why There is Something Rather Than Nothing

The answer that Leibniz offers to his question, "Why is there something rather than nothing?, is How, not Why, i. e. it connotes Efficient, rather than Teleological, Causality.  For, he posits the existence of a deity who sets creation in motion, without addressing the chronic Theological problem of a lack of a purpose for a purportedly perfect, self-sufficient entity to do so.  In contrast, a Species can have good reason to generate individuals--insofar as its guiding principle is a Will to Grow, which entails Diversification, a principle that is unattributable to the deity of Leibniz' Theological tradition.  Accordingly, the Unity that underlies the concepts of Perspectivism and interconnectedness in the Monadology is better grounded in a Vitalist adaptation of that system.

Thursday, March 10, 2016

Evil, Harmony, Perspectivism

Leibniz seems to not recognize a significant discrepancy between his proposition that "This is the best of all possible worlds", and his concept of Pre-Established Harmony.  For, according to the former, Evil is actual, but necessary to the maximation of Good, while according to the latter, the positing of its existence is only an expression of an inadequate understanding of the whole.  Correspondingly, Voltaire's criticism is of the former necessity, e. g. the Lisbon earthquake, while a Marxist can detect in the latter analysis a prototypical ideological suppression of the actuality of exploitation.  Furthermore, Leibniz does not seem to recognize that an improvement of the understanding can have implications beyond itself.  For example, in his Perspectivism is entailed the possibility of a modification of actual conduct, i. e. from the treatment of others as antagonists, to that of them as interdependent with one.  That possibility thus refutes the concept of Pre-Established Harmony, because it entails the possibility of a hitherto unestablished Harmony.

Wednesday, March 9, 2016

Monad, Windowless, Mirror, Practice

As has been previously discussed, Perspectivism is distinguished from Subjectivism--while according to the former, one's World is "for me", according to the latter, it is "in me".  Accordingly, a concept of Practice, which entails that of the modification of one's World, and, hence, as has been previously discussed, that of a substratum of the modification, is possible in Perspectivism, but not in Subjectivism.  Now, two of Leibniz' best-known images--the Monad as "windowless", and the Monad as a "mirror" of the universe with which it is interconnected--seem, though he does not recognize the distinction, to exemplify Subjectivism and Perspectivism, respectively.  Thus, if the Monadology has, as has been previously proposed, application to Social theory, it can only be qua the Perspectivist interpretation of the Monad, i. e. the Monad as mirror.

Tuesday, March 8, 2016

Monadology and Society

Leibniz conceives a Monad as essentially connected to and reflecting the entire universe.  Entailed in that concept is that of a Monad as similarly related to an entire Society.  So, an important implication of the concept is that any Monad's perception of its Society is determined by the general conditions that obtain.  Accordingly, for example, the judgment of each member of a Society is adversely affected by a pervasive dysfunction, as Marxists, notably, recognize.  Similarly, on a Monadological basis, an Atomist denial of essential interrelatedness, a fundamental tenet in Capitalism, is itself an expression of a pervasive disassociation.

Monday, March 7, 2016

Perspectivism, Monadology, Organism

Perspectivism has its roots in #57 of the Monadology, a work which has been more admired than influential.  Resistance to embracing it may reflect a pervasive Atomism, which Leibniz repudiates in #56, by positing the fundamental interrelatedness of all created beings.  However, the unity that grounds that interrelatedness is not some comprehensive living being, but a discrete creator.  Likewise, even though Whitehead characterizes the system as a "Philosophy of Organism", he does not extend the classification of Organism from Monads to some more comprehensive living being, e. g. to the Species, thereby preserving a recalcitrant Atomist dimension.

