Spinoza--Good and Evil

According to Spinoza, 'Good' and 'Evil' are ideas that exist only in the mind of a finite entity, as perceptions of external objects as constructive or destructive, respectively, of it. Hence, God, an infinite entity, has no concept of either, and, since an 'adequate idea', in Spinoza's system, is one that God thinks, 'X is good' and 'X is evil' are always inadequate ideas. On the other hand, God has an adequate idea of every finite entity, and, hence, has one of every modification of a finite entity. Thus, he has one of every harmful encounter in the experience of a finite entity. But a harmful encounter of P with X, is, by definition, one in which X is 'evil' for P. Hence, Spinoza seems to have not precluded that God does have thoughts of Evil, and, for similar reasons, of God, in a relativized sense. So, if God does think 'X is evil for P', it is an adequate idea. Thus, if P thinks 'X is evil for me', e. g. P is aware of being allergic to X, then it is not necessarily an inadequate idea, depending on the degree of reasoning involved, and likewise for thoughts of 'Good'. However, Spinoza seems to give no indication of recognizing the adequacy of 'Good' and 'Evil' in this relativized respect, without which, he seems committed to the potentially harmful dismissal of any individual perception of a legitimate threat to them as an 'inadequate' idea.

Spinoza and Political Philosophy

In Spinoza's system, individuals are Modes, i. e. modifications of Nature. They are thus naturally in a condition of interdependence, so the function of political life is to optimize the natural symbiosis. In other words, Spinoza conceives political association as an enhancement of the good of any individual involved. In contrast, for Hobbes, political association is a corrective to natural antagonism, via constraint on the self-interest of any individual involved. On the other hand, Locke agrees with Spinoza that political association enhances the individual, but unlike for Spinoza, such enhancement, for Locke, is contingent, rather than necessary, in the metaphysical sense. And, the optimization that political association, according to Spinoza, promotes, is not an approximation to a Rousseauian lost natural harmony, nor is the general good attributable to a Rousseauian particular Will. So, Spinoza's Political Philosophy is akin to, but distinguishable from, its prominent peers of the era. More generally, since political association is a means to the good of each of its members, Political Philosophy is a branch of Ethics, according to Spinoza, not antagonistic to it. Likewise, because God and Nature are identical in Spinozism, 'rendering unto Caesar' is not antithetical to 'rendering unto God', but is, more accurately, itself a divine rendering.

Spinoza and Courage

For Spinoza, Virtue is Rational conduct, and the most general Virtue is 'Fortitude', which he defines as 'strength of character'. In turn, the two main types of Fortitude are Courage, which aims at the good of the agent, and 'Highmindedness', i. e. Generosity, which aims at the good of others. While the inclusion of Courage among a list of Virtues is not unusual, that Spinoza reduces Temperance to a species of it, is. The cardinality, for him, of Courage can be interpreted as autobiographical, given the threats provoked by a theory coming from a scientific Jew in an era still dominated by Christian dogmatism. However, the primacy of Courage is systematically grounded. For, Spinoza regards Philosophy as, first and foremost, an alternative to Superstition, which he diagnoses as rooted in Fear, i. e. in the uncertainty of indifferent, if not hostile, Nature. Hence, he attempts to demonstrate how each individual is implicated in a divine, rationally necessary, natural system, which, based on the premise that Knowledge eliminates all passions, thereby overcomes Fear. The result secondarily serves as fortification against social authority that demands submission to it insofar as it purports to mediate appeasement of presumably supernatural forces as a response to Fear.

Spinoza and Egoism

Spinoza's Ethics can be classified as 'Egoism', but his anti-Teleological version distinguishes it from many of the standard varieties. While Psychological Egoism asserts that one always acts in one's self-interest, Ethical Egoism asserts that one should always act in one's self-interest, implying not merely that one does not always act that way, but that one can fail to act that way even while believing that they are doing so, e. g. conditioned behavior. Thus, Teleological 'self-interest', in which one finds satisfaction in the attainment of external goods, whether 'higher' or 'lower', is only conditioned behavior, and, hence not truly for one's own good. Instead, argues Spinoza, only the endeavor itself to persist in one's being is in one's self-interest, because it constitutes independence from external influences, which, rather serve it as promoting it. Furthermore, since mutual interpersonal activity enhances the endeavors of each involved, Egoism and sociality are not antagonistic, according to him. Finally, Spinoza's kind of Egoism is divinely based, because the endeavor of a Mode to persist in its being is nothing but a modification of God's ceaseless creativity.

