Evaluation and Description

Platonism does not necessarily oppose the thesis that Axiology is fundamentally comparative--it simply holds that expressions in which one-place terms, such as 'good', 'true', and 'beautiful', are predicates, are descriptions, not evaluations.  However, that classification is challenged to explain how or why the cognition of such properties even comes to verbal formulation to begin with.  Platonism thus has difficulty accounting for the dimension of Judgment that Kant discerns in the Aesthetic variety, and is generalizable to all Evaluation--the communication of some recommendation or another.  But, such communication includes, as has been argued, value-terms that are essentially comparative, e. g. 'X is beautiful' is a species of 'It is better to experience X than not'.  Accordingly, Platonism lacks the grounds for classifying the expressions 'X is good', 'X is true', and 'X is beautiful' as 'descriptions'.