Free Will, Determinism, Exertion

The standard 'Free Will vs. Determinism' debate tends to be conducted along methodological lines: the experiential datum 'free choice' is taken at face value by Empiricists, Phenomenalists, Phenomenologists, etc., while Rationalists argue that such an interpretation is inadequate to conditioned behavior, i. e. which also includes such a momentary appearance. But, as has been previously discussed, such 'freedom' of choice is, more precisely, that of favoring one specific course of action over another, and, hence, does not apply to the the spontaneity of Exertion. Now, the latter, as an immediately evident experiential datum, might appeal to Empiricists, etc., except the ordered sequence of events that exerting oneself can initiate eludes their standard, i. e. Atomistic, concept of Causality. And, proto-Rationalist Kant does recognize that 'freedom' is a 'fact', but his subsequent confusion involving 'Legislative Will' and 'Elective Will', indicates that he does not extend such self-subsistence to the fact of Motility. So, Exertion seems to be inconvenient to both sides of that traditional debate.