Spinoza, Modification, Sense Experience

According to Spinoza, sense experience consists of representations of bodily modifications, e. g. a visual perception is a representation of the effect of the object of perception on one's visual apparatus. The primary significance for him of such an analysis of sense experience is that a sensory representation is, thus, an inadequate idea, both of the affected body and of the affecting object. So, he does not pursue some of its other implications. For example, since a modification is a variation on a previous condition, the previous condition is entailed in the representation of the modification. Spinoza thereby challenges the long traditions, commonsensical, as well as Platonist and Empiricist, that treats the experience of a secondary quality as a synchronous event, as if each such experience occurred to a tabula rasa. Furthermore, since a modification is a transition from a prior to a subsequent condition, this account entails the fundamental temporality of sense experience, without needing to resort, as Kant does, to a transcendental demonstration of that temporality. Finally, since sense experience is a contrast with a prior condition, the more accurate type of language to describe it would seem to be comparative, rather than positive, modifiers, e. g. 'I am feeling colder' as opposed to 'I am cold', despite the long tradition otherwise.

Spinoza, Kant, Virtue, Reward

Both Spinoza and Kant believe that personal Virtue consists in Rational conduct. But, whereas the former holds that Virtue is its own reward, Kant regards it as an incomplete Good without Happiness. Spinoza's formulation that 'Virtue is its own reward' is slightly inaccurate, because Virtue is accompanied by a certain degree of Pleasure, and it is the latter which seems to be the actual locus of the satisfaction that he attributes to the attainment of Virtue. Hence, his judgment regarding Virtue is contingent, as Kant's dissatisfaction with that Pleasure bears out. In contrast, Kant maintains that the insufficiency of that Pleasure can serve as a disincentive to acting Rationally, i. e. that it is insufficient to counter other miseries that can interfere with Rational conduct. Furthermore, he argues that the Highest Good, which entails Virtue, is incomplete without Happiness. However, both of these points seem to undermine his Rational Principle. For, according to that Principle, one should obey Reason for its own sake alone, regardless of circumstances or consequences, and, hence, independently of the degree of Pleasure involved, of the strength of temptation to do otherwise, or of any hardship that might ensue. So, while his denial that Virtue is its own reward might have merit, Kant cannot ground it in his Rational Principle. Without this buttress, he encourages the suspicion that his disagreement with Spinoza reduces to a theological issue--his attempt to rescue the possibility of afterwordly rewards that is precluded by Spinoza's Pantheism.

Spinoza, Pity, Hope

Spinoza offers analyses of the various Emotions, as well as a moral assessment of each. The assessments of two of the Emotions that he considers, while not receiving from him any special attention, are contrary to not only conventional wisdom, but also some significant Moral theories. According to the analysis, the two fundamental Emotions are Pleasure and Pain, and the rest entail them in various combinations. According to the assessment, anything that strengthens an individual is a 'Good' for them, and anything that weakens one is an 'Evil' for them. The connection between the analysis and the assessment is that Pleasure is the idea of one's being strengthened, and Pain the idea of one's being weakened. For example, Pity, or, alternatively, Sympathy, Compassion, Commiseration, etc., is a sharing of Pain. Thus, Pity is an Evil, from which it does not follow that it is not Moral to alleviate the suffering of others, just that the state itself is one of weakness. Also, Hope entails, to at least some degree, a Fear of failure, and Fear is a Painful state. Hence, Hope, at best, is not an unalloyed Good. The Ethical status of Pity and Hope for Spinoza are thus contrary to many conventional Moralities. Furthermore, they present sharp challenges to Schopenhauer, for whom Pity is the Highest Good, and to Kant, for whom Hope is both an ingredient in his Highest Good, and a component of his Architectonic.

Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Thought

Schopenhauer's Philosophy is explicitly a variation on Kant's system. It interprets the 'thing-in-itself' as Will, and appearances, including the Self, as epiphenomena, and, hence, as irreal. But it can also be understood in terms of its divergence from Spinoza's system. Schopenhauer's Will is Spinoza's God, qua naturing nature, but without the attribute of Thought. That Will lacks Thought has two important consequences. First, since the existence of individual bodies is proven, for Spinoza, by their ideas being in the Thought of God, they are merely natured nature in the absence of that attribute. Second, Rationality has no adequacy, and is only a localized process, even in its Practical manifestation, if Will does not Think. Thus, the irreality, for Schopenhauer, of Individuality, is, from the perspective of Spinozism, primarily a function of the Thoughtlessness of Will, with respect to which the ontological status of Modes as epiphenomena is derivative.

Spinoza, Leibniz, Voltaire

It seems inarguable that Leibniz is a target of Voltaire's mockery in Candide. For, he explicitly challenges Leibniz' thesis that 'this is the best of all possible worlds' with factual examples of human suffering. But, his target is slightly inaccurate, for, it is, rather, another of Leibniz' principles to which those examples more immediately apply, one that is implicit in Spinoza's system, as well. What e. g. the Lisbon earthquake would more directly refute is, instead, the thesis of 'pre-established' harmony, which presumes to preclude the possibility of the existence of such dissonant events., as does Spinoza's Rationalism. And, since Spinoza rejects Leibniz' Best World thesis, because he argues that the thought of possible but non-actual worlds does not exist in the mind of God, it is, more precisely, the Harmony thesis that the existence of human suffering would refute. One fundamental problem for any Rational system is to explain the existence of conflict in a world presumably governed by a principle of non-contradiction, i. e. a world in which Harmony is guaranteed from the outset. Voltaire's expression of dissatisfaction with Leibniz' solution to that problem also applies to Spinoza's system.

Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Organism

As has been discussed, the concept of Organism is problematic in terms of Causality for Spinozism. But, it may be weaker in a different respect. Schopenhauer's thesis that individuality is illusory means that any distinction within a monistic system is arbitrarily drawn, and Spinozism is such a system. Hence, the existence of any Mode, including organisms, may be problematic for Spinoza. Schopenhauer's thesis implies, for example, that Spinoza's attempts to distinguish bodies on the basis of motion-and-rest, or on contiguity, are inadequate. Likewise, since Mind is no more than the idea of Body, and a possibly inadequate one, it cannot be the ground of individuation in the system, either. More generally, the lack of a Principle of Sufficent Reason for the generation of Modes, means that Spinoza does not demonstrate that God's creativity is, say, undifferentiated emanation, the interpretation of which as a chain of discrete causes and effects is an inadequate idea. Schopenhauer's criticism applies potentially to any theory that asserts the existence of individuals, but especially so to Spinoza's most conscientiously Rational system.

Reason and Organism

Kant's concept of Organism seems to be derived from his Rational Idea, the 'Kingdom of Ends'. If so, then his focus on Purposiveness distracts him from a deeper problem with any Spinozist concept of Organism. The primary characteristic of Reason, Purposive or otherwise, is its non-contradictoriness. Hence, a Nature that is a product of Reason should be conflict-free. And, yet, Spinoza affirms that one part of Nature can be harmful to another. So, the question for Spinozism is not 'how are organisms possible?', but 'how are non-organistic entities possible?, and it is unclear that he has a satisfactory answer.

Spinoza, Kant, Whitehead, Organism

Since Kant holds that the concept of Purposiveness is essential to the concept of Organism, his dissatisfaction with Spinoza's treatment of the former amounts to a challenge to the capacity of Spinozism to accommodate the latter. In scientific terms, Kant rejects the reduction of Biological nature to Mechanistic nature, and interprets Spinoza's system as purely Mechanistic. In contrast, Whitehead judges that his 'philosophy of organism' is "closely allied" with Spinozism, perhaps noting, as Kant seems not to, that Spinoza asserts that all created entities, human or otherwise, are "animated". In other words, Whitehead seems to reject the interpretation of Spinozism as Mechanistic. If so, however, he thereby seems to overlook his own grounds for criticizing Spinoza. For, his scheme categorically distinguishes between living and non-living entities, whereas, for Spinoza, any difference is only one of degree. Furthermore, that distinction is based, for Whitehead, on the irreducibility of the thought 'I want X' to Efficient Causality, a reducibility which Spinoza seems to affirm. Thus, it is open to Kant to respond that Whitehead's system is not in fact allied with one in which living entitities are not motivated by Teleological Causality. In other words, despite Whitehead's support, Spinoza's non-Teleological notion of animation lingers as problematic. One, and perhaps the only, solution, is for Spinoza to admit into his system another kind of Causality, such as Formal Causality, in which all intentions function as determinative of action qua the shaping and guiding of motion. Otherwise, he seems to be committed to accepting either that stones are organisms, or that humans are not organisms.

Spinoza, Kant, Purposiveness

In the Critique of Judgment, Kant attributes to Spinoza an explanation of Purposiveness that he regards as inadequate. Kant terms that explanation 'fatalistic'--that different elements of nature are suitable to one another can only be due, according to Kant, to fortuitous circumstance in Spinoza's non-Teleological system, because the latter rules out the possibility that such suitability reflects intentional design. Now, though Spinoza does not explicitly espouse such a position, it does seem consistent with what he does articulate. Spinoza also does not have at his disposal the non-Teleological explanation of natural suitability that arises to prominence two centuries later, namely the process of evolutionary Adaptation. Nevertheless, the latter is not only consistent with his non-Teleological doctrine, but it confirms his thesis that his knowledge of Nature is by no means complete. So, even if the notion of Adaptation is unknown to both him and Kant, Kant is wrong to assert that natural suitability is inexplicable from Spinoza's premises. Regardless, Kant's argument as presented is besides the point. For, his own concept of Purposiveness is a Regulative Idea only, i. e. he explicitly agrees with Spinoza that Efficient Causality cannot ground Purposiveness. Hence, his disagreement with Spinoza regarding Purposiveness must, first and foremost, be in terms of its heuristic value, not its content, and, so, his objection must directly address Spinoza's thesis that it is an idea that is deleterious to the intellect of a Mode. Plainly, Kant's argument is otherwise occupied.

