Friday, July 31, 2009

Exposition

One of the complementary legacies of the Aristotelian position that in itself, Body is inert Matter, is that Body is Potential that requires some Purpose to activate it. It might not have been until the 19th century that a serious challenge to this presumption appeared. Two challenges, in fact, from perhaps the most acute of introspectors, Nietzsche and William James. Both, from slightly different perspectives, argued that in at least some cases, what transpires is not that some goal motivates one to physically move, i. e. to secure the goal, but, to the contrary, some goal is chosen, in order to simply move. Even one example of the latter suffices to evince the fundamental independence of motility. So, it must be insisted that the Individual Material Principle here be taken as not entailing some destination. I am calling that Principle 'Exposition', a term which has several common connotations, and a few more obscure ones, none of which, for the most part, fail to approximate this technical one. The most literal meaning of the word is 'putting out', with respect to which 'setting forth' is unproblematically interchangeable. A more obscure usage, 'leaving unprotected' captures an essential dimension, that will become clearer when I elaborate on the relation of Exposition to the Formal Principle, Appropriation. On the other hand, 'exposition', meaning 'displaying', implicitly entails the presence of an experiencer of the displaying. That implication, while inarguably common in practice, is extrinsic to the technical connotation, as can be gleaned from its contrast with mere 'leaving unprotected', in which that which is exposited is, as is, left unclaimed. So, 'putting out' is to be understood as a process that has a definite point of departure, but is thereafter indefinite. Just as Becoming-Diverse is also a becoming-indefinite, so too is its Individual correlate, Exposition, and one of the fundamental experiential examples of the latter, motility.

Thursday, July 30, 2009

The Two Principles of Individuality

In the Aristotelian system, the Essence of something--'what' it is--is ultimately derived from the thing's Purpose, in accordance with which a Form is imposed on inert Matter. In contrast, in Formaterialism, the Essence of anything is the particular way that the Formal Principle--Becoming-the-Same, and the Material Principle--Becoming-Diverse, combine, there being infinite possible ways they can combine. Now, Individuality is achieved with the awareness of one's own Particularity qua Particularity. This insight is not merely a passive experience (as, notably, Spinoza seems to have it, but a recombination of the two Principles, effecting a transformative activaation, as well (which could be read into Spinoza, if his Political theory were taken as a continuation of his Ethics). One distinctive characteristic of this transformation is the establishment of an Inside and an Outside with respect to the entity. So, a type of Becoming-Diverse that seems distinctive of an Individual is a process of Externalization, and, likewise, that of Becoming-the-Same is a process of Internalization. More precisely, I am calling the Material Principle of an Individual 'Exposition', and its Formal Principle, 'Appropriation', both to be considered as dynamic. I will henceforth be explaining these in more detail.

Wednesday, July 29, 2009

The Individual Human System

As a System, the human Individual entails a Formal Principle and a Material Principle. The main traditional dualisms are unsatisfactory to serve in those capacities. To begin with, in Aristotle's Soul-Body pair, Body repeats the problem with Aristotelian 'Matter' in general, that it is no more than inert stuff that requires a separate principle to activate. As such, it only encourages an interpretation which Aristotle insists he does not subscribe to--a separation that is not merely analytical, but is ontological, of Body from Soul, such as some Medieval theologians attempted to foist on him. Plus, the legacy of inert corporeality persisted even into the Modern era, for example, in Descartes' Mind-Body duality, in which the latter's property of 'Extension' appears as an accomplished fact, not a dynamic process. Furthermore, as I have once informally discussed, the Mind-Body pair is an abstraction from a more fundamental duality that cuts across both of those parts. The organism's efferential and afferential processes are both part 'mental' and part 'physical'. The efferential begins with a 'mental' moment of willing that activates the 'physical' limbs, while the afferential begins with the 'physical' sense organs, terminating in 'mental' consciousness. Also, there been other pairs of concepts that have traditionally been associated with the Individual, but which have rarely been developed as systematically binary. One is Freedom and Responsibility, the relation between which actually roughly corresponds to the Efferential-Afferential. And, their systematization famously posited, but never developed with respect to the Individual, is the Practical-Theoretical, in the Kantian sense, combination. The Material-Formal pair that I will present will crystallize what is common to all these tandems.

Tuesday, July 28, 2009

Mutable Individuality

I have coined the term 'Idionomic', meaning 'self-ruling', to distinguish it from the more familiar 'Autonomic'', which means the same thing, but which Kant has put to a different use, with respect to which I will eventually be presenting a crucial contrast. Now, when I assert that the Idionomic stage of Individuality is the most greatly developed of the four stages, I do not mean to imply that the independence attained there is unqualified. For the Individuality of a System in some respects does not preclude that it is a sub-System in others. That is, to whatever extent an Individual human is still a part of Nature, of organic nature, of the animal kingdom, and of the human race, it is subject to the extant laws governing those realms--gravitational, chemical, metabolic, etc. With respect to the human race, how much species instinct governs one's behavior is unknown. For example, Spinoza has argued that one's apparent freedom of physical movement is as illusory as an ant's on a solo assignment might be. But the key question is not whether Spinoza's speculation is correct, but whether or not one's actual subjection to laws is immutable. For example, in a situation in which one becomes sexually aroused by someone to whom they are not married, one common response is a belief that such thoughts are Evil and that they will be punished. Such a response would qualify as 'Conventional' in the scheme that I have presented. An 'Unconventional' response might be to pursue satisfaction BECAUSE some authority has judged that to be 'Evil'. A third response is the understanding that sexual pleasure is Nature's way of 'tricking' humans to procreate, as Schopenhauer has put it, the impersonal nature of which understanding potentially neutralizing the arousal. Finally, there can be not merely that general understanding, but also some specific knowledge, from past experience, regarding the dynamics of one's own sexual chemistry, which can open up a variety of possible responses to the situation. So, this one example demonstrates that the degree of subjection of an Individual to a general law is not fixed. And, while it might be protested that there are still plenty of inviolable conditions in effect, it should be noted that a human's living with artificial assistance on the moon is about as 'impossible' as it would have seemed for a fish billions of years ago being able to breath out of water. But, sufficient for the moment, is to the extent that there are in fact such laws in effect, Individuality is qualified.

