Evaluation, Description, Master Morality, Slave Morality

As has been previously discussed, Nietzsche's development of the 'Master'-'Slave' distinction is complicated by some problematic psychological and sociological suppositions.  Instead, a simpler derivation of those classifications can be based on the Evaluation-Description distinction.  For, the thesis that normative language is fundamentally descriptive casts a value-term as dependent on its object, and, so, functions as a 'slave' with respect to the latter.  In contrast, the thesis that such language is fundamentally evaluative casts a value-term as determining its object, and, so, functions as a 'master' with respect to the latter.  Accordingly, classical Zoroastrianism, Manicheanism, Platonism, and Christianity--the main targets of Nietzsche's Revaluation--are all 'Slave' Moralities, while Zarathustra's Will to Power is a 'Master' doctrine, and, perhaps, one of 'Self-Mastery', as well.  Thus, even though Slave Morality is logically opposed to Master Morality, the proper evaluation of it in terms of the latter is as 'worse than' it, not as 'bad' simpliciter.  So, this alternative derivation can also more clearly formulate a distinction that elevates Nietzsche's doctrine above the Ressentiment of Opposition--that between 1. describing the difference between Master and Slave Moralities, and 2. evaluatively contrasting them.