Friday, April 30, 2010

Reflection and Absorption

To 'reflect' means, most literally, to 'bend back'. For example, the Moon is said to 'reflect' the Sun because moonlight is a bending back, by the Moon, of sunlight. Hence, any sunlight that the Moon absorbs will not appear as moonlight. Likewise, it is inaccurate to speak of looking 'in' a mirror--what appears when one looks at a mirror is an image that has been bounced back away from the surface of the mirror, not something 'in' it. Similarly inaccurate is the common connotation of a 'reflective' type of person as 'self-absorbed'--a truly 'reflective' person expresses what is influencing them, rather than exhausts it. So, Rorty's image of the Mind as a 'mirror of nature' mischaracterizes the contemplative Philosophical tradition to which he contrasts the Pragmatist tradition. It is the Pragmatistic, not the Contemplativistic, Mind that expresses what it entertains, e. g. Peircian 'belief' is a representation that yields action.

Thursday, April 29, 2010

From Definition to Interpretation

Having a definition means that an expression is interpretable as such. Accordingly, the word 'interpretation' is interpretable as its definition, e. g. as 'the understanding of a linguistic expression. Furthermore, the relation between definiendum and definiens, in the case of the definition of the word 'interpretation', is pre-eminently self-dynamic--the definition denotes a process that begins with its definiendum, i. e. with the perception of the word 'interpretation', and ends with its definiens, i. e. with the understanding of that word. Thus, 'interpretation' might be described as 'self-instantiating', showing that the interpretation of any expression entails an instantiation of its definition. Hence, if Definition is the Sun of language, Interpretation is its Moon.

Wednesday, April 28, 2010

Plato, Language, and Definition

According to Plato himself, the contrast between shadows on a cave wall and real objects, presented in the Republic, is a metaphor for the relation between sensory objects and intellectual objects. But, another dimension of the imagery of that passage is that the shadows are deliberately produced by controllers within the cave. Hence, another interpretation of them, consistent with most, if not all, of Plato's work, is as Rhetoric, which would entail not merely sophistry and superstition, but language in general. On that basis, the metaphorical contrast is between language and thought, which Plato often asserts is a relation between copy and original. So, if that imagery is applied to Plato's writings themselves, they would have to be understood as no more than inessential, lending credence to the interpretation of his dialogues not merely as being inconclusive, but as shadows of conclusions that can only be extramural, i. e. non-verbal insights occurring to the participants. Furthermore, on such an understanding, the function of Definition in the course of a dialogue is not merely to fix terminology, but to break the chains of linguistic illusion. For, a definition, at minimum, objectifies a word, thereby exposing it as a mere shadow. Definition is thus the Sun of language--it not merely illuminates the meaning of words, but, furthermore, by revealing that they have meanings, it points to a realm beyond language, to 'reality', according to the metaphor.

Tuesday, April 27, 2010

Definition and the Heliotic Trope

As Derrida, among others, discusses an enduring motif in the Philosophical tradition is the heliotic trope, i. e. the use of the Sun as a metaphor in a theory, which conversely, often explicates the literal Sun, as well. For example, in Plato's Republic, the relation between the Form of the Good and Knowledge is presented as that between the Sun and the objects that it makes visible. Kant's distinction between Appearance and Thing-in-Itself suggests a distinction between the Sun that is one visible object among others, and a non-visible Sun-in-Itself that is the source of all visibility, including that of the appearing Sun. Heidegger goes further to suggest an 'Ontological Difference' between the visible object the Sun, and Visibility, the non-thing precondition of the visibility of all objects. Now, the structure of Definition shares some of the features of Plato's heliotic trope--since all meaningful words have a definition, the word 'definition' is the Sun of language. But, 'definition' is itself a word, and, it, too, has a definition, suggesting an outer-inner relation between 'definition' and the definition of 'definition'. However, rather than that relation being one between an appearance and an in-itself, it is frequently analyzed as that between a definiens and a definiendum. Furthermore, the latter relation entails a transition to a more complex expression from a less complex one, e. g. from a single word, to a group of words. So, analogously, the relation between Visibility and Sun is not one of Heideggerian Difference, but, rather, is one of process and reification, i. e. the Sun is nothing more than a process of becoming-visible. Or, as Plotinus has it, the Sun is a process of emanation, but with a modern variation--the emanation has a quantum pattern, so that the visible Sun is a quantum of emanation. Finally, as the example of neologic Definition shows, a coined term, prior to being defined, serves to discern a pattern, i. e. a unification of some manifold. Likewise, the Sun is not merely the origin of the visibility of its system, but its center of gravity, as well.

