Purpose, Causality, Means

In # 65 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant suggests that the Efficient-Teleological contrast of Causalities be recast as Real-Ideal.  Though he does not cite it, one reason that he might prefer the latter is that his revision of the tradition concept of Teleological Cause eliminates one of its fundamental differences with that of Efficient Cause, which is that in the former, the 'Cause' terminates a sequence, while, in the latter, it initiates one.  In contrast, an 'ideal' cause', like not only a 'real' cause, but every other Cause in his system, initiates a sequence.  Now, one awkward consequence of this revision is that it leaves little room for the traditional concept of 'means'.  For, if a 'purpose' is both a concept of an effect and its cause, then it also functions as a means to that effect, as well, in which case his characterization of each part of an Organism as both a "purpose" and a "means" is trivial.  Perhaps, he might accept this modification of the concept of Purpose--'an effect that is represented as part of a sequence which is the execution of the representation of the sequence'.  Still, the potential difficulty for him in that modification is that it is the representation of the entire sequence, e. g. a maxim, that is the cause of the entire sequence, so there is no direct causal connection between the represented effect and the actual effect.  Thus, his attempt to conceive Purpose as isomorphic to the concept of Mechanical Causality remains problematic for his study of Teleology.