Axiology and Comparison

Nietzsche's distinction between a Whence and a Whither, which he draws in his analysis of Volition in Beyond Good and Evil #19, implies that among the rejected alternatives to a chosen Whither are not only competing Whithers, but their common Whence, as well.  In other words, that choice always entails the evaluation that the Whither is 'better than' its Whence.  On that basis, the traditional attribution of a one-place value-term, e. g. 'is good', to a volition always falsifies the latter, by abstracting from its Whence.  furthermore, a volition judged to be 'unconditionally good' is no exception--such an evaluation means, more accurately, 'better than any Whence'.  In contrast, an apparent counter-example that actually affirms the analysis is Spinoza's doctrine, in which 'good' and 'bad' denote an increase and a decrease, respectively, in strength, and, hence, implicitly compare a Whither to a Whence.  More generally, because any Experience consists in a Whence-Whither span, the Axiology that is appropriate to it is one of Comparison, if Nietzsche's analysis is correct.