Monday, April 26, 2010

Moore, Good, and Definability

Moore asserts that 'the Good is indefinable'. Given that numerous definitions of 'the Good' have been offered, the assertion is plainly false, if by 'indefinable', he means 'impossible to physically define'. Now, his main argument against many of those definitions is that they entail 'naturalistic' properties, whereas the Good is 'non-natural'. Such an argument is, at best, inconclusive, because it implies a distinction between 'natural' and 'non-natural' that can only beg the question. He is also open to the response that 'indefinable' could mean nothing more than 'has yet to be defined', implying that Moore's assertion is indistinguishable from 'I have thus far failed to define the Good'. More problematic is that his thesis fails to distinguish between 'the Good is indefinable' and my Good is indefinable', i. e. that what others take to be 'the Good' is, in fact, a case of mistaken identity. If so, then his thesis does not establish the universality of what he calls 'Good'. So, his best explanation of his thesis is that 'the Good' is simple and sui generis, whereas Definition entails a plurality of components, at least some of which are general properties. In other words, for Moore, 'the Good' is a name that he attaches to a certain phenomenon in his experience. Because of the opacity of his experience, it is indeterminable whether or not that phenomenon can also be termed 'Harmony', in which case it would be non-naturalistically definable, i. e. as 'a suitablity of whole to parts'. Regardless, a further question is whether or not Moore also subscribes to the thesis that 'Indefinabilty is Good'. Given that indefinability is, at minimum, according to him, a characteristic of Goodness, it cannot be Bad. And, for one of the founders of Analytic Philosophy, atomic entities do have an honorific status. In any case, it follows from 'the Good is indefinable' that 'definability is not necessarily Good', which seems difficult to defend without begging some question.

Sunday, April 25, 2010

Definitiveness

According to many theories, the knowledge of any object consists in an ability to define the object. Hence, all such knowledge presupposes knowledge of Definition, i. e. an ability to define 'definition'. So, Definition is the basis of Knowledge in those Systems. But, Definition serves more than a merely cognitive function. Not only is it the precondition of all Knowledge, but the definition of 'definition' sets a standard for all definitions, and, hence, presents a criterion for distinguishing between good and bad definitions. In other words, Definition is normative, as well as cognitive, a characteristic which is perhaps best expressed by the property 'definitiveness'. So, if there is any self-predication that is appropriate to Definition, it might be that 'Definition is definitive', and, furthermore, all definitions are definitive, i. e. normative, for particular objects of knowledge. Thus, as a basis of all Knowledge, as normative, and as self-predicating, Definition would seem to qualify as a Platonic 'Idea', entailing that it is an 'Ideal' as well.

Saturday, April 24, 2010

Definition and Self-Exemplification

The definition of Definition applies to every other definition. Hence, Definition can be described as 'self-exemplifying'. An approximately related term, associated with Platonism, 'self-predicating', seems less appropriate, because unlike the bearers of self-predication in Platonism, i. e. the Forms, Definition is not a reified attribute. Nor does 'self-referential' seem adequate, because the self-relation entailed is not an expression pointing to itself, as in 'This sentence is false', but an expression applying to itself, as well as to all other expressions. Hence, 'self-exemplification' seems the most suitable characterization.

Friday, April 23, 2010

Definition and Ordinality

Under the most common circumstances, a 'definition' is sought to clarify the meaning of an unfamiliar expression that emerges in discourse. Hence, in such circumstances, the definition of Definition as 'a more familiar expression that is equivalent to a less familiar expression' is adequate. However, it is inapplicable to other efforts to define a term. To the contrary, as seen in Plato's attempt to define 'Justice', and in Aristotle's, for 'Happiness', it is the definiendum which is familiar, and the definiens which is unknown. Furthermore, the common notion does not explicitly accommodate the function of Definition in theoretical projects--to serve as a basis for further definitions. Nor is it adequate to the neological process, in which a new term is offered both to represent a discovered pattern and to found further discourse. The latter case reveals Definition to be analogous to Counting, in which a unit is offered both to homogenize some manifold and to found subsequent enumeration. In other words, Definition is linguistic Ordinality, a characteristic which is usually only implicit in more common circumstances.

Thursday, April 22, 2010

Neology

The process of defining a word is perhaps most salient in the coining of a new term. So, let 'Neology' be 'the study of Definition', and, it seems as if Neology is self-exemplifying, as well. When a new term is coined, it usually serves to describe a pattern of activity that has hitherto gone unrecognized. In some cases, the pattern has been present, but undetected, e. g. Freud's 'Oedipus Complex', while in others, the pattern is novel, e. g. cell-phone 'texting'. Furthermore, in some of the latter cases, the discovery of a novel pattern illuminates previously existing, but hitherto either undetected or otherwise characterized, patterns. For example, Neologic Definition illuminates the process that has hitherto been characterized as 'stipulative definition', by revealing that the latter, usually regarded as the arbitrary taking of an already given term to be a foundation of further discourse, to be tantamount to the coining of a new term. Neologic activity is hence Idionomic--term-coining cannot be sufficiently explained as either Heteronomic, i. e. as a borrowed usage, or as Autonomic, i. e. as a free choice of a pre-given term.