Sunday, March 6, 2016

Perspectives, Worlds, Society

Through Reflection, one can enlarge one's knowledge of a situation, thereby increasing the possibility of efficacy in action.  Furthermore, one can learn that one's Perspective is a Perspective, which can be generalized to the awareness that each other that appears in one's world is themselves a focal point of their world, in which one appears.  Now, there seem to be three general conditions between Worlds--harmony, conflict, and dissociation, each of which can often be easily recognized when it occurs.  But, Political Philosophy, if not Metaphysics, tends to go further, and to posit that one of the three is the fundamental condition of Society, e. g. Leibniz and Rousseau, Hobbes, and Smith, respectively.  But, regardless of their differences, an implication common to three is that factors within a Perspective are determined by and are expressions of a general condtion, e. g.  a personal dislike by a general discord, in contrast with the Atomistic denial of any such general condition, a denial which can itself be analyzed as an expression of a general condition of dissociation.

Saturday, March 5, 2016

Perspectivism, Subjectivism, Practice

Practice is the modification of a World.  A Prospect is a concept of a modification of my World.  Now, the concept of Modification entails that of a Substratum.  But, as Kant shows, Subjectivism, e. g. Hume's 'bundle of perceptions', has no concept of a Substratum.  Hence, a significant advantage of Perspectivism over Subjectivism, as rival alternatives to Epistemological Realism, is that it has a Practical correlate.

Friday, March 4, 2016

Truth, Comprehensiveness, Practice,

The value of the Comprehensiveness Theory of Truth can be discerned in a Practical context--when Cognition is implicated in Action, and a Perspect is a Prospect.  In that context, Truth is an essential part of the determination of Efficacy, and of the calculation of consequences.  In other words, the more comprehensive the knowledge of the pre-conditions of a projected action, the more likely its success.  Furthermore, as is the case with Perspectives, Prospectives can be mutually relative, thereby requiring a concept of Truth that can entail dependent variables.  The reasoning involved in the Prisoner's Dilemma, for example, recognizes a Comprehensiveness Theory of Truth.

Thursday, March 3, 2016

Perspectivism and Truth

According to what is probably the most common theory of Truth, the Correspondence Theory, Truth is a relation between a Proposition and some object.  In contrast, according to the most prominent rival, the Coherence Theory, Truth is a relation among a set of Propositions.  But, neither is suitable for Perspectivism.  For, each entails an independence, from an object of cognition, of an act of cognition expressed by a relevant Proposition, while according to Perspectivism, a cognition is inherently relative to its object.  However, it does not follow that Perspectivism agrees with Subjectivism that propositions cannot be objectively evaluated.  For, as the comparison of 'The sun crosses the sky from East to West' and 'The Earth spins from West to East' shows, one proposition can be truer than another because more comprehensive, including social judgments.  So, appropriate to Perspectivism is what can be called the Comprehensiveness Theory, which entails the possibility of greater and lesser Truth.

Wednesday, March 2, 2016

Perspectivism and Subjectivism

Phenomenalism can be classified as 'Subjectivist', since it conceives the elements of Experience to be fundamentally private and detached from any external correlates.  Thus, it is not be confused with Perspectivism, according to which Experience is fundamentally relational with an external world and its objects.  Another distinction between the two is that while, as has been previously discussed, a Perspective, and the propositions that express it, are mutable, the elements of Subjectivism can be fixed and unassailable, e. g. a dislike of broccoli.  So, a significant confusion is when a Social relation is interpreted Sujectivistically, rather than Perspectivistically, thereby immunizing judgments that express it from criticism, and preempting the possibility of modification. The likening of ethnic hate to a dislike of broccoli is an example of such a confusion, one that only perpetuates the former.

Tuesday, March 1, 2016

Perspective and Reflection

From a position within a train, the perception of a train that remains constantly alongside it in itself gives no clue as to whether or not one's train is moving.  But, from a distance, that each train is moving, or not, can be perceived.  Likewise, one can increase Self-Knowledge by enlarging one's Perspective to include an initial focal point, e. g. from the perception of people walking around, to the perception that one is sitting on a bench watching people walk around, to the perception that one is sitting on a bench in the middle of a park watching people walk around, etc.  Now, the term for this mundane concrete enlargement of Perspective is 'Reflection', and the examples illustrate how Philosophers have mystified the concept over the centuries.  For some, Reflection arrives at an absolute position, while for others, it opens up an infinite empty regress. But each variety abstracts from concrete experience, and devalues Education, in which Reflection can enlarge Perspective, thereby increasing Self-Knowledge.