Language, Universe, Species

Leibniz speaks of a "universal" language, and of a Monad as a mirror of the "universe".  Now, plainly, 'universe' is equivocal in these formulations.  For, in the latter, it includes all objects of perception, while in the former, its scope is the human species.  But, that its language is exclusive to a species suggests that Kant is correct to propose that the cognitive experience that it expresses is also specific to humans.  On that basis, it is the 'universe' that is the mirror--of the human mind, not vice versa, an inversion that Kant calls "Copernican".  Accordingly, whatever universal society results from universal communication facilitated by a universal language, it is not, as Leibniz seems to suggest, a reflection of a universal creator, but of a principle that is specific to the species.