Wednesday, April 21, 2010

Definition

Aristotle observes that the primary innovation of Plato's System is not so much its 'Forms', which Aristotle argues is implicit in Pythagoreanism, but its focus on definitions as the fundamental objects of Knowledge. For sure, Plato does argue in places that arrival at a definition is the aim of any inquiry, and, as Aristotle could not have known, the formulation of definitions has been central to most, if not all, of the subsequent intellectual tradition, e. g. scientific laws. Still, regardless of how accurate Aristotle's assessment might be, it masks a profound paradox: if the object of knowledge is a definition, then knowledge of Definition is the definition of Definition; but, if so, the effort to define Definition is impossible, since any instruction as to how to go about producing a definition of Definition is lacking at the outset. One resolution of the paradox is that the knowledge of Definition is intuitive and pre-verbal, which is what Plato's theory of Forms is traditionally taken to assert. On the other hand, so-called Nominalism asserts that Definition is arbitrarily stipulative, which is usually interpreted as an antithetical to Platonism, but, rather, is complementary to it--the basis of a theory of discursive Knowledge vs. Platonism as a theory of non-discursive Knowledge, which Spinoza distinguishes as merely two different types of Knowledge. A third alternative, Pragmatism, treats Definition as preceptive, which seems to amount to only a practical variation of Nominalism. Formaterialism regards all these notions of Definition as foundational, namely as providing a point of departure for the pursuit of Knowledge, theoretical or practical, in contrast with which it regards Definition as itself an ordering principle. That is, Definition is itself the ordering of any foundation-derivative relation, insofar as it entails both definiens and definiendum. Furthermore, Definition is self-exemplifying--the definition of Definition applies to itself--and, hence, is internally dynamic. In places, Plato seems to toy with the notions that a Form is self-predicating, and that it has causal efficacy, both of which seem to lead him into inextricable difficulties. Perhaps the notion of a Form as dynamically self-exemplifying avoids such problems.

Tuesday, April 20, 2010

Idea, Ideal, Role

One of the most venerable Philosophical notions, 'Idea', has also had one of the most confusing histories. For example, in some Systems, the realm of 'Ideas' is synonymous with 'Reality', while in others, they are antithetical. In its perhaps most basic meaning, 'Idea' is synonymous with 'pattern', and, hence, with 'Form', which is why Plato's 'Forms' are often also called 'Ideas'. Since, for Plato, Forms actually exist, while the transitory physical realm does not, 'Ideas' are 'real' in Platonism. However, in other Systems, a 'form' is a mere abstraction from a concrete entity, so an 'idea' is irreal in them. Compounding the confusion is that the some Idea-Realists, notably Plato, believe that Ideas exist independently of any mind, while for others, e. g. Spinoza, they are constituents of either a divine or human mind. Lost in this complicated history is the original synonymity of two terms that have become generally accepted as distinct: Idea and Ideal. In both contemporary scholarly and common usage, 'Ideal' has a normative connotation that 'Idea' does not have. The genesis of their divergence is unclear, but as late as in Kant's System, both Idea and Ideal are products of Reason, though both of non-normative theoretical Reason. In contrast, for Plato they are univocal, and normative. For, a Platonic Idea is essentially a perfect entity, an archetype for things that participate in it, and, hence, is the best of a type, e. g. all particular dogs participate in the Idea of Dog, the exemplification of perfect Dogness. On that basis, 'Ideal' is primarily nothing but the adjectival form of 'Idea', so, 'an Ideal', is nothing more than a reification of the property of being 'an Idea'. So, a Platonist explanation of the normative dimension of social role-playing, i. e. that what one tries to be is a 'good husband', 'good wife', 'good citizen', etc., is that role-descriptions are Ideas, the fulfillment of which can be better or worse, i. e. closer to or further from perfection.

Monday, April 19, 2010

Playing One's Self

Different modes of role-playing exemplify three main Evolvemental categories--Heteronomy, Autonomy, and Idionomy. Heteronomous role-playing includes being pushed into a role by others, and instinctively emulating a role-model. Autonomous role-playing includes the choosing of a role out of a range of pre-given roles. There is thus a very fine line between Heteronomy and Autonomy--e. g. when the least undesirable out of a range of pre-given roles is the choice. So, for example, many careers in contemporary American society fall in between Heteronomy and Autonomy, and social stasis depends on the endurance of a range of pre-given roles. In contrast, playing a role that one has created for oneself is Idionomic, though, such role-playing is typically limited to specific contexts. Instead, the unlimited Idionomic role is One's Self, as explicated by the Formaterial concept of Individual Experience. To play One's Self, one actualizes one's image of oneself that is a variation on what one has become to the moment, which, as has been previous discussed, is the fundamental structure of all Individual Experience. Furthermore, insofar one is constantly varying oneself, with repetition as a special case, one is continuously re-creating oneself. With the discovery of this fundamental structure of Experience, all role-playing can be transformed into Idionomy.