Monday, July 27, 2009

A History of Individuality

The four-stage account of the Individual that I presented yesterday also recapitulates, very informally, a history of the Philosophical concept of Individuality. In some of its earliest manifestations, especially in ideologies often characterized as 'Eastern', Individuality is treated as a transgression that needs to be overcome, e. g. through the reabsorption of the particular into the totality. The Socratic tradition pioneers the second stage, notably with Socrates' assertion that 'I know only that I do not know'. 'Medieval' Philosophy is generally a reactionary regression to the first stage. So, Modern Philosophy is truly a Renaissance, because of its recovery of the anti-conventional Socratic spirit, in the guise of methodical Scepticism, pre-eminently from Descartes and Hume. Kant marks an advance to the third stage, a transition from independence in the negative sense to one with a positive connotation. However, his paradoxical notion of 'Autonomy'--at bottom, the free choice of one's master--was unsatisfactory enough to breed a further search for pure Individuality, with the 'Existentialists'. But the most innovative of those efforts are still compromised. Nietzsche advances an Individualist ethos, while still tied to a commitment, in his neo-Schopenhauerian Dionysianism, to a doctrine of the illusoriness of Individuality. Heidegger presents an Individualistic concept of Conscience, only to swallow up the Individual in Being. And Sartre's Individualistic 'Being-for-itself' is at bottom only a 'flight' from Being, without its own intrinsic character. The general Philosophical problem has always been to account for Individuality within a System, which by definition, is a larger scheme that includes everything, and the specific problem has been to arrive at a purely Individualistic notion of Form. I believe that what I will be developing henceforth solves those problems.

Sunday, July 26, 2009

The Development of Individuality

The Evolvement of the human species entails its Diversification, starting with the differentiation into various physical types at various locations. At its ultimate, Diversification is the development of Individuals, and, once again, I am reserving 'individual' for its literal meaning, 'undivided', and 'particular' for its common usage, i. e. 'separate', for reasons that I can better explain below. There are four main stages of development of Individuality. First, is the 'Conventional' one, in which one's conduct is guided by unconditional submission to an authority figure, parent, boss, clergyman, god, cultural icon, institution, etc. The second is the 'Unconventional' stage, in which one is a general 'rebel without a cause'. Third, following the Kantian terminology, is the 'Autonomic' stage, in which one submits to a freely chosen image of authority, e. g. Kant chose the image of a 'Rational being'. Finally, there is the 'Idionomic' stage, in which one's conduct is a development from what one has become. The latter, the fully Individual stage, is what I will be elaborating on in future posts. For the moment, to examine the earlier stages, they are all healthy insofar as they are provisional, put as ends-in-themselves, they are stunted. The first one, all-to-prevalent in current society, is plainly antithetical to the ideal of a free society. But the second one is the more problematic one, because its seeming independence is deceptive, a deception that is reinforced by the terminological problem that I have repeatedly alluded to. Someone who is, in principle, 'unconventional', lacks true independence from convention, because they still define themselves in terms of what they are trying to distance themselves from. Some of the more degenerate manifestations of this subtle dependence are Nietzsche's 'ressentiment', Sartre's 'anti-Semite', and Deleuze's 'reactive' type. Probably all forms of bigotry would qualify, as well. The terminological problem is the prevalence of the use of 'individual' meaning 'separate from', because that definition precisely exemplifies the Unconventional type, and thus falls short of the true independence of the Idionomic type. The kind of 'rugged individualism' that is promoted in American culture is generally of this short, leaving us with a Democracy that falls far short of its potential.

Saturday, July 25, 2009

Social Evolvement

Diversification entails indeterminacy in two respects. First, it introduces indeterminacy into the system that is its point of departure. Second, it is indeterminate within itself. That is, it is indeterminate with respect to degree of diversity involved, e. g. doubling, tripling, etc. Thus, diversity can be greater or less, and, likewise, a system can be more or less evolved. This is perhaps a key insight that eluded Spencer when he settled on what amounts to Fascism as his ideally evolving social order. For, even if at its best that does qualify as an evolving system, the further question is whether or not it is the system that evolves to the greatest extent possible. Plainly, it is not, because at least one other system can accommodate a greater diversity than is possible in any hierarchy, and that system is Democracy. Democracy is built from the ground up, so, unlike in a hierarchy, especially the Military one that Spencer recommends, its diversity is in principle unlimited. Thus, in principle at least, his purported ideal is surpassable. Furthermore, the inversion of that model entails another inversion, one which offers a solution to a problem that seems to have confounded traditional Evolutionism pervasively, namely how to extend the Evolution paradigm to individuals. That inversion transforms a particular human into an individual, which, in conjunction with the jettisoning of extrinsities such as Survival and Fittingness, opens the way for a description of the individual human System.