Spinoza and Teleology.

Probably following the example of modern Physics, Spinoza attempts to eliminate Teleology from Metaphysics. That is, God, in Spinozism, never acts purposefully, either proximally or remotely. Instead, the root of Teleological thinking, according to Spinoza, is the same idea that is the origin of the thesis of Free Will, namely, the consciousness 'I want X', from which the mind has the tendency to infer 'X is for me', in turn from which the notion that 'God has a plan' is an extrapolation. But, 'I want X' is an inadequate idea, not only because it is ignorant of its preconditions, but because it cannot be an idea in God, and, hence, is not adequate. Thus, the emergence in his system of an idea of the form 'O is useful to S' seems ungrounded, for, its structure is plainly purposive. Spinoza treats it as if it follows from 'S endeavors to persist in its being', and 'O preserves or increases the strength of S', but it would follow only with a further proposition "'O causes S' is equivalent to 'O is a means to S'". However, the latter cannot be an idea in God, so, it is not an adequate idea, in which case, it can have no place in Spinoza's deduction, leaving him with a vestige of Teleology.

Spinoza, Kant, and The Power of Reason

Spinoza and Kant are traditionally classified as being in dispute regarding the possibility of Free Will--Spinoza denies it, holding that every cause, except God, is the effect of a preceding cause, while Kant affirms it, arguing that some events can be interpreted as both having and not having such an antecedent. However, the issue is more complicated. Spinoza, as has been recently discussed, does advocate a concept of Freedom, and identifies Reason and Will. Furthermore, his concept of conatus has a zone of indeterminacy--the endeavor to persist in being does not explain how an entity can seek to increase its strength. Meanwhile, despite his efforts to identify Pure Practical Reason and Free Will, Kant fails, eventually acknowledging that freedom of choice requires a notion of 'Will' that is distinct from Pure Practical Reason. But, one point of agreement seems to be that Practical Reason has the power to overcome heteronomous influences, whether it is the aroma of unhealthy food or money that a false promise could secure. Even in his inability to explain why his Principle of Pure Practical Reason can be motivationally compelling, Kant is implicitly agreeing with Spinoza that when it is so, it exercises a more powerful influence on an entity than a competing force. However, it is unclear if Kant would go so far as to agree with Spinoza that the resistance to Reason and an inadequate idea of a Rational principle are one and the same. Still, the two might agree that the categorical limits that Hume, for example, places on Reason is an arbitrary expression of contingent weakness.

Spinoza, Kant, Practical Reason

Spinoza is typically classified as a 'Continental Rationalist', and taught in a sequence that also includes Descartes and Leibniz. For sure, Descartes influences Spinoza, and Spinoza influences Leibniz. However, what sharply distinguishes Spinoza from the other two is that his notion of 'Reason' is, more properly, 'Practical Reason', in which respect, his closer historical peer is, rather, Kant. Nevertheless, Kant's only reference to Spinoza in relation to Practical Reason does not appear until the Critique of Judgment--he rejects Spinoza's thesis that Virtue is its own reward. But, since Virtue for both means Rational conduct, Spinoza is, on this issue, the more consistent Rationalist, because he affirms, while Kant denies, that Reason is a sufficient Good. Otherwise, since it is generally accepted that Spinozist 'Reason' is only Theoretical, the Critique of Pure Reason is generally taken as an implicit critique of Spinozism. Furthermore, even qua Practical, Spinozist Reason seems to exemplify what Kant variously classifies as 'technical' or 'prudential', i. e. a mere means to personal non-rational ends, in contrast with 'moral', which alone for Kant qualifies as 'Pure Practical Reason'. On the other hand, Spinoza's assertion that "the good which each follower of virtue seeks for himself, he will desire also for others" expresses the same content as Kant's Principle of Pure Practical Reason, so Spinozist Reason is also 'moral' in the Kantian sense. Thus, Kant, but not Spinoza, draws a distinction between self-interested and impersonal Practical Reason, thereby implying a disagreement between the two as to the essence of Practical Reason. The ground of the disagreement is theological--for the Pantheist, natural and divine Practical Reason are one and the same, while for the Theist, they are not--so Kant, but not Spinoza needs to distinguish between supernatural Practical Reason from natural Practical Reason, as expressed in his distinctions between 'moral' and 'prudential', and 'categorical' and 'hypothetical', among others. Hence, Kant's most significant advance with respect to Spinoza on the topic is to formulate Practical Reason in imperatival terms.