Sunday, April 18, 2010

Role-Playing and Categorical Imperatives

Some common examples of role-playing connote pretense--either in the portrayal of a film or play character, or in the assumption of a character-type in interpersonal interaction. But, pretense is extrinsic to the notion of Role, which primarily means 'part', and many of the parts that can be played are as much from the real world as from a fictitious one. Real-world roles are usually based on social categories, e. g. 'good husband', 'good wife', 'good citizen', etc., with the frequently associated qualifier 'good' an indication that role-playing is central to Morality. In fact, one specialized synonym of 'role' is 'category', which helps explain why the notion 'categorical imperative' is central for Kant. Usually, and not incorrectly, 'categorical' is taken to mean 'unconditional' in the context of Kantian Morality. But, the underexamined reason why 'categorical' and 'unconditional' are synonymous is that subsumption under a category entails instantiation under a universal, which is, therefore the sole condition of that instance, supervening over all other conditions. The category that is the basis of Kantian Morality is 'rational being', and his Principle of Pure Practical Reason articulates what instantiating that category consists in--i. e. in acting as a rational being would--which supervenes over any other motivation, e. g. responding to an external stimulus. Likewise, a key unresolved flaw in Kant's System is that choosing to play the role of a rational being precedes any categorical demands that would apply only upon choosing to do so, so his Moral imperative is only conditionally unconditioned, as is the case with the requirements of any role-fulfillment. Still, what is instructive in Kantian role-playing is how categorical conduct supervenes on heteronomous purposeful behavior. For, it demonstrates how a mode of behavior, i. e. role-playing, is determined by Formal Causality, i. e. the role guides and shapes behavior, rather than by Efficient and/or Teleological Causality, i. e. behavior that is a response to external stimuli.

Saturday, April 17, 2010

Acting

To 'act' has a variety of meanings in common discourse, three of which are sharply distinguished from one another. It can be synonymous with 'deliberately behave', with 'portray', or, with 'deceive', and the commonality of all three usages makes it difficult to determine whether one is more fundamental than the others, or if 'act' entails all their distinctions, especially that between truth and falsity. Some analytical clarity can be gained by considering another synonym, perhaps the most etymologically literal of them all, namely, to 'actualize'. So, in terms of the latter, to 'deliberately behave' is to make real some intention, to 'portray' is to delberately behave in order to communicate, and to 'deceive' is to portray in order to induce someone to do something under false pretenses. Thus, from this perspective, the differentiae are extrinsic and teleological, and, hence, so too, are any connotations of truth or falsity that are attached to the concept 'acting'.

Friday, April 16, 2010

Play and Spectating

While Play is Idionomic activity, one of its frequent concomitants is generally not. The spectating of Play, notably the audiences of the Arts or of Sports, is primarily social homogenization, sometimes socially constructive, with Individuation an only occasional further development. Dancing to Music, someone inspired by an Artist or athlete to pursue cultivation of their own talents, even 'the wave' at sporting events, are examples of Playful responses to Play spectacles. Criticism can be understood as expressive of the ambivalent nature of Play-spectating, for example, the Aesthetic Judgement theories of Kant and Alexander, which combine subjective and universalistic elements--the subjective elements are the Idionomic dimension of Play-spectating, while the criterion of universality is its socially homogenizing component. So, depending on content and circumstances, Play can either promote Evolvement, or reinforce the status quo, as notably Adorno discusses. When the content of Play functions primarily as a social palliative, e. g. the 'sitcom', it is often classified as 'entertainment', and when Play is controlled by mercenary interests, it is often classified as 'show business'. That Sports is sometimes categorized as 'show business' expresses not another further similarity between Art and Games qua Play, but qua commodity.