Friday, July 24, 2009

Evolvement and Spencer

One of the more ambitious neo-Darwinians was Herbert Spencer, whose insights antedate considerably some of the notions that are being advanced here. His most significant effort was to universalize Darwin's innovations, centering on the same idea of Complexity as I have defined. That is, the essence of Evolution is an increase in heterogeneity while maintaining homogeneity, according to Spencer. Where his theory differs from Evolvement is that it is overextended in one respect, and crucially underextended in several others. While Spencer interprets all phenomena as governed by Evolution, in the Formaterial system, not all processes are Evolvemental, e. g. generally speaking, only the 'organic' ones are. On the other hand, Spencer follows Darwin in compromising Evolutionism by subordinating it to other principles at crucial junctures. For example, he proposes that Evolutionary ascent has a terminal point of equilibrium. But that construal of equilibrium is not intrinsic to Evolutionism, because the ascent itself is in equilibrium, a balance between the diversifying and the homogenizing forces. Secondly, it is actually Spencer who coined the phrase 'survival of the fittest', his interpretation of Darwin's principle of 'natural selection', which, again, is a principle that is extrinsic to Complexity-increase, and, again, to which the latter is subordinated. The unfortunate implications of infecting Complexity with Survival and Fitness are exposed in Spencer's attempts at a social theory. He does maintain conceptual consistency to the extent that he suggests that the ideal society would be a Military-Industrial complex, literally, because social homogeneity is exemplified in Military organization, while the free enterprise activities of an Industrial sector are the paragon of heterogeneity. Sorely lacking, however, is any kind of Evolutionary concept of the individual, which leaves him stuck with an individual ideal in terms of physical fitness that he struggles to integrate into the ideality of social Complexity. The most important consequence of his shortcomings in this respect is the subsequent rise of 'Social Darwinism', with the preponderance of its emphasis on physical fitness over Complexity. Not only does my notion of Evolvement dispense with extrinsities such as a Survival and Perfection, but my extension of it to individuals will facilitate an entirely different approach to social theory than Darwin and Spencer are capable of offering.

Thursday, July 23, 2009

Formalization and Materialization

By 'Formalization' and 'Materialization', I mean the processes that I have been characterizing as the Formal Principle and the Material Principle, respectively. Thus, some processes that are commonly called 'formalization' would not qualify as Formalization. For, I have distinguished Principle from Cause on the basis of the former being an internally generated process. So, where 'formalization' refers to the imposition of Form from without, that would be the operation of a Cause not a Principle. Generally, which obtains will vary from case to case, e. g. some marriages are Principles, and some are Causes. Where the expression 'a mere formality' is accurate is a reliable sign of 'formalization', not Formalization, occurring. Likewise, Materialization is to be distinguished from many usages of 'materialization'. Often, the former will apply insofar as the latter refers to a development, e. g. from a germ of an idea, but to the extent that what develops takes on a definite form, 'Materialization' is no longer applicable. Sometimes to 'materialize' means to 'appear'. Once again, if it more accurately means to 'appear in some determinate manner', then 'Materialize' is inappropriate. On the other hand, if 'materialize' means 'appear to a Form-imposing perceiver', as it does in certain Epistemological theories, then, 'Materialize' could be correct, depending further on the genesis of the appearing. In that case, where Materialization is followed by Formalization, Evolvement occurs. A significant example of this type of Evolvement is the kinaesthetic process, in which its Motility is followed by the organism's awareness of that Motility.

Wednesday, July 22, 2009

Bergsonian Evolution

Another alternative to Darwinian Evolutionary theory, that enjoyed popularity in the early 20th century, is Bergson's. Bergson was a philosopher whose theory is typical of the vacillation between Monism and Dualism that I have previously discussed. There is both Spirit and Matter in his system, but in some places, he seems to treat them as separate substances, while in others, the latter is regarded as a degenerate version of the former. In either case, Spirit is accorded primacy. In his Evolutionary theory, which he terms 'Creative Evolution', his spiritual substance is called 'elan vital'. Elan vital is pure ascent, which leaves in its wake, so to speak, precipitated Matter that embodies the progressive development, and which accumulates as higher species appear. For example, opposing thumbs are the precipitated Material manifestation of elan vital as the latter proceeds beyond the stage of certain apes, added to the hands that have accreted from previous stages of ascent. From the perspective of Evolvement here, the analysis is contrary to Bergson's general commitments, because elan vital is thus a cause of Diversification, therefore qualifying as a Material Principle. Furthermore, he provides no explanantion of how the novel Matter, e. g. the opposing thumbs, gets integrated into the preceding system, e. g. the creature with thumbless hands. These are difficulties that are inherited from his earlier work on Duration, which I have previously touched upon, and which I will return to in a more methodical discussion of Space and Time.

