Experimental Reason and the Quantification of Experience

The enduring appeal of Pythagoreanism--that the world is intrinsically mathematical--has been so pervasive that even an Empiricist such as Locke accepts it, i. e. among his Primary Qualities,  But, the subsequent subjectivization of Mathematics by Berkeley and Hume, raises for Kant the problem of the legitimacy of the quantification of Experience, in general, and, of Mathematical Physics, in particular.  His 'Copernican' solution is to conceive Physics as a system of subjective appearances that, concomitantly, objectifies them, while remaining agnostic about things-in-themselves.  However, while that solution might suffice for Theory, its agnosticism is inadequate for Practice, which entails interaction with things-in-themselves.  In contrast, Locke, anticipating Pragmatism, briefly offers the insight that any correspondence between subjective Secondary Qualities and objective Primary Qualities is, ultimately, provisional, i. e. is a problem of ongoing adjustment.  So, to elaborate on that insight, the quantification of Experience, systematic, or otherwise, by Experimental Reason, is itself experimental, i. e. is validated by being effective until proven otherwise.