Thursday, April 15, 2010

Art and Games

A casual glance at any conntemporary newspaper will discover that Art and Games are two different types of activity. An immediate impression might be that the main distinction between them is that the latter, but not the former, essentially entails competition, which would be inaccurate, since Solitaire is a non-competitive game. More to the point might be that games entail winning and losing, though, whether or not that entailment is essential is unclear, since some game-playing is enjoyed for its own sake as much as Art is, and both Art and Games can be a means to an ulterior purpose, such as pay or fame. Regardless, Nietzsche's Will to Power explains how a 'will to win' is no different than an Artistic drive--both aim to impose Form on their respective circumstances, e. g. on the movement of a ball as much as on paints, canvas, and brush. That is why, despite the familiar maxim, 'winning is the only thing', the highest praise accorded an athlete is not 'winner' but 'artist', a recognition of a degree of mastery over not only an opponent, but over happenstance as well. In other words, both an Artist and a Game-Player perform with greater or lesser degrees of skill. Furthermore, winning is attainment of Idionomy--i. e. the performance of a loser is dictated by that of the winner, and, hence, is heteronomous--as much as is the performance of an Artist. Thus, Art and Games are both types of Play, distinguished only by the differences of their respective media.

Wednesday, April 14, 2010

Play and Idionomy

One reason that Play has been problematic for traditional Philosophical Systems is that it is activity performed for its own sake, and those systems have difficulty accounting for activity performed for its own sake. For, in them, Efficient Causality and/or Teleological Causality are the usual primary Principles, in which cases all events have antecedents and/or consequences, rendering self-contained activity either impossible, illusory, or, at best, inexplicable. Accordingly, in the Practical aspect of these systems, heteronomous behavior is the accepted premise, with freedom from which, when not asserted to be impossible or illusory, definable merely negatively, e. g. Stoic detachment, or equivocally, e. g. Kantian 'autonomy'. In contrast, Formaterialism, especially with its Material Principle explaining Idionomic locomotility, has no such problems, because it can define Individual activity entirely on its own terms, i. e. as a combination of the Formal and Material Principles. Thus, Play is for Formaterialism, not anomalous, but, to the contrary, exemplary activity. It exemplifies Idionomy, which, as has been discussed previously, is a maturation from the Heteronomous and Autonomous stages of Human development.

Tuesday, April 13, 2010

Dewey, Art, and Play

Dewey rejects the theory that Art is Play, primarily on the grounds that Art, but not Play, has a definite objective, and, hence, is more accurately described as 'work', though not 'toil' or 'labor'. If he has in mind, as examples of Artwork, pieces such as a book, a painting, a sculpture, or a musical score, there is no question that Art has a definite objective. However, as has been previously discussed, the example of games demonstrates that Play can entail a definite objective, e. g. checkmate, having scored more runs than an opponent at the end of nine innings, etc. But Dewey's concept of Art itself seems to fail to take into account improvisatory Art, in which, e. g. a musician is concerned with nothing beyond producing a new sound that is an interesting continuation of what has preceded, until a suitable termination point is discovered. Furthermore, his concept of Experience, as has been previously discussed, suffers from an analogous shortcoming--it arbitrarily delimits an 'experience' to being an extended sequence between a definite starting point and definite termination point. Hence, just as he cannot accommodate a concept of Experience as at every moment both becoming cumulatively complete and increasing beyond that culmination, he cannot appreciate that at every moment an Artistic objective can be both achieved and surpassed, e. g. with every note played by a musician. And, since, he insists on the significance of the term 'work' of Art, that a musician is said to 'play', not to 'work', effectively counters that insistence. Regardless, Dewey's rejection of a Play theory of Art is based on a too narrow concept of Art.

Monday, April 12, 2010

Games and Morality

Games are both individual and collective, and the notion of Morality as a game exhibits how one central debate in Morality has been whether it is an individual game, or a collective game. Much of the tradition is indecisive. Utilitarianism begins, with Bentham, explicitly as an individual game, i. e. each should pursue one's own happiness, though it is implicitly collectivistic, i. e. each's pursuit of happiness adds up to collective happiness, while the predominant type has become Mill's collectivist, greatest happiness for the greatest number, principle. Kant explicitly qualifies his greatest good--Happiness in proportion to Virtue--as of an individual, implying that there is a distinct collective greatest good, possibly his Kingdom of Ends. The ambivalence is perhaps starkest in Aristotle's Ethics--on the one hand, Virtue, i. e. the actualization of individual Rationality is presented as requiring a political, and, hence, collectivistic, context, while, on the other, it consists in solo contemplative activity, with no explanation of their systematic relation offered. Now, some games, notably basketball, demonstrate how individuals can become better players in a collective context. Likewise, Formaterialism regards Morality, i. e. 'Phronetics', as a game in which an Individual Evolves through collective activity. So, while some games are plainly individualistic, it is not that others are not individualistic, but, more accurately, are more than individualistic.