Tuesday, July 21, 2009

Emergent Evolution

One variation on Evolutionary theory that was popular early in the 20th century focuses on the phenomenon called 'Emergent Evolution'. Probably the most interesting proponent of this notion was the unfortunately neglected British philosopher Samuel Alexander. According to him, Emergent Evolution explains the appearance of certain types of quality, a question which was brought to prominence two centuries earlier by Locke. Locke distinguishes between 'primary' and 'secondary' qualities, by locating the former in objects themselves, and the latter in the mind of a perceiver. For example, size and shape are primary qualities, while colors, sounds, tastes, smells, and textures, i. e. the objects of the five senses, are in the mind of the perceiver. The existence of the secondary qualities is not random, for they correspond to certain primary qualities that cause them when being perceived. For example, colors appear in the mind of an observer when the latter is looking at what in the object are certain motions and interactions of minute particles in the object. Alexander rejects this analysis, by arguing that the secondary qualities are properties that 'emerge' in the object itself, independently of the object being perceived. For, such emergence obtains when the motions and interactions of the minute particles achieve a certain configuration in themselves, an achievement that does not require any perceiver. Here, without adjudicating between Locke and Alexander as to the location of the secondary qualities, the judgment is that the process of Emergence fails to qualify as Evolvement. For, the emergence is a product of a Formal Principle, namely the achieving of a certain configuration that obtains amongst the particles, but in itself there is no increase in Complexity, i. e. the difference between color not emerging and its appearance is not due to the introduction of any new particles into the system. In other words, Evolvement distinguishes between novelty that is merely a rearrangement of some given Matter, and that which entails the introduction of novelty into the Matter itself.

Monday, July 20, 2009

Evolvement of the Species

With respect to a species, unlike traditional Evolution, Evolvement does not necessarily govern only its origin. It obtains in any kind of growth, including intra-species growth. For example, one point of agreement between Darwinism and Creationism regarding the origin of humanity is that it was a localized phenomenon--from one group of apes or the Garden of Eden. So, given the eventual ubiquity of the species on Earth, the two also must agree that early in human history there must have been a diasporatic stage. In contrast, there has been an unprecedented linking of the race underway over at least the past several centuries, such that global simultaneity is now possible in several media, especially on the internet. Hence, the human race has plainly undergone a massive diversification that is more recently being just as plainly met with a unification on a grand scale. In other words, the species has Evolved, i. e. increased Complexity, since its inception, and it remains to be seen to what extent this process will continue. The schematic point is that traditional Evolution entails some residual Platonism, because its developments are characterized only be changes of Form, e. g. ape to human. In contrast, in Evolvement, transitions are primarily Material, so it is only a question of convenience whether or not a development is an origin of a new species or the growth of an old one.

Sunday, July 19, 2009

Other Points of Contention

I have been referring to Evolvement as a 'paradigm' to indicate that more than one issue is in dispute. For sure, the title 'Origin of the Species' has determined the main question hitherto, but there is a lot more at stake. The Humpty Dumpty paradigm establishes not merely a thesis regarding origins, but also one regarding termini, starting with the simple point that there are termini. In other words, it is a closed system, at both ends, whereas, Evolvement is intrinsically open. Hence, while contemporary theorists continue the debate between Creationism and Evolutionism, they hardly seem to notice what writers of fiction have--that an open system presents a serious challenge to that Theology elsewhere. That is, a doctrine that is crucial to that Theology is that humanity is the steward of the natural world. But if the Evolutionary theory is correct, the emergence of natural creatures that are superior to humans is possible, in which case humanity would no longer qualify as the crown of creation. Perhaps Darwin, etc. believed that Survival would serve as a stage of closure, but, if so, it fails to do so, since, as I have shown previously, Survival is only a special case of Evolvement. Systematic closedness is to be found in not only this Theological tradition--there is teleology to be found in Aristotle, as well as in the messianisms of both Hegel and Marx. And, as I have suggested previously, the paradigms are applicable to individual humans, and not merely to the race. Hence, according to Evolvement, Ethics concerns something other than a recovery of something lost, and self-actualization Psychological theories are similarly misguided. Finally, it is usually hardly noticed that Newton was for the most part a theologian, and, so, that his banishment of teleology from Physics was actually a relocation of it in the supernatural realm. So, as I have argued, since the Final Cause is a species of Formal Cause, returning teleology to nature will facilitate the development of a Formaterial theory of Physics.

Saturday, July 18, 2009

Features of Evolvement

Evolvement is a process that captures both the essence of what is normally meant be 'Evolution' in the Darwinian sense, as well as any other situation describable by the ordinary use of 'evolving', e. g. 'growth'. In fact, since it means 'an increase in Complexity', in which 'Complexity' means 'an increase in Diversity without loss of Sameness', it can apply to anything that has both Diversity and Sameness', i. e. any System, and, hence to anything that exists. Dialectic is a special case of Evolvement, in which the increase in Diversity is restricted to the generation of only one type of variation, namely to the generation of an antithesis. So, the scope of Evolvement is at least as broad as Hegel, Marx, Engels, etc. intended. It can apply as much to a species as it does to a member of that species, so it can be shown how an Evolvement of an individual conduces to the Evolvement of a society or the race as a whole. That would solve what I have previously been describing as the 'problem of Materialism', namely, how the pluralization of the race can be regarded as a progressive development, not a cosmic catastrophe. Since Evolvement is a process that obtains with respect to a given system or systems, it is always situational. For example, motion, i. e. a diversification of location, is an Evolvement of an object with respect to its being at rest, and acceleration, i. e. diversification of motion, is an Evolvement of that same object with respect to its uniform motion. Furthermore, Diversification has infinite possibilities--doubling, tripling, quadrupling, etc. all entail Diversification--in which a comparison of degree of Evolvement can be made, e. g. the tripling of the size of a balloon via inflation is more Evolved than its doubling. This possibility of degrees of Evolvement, and their comparison, as will be seen later, facilitates Ethical evaluation. For the moment, one of the seeming inconsistencies in Darwinism can be brought to light, and clarified. As I have discussed on previous occasions, Darwinism proposes that Evolution is a fundamental law of nature, and, yet, subordinates it to Survival, i. e. it holds that Evolution is merely a means to something else, survival. But now, the relation between Survival and Death can be likened to that between Motion and Rest. So, mere Survival is in fact Evolvemental, but it is less of an Evolvement than not merely surviving, but, for example, growing.

