From Need to Ability

Utilitarianism is a variation of Hedonism, i. e. Pleasure is its ultimate criterion of 'Goodness'. Now, Capitalism is applied Utilitarianism. Hence, the implied value of its ultimate goal, Wealth, is that it brings Pleasure, which is an End-in-Itself. In contrast, as has been previously proposed, in "each according to his needs", the goal can be characterized as 'Health', of which, following Spinoza, Pleasure is an inadequate idea. Still, that contrast preserves the status of Health as, like Hedonist Pleasure, an end-state with no further consequences, i. e. as Inertia. However, on the Vitalist interpretation, Health is a dynamic condition, consisting in the harmonious maximum exercise of all the functions of an organism. But, that condition is precisely the actualization of one's abilities, with respect to which 'ability' qua potential is a mere abstraction. Hence, on the Vitalist interpretation, "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs" presupposes that Need is a means to Ability, an interpretation to which it is unclear if Marx subscribes.

Ability, Individual, Collective

Rand, in Atlas Shrugged, is not incorrect to characterize 'From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs' as 'collectivist'. However, her associated opposition of 'Collective' to 'Individual' reflects only the lack in her system of an adequate Pluralist principle, i. e. one via which a Collective that consists of, rather than suppresses, Individuals can be generated. The possibility of such a 'Collective' is plainly connoted by each 'each' in the formulation. Furthermore, she is too short-sighted to recognize that "From each according to his abilities" entails the possibility of one's creation of a social role that expresses one's abilities, instead of, as in the case of her works, the subordination of the abilities of even distinctive individuals to established social roles, e. g. an 'engineer'.

Ability, Education, Division of Labor

Ability is developed by the cultivation of natural talents, i. e. is determined by Education. Now, in contemporary America, for example, the primary aim of Education is the channeling of students to a slot in the established division of labor, i. e. 'choosing a career-path'. Hence, under such conditions, Ability is at the service of prevailing self-interests, and, so, is hardly the cardinal factor of an Economy or a Society that is connoted in Marx's formula "from each according to his abilities". In contrast, the aim of the Education theory of Dewey is the facilitation of the self-discovery of the student, which he conceives as coordinated with his vision of a permanent "reconstruction" of society, a condition that is, thus, more hospitable to the creativity of its members, though, to the detriment of the status quo. So, the actualization of Marx's principle requires a concept of Education of which he is generally relatively vague.

Ability-Need and Supply-Demand

In Marx's formulation, "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs", Ability and Need are conceived as systematic poles, analogous to Supply and Demand in the Capitalist model. Analogously, the challenge is the coordination of the two, though whether via an immanent 'law', as Smith posits, or by artefactual means, depends on whether or not the Marxist attributes the process to a necessary Dialectical movement. One notable precedent of that formulation is easy to overlook because of its class-stratification--the polis of The Republic, which, regardless of those details, attempts to correlate the psychological capacity of each of its members, to the vital needs, i. e. the "necessity", of such an organization.

Ability and Division of Labor

Superficially, Marx's formulation, "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs", seems to directly correlate ability and receipt. However, the immediate determinant of what one receives is one's "needs", so the expression is more accurately parsed as the conjunction of 'Do what one can' and 'Receive what one needs'. Now, if contemporary American Politics is any indication, a Capitalist might object to the formulation on the grounds that it entails an incapacitated person not working while enjoying extensive medical benefits. A further problem for the Capitalist is that implicit in the first clause is the model of a society determined by, and constituted by, the abilities of its members, in contrast with one in which a role is pre-established by the prevailing division of labor, a structure that reflects the self-interests of those who do not labor.

Democracy and Inheritance

The standard academic segregation of 'Political Science' from 'Philosophy' makes it difficult to appreciate the systematic thinking of Locke. Thus, not widely recognized is that corresponding to his better-known Epistemological 'tabula rasa' is a Political one as well. The innate idea that is the specific target of the latter is the 'divine right of kings', which, even in its more secularized manifestation as inherited power, e. g. the British House of Lords, remains antithetical to Democracy. Thus, both Marx's insight that land is part of the means of production, and, therefore, subject to collectivization, and, to a lesser degree, Smith's advocacy of an inheritance tax, are consistent with the Democratic ideal. Similarly, the contemporary resistance to estate taxation in American politics is not.

