Affirmation, Evaluation, Order of Rank

A Morality founded on the affirmation of all Life is sharply contrasted with one conceived as a weapon of Ressentiment, especially since, unlike the later, it does not have at its disposal a ready-made basis of evaluative division, e. g. enmity.  Instead, Evaluation must maintain the presupposition of the fundamental homogeneity of universal Affirmation, within which distinctions are to be made, distinctions that must, therefore, be of degree, not of kind.  Accordingly, Nietzsche's concept of 'Order of Rank' spans differences of degree, not of kind, which the terms "higher" and "lower", appearing in #30 of Beyond Good and Evil, express more appropriately than does the "good" vs. "bad" polarity that he frequently uses, e. g. notably in #260 of BGE, and its continuation in On the Genealogy of Morals.  That polarity is difficult to reconcile with universal Affirmation, and in conjunction with some of his strident language, encourages the interpretation that he, too, conceives Morality as a weapon of Ressentiment.  Instead, since even Ressentiment is part of Life, it is affirmed, but is of a lower rank.