Sunday, April 11, 2010

Play and Purpose

Play is sometimes denigrated as being 'purposeless', but the example of game-playing exposes the shortcoming of such a judgement. The invention of a game, such as chess, entails definitions of not only the board, the pieces, and the moves, but of the end of the game, i. e. what constitutes the last move of the game, as well. In chess, that last move is the taking of a King, but a different game, involving the same other preconditions, could be defined as ending when the last of one player's pieces have been taken, or, when a Pawn is surrounded on three sides by a Knight, a Rook, and a Bishop. In any case, the 'purpose' of the game is the defined last move, so, that purpose is continuous with the moves that precede it, and is not something transcending the context of the game. Furthermore, purpose shapes the course of the game, without necessarily being the motivation for playing it. For, wanting to play chess, and wanting to win at chess are two different motivations, which is why there are chess players who are especially fascinated by certain phases of the game, e. g. experts on openings. So, first of all, game-playing illustrates that and how purposes are invented, and, hence, that they are products of Play, even as a response to Need, e. g. to get a drink of water is an invented purpose in response to a dry mouth. Furthermore, it demonstrates that purposelessness, in the sense of having no ulterior purpose, means nothing more than there being no further defined moves, so, if the last move of one game were preliminary to the further moves in a supervening game, then the former game would not be without ulterior purpose. For example, insofar as checkmate is followed by the receipt of an award, by some recognition, by a party, by enhanced intellectual powers, etc., then chess has an ulterior purpose, e. g. to earn some money, to gain fame, to socialize, for intellectual satisfaction, etc. Hence, the assertion 'Play is purposeless' is ambiguous--in particular cases it means that a purpose has not been contrived for an activity, while, in general, it means that Play is the source of purposes. Neither supports a derogatory attitude towards Play.

Saturday, April 10, 2010

Game-Playing

One common medium of Play is the Game. Two main characteristics of games are their artificiality and their exceptionality. Their artificiality consists in their being arbitrary constuctions, beginning with their rules, and their exceptionality consists in their detachment from general social activity, e. g. physical contact that would qualify as 'Battery' in general circumstances, is not merely acceptable in Football and Hockey, but essential to them. Now, because artificiality and exceptionality are two characteristics that are generally considered to be extrinisic to the prevailing American ethos, games serve an ancillary role in this society. But these common attitudes are expressions of deep ideological prejudice. In contrast, for Formaterialism, artificiality is creativity, exceptionality is supererogatory, and game-playing is Idionomic activity--Individuals voluntarily conducting themselves on the basis of rules that they themselves construct for themselves, performing actions that are beyond the call of duty. So, rather than being socially extrinsic and ancillary, game-players exemplify characteristics that are not only worthy in Formaterialism, but have frequently been regarded as ideal in some tradional Systems. Perhaps, then, the uses in recent decades of the notion of Game to characterize everyday activities such as decision-making and language-use are further indications of the emergence of Homo Ludens

Friday, April 9, 2010

Diversion and Play

Some of the main cultural prejudices against and misunderstandings of the notion Homo Ludens are epitomized in the common characterization of Play as 'diversion'. Usually implied in the latter is 'temporary mindless relaxation' that is ancillary to some regular course of events. In contrast, to begin with, one of the two main Principles in Formaterialism, the Material Principle, is Becoming-Diverse, a term to which 'diversion' is equivalent. Hence, in Formaterialism, 'diversion' is not an ancillary process, but is as fundamental to all Experience as is the Formal Principle. Thus, also, diversion is hardly a temporary experiential episode. Furthermore, the Becoming-Diverse of an Individual, i. e. Exposition, entails exertion, so Formaterial diversion is not necessarily a relaxation. Finally, the Becoming-Diverse of an Individual is deliberate, and, so, is not mindless. Thus, the common notion of 'diversion' is as intrinsically prejudicial against Play as traditional ideology is against Formaterialism. Regardless, Formaterialism rejects the very classification of Play as 'diversion', even in its own sense of the latter. For, Play is a combination of both the Material and the Formal Principles, so diversion, i. e. Becoming-Diverse, is only one component of Play, with one most basic expression of the other, attention, being a constant concomitant to it, giving shape to diversion within Play.

Thursday, April 8, 2010

Work and Play, Means and End

In Formaterialism, Experience is a combination of the Material Principle and the Formal Principle, particular manifestations of which are exertion and satisfaction, respectively. There are infinite varieties of combinations of the two Principles, so, likewise, the relation between exertion and satisfaction can vary infinitely. For example, when they are in approximate equilibrium, the experience is what is termed in Formaterialism 'Evolvement'. Other possible combinations include relatively satisfactionless exertion and relatively exertion-free satisfaction, i. e. toil and leisure, respectively. Furthermore, a generalization of the relation between toil and leisure is Means-End, so, in other words, the Means-End relation is nothing more than a scheme of attempted experiential reconstruction. Now, what are generally known in Western culture as 'work' and 'play' are toil and leisure, respectively. But, while Formaterialism agrees that Work is satisfactionless exertion, it maintains that Play is equivalent to Evolvement, not to leisure. So, while it agrees with the predominating ideology that Work is a 'fallen' condition, it regards most of what usually constitutes leisure activity as equally un-Edenic. Furthermore, according to Formaterialism, the culture's 'work ethic' is a perpetuation of an unbalanced type of Experience, rather than a path to some redemption. Finally, just as taking medicine in order to cure an illness has value only as a temporary contrivance, the teleological conception of Experience, i. e. as fundamentally as 'Means-End' structure, has value only as a temporary means itself, not as an end, and is not to be confused with balanced Experience, i. e. with Play.