Justice and Inheritance

Contemporary Capitalists tend to be critical of the Marxist principle of Retributive Justice, "To each according to his needs", often vociferously on the grounds that it promotes laziness. Now, such Moralizing might overlook the other clause in Marx's formulation, "From each according to his abilities". Regardless, it is hypocritical insofar as it is not also directed at lottery and gambling winnings, at returns from investments, and, especially, at inheritance receipts. Indeed, the latter seem to violate the free enterprise thesis that income results from the Invisible Hand functioning as an agent of Retributive Justice, rewarding hard work.

Shopping, Recreation, Experimentation.

For many Americans, shopping is the primary mode of recreation. Now, while the source of its appeal is often analyzed as the exercise of 'freedom of choice', the latter is a moment in a more extended process--trying something new--which spans the moment of purchase to the moment of consumption, i. e. taking a product home, unwrapping it, etc., is part of the recreation. In other words, shopping under such circumstances is an opportunity for the exercise of the experimental drive, for which part the price paid is a cover charge. In contrast, insofar as a Marxist Economy aims at only the fulfillment of needs, shopping is not recreation, from which Capitalists can derive the argument that their system better accommodates the spirit of Experimentation than does its rival. The Marxist might respond that such 'recreation' is as ersatz as are the products that are its occasion.

Economics, Science, Experimentalism

A shared ambition of Smith and Marx is, inspired by Newton, the concept of Economics as a Science, in particular, as applied Physics. But, Marx's concept of Physics diverges from Smith's--that of the latter, following Hume, is Associative, while that of the former, influenced by Hegel, is Dialectical, as is, arguably, Smith's Invisible Hand. So, given a model of presumed 'natural' events as their shared prototype, the dogmatism of each subsequent tradition may not be surprising. However, the impressiveness of Newton's achievement tends to obscure a more fundamental feature of modern systematic Physics, the manifestation of which predates not only Newton, but Cartesian Rationalism and Lockeian Empiricism, as well--the pioneering codification of Experimentalism by Bacon. So, if modern Economics, of any variety, were true to the ambition of being accepted as a 'Science', the dogmatism that has been responsible for much of the militarism of the past two centuries would be shared.

Utilitarianism, Selfishness, Exchange Value

A prominent criticism of Capitalism is entailed in Mill's variation of Bentham's Utilitarianism. For Bentham, as it is for Smith, the only significant consequences of an action are those to the agent, whereas, for Mill, the agent has no privileged status with respect to others in the evaluation of an action. In other words, Mill rejects the Selfishness principle of Smith's and Bentham's systems. However, from a Marxist perspective, a problem with his own doctrine that Mill himself acknowledges--that is has no ground for distinguishing 'higher' from 'lower' pleasure--is indicative of vestigial Capitalism. For, on that analysis, the difficulty stems from the homogenization of all the objects of desires, whether of vital need or of frivolous wish, effected by the quantification of them, which is essentially an assignment of an Exchange Value to them, and, hence, is subject to the vicissitudes of Supply and Demand So, despite the criticism of Selfishness, Mill's calculus remains committed to at least some market principles.

Innateness and Selfishness

A cardinal proposition of the Empiricist tradition that Locke initiates is 1. There are no innate ideas, from which, as Hume, notably, shows, is derived 2. There is no innate idea of Self. A third proposition advocated by the members of this tradition, including Smith, is 3. Selfishness is a natural instinct. Now, the relation within the system between #2 and #3 is unclear, and possibly inconsistent. In contrast, Dewey argues that the #3 is simply false, on the basis of the premise, which follows from #1, that Selfishness is a learned mode of behavior. In any case, the unresolved apparent incoherence in the Psychological model that grounds Capitalism may be one reason why its advocates tend to avoid deciding if the concept of Selfishness that it entails is a descriptive principle, or a normative one.

Justice and Dehumanization

The Capitalist violation of the principle 'to each according to his needs' that is the primary focus of Marx' attention is the concept of Labor as a cheapest possible inert commodity. The more recent gap between living wage and minimum wage only begins to suggest the incommensurability of the two concepts of Retributive Justice. Another contemporary violation is in the derivation of the Need-Satisfaction relation from the Consumer-Product one, in which, e. g. the availability of medicine to a sick person is as much a function of market vicissitudes as is that of a pet rock to a wealthy person. A more contemporary formulation of the Marxist criticism of Capitalism is that the latter tends to dehumanize, even if it does not devolve into overt slavery.