Spinoza, Plato, Empowerment

Some passages in the Ethics encourage a Platonist interpretation of Spinoza's "knowledge of God". That, for Spinoza, such knowledge is intuition; that the knowledge of God entails understanding the eternity of God; and that such knowledge qualifies as the highest virtue, suggest a similarity of his 'knowledge of God' and the Platonist 'contemplation of the Good'. However, the differences are significant. First, whereas the Platonist 'Good' is supernatural, the Spinozist 'God' is Nature, qua dynamic creativity. Second, while, Platonic Forms are generally interpreted as simple, for Spinoza, the idea of God entails God's causality. Third, while for Plato, the idea of the Good is both a necessary and a sufficient condition of Virtue, for Spinoza, the knowledge of God is not necessary to virtuous conduct. More generally, every idea has an effect, according to Spinoza, which means that, unlike the contemplation of the Good for Plato, the knowledge of God is not an end-in-itself. Rather, like all knowledge, it promotes an increase in the activity, and a decrease in the passivity, of the knower. In other words, for Spinoza, the knowledge of God is empowerment more than enlightenment, and Spinoza is as much a Baconian as a Platonist or a Cartesian.

Spinoza, Parallelism, Form-Matter

Mind-Body parallelism is not happenstance in Spinoza's system. It is entailed by the more fundamental thesis that Mind and Body are two aspects of the experiences of one and the same entity. Likewise, Mind and Body are either both active or both passive in his system, in contrast with traditions for which one is active and the other passive. Spinoza originally introduces the distinction between 'active' and 'passive' as that between 'nature naturing' and 'nature natured', or, more commonly, creator-created, as preparation for terming God's creatures 'Modes'. But Modes are not thereby immutably passive, and can become active to a lesser or greater degree, depending on the acquisition of adequate ideas. In On the Improvement of the Understanding, Spinoza specifies that adequate ideas are definitions that meet certain criteria, and in the case of the definition of a created thing, one criterion is that the definition comprehend the proximate cause of the thing, e. g. a 'circle' is a "figure described by a line whereof one end is fixed and the other free". Hence, drawing a circle with this definition in mind exemplifies active conduct, as well as what he elsewhere characterizes as action "determined" by reason. Now, as has been argued previously here, in the performing of such an action, the definition is the 'Form' of the performance, and the physical motion its 'Matter', with both dynamic processes. Thus, qua active, Mind and Body are a Form-Matter relation, which, by analogy, suggests that so, too, are God's attributes, Thought and Extension. However, if so, then that God can possess additional attributes, as Spinoza speculates, is impossible, i. e. Form and Matter are exhaustively complementary.

Spinoza and Practical Parallelism

Hume's treatment of Causality not merely challenges Spinoza's Parallelism, but transforms it from an Ontological to an Epistemological thesis. Hence, what Spinoza conceives as a relation between the physical and the mental aspects of events is re-conceived as a relation between events and the representation of events, a transformation that Kant's response to Hume reinforces. It has been only more recently, by e. g. Alexander, Whitehead, and Deleuze, that Ontological Parallelism in its own right has been revived. Still, these treatments seem to ignore a further species of Parallelism, that even Spinoza only occasionally addresses. Since, every course of human conduct is a sequence of events, Ontological Parallelism applies to it as well, i. e. the sequence consists of both a concatenation of motions and a concatenation of ideas, that are the same. In other words, the thesis entails what might be termed 'Practical Parallelism'. Spinoza offers only brief allusions to the dynamics of Practical Parallelism, but, in characterizing actions as "determined" by Reason, as well as in his advocacy of genetic definitions, he seems to suggest that he conceives Body and Mind as a Matter-Form relation, which would, at least, qualify as a parallel.

Spinoza's Parallelism

Spinoza's 'Parallelism' is a common reference to his proposition that 'the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things'. Seemingly under-appreciated is that the proposition most immediately challenges the Teleological concept of Nature, in which the order of ideas is the inverse of the order of things--in the Teleological order of ideas, the End is prior to the Means, but in the order of things, the Means, i. e. the Efficient Cause, is prior to the End, i. e. the effect of that Cause. Now, Hume's theory of Causality is often taken as a refutation of Spinoza's Parallelism. The main thread of his argument is that Spinoza confuses three distinct structures--the analytical relation of a priori ideas, the synthetic relation of a posteriori ideas, and the relation between events--and that causal knowledge is the second type, with no correspondence to either the first or the third. An easy response for Spinoza is that the absence of the correspondence between the second and the other two only confirms the inadequacy of that kind of knowledge, and of its irrelevance to Parallelism, which pertains only to the relation between the those other two structures. That response also applies to interpretations of the course of events by not only common sense, but by theories of History as well, including Hegel's, i. e. that they are all inadequate constructions. A stronger objection to Parallelism can come from Pragmatism--since only God can verify it, there is no human way to either confirm or disprove it, so, hence, the proposition is meaningless. However, a Kantian might defend it as a useful 'Regulative' idea, i. e. as a potentially fruitful guide to any construction of a sequence of events, of both mundane and of historical scope.