Wednesday, April 7, 2010

Homo Ludens

Huizinga has proposed the notion 'Homo Ludens', which has received scant mainstream attention, that entails that Play is a necessary condition of any culture. With the conceptual resources of Formaterialism available, a stronger assertion can made: Play is the essence of any Individual activity, equivalent in the System to the notions Evolvement and Creativity. Hence, the historical thesis can be advanced that Homo Ludens fulfills the Kantian turn from Homo Sapiens, as the definition of Humanity, to Homo Faber. Implicit versions of this concept of Humanity can be found in the later works of both Nietzsche and Dewey, e. g. in the former's struggle against 'the spirit of gravity', and in the latter's attempt to transcend the distinction between Means and End. As the sometimes hysterical reaction to Nietzsche indicates, Homo Ludens is contrary to some of the main premises of Western culture, and of American society, in particular. The primary source of those premises is the standard interpretation of the exile of Adam and Eve from Eden, i. e. the condemnation of Humanity to a toilsome existence, and of the more specific American 'work ethic', for which toil is the path to redemption. At minimum, Play is associated with idleness and laziness, and more stridently, with charges of 'immorality' and 'atheism', similar to what Nietzsche's thinking continues to encounter. But, Formaterialism is satisfied that such orthodoxy is an expression of underdeveloped Humanity.

Tuesday, April 6, 2010

Work and Play

Certain notions of Work and Play are so deeply ingrained in most cultures, especially American, that an attempt to cast a fresh eye at them might constitute blasphemy. But, an athlete describing "working hard" at playing a game also effectively exposes the insubstantiality of the theological premises that have governed much of economic and moral experience for at least centuries. So, let 'Play' be any 'activity performed for its own sake', and 'Work' any 'activity performed for the sake of something else'. Beyond these definitions, the familiar cultural connotations that characterize and differentiate them are extrinsic. For example, Play can be serious and concerted, while Work can be careless and lackadaisical. Hence, a 'labor of love', or 'playing' a sport as merely a means to a large salary, are not anomalies, linguistic quirks, or examples of irony, but evidence of the inadequacy of traditional cultural classifications.

Monday, April 5, 2010

Individuation, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche

The central problem for Schopenhauer is suffering, his diagnosis of the problem is the individual experiencing of universal Will to Live, e. g. selfishness, and, so, his solution is the overcoming of individuality, either via the contemplation of universal Forms, or via self-abnegating conduct, e. g. compassion. Regardless of the practicability of the solution, his diagnosis has one serious weakness--it avoids explaining the origin of individuality, which he calls the 'principle of individuation'. As the ground of individuation, this principle can only be a mode of the Will to Live, not a product of an illusion within individuated experience. But Will to Live, on his hypothesis, is universal and undifferentiated. Hence, his diagnosis does not reach the root of individuation, which is why his solution may be just as selfishly motivated as the selfishness that it purports to overcome. Nietzsche's inheritance of the structure in Birth of Tragedy, is a little less dogmatic--the God of individuality, Apollo, is distinct from the God of incessant striving, Dionysus, but the former remains a not necessarily welcome interloper through much of Nietzsche's earlier work, e. g. when he reluctantly accepts that humans cannot survive without illusions. That individuation might itself be a fate does not seem to occur to him, at least at these stages. Regardless, it is unclear whether or not he intends it as such, but his later Will to Power entails a principle of individuation, as well as effects a synthesis of the Dionysian and the Apollinian. For, according to the doctrine of Will to Power, all events are resultants of opposing manifestations of Will to Power, and hence, are discrete quanta, i. e. are individuated from other such events. Thus, every event combines Dionysian and Apollinian features, though it is unclear if Nietzsche intends explicitly that Will to Power is the synthesis of the two principles. In any case, because Will to Power provides a genetic account of individuation, Nietzsche begins to treat individuation and 'illusion' as constructive developments.

