Nature as a Moral Phenomenon

Kant's concept of Nature as a purposive system is the correlate of Reflective Judgment as the link between Understanding and Reason.  However, Reason is more than a faculty of Purposes--it is, in his doctrine, the source of his concept of the Highest Good, which entails the existence of a God that rewards Virtue.  Hence, the fully developed concept of Nature, as the correlate of the link between Understanding and Reason, is as a Moral phenomenon--in which, i. e. Happiness is interpreted as a divine reward, and, analogously, Unhappiness is interpreted as a divine punishment--and, hence, as a Theological phenomenon, as well.  Now, a significant influence on Spinoza's critique of Teleological Reason is that he conceives it as a breeding ground of superstition.  Likewise, Kant's attribution of Teleological Reason to Reflective Judgment is an opportunity to similarly debunk any interpretation, in conventional Morality, of the events of Happiness and Unhappiness as Theologically significant, i. e. to expose it as the superstitious product of mistaking a Reflective Judgment for a Determinative Judgment, i. e. of mistaking a heuristic fiction for objective fact.  However, his ambition to reinforce conventional Morality, and its implicit Theological premises, results in a squandering of that opportunity.