Friday, July 17, 2009

Paradigm Wars

At the root of what are sometimes referred to as today's 'Culture Wars' is a conflict of Paradigms. On the one hand is what I have been calling the Humpty Dumpty paradigm. According to this, the human race is a product of a catastrophic descent, in the prejorative sense, with multiplicity and corporeality as the telling characteristics of this misfortune. In contrast is the Evolvemental paradigm, according to which the human race is the product of an ascent, with the complexity of corporeality as the main index of its progress. As a consequence, what is at issue in the Culture Wars is not merely two different means to the same end, but the very nature of Culture itself. George Lakoff is on the right track in characterizing the contrast as 'tough love' vs. 'nurturing', but his use of the parent-child metaphor is, as I have argued previously, fundamentally misplaced in a society of self-governing adults. More to the point is the contrasting notions of the very function of Ethics--a corrective vs. an enhancement. Hence, according to the Humpty Dumpty view, Morality is a demand, often a repression of corporeality, while Evolvementally, Ethics is a program of self-cultivation, in which corporeal development plays an essential role.

Thursday, July 16, 2009

No Humpty Dumpty

According to one prominent theological system, by virtue of merely being born, every human is a sinner, because of the actions of their original ancestors. While there are many who distance themselves from the specifics of this cosmogony, its vestigial influence is to this day discernible in many spheres of everyday life. What reinforces the staying power of that story is that its general pattern is chronic and prevalent throughout all cultures. That pattern begins with some perfect condition, which is then destabilized by a massive fragmentation, a 'fall' into multiplicity, such that it could be called the 'Humpty Dumpty Genesis'. Under those conditions, the task for humanity can be nothing other than one of making like all the king's horses and all the king's men, etc. Likewise, Philosophy for the most part has treated the particularity of a human being as a problem that needs to be resolved, the solution of which is formulated in Ethics or Political Philosophy. The philosophers, notably Descartes, Fichte, and Kierkegaard, who have attempted to buck that tradition by positing the individual human as the starting point of their systems, merely duck the question of the ontological status of the individual qua product of an original diversification. Instead, the most serious challenge hitherto to this Humpty Dumpty tradition comes from some branches of Darwinism, in which some humans serve a progressive function, by being the bearers of traits that conduce to the survival of the species in general. Now, that constructive role of particular humans is played only by select ones, in contrast with what my System proposes, namely, that particularity per se is an essential phase in the Evolvemental process. To Evolve is to increase in Complexity, which entails an increase in Multiplicity without loss of Unity. Hence, Multiplicity, and the particular humans that constitute it, have progressive value.

Wednesday, July 15, 2009

Individuation and Particularization

Relevant to the analysis of Materialism is, as seen in the discussion of Schopenhauer, the process of 'Individuation'. However, as I have previously shown, the usual usage of this term is crucially inaccurate. Literally, 'individual' is synonymous with 'indivisible'. But the meaning common to both ordinary and philosophically technical usage is 'discrete', i. e. differentiated from anything else. The profundity of the discrepancy between the two meanings is borne out in the system that I am presenting here. 'Individuation' in the proper sense means 'becoming integrated', which in my system is an expression of the Formal Principle. In contrast, 'individuation' in the usual sense means 'becoming isolated', which in my system is an expression of the Material Principle. Henceforth, I will use the more accurate 'particularization' in the latter case. Where the distinction between particularization and individuation becomes crucial is in the development of selfhood. To put it briefly now, every human begins as a product of particularization, that is, of the becoming-diverse of the human race, and must learn to become a distinct entity. However, independence in that sense is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition of 'idionomy', which, as I will explain later, is my replacement for 'autonomy', and which is a pivotal moment in the becoming-the-same of the race. As will be seen, both particularization and individuation are ingredients in the Evolvement of the human race, and their distinction is significant to the Ethical program that I will be presenting.

Tuesday, July 14, 2009

Materialism and its Discontents

What Horkheimer and Adorno called 'the dialectic of Enlightenment' might also be called 'the revenge of the thing-in-itself'. The peak of the Enlightenment was probably the Kantian system, the construction of which was accomplished by its delimitation to the appearance of things, i. e. by its exclusion of what they might be independent of their being perceived, which for Kant amounts to their unknowability. Schopenhauer followed Kant by taking the bold step of characterizing the realm of the in-itself as pure 'Will', a precursor of Nietzsche's 'Dionysus', and then, his 'Will-to-Power', and of Freud's 'Id', each a universal progenitor, which qualifies each as a Material Principle. The problem for Schopenhauer is that while Will multiplies, he treats the products of that multiplication, 'individuals', as not merely, as Kant has it, appearances, but as illusory. Furthermore, insofar as Reason functions only within the locus of appearance, its efficacy, too, is illusory, according to Schopenhauer, which for him is grounds for pessimism. In contrast, Nietzsche affirms the primacy of Will, and takes ironic joy in the realization of the vanity of the ambitions of human Reason. Still, Nietzsche concurs with Schopenhauer in denying the in-itself reality of the individual, or, in other words, in denying that Diversification can have a positive significance. Later, Freud misses that both the Id and 'Civilization' are antagonistic to the 'Ego', as much as Kant misses that both the in-itself and Reason are anatagonistic to selfhood. Only the kind of Materialism proposed here grounds the generation of selfhood that has a positive connotation--even the dynamic of Marxian 'Materialism' is a process of social totalization, as, e. g. Stalin demonstrated.