Wealth and Universal Health

The Highest Goods of classical Capitalism, contemporary Capitalism, and Marxism, are, respectively, the wealth of a nation, freedom of enterprise, and the well-being of each according to his needs. Each of the three is given weight in the latest resolution of the current 'health-care' debate in the U. S.--the soundness of The Economy, the interests of insurance companies, and coverage for as many people as possible, respectively Now, one alternative to this rather Byzantine arrangement, to be found implemented in many other countries, is variously known as 'universal health-care', 'single-payer health care', or 'socialized medicine'. The aptness of the latter is not because it represents a victory of Collectivism over Individualism, as some conceive it, but, rather, because it expresses, as does Marxism, the priority of Health over Wealth.

Capitalism and Small Government

In Smith's system, the goal is the wealth of a nation, to which the pursuits of personal wealth by its members is a means. Therefore, in a codified Capitalist polity, its government has authority to intervene in the specific transactions of its citizens. Thus, contrary to familiar contemporary political rhetoric, Capitalism is not inherently a 'small government' doctrine.

Consequences, Freedom, Wealth

According to Consequentialism, the ultimate bearer of Value is the outcome of any action. Thus, for example, the value of the psychological conditions under which an action is performed, e. g. whether intentional or not, is a function of what results, i. e. it is never the thought that counts. So, likewise, whether or not behavior is 'free', however that might be defined, has no inherent value, according to Consequentialism. Now, Smith's system is squarely in the Consequentialist tradition--derived from Hume's doctrine, and elucidated by Bentham's calculus. Thus, Freedom has no intrinsic value in Capitalism, whether the goal is the wealth of a nation, or that of a person, even if acquired via a lottery.

Selfishness, Freedom, Capitalism

According to what is probably the predominant Psychological model, Selfishness is instinctive in humans, and, where it is conceived as not innate, it is posited as inculcated at a very early age. In either case, in ordinary experience, while there might be a 'freedom' to calculate between alternative means to selfish ends, e. g. the more profitable of two investments, that end itself is not freely chosen. Thus, there is no inherent systematic relation between Selfishness and Freedom. Hence, neither Smith's advocacy of Self-Interest, i. e. as a means to the wealth of a nation, nor the more recent shift of emphasis in Capitalism, from collective wealth to personal wealth, entails Freedom, regardless of the familiar trumpeting to the contrary that is a staple of contemporary Political rhetoric.

Health, Wealth, Freedom

As has been previously discussed, the essence of Marx's argument against Smith's system is Moral--that Health is a higher Good than Wealth. Perhaps because of the difficulty in countering that comparison, more recent Capitalists have shifted their Moral focus to the 'freedom' to pursue personal profit. However, the effectiveness of that alternative defense depends on the premise that such perceived 'freedom' is necessarily independent of any prior conditioning, the questionability of which has been previously discussed here. So, the Marxian Moral challenge to Capitalism remains unmet.

Justice, Wealth, Health

It might be inferred from Marx's exposure of the possible exploitation, previously discussed, inherent in the payment of wages for work, that his corrective is some kind of profit-sharing of arrangement. However, his concept of Retributive Justice is more radical, as is indicated in the formulation 'From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs'. For, implicit therein is not only that what one ought to receive is not correlated with one's labor, but that Well-being, not Profit, is the deserved Good. In other words, the more general conflict between Capitalism and Marxian Socialism can be expressed as 'the wealth of a nation vs. the health of each'. So, since a nation is a collective, the fundamental difference between the two is not Individualism vs. Collectivism, as it is commonly taken to be, but Wealth vs. Health as the higher Good, and, hence, as a cardinal factor in the concept of Justice.

Work, Wage, Justice

According to Capitalism, working for a wage is 'just', because it is a species of Exchange that is validated by the consent of the worker. Marxism rejects that judgment for three reasons. First, Labor is a vital process that, in such an Exchange, is reduced to an inert commodity equivalent to another inert commodity. Second, with the alternative sub-subsistence-level existence, a worker's consent to a wage is given under duress. Third, in that scenario, the worker receives no recompense for subsequent profits enjoyed by the employer, made possible by the surplus-value that material acquires through labor on it. In other words, the first and third indicate that what the worker receives in a wage is not commensurate with what they give in labor, and the second undermines the face-value of their consent. Hence, working for a wage constitutes a violation of Retributive Justice to a worker, according to Marxism.

