Wednesday, July 28, 2010

Ontology and Questioning

Being and Time and Being and Nothingness both begin with a discussion of the process of Questioning, each preparatory to their respective introductory analyses of the 'question of Being'. Each treatment is surprisingly generic--their similar characterizations of Questioning as a transition from indeterminacy to determinacy can be found in, for example, Dewey's definition of 'Inquiry'. Specifically lacking in both is an Ontological account of Questioning, of the caliber of the painstaking derivations to which both submit other activities, e. g. Heidegger's 'Being of Understanding'. In Heidegger's case, Dasein's fundamental experience of Being is the awareness of the call of conscience. Hence, the Questioning of Being can only be a phase or mode of a response to that call, for, otherwise the absence of Being cannot be experienced as questionable at all, and can never arise as an object of inquiry. Furthermore, the answering of the question of Being, i. e. the arrival at an understanding of Being, can be achieved only insofar as Being becomes revealed, not insofar as it is discovered, just as the perception of a dawning sun is not the result of a search for it that had begun at midnight. In other words, in Heidegger's Ontological scheme, the Questioning of Being cannot be more than an ontical process which, upon completion, is revealed, in hindsight to have been a misinterpreted response to the call of Being. As for Sartre, his initial Questioning of Being is eventually revealed to have abstracted from a preceding phase, namely the becoming-questionable of Being. For, his eventual presentation of Being-for-itself, as the negation of Being-in-itself, demonstrates that the former intrinsically renders the latter questionable. In other words, the Questioning of Being is, in his scheme, more precisely, the perpetually recurrent fundamental structure of the relation between Being-for-itself and Being-in-itself. As such, it is a transition not from indeterminacy to determinacy, but, to the contrary, from the determinacy of Being-in-itself to the indeterminacy of Being-for-itself. More than either of these two Ontologists explicitly do, Deleuze accords Ontological status to Questioning, though he seems to attribute to Heidegger what is actually Sartre's position.

8 comments:

  1. Plato, "Sophist"

    STRANGER: These then are the two kinds of image-making—the art of making likenesses, and phantastic or the art of making appearances?

    THEAETETUS: True.

    STRANGER: I was doubtful before in which of them I should place the Sophist, nor am I even now able to see clearly; verily he is a wonderful and inscrutable creature. And now in the cleverest manner he has got into an impossible place.

    THEAETETUS: Yes, he has.

    STRANGER: Do you speak advisedly, or are you carried away at the moment by the habit of assenting into giving a hasty answer?

    THEAETETUS: May I ask to what you are referring?

    STRANGER: My dear friend, we are engaged in a very difficult speculation—there can be no doubt of that; for how a thing can appear and seem, and not be, or how a man can say a thing which is not true, has always been and still remains a very perplexing question. Can any one say or think that falsehood really exists, and avoid being caught in a contradiction? Indeed, Theaetetus, the task is a difficult one.

    THEAETETUS: Why?

    STRANGER: He who says that falsehood exists has the audacity to assert the being of not-being; for this is implied in the possibility of falsehood. But, my boy, in the days when I was a boy, the great Parmenides protested against this doctrine, and to the end of his life he continued to inculcate the same lesson—always repeating both in verse and out of verse:

    'Keep your mind from this way of enquiry, for never will you show that not-being is.'

    Such is his testimony, which is confirmed by the very expression when sifted a little.

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  2. Sartre often repeated, "Human reality is what it is not, and it is not what it is."

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  3. What do either of these comments have to do with the content of what was posted? In your own words.

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  4. Sartre is Plato's ever elusive "sophist". Nothing more. Nothing less.

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  5. Sartre thinks he's an ontologist, but he doesn't get it, he's a Cartesian.

    That was the best use of an excerpt from The Sophist in a blog post comment, ever.

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  6. But, the fact is that the excerpt from the Sophist has no bearing on the posting. The topic of the posting is a comparison between Sartre and Heidegger on the structure of 'questioning', one which Deleuze has commented on. What Plato may or may not have said, and how somebody may or may not interpret what he said, is completely irrelevant to the content of the posting.

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  7. The original Nature of Being is irrelevant?

    If you say so...

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  8. Heidegger's densest (500+ pages) lecture course in his career was on The Sophist, so what Plato wrote might have some connection to Heidegger's concerns.

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