Monday, July 13, 2009

Other Causes

The Formaterial System accords primacy to two of Aristotle's four Causes. The other two, Efficient and Final, it treats as derivative. For Aristotle, the latter is the fundamental one, for, the purpose of anything determines its shape, what matter is most suitable, and how the shaping of that matter is brought about. For example, that it is to be used to hold items is the cause of the concavity of a bowl, of the choice of clay, and the use of a chisel to shape the clay. Here, purpose is one type of Formal Cause, because, first, it is not the actual ultimate use of the bowl that guides the shaping of the concavity, but the idea of it as the shaper proceeds--the 'end-in-view', as Dewey calls it, as opposed to the 'end'--that guides the imposition of form on the clay. On the other hand, there can be form without purpose, i. e. in the form of a work of art, or 'purposive' form, as Kant calls it. Thus, the Final Cause is just a special case of the Formal Cause. Likewise, the Efficient Cause is a special case of the Material Cause, given the definition of the latter proposed here. For, while the operation of a chisel can be taken as external to the clay, and, hence, extrinisic to the manifold of the latter, the chiseling-of-the-clay can be taken as an integrated process, in which the Matter is the various motions involved, and the Form is its structure. This is precisely what Newtonian Physics accomplishes, despite its apparent commitment to a univocal notion of Cause, i. e. Efficient. For the fundamental aim of modern Physics is to demonstrate the law-like regularity that obtains in any physical interaction. But law-like regularity is an expression of the unity of the interaction, a unity of the multiple motions entailed, in other words, an expression of the Form of which those motions are the Matter. Thus, any Efficient Cause is a type of Material Cause.

Sunday, July 12, 2009

Other 'Materialsims'

Here, the Material Principle is 'Becoming-Diverse', so the defining characteristic of 'Matter' is its having become diverse. Hence, any inert 'stuff' does not qualify as Matter. So, for example, when Aristotle characterizes the bronze of a sculpture as its Matter, insofar as he means the multiplicity of the statue, the usage is acceptable here, but to whatever extent he regards bronze as inert stuff, it is not. Among pre-Socratic theories, insofar as Water or Fire are life-engendering, they qualify as Matter. Empedocles' 'Strife' is a Material Principle but the inert atoms that the latter acts upon are not Matter. Insofar as by 'Extension' Descartes means the active process of extending, that is a Material Principle. In Dialectics, the generating of an 'Antithesis' is a Material Principle. In fact, not only does the subsequent 'Synthesis', which unifies the opposites, qualify the entire process as Formaterial, because with respect to the original 'Thesis' it constitutes an increase in Complexity, it is also an Evolvement. However, this analysis applies to Dialectics in general, so the generation of the Antithesis in the Hegelian system is as much a Material Principle as it is in the Marxian one. In other words, its mere rejection of Hegelian spiritual stuff in favor of corporeality does not, from the perspective here, per se qualify Marxism as a 'Materialism'. On the other hand, one more recent notion that does qualify as a Material Principle is Gilles Deleuze's 'Difference', which actively differentiates. In general, inert stuff is actually Matter that has already achieved one Form or another.

Saturday, July 11, 2009

God and System

In the Formaterial System, everything has both Form and Matter. This means that nothing is extra-systematic, and that pure Form does not exist. Hence, the System rejects the notions of God as existing outside of a System, and of an immaterial God. Instead, it maintains that a monotheistic God is intrinsically implicated in some System or another, and has a Material nature, e. g. as the starting point of a Becoming-Diverse process, or as the terminus of a Becoming-the-Same process. While most Abrahamic theologicans seem likely to reject that notion of their God, their very own scriptures exemplify it. Genesis begins with a description of God-creating-the-universe, not of God subsisting on his own. Furthermore, all subsequent descriptions of divine action are of a similar structure. On the other hand, the gathering of people to worship or to listen to God is an example of the Becoming-the-Same of the System. Literal readings of scriptures support this analysis, so the onus is on those theologians to substantiate their insistence that God exists independently of his creation. But doing so will be internally destructive to their doctrines, because they are obstinantly committed to the concept of an immaterial God, as seen in their antipathy to, e. g. Spinoza's Pantheism, which attributes a corporeal nature to God. A further important theological question will be discussed later, after I have fully developed the notion of a personal system, i. e. of a sub-system, in its relations to its super-system. At that point I will be better prepared to introduce an analysis of a personal 'relationship' with God.

Friday, July 10, 2009

Binary System

What I refer to here as 'my system', I obviously mean 'my philosophical system', which is, more accurately, one of my 'sub-Systems', with my life in general qualifying as my 'System' in the strictest sense. I prefer to not use the term 'Theory' for two reasons. First, that might inaccurately suggest that there is no 'Practical' dimension to what I am presenting, and, second, that it might be construed as standing apart from its subject matter. To the contrary--the writing, the sentences, etc. are all systematic, and are thus instances of that subject matter. Prior to Hegel, it is unclear to what extent philosophers have attended to the self-exemplification of their theories. Now, given that my system has two fundamental principles, it certainly qualifies as 'Dualistic'. However, I prefer 'Binary' because of the connotations traditionally associated with the latter, i. e. that one principle refers to corporeality, the other to incorporeality, with the latter at least implicitly the superior of the two, e. g. Body/Mind or Matter/Spirit. Furthermore, I believe that my system solves a problem that has chronically vexed the traditional Dualisms, namely, that two principles that are absolutely distinct manage to interact. Descartes notably suggested that they might intersect in the pineal gland, a suggestion which only relocates the problem, not solves it. Likewise, while Spinoza seemingly keeps them separate, he actually unites them in Substance or a Mode, without explaining their correlation. In contrast, Becoming-the-Same and Becoming-Diverse presuppose another, i. e. the point of departure of the former process is a condition of diversity, and that of the latter is one of Sameness. 'Binary', which is synonymous with 'dual' is free of such baggage.

