Friday, July 23, 2010
Heidegger, Nihilism, and Nominalism
Heidegger's early work on Duns Scotus is a clue that the real locus of his analysis of Nihilism is the 'Realism' vs. 'Nominalism' debate. The former holds that Platonic Forms are self-subsistent entities, while the latter holds that they are only abstractive words. Heidegger's innovation is to radicalize the Realist position--just as visibility precedes the appearance of even the sun, Being is the precondition that permits the revelation of the Forms, even that of the Form of Being. In other words, even Platonic Realism has already strayed from original Being, and on this definition of Being, Nominalism, according to which 'Being' is only a word, is an extreme deviation from original Being. Given the Being-Nothing antithesis, Nominalism is, hence, Nihilism, on this account. Accordingly, since Nietzsche is an unabashed Nominalist, he is a Nihilist, from this perspective. However, Nominalism is as old as Greek Scepticism, so Heidegger's 'History of the forgetting of Being', that leads to Nietzsche, is an irrelevant contrivance in the charge that Nietzsche is a Nihilist. Equally irrelevant are any of Nietzsche's main doctrines--Will to Power, Eternal Recurrence, and, especially, his own diagnosis of Nihilism. So, Heidegger's treatment of Nihilism compromises his own insights, by what is likely an attempt to pander to his political environment.
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Visibility didn't precede the existence of the sun. The sun allowed the sense organs we call "eyes", hence "visibility" itself, to evolve. Vision/visibility would not have evolved w/o it.
ReplyDeleteIn Plato's scheme, "being" resides at the intersection of the class of the infinite w/the class of the finite in the present moment... where the two "spheres" touch (think Ven Diagram). This is how we come to live a "mixed" existence (per Plato's "Phaedrus").
And it isn't Being or "nothing" w/Plato, it's a more "Shakespearian (think "Hamlet") Being or "not-Being" (Sophist).
ps - I may not agree w/you as to your conclusion vis a vis Nietzsche's doctrines, but I do agree that Heidegger likely pandered to his readers and their political environment.
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ReplyDeleteHeidegger would probably agree that Being is responsible for the capacity of beings to perceive the Form of Being, so to that extent, your elaboration of the nature of 'visibility' seems aptin the context. Since my focus in this posting is on how Nominalism strays from that revelation, I thought that only a brief account of Heidegger's radicalization sufficed to make the point.
ReplyDeleteMy reference to the Sophist was casual, at best. A forthcoming posting on Being and Nothingness will emphasize the contrast of my concern here with the Hamlet dichotomy.
Note that in the piece, Philosophy in the Age of Greek Tragedy, Nietzsche's classification is not 'The Pre-Socratics', as it is commonly taken to be, but 'The Pre-Platonists', i. e. he includes Socrates in the era that includes Thales, etc.
...that's not exactly what he says about Socrates in Twilight of the Idols...the "Problem of Socrates".
ReplyDeleteBut that is what he says elsewhere. Once again, there can be a problem with taking what he says out of context.
ReplyDeleteIndeed, as Nietzsche's reason for separating out Plato from Socrates and the other Pre-Socratics was due to the fact that Plato was not a "pure" strain of original Hellenic thought in philosophy, but one that sought to reconcile the strains of his predecessors. This doesn't mean, however, that Plato "corrupted" the Parmenidean concept of Being in the course of his writing.
ReplyDeletefrom Wikipedia:
In the Way of Truth, Parmenides presented his ontology: a real being is timeless, immobile, immutable, permanent, unborn, imperishable, one, and whole. Parmenides did not discuss what that was, which exists permanently, but highlighted the fact of existence as the truth.
There is only one other description of the way remaining, namely, that What Is. To this way there are very many sign-posts: that Being has no coming-into-being and no destruction, for it is whole of limb, without motion, and without end. And it never Was, nor Will be, because it Is now, a Whole all together, One, continuous; for what creation of it will you look for?
One should both say and think that Being Is; for To Be is possible, and Nothingness is not possible.
...and since Nothingness is not possible, the antithesis of Being would be "Not-Being" ie - Heraclitian reality?
I'm not sure what you are referring to by "That doesn't mean. . ." I never made any such assertion. My own general interests are only to emphasize a distinction between Plato and Socrates, which, as I have contended in a previous posting, Nietzsche himself obscures in Birth of Tragedy, and which he may continue to be causal about in other places. On the other hand, Heidegger seems to believe that Plato has reified an original Parmenidean insight. Whether or not he is correct in that belief does not seem to matter to his 'History of the forgetting of Being', nor to my challenge to it.
ReplyDeleteAs I mentioned previously, Plato is not my go-to guy on the topics of Nothingness, not-being etc. As some earlier postings should indicate, I keep my own counsel on these, and some other questions.
...and I'm not really up on and into Heidegger and the later Existentialists, so perhaps I'd best hold my tongue and listen to someone like yourself who is interested in their arguments.
ReplyDeletePlease forgive my intrusion and continue making your argument. You seem to be on a roll, and perhaps if I let you finish, my question as to the relevance of the question on the forgetting of Being will be answered.
Familiarity with those Existentialists can enhance one's understanding of what it means to 'think for oneself'.
ReplyDeleteI originally brought up Heidegger's issue regarding the forgetting of Being primarily to expose its inadequacy as a critique of Nietzsche's theory of Nihilism. I'm satisfied for the moment that I've accomplished that, so I'm moving on to other topics. If there is a loose end, I can't see what it is, so you might reiterate your point.
Familiarity with those Existentialists can enhance one's understanding of what it means to 'think for oneself'.
ReplyDeleteAs can familiarity with Neurology and the new Neurophilosophers.
If there is a loose end, I can't see what it is, so you might reiterate your point.
Sure. Nietzsche turned ontology into a moot point, so who cares what Heidegger thought about the subject? After Nietzsche destroyed the concept, all Heidegger tried to do was re-define it, and not very well if you can believe his critics.
First point--you have previously asserted that detailed Philosophical explanations discourage 'thinking for oneself'. I'm wondering what notion of 'thinking for oneself' is the basis of that assertion.
ReplyDeleteSecond point--I did answer this, and to repeat, a lot of people continue to care what Heidegger said, and I continue to care about some of the mischief that that has entailed, even if you don't.
My notion of thinking for yourself:
ReplyDeletePlato and Nietzsche use this educational device — provoking the reader through the presentation of opposed arguments, and leaving the contradiction unresolved. They write works whose principal aim is the presentation of unresolved difficulties. Puzzling the reader is their chief aim and one should not overlook the fact that there is some substantive theory-construction in their work. Only by solving the puzzle can one derive the intended message underlying the dialogue or aphorism. Think of a "paradox" whose resolution explains the behavior of the character in the dialogue. And resolution of each paradox leads to deeper understandings and "revelations" that a less esoteric reading would overlook. And yes, I'm a Straussian of sorts.
This here's a powerful blog. Have you read Gillespie's Theological Origins of Modernity?
ReplyDeleteIt is my hunch that phenomenology is the only ray of light in the enlightenment, which was overall an endarkenment. The Catholic use of it in Stein, Scheler, Wojtila, shows perhaps that it is a continuation of Augustine all along.