Wonder and Empowerment

Plato and Aristotle agree that philosophizing begins with Wonder, and, probably, that it ends with Knowledge.  Where they disagree is about what happens in between--Dialectics vs. Analysis, respectively.  Thus, whether they conceive Contemplation as Wonder or as Knowledge, they implicitly agree that it cannot be a self-contained experience, contrary to how Aristotle presents it.  Furthermore, each demonstrates that Wonder is the beginning of something else--Communication, i. e. written, in the case of Plato, oral, in the case of Aristotle.  Thus, Wonder also ends in the learning of another.  Hence, it is also a social act, even if it begins with a private moment.  Thus, even if instantaneous Enlightenment occurs at some phase of the process, Wonder is fundamentally an initial moment of Empowerment, as Plato and Aristotle show, even as they might articulate otherwise.

Henosis and Wonder

Plotinus presents a qualification of the shared assertion of Plato and Aristotle that Philosophy begins in Wonder--it begins in Wonder about specifically Henosis.  But, it is perhaps not until Nietzsche, under the influence of Schopenhauer, systematically contrasts Henosis and Wonder, distinguishing the Dionysian principle of the former from the Apollinian principle of the latter.  However, he stops short of considering the possibility of an interaction of the two, and hence of the possibility that Henosis is more than a self-contained event.  Rather, as is plainly evident, its larger context is comprised of, first, a transition from a condition of separation to a condition of primal unity, and then a re-separation.  He does briefly more comprehensively consider the rhythm of these transitions, but focuses, instead, like Schopenhauer, on the eventual separation exclusively, the result of which is a fixed dualism of the Dionysian and the Apollinian, and, hence, of the abstraction of Wonder from Henosis, thereby undermining a possible internal critique of the effete Intellectualism of some Philosophy, sometimes formulated as the priority of Theory over Praxis.  That critique could be grounded in the interpretation of Wonder as a secondary Henotic moment, and, accordingly, of Cognition, in general, as essentially Volitional.  Regardless, he preserves the non-Cognitive character of his Henosis, avoiding even an interpretation of it as consisting in an anti-Intellectual Intuition, e. g. Bergson's interpretation.

Henosis, Empowerment, Enlightenment

One prominent Ancient Monadist, properly Monist, unlike Leibniz, is Plotinus, whose system is probably best known for the Emanation that is his characterization of the Monad's creativity of the Universe.  Now, within this Universe, the peak experience of a created being is Henosis--its fusion with the Monad--an experience that Plotinus reportedly attributes to both Plato and Aristotle, as well.  But, Henosis is not to be confused with the retrospective interpretation it, e. g. in Plotinus' case, the moment of a created being's awareness of its own divine creativity, retrospectively reduced to a mere Intuition.  Likewise, Plato does not thereby do Good when encountering the Form of the Good, but merely knows it, while Aristotle's Active Mind is most fulfilled when merely contemplating eternal principles.  In Modernity, too, the unity of a Spinozist Mode with its creative deity is Intuition, as is Bergson's experience of Creative Energy.  In other words, Plotinus epitomizes the long-standing philosophical tendency of reducing Henosis from a moment of Empowerment, to that of Enlightenment, i. e. from a dynamic moment with consequences, to a self-contained static one.

Monad, Dyad, Circle, Ellipse

It is unclear if Leibniz is aware of the historical precedent of his use of the term Monad.  That is Pythagoras', and it is the name of his diety, the simple and original entity from which all else follows, including the Dyad, his term for Matter.  So, Leibniz' use is perhaps doubly ironic--the existence in his system of a plurality of Monads is contrary both to what the term connotes, as well as to the Monism of his ancient predecessor.  Now, the Pythagoreans represent the Monad as a point within a circle.  So, the irony in their case is that these pioneers of Geometry seem unaware that a Circle is a special case of an Ellipse, and, specifically, of a figure with two foci.  In other words, the image of an Ellipse with two foci could represent the Dyad, which therefore precedes the Monad.  Indeed, the reduction of an Ellipse to a Circle could represent one of the most ancient of philosophical endeavors--the attempt by a complex entity to posit the prior existence of a simple entity from which it is derived.

Monad and Dyad

Leibniz' Monad is the Soul of a Body, the Unity of a Multiplicity, the experiences of which are a succession of Perceptions, each itself a Unity of a Multiplicity, driven by Appetition.  Now, a problem with this model is signified in the formulation 'the Monad is the Soul of a Body', since it suggests a separation of Monad from Body.  Furthermore, since Experience is constituted by Perceptions, the model is subject to the challenge raised by Descartes, and amplified by Phenomenalists--the supposition that the Body even exists is ungrounded, and, hence, is problematic.  But, that challenge abstracts from another dimension of Experience--Motility, the product of Volition, constituted by setting in motion multiple corporeal parts, e. g. each of the legs.  In other words, the Monad is a Formal Principle that abstracts from its complementary Material Principle, i. e. the Monad is half a Dyad.

Active Mind and Practical Syllogism

Aristotle' contrast of Active Mind vs. Passive Mind is that of created particulars vs. received particulars, or, in other words, Knowledge from Deduction vs. Knowledge from observation, e. g. that Socrates is mortal as a conclusion from the proposition that all men are mortal vs. watching him die.  So, Mind is Active only to the extent that there exists at least one non-empirical Major Premise.  And, for such to exist, it can only be discovered in Reflection, i. e. in the self-contemplation of Mind, perhaps aka 'Intuition', a term that he occasionally uses.  Now, he recognizes that a Syllogism can be either Theoretical or Practical, though he does not seem to go so far as Spinoza or Kant in recognizing the existence of Practical Particular propositions derived purely from Reflection.  Accordingly, his concept of Active Mind has a lesser extent than do theirs.  Likewise, he cannot recognize that Active Mind is fundamentally Practical, as is Reflection, from which passive Contemplation is abstracted.

Particulation and Re-formation

The process, attributed by Aristotle to Active Mind, of creating a particular can be called Particulation.  It can also be called Materialization, since a Class is the Form of its Particulars, though that term is laden with other connotations.  And, since the addition of a new member varies the given Class, the process is a variety of Diversification, as well.  So, for example, by Particulation in 1959, the United States created the State of Alaska.  But, at the same time, Alaska has its own Particulars, i. e. its inhabitants.  Furthermore, the addition of a new side to a rectangle can be accompanied by a re-formation, resulting in a pentagon.  These familiar examples illustrate that the Formal Principle and the Material Principle are complementary processes, in contrast with the many uses of 'material' and 'matter' throughout history that connote them as antithetical to some corresponding term, e. g. to Spirit, to Mind, etc.