Spinoza and Conatus

Spinoza defines the essence of any individual human as 'the endeavor to persist in its own being', with 'persist' also translatable as 'persevere'. However, this concept of conatus is often, e. g. Wolfson, represented as 'self-preservation', thereby aligning Spinoza with a long Stoic-based tradition, that includes, most influentially, Hobbes. The difference between 'persist'/'persevere' and 'preserve' is perhaps subtle, but of potentially great significance. Whereas, 'preserve' connotes the maintaining of some already determined entity, 'persist'/'persevere' is open-ended. Indeed, the Spinozistic Mode not only persists, but has the capacity to increase its strength. In other words, preserve, but not persist/persevere, precludes the possibility of growth. Now, the contrast between self-preservative conatus and evolvemental, i. e. self-growth, conatus has been previously discussed here, with some of the main conclusions being that the former, which has dominated Anglo-Saxon culture for centuries, breeds greed and antagonism, and, thus, stunts, the development of a healthy society. So, to take Spinoza's formulation at face value, his theory of conatus stands as a variation on the traditional one, and anticipates one that does not emerge into prominence for another two centuries.

Spinoza and Freedom

'Determinism' is the thesis that every event is the effect of a preceding cause, while 'Free Will' asserts that there are acts that are not the effects of some preceding cause. So, it is seemingly contradictory for Spinoza to both plainly affirm the former, and, yet, propose a theory of Freedom. His solution is to conceive 'Freedom' as a type of causal chain, specifically a rational sequence. On this account, Freedom, rational conduct, active conduct, and persistence in being are identical. Rationality achieves persistence in being by generating consistency in conduct, which is Free, because it resists external influences that produce the emotions that cause passive behavior. For Spinoza, 'persistence in being', not to be confused with 'self-preservation', is the essence of the individual, so only rational conduct is the individual's mode of being in accordance with its essence, since irrational behavior is willy-nilly, and, hence, inconsistent, i. e. lacking in persistence. With this doctrine, Spinoza is not attempting to reconcile his theory of Freedom of with the traditional one, but to reform it. He is, thus, not in dispute with e. g. Sartre regarding the nature of human motivation, but, rather, regarding the validity of the latter's thesis that Freedom consists in a spontaneous upsurge that negates all that precedes it, a challenge which Spinoza could substantiate by pointing out that Sartre himself eventually finds the thesis unsustainable. Still, what remains lacking in this new notion of Freedom is how, given that he is already committed to the position that Mind and Body have no causal interaction, Reason can guide conduct. One solution is that as such a guide, Reason is functioning as a Formal Cause, not an Efficient one, a possibility seemingly not inconsistent with other aspects of his system, but not one that Spinoza explicitly affirms.

Descartes, Spinoza, Method

Spinoza's advocacy of the 'geometric' method of proof implies a rejection of Descartes' method of doubt. The latter is, according to Spinoza, procedurally inadequate, for two main reasons. First, it employs as primitive, i. e. 'certainty' and 'doubt', notions that, at minimum, require definition, if not derivation, and, likewise, 'Mind' and 'Body' are soon introduced without preparation. Second, since the geometric method advances from certain proposition to certain proposition, 'I doubt X' cannot appear in a sound proof. Also unsound, according to Spinoza, is any attempt to prove the existence of anything without the existence of God as its initial premise. Conversely, any proof in which the existence of God is a conclusion is likewise unsound. Furthermore, Spinoza shows that any thought of the thought of X is no more certain than the thought of X, which means that Descartes cannot be both certain that he thinks that he thinks that his body exists and doubt that his body exists. Finally, Spinoza argues that every representation of X is an affirmation of the existence X, which means, first, that Descartes' affirmation of his conclusion that he exists is superfluous, and, second, that Descartes cannot simultaneously think X and doubt the existence of X, which his method seems to entail.

Whitehead on Descartes and Spinoza

Whitehead proposes that the fundamental relation between Descartes and Spinoza is that the latter provides a more coherent framework for the principles of the former, citing Spinoza's unification of Descartes' two substances as parallel attributes of the same subject. The same interpretation also seems to apply to Descartes' other significant dualism--Creator and Created--which Spinoza recasts as Substance and Mode, respectively. A further innovation of Spinoza's also follows from this second synthesis--since Mode is not independent of Substance, as a Creature is of its Creator, then the purported free will of a Cartesian existent is illusory. However, Whitehead's hypothesis does not seem to accommodate the most explicit of Spinoza's radicalizations--that the resultant system is an 'Ethics'. In particular, Whitehead does not explain how Cartesian enlightenment becomes Spinozistic empowerment, i. e. how Cartesian freedom from sensory cognition becomes Spinozistic freedom from emotional motivation. In other words, Cartesian Mind is essential cognitive, while Spinoza's is practical, a distinction that Whitehead's own system seems incapable of recognizing.

