Evaluation, Pathos of Distance, Slave Morality

As has been previously discussed, according to Nietzsche, the act of Evaluation involves a "pathos of distance", i. e. a feeling of superiority, which thereby distinguishes it from Emotivist utterances that merely report a mechanical effect of pleasure or pain.  Now, the sentences that constitute 'Slave Morality' are either Evaluations proper, or Emotivist utterances.  Likewise, the Ressentiment that, according to e. g. the Genealogy of Morals, I, 13, is the ground of those sentences, is constituted by either a pathos of distance, ore else is simply a mechanical response.  But, if the former, then Ressentiment possesses a strength lacking in the latter, in which case 'Slave Morality' is a Political classification, and not a Psychological one, i. e. the rubric denotes Political, but not Psychological weakness.  If so, then, Nietzsche's concern with the 'Nihilism' that he diagnoses as rooted in Ressentiment, is Oligarchical, as many have interpreted his fundamental orientation.  So, if, in contrast, his concern is general and medical, as he at least sometimes presents himself, then he seemingly needs to either debunk the 'Slave's' 'feeling of superiority', or else deny that sentences that constitute Slave Morality, e. g. 'X is evil', are properly 'Evaluations'.  Whether or not he can accomplish that without recanting his concept of a "slave rebellion in morals" (Beyond Good and Evil, #195) is unclear.