Perception, Event, Copernican Revolution

For Kant's modern predecessors, perception is at least partly mediated by subjective conditions.  So, his concept of perceptual object as mediated by subjective processes, is not a radical innovation.  Rather, his distinctive contribution to the tradition is the temporalization of those subjective conditions, yielding, via the Schematism, essentially temporal objects of perception.  In more contemporary jargon, perceptual objects are, on his model, fundamentally events, not substances, or qualities, as they generally are for both his modern and ancient predecessors.  For example, what is traditionally rendered as 'A perceives B', with 'B' either a substance or a quality, is, according to Kant, derived from a more fundamental 'A perceives that S is P', with 'S' some relatively enduring feature, 'P' some relatively ephemeral feature, and one or the other = 'B'.  So, one of the expressions of his 'Copernican revolution' is a transition to an event ontology, from the more traditional substance or quality ontology.