Descartes, Thinking, Willing

Descartes' proof that he exists is comprised of both objective and subjective dimensions. The main steps of the objective dimension are: 1. X is certain if and only if X cannot be doubted; 2. It is impossible to doubt that one is doubting; 3. Therefore, it is certain that one thinks; 4. Therefore, it is certain that one exists. The main steps of the subjective dimension are: 1. He is a willing being, i. e. he possesses the power to choose; 2. His criteria for choosing to believe X is that X is clear and distinct; 3. It is certain that he exists; 4. Therefore, it is clear and distinct that he exists; 5. Therefore, he exists. But, once Descartes begins to examine 'I will', the nature of his incorporeality becomes more problematic. For, according to his analysis, Willing is detached from his corporeality, and has wider scope than Thinking, but can be influenced by the latter. One systematization of these propositions is to distinguish Soul and Mind, which he seems to identify, with 'I will' as the most general expression of the Soul, and with Mind, i. e. 'I think', as one of its special functions. Such a concept of Soul stands in contrast to Aristotle's, which is not exclusively incorporeal, and in which volition is located in the animal part, beneath the rational part. Or, with 'I think' reserved, as is the case with Kant, for intra-psychic and, yet, impersonal functions, the Soul could be conceived as consisting of subjective and objective divisions, i. e. 'I will' and 'I think', respectively. In any case, the Thinking-Willing relation seems to present Descartes with some systematic complications.

Demon, Brain, Soul

One popular modernization of Descartes is the 'brain in a vat' interpretation of his 'evil demon' scenario. He proposes the latter to explain the possibility that the existence of one's own body can be doubted--it might be an illusion produced by a evil demon. Analogously, a brain in a vat, located in a laboratory, could be stimulated to create the illusion of the possession of a body. Now, the evil demon scenario is a pivotal element in Descartes' attempt to prove the Immortality of the Soul, which entails the possibility that the Soul can survive the death of the Body. For, that the existence of the Body can be doubted, whereas that of the Mind cannot, provides Descartes with the decisive separation of the two. Perhaps the soundness of his argument is questionable, since it entails equating 'I am not certain of my corporeality' and 'I am certain of my incorporeality'. Regardless, the modernization undercuts Descartes' purpose--a brain in a vat is still corporeal--so that even if it does explain how the perception of one's own body is illusory, it falls short of accomplishing what Descartes requires at this juncture--the dubitably of any corporeality whatsoever. Such an abstraction from the importance to Descartes of the thesis of the Immortality of the Soul is not a isolated modern case. For example, Sartre seems to completely ignore it in his critique of 'I think, therefore I am'. Furthermore, arguments often known as 'Refutation of the Idealism', and 'Proof of the Existence of the External World', are ridiculed by Moore and Heidegger, without any evidence of recognition of the roles that they serve Kant in his argument against Descartes regarding the Immortality of the Soul. That Sartre--in-itself vs. for-itself; Moore--natural vs. non-natural; and Heidegger--beings vs. Beings, each inherit Cartesian dualism, is perhaps evidence of the shallowness of such presentations.

Descartes and Modern Philosophy

Descartes is often described as the 'father of Modern Philosophy', and the most frequently cited reason for that characterization is his principle 'I think, therefore I am'. But that proposition is hardly universally ascribed to by subsequent Philosophers, and, within his own project, is only one result of a more fundamental ambition. Indeed, what most of the main modern schools--Rationalism, Empiricism, Transcendentalism, Intuitionism, Phenomenalism, Phenomenology, Epiphenomenalism, Dialecticism, Structuralism, Deconstructionism, Analytic Logicism--share with Cartesianism is that they are methods in the quest for Certainty. Even one prominent seeming exception, Pragmaticism, is explicitly a method in pursuit of modified Certainty, i. e. highest Probability. So, Heidegger is mistaken to classify Descartes as a modern Protagoras, the father of modern Subjectivism. For Descartes does not assert that he is the measure of all things--his presumption is that his logically sound method of doubt is the measure of all things, including of 'I am'. Instead, Heidegger's own ontologization of Phenomenology only underscores that Descartes' primary influence on Modern Philosophy is as the progenitor of the ascendancy of Epistemology, a not necessarily intentional paternity.

