Experimental Reason--Constitutive and Regulative

Kant's distinction between 'constitutive' and 'regulative' Reason is his representation of the traditional 'Platonist' vs. 'Nominalist' contrast, i. e. whether Reason is ingredient in Existence, or is merely a human mental tool.  His pivotal innovation is to propose that the distinction pertains to Theoretical Reason only, for, Pure Practical Reason is both constitutive and regulative.  A similar argument can be made for Experimental Reason--even if it might not be constitutive for Theory, e. g. 'God does not pause to wonder', it is so for Practice, not merely for methodical scientists, but for a child curious to discover 'What if?'  Still, if, e. g. Lucretius is correct to propose that 'Swerve' is ingredient in Existence, then Experimental Reason, qua instance of Swerve, is constitutive for Theory, as well.  Hence, Experimental Reason eludes traditional classifications, and the debates predicated upon them.