Consent and Labor

As has been previously discussed, Consent is often taken as an indication of an acceptance of an interaction as 'just', i. e. that what one is receiving is commensurate to what one is giving. However, its face-value is not always unequivocal, e. g. when voiced by a minor, by someone psychologically debilitated, or under duress, in which cases the other party can be held liable for an injustice. An important example of an economic exchange consented to under duress, though not commonly recognized as such, is a condition of slavery, in which consent to work is given in preference to undergoing punishment, if not death. Now, the historical significance of that scenario is that Marx analyzes the acceptance of wages by a laborer in industrial conditions as slavery with a trivial degree of difference of duress, an interpretation that the Capitalist tends to not so much dispute as ignore, resulting in the manifestation of the conflict in more than a century of global violence that has only recently abated somewhat. The cardinality of the thesis that Capitalism violates the principle of Retributive Justice is also one reason why traditional Marxists repudiate the variations of the doctrine that embrace forced labor as a means to their ends.

Consent, Belief, Knowledge, Justice

Most Psychological models accept the Aristotelian distinction between one's belief that X is good for one, and one's knowledge that X is good for one. Now, Consent to something, e. g. to an exchange, is usually interpreted as an expression of the consenter's belief that the exchange is beneficial for them. However, the inadequacy of Belief to Knowledge leaves open the possibility that they are consenting to what, in fact, is not beneficial to them. Thus, the Consent to an exchange in which what the consenter receives is not commensurate with what they give, does not suffice to qualify it as 'just'; it merely exempts the other party from responsibility for the violation of Retributive Justice.

Justice, Consent, Self

When an exchange is unjust, e. g. due to misrepresentation, it is a violation of Retributive Justice, i. e. one party does not receive what they had taken to be commensurate with what they had given. So, implicit in such judgments is that the consent of a party suffices to ratify such commensuration. However, one's consent to purchases that are harmful to one, e. g. cigarettes, junk food, etc., is not uncommon. Hence, one can be unjust towards oneself.

Law of Supply and Demand, Justice, Karma

Entailed in the 'Law of Supply and Demand' is the achievement of an equilibrium on both sides of an exchange, and, hence, of a commensuration between what each party gives and receives. Now, as has been previously discussed, common to Retributive Justice and Karma is such commensuration, while one significant distinction is that the former is an artefactual institution, whereas the latter is typically conceived as either a divine or a natural force. But, Smith presents the Law as inherent in Economic activity, and, further, his more fervent laissez-faire followers insist that it is not to be interfered with. Hence, that cardinal principle of Capitalism is more akin to Karma than to Retributive Justice.

Justice and Commensuration

As the contrast with Karma illustrates, Retributive Justice is an attempt to superimpose commensuration on heterogeneity, i. e. on the discontinuity between what one does and what one undergoes. So, the primary challenge to the attempt is the determination of a standard of measure, which is sometimes more readily available in punitive contexts, e. g. an eye, a tooth, a life, etc. then it is in economic ones, insofar as they are constituted by exchanges of different goods. Thus, though, as has been previously discussed, Distributive Justice is a special, more complex, case of Retributive Justice, i. e. involving multiple participants, implementation is actually often easier than in the simpler scenario. For, it typically entails a quantification, e. g. each participant is equally a single member, on the basis of which commensuration can be immediately determined, e. g. each receives an equal share, thereby accomplishing a just retribution to each.

Distributive Justice and Retributive Justice

The concept of Distributive Justice requires a formulation of proportionality between input and allotment. Thus, for example, if A invests twice as much as B in some enterprise, then A receiving twice as much as B from the profits is 'just'. Now, another common example of such a formulation is so trivial that it is often only implicitly expressed--when the determining factor is that each is simply a single member of a collective, corresponding to which is, therefore, an equal share of an allotment, e. g. in a Rawlsian 'original position'. So, regardless of such variations, fairness in distribution is ultimately based on commensuration between input and receipt, or, in other words, on Retributive Justice. But, the converse does not hold--Retributive Justice is definable independently of Distributive Justice. Thus, though they are typically treated as distinct varieties of Justice, the latter is a special case of the former.