Descartes, Circularity, Method

The 'Cartesian Circle' refers to the alleged circularity of the reasoning with which Descartes appears to argue both that he is certain that God exists because God exists, and that God exists because he is certain that God exists. However, if there is any circularity involved, it is not specific to the theological content of the argument; rather it is a characteristic of Cartesian methodology in general. His method entails three premises. First, every appearance A in consciousness has a cause X. Second, if an effect exists, then so too does its cause. Third, if it is impossible for A to have any other cause than X, then X is certain. So, if X is certain, it is the cause of A, and, therefore, it exists. Conversely, if X exists, and it causes A, then it is impossible that A have any other cause than X, and, thus, X is certain. So, the alleged Cartesian Circle entails a specific application of a methodology comprised of an Epistemological premise, an Ontological premise, and a Modal premise, respectively. Unfortunately, Descartes breeds confusion by often expressing the Modal proposition 'It is impossible to doubt X' in Epistemic terms, 'I am certain that X'. Hence, his 'I am certain that God exists', may, more properly, mean, 'God necessarily exists', which might defuse the charge of circularity.

Descartes, Doubting, Thinking

As has been previously discussed, Descartes finds Certainty in his uncertainty, i. e. he cannot doubt that he doubts. What rescues him from Skepticism is his further proposition that Doubting is Thinking. That proposition can mean one of two things: either that Doubting and Thinking are identical, or, that the former is a species of the latter. That he means that Doubting is a species of Thinking seems most likely, because to reduce other modes of Thinking to Doubting seems difficult. But, for that very reason, his inference from "'I doubt' is certain" to "'I think' is certain" is invalid, i. e. it entails an illegitimate generalization of a property of Doubting to all modes of Thinking. Now, such a clumsy introduction of Thinking into his argument may represent more than a relaxation of logical rigor. It encourages the suspicion that Descartes' primary aim is not a presupposition-less reconstruction of Knowledge, but a re-grounding of traditional soul-body dualism.

Descartes, Certainty, and Uncertainty

Often ignored in the attention to Cartesian doubt is the original problem that is its condition, i. e. the end to which Descartes designs it as a means, namely Certainty. The historical backdrop of Descartes' project is familiar--with the demise of Medieval Philosophy, perhaps prompted by the emergence of Copernican cosmology, Descartes seeks to rebuild Knowledge. Reconstruction requires a sound foundation, and Certainty is, for Descartes, the criterion of foundational stability. Abstractly, his plan seems reasonable, but, concretely, 'Certainty' is too vague to be accepted at face value. For, it is unclear whether Certainty is a state of affairs, or an attribute, and, if the latter, whether it is a subjective aspect of experience, or a property of an object of experience, and, in either case, whether it is part of sense experience or of intellectual experience. For example, 'S is certain that X' often refers to a feeling experienced by S, while 'X is certain' refers to a property of X. Now, Descartes seems aware that the subjective feeling of certainty is inadequate as a foundation, since its apparent solidity is fleeting. Hence, only intellectual certainty is acceptable, because only the intellect can make guarantees that transcend the moment. But, such certainty cannot be a subjective aspect of experience, which is in flux, so it must be a property of an object of experience. As it turns out, Descartes determines it to be a property of doubting, but not qua subjective experience, rather qua object of experience, i. e. of reflection. That is why Sartre is correct to note Descartes' equivocal treatment of doubting, i. e. it vacillates in his argument between subjective experience and object of experience. But, the equivocation is ultimately a function of the uncertainty of Certainty, which Descartes resolves by objectifying 'I doubt'. And, since, 'I doubt' is an expression of uncertainty, Cartesian Certainty, the foundation of his reconstruction of Knowledge, is his Uncertainty.

The Logic of 'I Can'

While Descartes focuses on the Logic of 'I doubt', his effort is complicated by his seeming unawareness of the complications of the Logic of 'I can doubt'. More precisely, it is the Logic of 'I can' that is the source of the complication. For, the semantics and truth conditions of 'I can X', i. e. what it means, and its relations to some state of affairs to which it presumably refers, seem to elude the operations of traditional declarative Logic. In some respects, the meaning of 'I can X' resembles that of 'A causes B', namely, that it often entails 'I have done X', with no new accomplishment sufficing to satisfy 'I can X'. But, even without skepticism about its causality, the performance of X only proves that 'I have X', or even 'I was able to X', but not 'I can X', even in an isolated case. For, say that the performance begins at t, and is complete at u--at t, 'I can X' has not been proven, and at u, only 'I was able to X' has been proven. In other words, even if one does perform X, there is no time at which 'I can X' is true. Falsification is no less unwieldy, though it does assist in better defining 'I can X'. At t, 'I cannot X' is indeterminate, nor does the failure at u do have performed X suffice to falsify 'I can X', but the latter does show that 'I can X' entails 'I attempt X'. So, 'I can X' seems definable as 'If I attempt X, I accomplish X'. Still, establishment of the truth conditions of the latter seems to remain difficult, since it entails accurately determining at what point effort qualifies as 'attempt', i. e. not trying hard enough does not mean not being able. So, independent of the Logic of doubting, the logical status of 'I cannot doubt that I can (or do) doubt' is problematic for Descartes.