Thursday, July 9, 2009

The Human Systems

Both the human race and specific humans are Systems, the latter being a sub-system of the former. The race is itself a sub-system of the animal kingdom, which, in turn, is a sub-system of organic life, etc. As a System, the human race is constituted by both unifying and diversifying processes. Sympathy is one of the more obvious of the former, and reproduction, of the latter. Specific humans are likewise Systems, in which the Formal Principle is what I am (tentatively) calling 'Closion', and the Material Principle, (again, tentatively) 'Oversion'. These I have occasionly briefly touched upon previously, and I will be elaborating on them in forthcoming postings. For the moment, I just want to cite an example of the analytical usefulness of the conceptual framework that I am proposing. Relations between two humans are determined by two very different processes: one intra-Systematic, i. e. qua sub-systems within the same System, the other inter-Systematic, i. e. qua discrete Systems. That means that, as a notable example, the experience of sexual desire is equivocal--it might be the experience of unifying species processes, and, hence, one with a corresponding desire being experienced by someone else, or it might be a private experience only. Again, I will be elaborating on this type of question at a later time, but for the moment, suffice it to say that to whatever extent it is useful in freshly illuminating e. g. the experience of sexual desire, this Formaterial theory that I am proposing has practical benefits beyond being a merely intellectual curiousity.

Wednesday, July 8, 2009

Complexity and Evolvement

The relation between the Matter and Form of any System is its 'Complexity'. This relation is most clearly given in quantatative terms, but it is not restricted to that category. This concept of Complexity is at odds with the standard usage that treats it as synonymous with mere multiplicity, because it entails unity, unlike the latter. Hence, here, Complexity is not an antonym of the usual meaning of 'simplicity', i. e. 'unity'. In fact, in a Formaterial theory, sheer simplicity is impossible; what the term actually refers to, instead, is a system of minimal multiplicity, not none at all, or, in other words, a system of minimal Complexity. Any increase in Complexity is 'Evolvement'. More precisely, Evolvement is an increase in Diversity without loss of Sameness. This means that it is a process consisting of two distinct moments--the introduction of a novel element, and the integration of the latter into the previous system. For example, the growth of opposing thumbs is not Evolvement until the organism integrates them into its activities. An notable consequence of this analysis is in Mathematical theory. In '3+4=7', '+4' introduces a novel element, and '=7' integrates it into the previous system, 3. This analysis confirms Kant's assertion that arithmetical statements are 'synthetic', i. e. that '3+4' is not in itself identical to '7', but requires a further integrative process to equate them.

Tuesday, July 7, 2009

The Two Principles

To say that the Formal Principle and the Material Principle are both fundamental is to say that neither is to be found in isolation. Hence, clarifications of them are at best approximate. Becoming-the-Same, functioning by itself, would effect an instantaneous reduction of all existence to an infinitely diminishing singularity. Becoming-Diverse would effect an instantaneous infinite dissipation of everything. More familiar would be examples in which one predominates over the other: contraction, fusion, coming to rest, etc., are systems in which the Formal Principle is stronger, while expansion, fission, setting in motion, etc., are systems in which the Material dominates. Stable systems--things, regular motions, etc., are examples of an equilibrium obtaining. The notion that ordinary fixed objects are the products of dynamic forces might defy common sense, but modern science has for centuries been exposing them as such, e. g. even an atom is a product of nuclear electrical and gravitational forces. Also, it is not to be inferred from a comparison of the two principles that a more fundamental one, Becoming, underlies them. In some theories, Becoming is indeed a fundamental principle, though it is sometimes unclear as to whether or not it is meant as sheer flux, or as a developmental motion. Here, the 'Becoming' in each principle is of a piece with -the-Same, or -Diverse, so any generaliztion is an abstraction.

Monday, July 6, 2009

Systems

That the Formal Principle and the Material Principle are the two fundamental ones means that everything is a combination of the two. That everything consists of a Form and a Matter is hardly a new proposal, but what each Principle is, and how they combine, seems to be. The traditional combination has Form being actively imposed on passive Matter. Here, in contrast, both are dynamic principles--Becoming-the-Same, and, Becoming-Diverse--that pre-suppose one another, but are in opposition to one another. Hence, every combination of them is a resultant dynamic tension, and the possibilities of combination are infinite. Every such combination is a 'System': for example, both a thing and an event are Systems, just as for Whitehead they are equally 'Processes'. Systems consist of sub-systems, and are themselves parts of super-systems. Any System can be part of more than one super-system, e. g. a person can be part of a family, and part of a work organization. There is not necessarily any limiting sub- or super-system. The 'uni-multiverse' would be a more accurate term than 'universe' for all that exists, as would 'God', so long as there is no implication of any ultimate finitude. And, just as human vision and hearing and limited in range, e. g. with respect to frequency and wave-length, the human system is limited in Systematic range. In other words, there can be an infinite number of actual worlds that are inaccessible to humans, which should not be confused with any Leibnizian/Modal Logic thesis about 'possible worlds', nor with the notion that each human has its own 'world'.