Retributive Justice and Artefactual Karma

The concept of Retributive Justice entails those of Property and Equivalence. For, it presupposes that that to which what one receives corresponds is, in some respect, 'one's own', and that the correlation is that of Equality. Thus, grounding the concept is that of constancy in an orbital pattern of motion initiated by, and returning to, some agent. In other words, underlying the concept of Retributive Justice is that of what is often more familiarly known as 'Karma'. However, one significant distinction between the two is that the latter is conceived as either 'natural', or 'divine', whereas, the former is an artefactual institution. Thus, for example, the Labor Theory of Value, according to which retribution for work should correspond to the quantity of energy invested in the modification of some material, is a special case of artefactual Karma

Dismalness, Science, Justice

The usually jocular banter over whether or not Economics is a "dismal" Science obscures the more serious premise that it is a 'Science' at all. Entailed in that premise is that the object of Economics is an inherent regularity of phenomena, with respect to which, e. g. the 'Law of Supply and Demand' is descriptive, and, not, say, wishfully fictitious. More generally, that classification preempts the possibility that Economics is primarily a normative problem, i. e. a topic under the category of Retributive Justice. Contributing to that preemption is the common restriction of 'retributive' to punishment, and, hence, to jurisprudential issues, whereas the term in its literal meaning includes rewards, as well, and, therefore, pertains to the allocation of resources. The concept of Economics as a 'Science' thus circumvents the possible interpretation of it as a system of exploitation, e. g. in which the actual producers of wealth are not its beneficiaries, and for whom, therefore, Economics is indeed dismal as a Science.

Free Will, Determinism, Exertion

The standard 'Free Will vs. Determinism' debate tends to be conducted along methodological lines: the experiential datum 'free choice' is taken at face value by Empiricists, Phenomenalists, Phenomenologists, etc., while Rationalists argue that such an interpretation is inadequate to conditioned behavior, i. e. which also includes such a momentary appearance. But, as has been previously discussed, such 'freedom' of choice is, more precisely, that of favoring one specific course of action over another, and, hence, does not apply to the the spontaneity of Exertion. Now, the latter, as an immediately evident experiential datum, might appeal to Empiricists, etc., except the ordered sequence of events that exerting oneself can initiate eludes their standard, i. e. Atomistic, concept of Causality. And, proto-Rationalist Kant does recognize that 'freedom' is a 'fact', but his subsequent confusion involving 'Legislative Will' and 'Elective Will', indicates that he does not extend such self-subsistence to the fact of Motility. So, Exertion seems to be inconvenient to both sides of that traditional debate.

Freedom, Exertion, Intention

As has been previously discussed, Exertion is independent of its object, i. e. of what one is trying to do. In other words, just as in driving a vehicle, acceleration and steering are independent though coordinated mechanisms, physiological motion and the direction of motion are distinct though coordinated factors in behavior. Correspondingly, any 'freedom' to exert oneself is inherently independent of any 'freedom' to choose a course of behavior, i. e. to formulate an 'Intention', as Kant belatedly stumbles upon when he discovers that the Elective Will is not reducible to the Legislative Will. Now, as a theory, Capitalism is especially afflicted by a conflation of the two--it does not recognize that 'freedom' of Exertion is not inconsistent with an Intention being the product of external conditioning, though, in practice, the profitability that it advocates often depends on, if not promotes, the latter unfreedom.

Capitalism, Causality, Value

As Kant shows, the inadequacy of Hume's Atomistic Empiricist concept of Causality is that its central component, Conjunction, lacks the ordinality that distinguishes Cause from Effect, i. e. 'A and B are conjoined' is his analysis of both 'A causes B' and 'B causes A'. Now, Labor is a special case of Causality, i. e. in which some material is transformed from one condition to another. Thus, Hume's system is inadequate to the concept of Labor. But, Smith's Capitalism is essentially such Atomistic Empiricism. Hence, the Exchange Theory of Value, which is based on no more than circumstantial association, is compatible with his premises, whereas the Labor Theory of Value is not. Thus, his advocacy of the former, to the disadvantage of the latter, reflects more his methodological commitments than some insight into specifically Economic relations.

Exertion, Reward, Labor

Perhaps the primary Practical significance of the concept of Freedom is its implication in the concept of Retributive Justice, the proper meaning of which spans both Reward and Punishment, in contrast with the common usage, which usually connotes only the latter. For, an assignment of desserts requires ascribability of an action to some agent, which presupposes that the latter initiates it. Now, as has been previously discussed, Exertion is always self-initiated. Thus, for example, since Exertion applied to some material is Labor, the latter should be rewarded in proportion to the modification of the material effected by Exertion. In other words, Freedom implies a Labor Theory of Value. However, while Smith, at times, seems to subscribe to that theory, he eventually abandons it, in favor of an Exchange Theory, according to which, what Labor 'deserves' is whatever wage is set for it by the market. So, despite its familiar rhetoric, Capitalism tends to undermine, not promote, personal Freedom.