Sunday, July 5, 2009

Happy Independence Day

The one indigenous American school of Philosophy has thus far been 'Pragmatism'. The primary feature of this doctrine, not to be confused with 'expediency', is the recombination of Thought and Action, of Theory and Practice, after the pervasive millennia-long tradition of the priority of Thought and Theory over Action and Practice. The pioneer of Pragmatism, in the late 1800s, was Charles S. Peirce, with notable further developments coming from William James and John Dewey. The latter perhaps best exemplifies the doctrine, as he became a prominent figure not only with respect to the Theoretical dimension of Pragmatism, but in his impact on American Education, and in his involvement in the rise of Political Progressivism that led to the New Deal. The influence of Pragmatism can also be found, implicitly, if not explicitly, in the works of such European luminaries as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Derrida. Ironically, where Pragmatism seems least welcome these days is in American Academia, where it dominated for the first half of the 20th Century. But the predominant school in Academic Philosophy since the turn of the century has been Analytic Philosophy, the founding fathers of which were the British Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore. This school is dedicated primarily to Logical evaluation of the language of Philosophy, and it accords priority to Theory over Practice. But perhaps the most telling contrast with Pragmatism is the prominent political activism of Russell, which might be more Leftist than Dewey's, but which, unlike the latter's, assertively bears no systematic connection to his Theoretical work. Happy Independence Day, American Academic Philosophy!

Friday, July 3, 2009

Formaterialism

Everything that we experience is both a unity and a multiplicity. Each particular item is a whole with parts, and the whole is both one and many. So, insofar as the fundamental principles of a philosophical theory must account for the most basic features of experience, principles that have something to do with Unity and Multiplicity are well-qualified to be fundamental. One traditional pair of terms denoting Unity and Multiplicity are Form and Matter, so everything that we experience possesses both Form and Matter. The principles which produce them can thus be called the Formal Principle and the Material Principle, and, hence, these are well-qualified to serve as the fundamental principles of a philosophical theory. This is hardly an original observation, but as I've argued previously, traditional efforts to present a legitimate 'Formaterialism', to coin a term, have fallen short, because Unity, e. g. God, the One, Being, etc., have seemingly always been accorded priority over Multiplicity, e. g. Creation, the Many, Becoming, etc., if not ontologically, then morally. Here, they are regarded as equiprimordial, equipollent, and irreducible to one another, as befits a pair of 'fundamental' principles. More precisely, I define the Formal Principle as 'Becoming-the-same', and the Material Principle as 'Becoming-diverse'. I will elaborate on these in forthcoming postings.

Thursday, July 2, 2009

Monism and Dualism

'Monism' and 'Dualism' are philosophical doctrines that hold that the number of fundamental principles of Reality are one, and two, respectively. The problem with most of them is that they are in fact neither one nor the other, but should most accurately be placed somewhere in between. One of the most prominent Dualists, Descartes, holds that there are two fundamental principles, Mind and Body. However, on closer examination, Mind is more important to him than Body, as perhaps best inferred from the point that his God is incorporeal. Hence, Mind is actually more fundamental than Body, which amounts to denying that the latter is fundamental to begin with. Spinoza attempted to correct this disparity by positing that God is as corporeal as he is mental. However, that would seem to leave him as a Monist, except that he now has to explain how there must fundamentally exist both one principle, i. e. God, and, yet, a multiplicity of 'Modes'. This problem with Spinoza's Monism is typical of most other ones--they posit a single fundamental principle, e. g. God, the One, Being, Nothingness, etc., and, yet, cannot seem to do without a subsidiary principle, e. g. Creation, the Many, Becoming, illusory individuality, etc. Conversely, Dualists tend, like Descartes, to accord priority to one of their two principles. So, despite the apparent conflict between Monism and Dualism, for the most part, philosophers of either persuasion concur that Reality consists of one fundamental principle, and at least one subsidiary principle, for which the term 'Ordinalism' might be an accurate description, except that it is already in use for different purposes.

Wednesday, July 1, 2009

Material Cause

Aristotle's concept 'Material Cause' might sound peculiar to more modern ears because the notion 'cause' has dynamic connotations, while 'material' is usually regarded as passive. Aristotle himself does not help resolve this seeming contradiction, citing as examples of Material Causes the bronze of a statue, and the letters of a word. More likely, this category is his half-hearted accommodation of the dynamic Materialism of some of his predecessors, a doctrine which he rejects. His 'bronze' is far removed from the dynamic Water of Thales, which the latter chose as his fundamental principle because of its life-engendering power. One basic problem here is the difficulty in defining Matter, an intrinsic difficulty, since Matter is essentially indefinite. But there is a way to define it without rendering it definite. 'Form' can be most generally defined as the Unity of a Multiplicity. So, conversely, 'Matter' can be most generally defined as the Multiplicity of a Unity. Likewise, just as 'Formal Cause' can be defined as the generation of Unity in a Multiplicity, 'Material Cause' can be defined as the generation of Multiplicity in a Unity. And, insofar as in either of the latter cases the process of the relevant generation is immanent, i. e. not imposed from without, these can be referred to as 'Formal Principle' and 'Material Principle', respectively.