Sunday, April 4, 2010

Epiphenomenalism, Tragedy, and Dance

Mind-Body theories differ on the basis of how they conceive the relation between Mind and Body: one reduces to the other, one predominates over the other, the two are parallel, etc. Epiphenomenalism, for example, asserts that one specific relation obtains between them, i. e. that physical events generate mental phenomena, but that there is no converse causality. Nietzsche's concept of Tragedy is based on Schopenhauerian Epiphenomenalism--just as Schopenhauerian Representation has no power over Will, Nietzsche's Apollinian illusion cannot alter Dionysian fate, while in both cases, the emergence of the latters from the formers is posited, but not fully explained. What is common to all traditional Mind-Body theories, and, hence, to Nietzsche's theory of Tragedy as well, is that the relation between its components, whatever it happens to be, is a fixed one. In contrast, in Formaterialism, any System is a combination of the Formal Principle and the Material Principle, from which, as has been previously discussed, 'Mind' and 'Body' are abstractions. But such abstraction, in general, is not from a specific combination, but from a range of combinations of the Principles. Hence, not only is no one combination exclusive, but any one that happens to obtain is not necessarily fixed. In other words, the various Mind-Body theories are not mutually exclusive fixed alternatives, but, in fact, may all obtain even within a short experiential sequence. For example, while pondering going for a run, Mind predominates over Body; while running with abandon, Body predominates over Mind; and, while deliberately pacing oneself, the two are mutually affecting one another. So, just as 'Epiphenomenalism' denotes only one such combination, Nietzschean Tragedy is only one combination of the Dionysian and Apollinian principles. Dance is another, in which the Apollinian effectively modifies the former by giving shape to it. The subtitle of Birth of Tragedy is 'From the Spirit of Music', a description which almost tautologically applies to Dance. Furthermore, with Dance understood as an equilibrium between the Dionysian and the Apollinian, Tragedy can be seen as an unbalanced mode of interaction between them, just as Epiphenomenalism can be seen not as a true doctrine, but as descriptive of a relatively disassociative mode of experience. The later Nietzsche may have arrived at similar conclusions.

Saturday, April 3, 2010

Aesthetics and Purposelessness

On the assumption that the behavior of particular human organisms is essentially teleological, i. e. a means to an end, unpurposeful activity is not natural, and is only possible through the supervention of some impersonal vehicle. Hence, to enjoy the mere appearance of an object, in abstraction from any end that the object might serve, is possible only via some transcendence of subjectivity, most frequently a Universal idea. But, on the Formaterial thesis, human activity is fundamentally self-creativity, and the experience of an object is primarily constructive, so, unpurposeful behavior is exemplary of personhood. Part of the historical endurance of the teleological model is due to a lack of what Formaterialism calls the 'Material Principle', which accounts for e. g. the locomotility of a particular organism independent of any external stimulus. But, part, too, may be simply due to interpreting the natural dependence of a child as natural purposefulness, which the equally natural playfulness of a child, e. g. walking for the sake of walking, tends to contradict, anyhow. So, while Formaterialism does not disagree with the tradition that holds that Aesthetic experience is in some respect symbolic of Moral experience, it does dispute that it must be on the basis of impersonalism that it is so. For, as has been discussed, Dance exemplifies Idionomic activity, and Idionomy is the locus of the Formaterial analogue of Morality, i. e. Phronetics. Or, to put it equivalently, Aesthetic experience can promote the Evolvement of the Individual from Heteronomy, or Autonomy, to Idionomy, and continues to promote it even after Idionomy is achieved.

Friday, April 2, 2010

Epistemology and Plato's Cave

One standard contemporary reading of the passage in Plato's Republic, often referred to as 'the parable of the cave', is Epistemological. It interprets the prisoners' belief that the shadows on the cave wall are real objects as Plato's attempt to demonstrate the unreliability of the senses for the attainment of Knowledge, and, hence, as a defense of Epistemological Rationalism. However, this interpretation does not accommodate three further details of the imagery--the violent reaction of the prisoners to the escapee who has perceived real objects; that the shadows are deliberately produced; and, that the prisoners' fetters are the irrational desires that are the products of their upbringing. Hence, what Plato is actually expressing is how what one believes is conditioned by what one wants to believe, which makes one susceptible to manipulation by political rhetoric. Acccordingly, it is only when one is guided by the objective Good that belief is veridical, i. e. that one attains Knowledge, and that one is politically free. Aristotle's theory of Knowledge, a branch of his Psychology, and, hence, systematically integrated with his theories of Ethics and Politics, is adequate to what Plato is presenting in these passages. Contemporary Epistemology, which isolates Knowledge from Psychological, Ethical, and Political considerations, is not. Furthermore, this passage in the Republic refutes a prevalent contention among Epistemologists, that a hypothesis that Plato examines in the Theatetus, that Knowledge=Justified True Belief, only to explicitly reject it, is the theory of Knowledge to which Plato definitively subscribes.

Thursday, April 1, 2010

Aesthetic Detachment

Aesthetic appreciation is traditionally thought to be disinterested, i. e. involving attention to the appearance of an object, in detachment from any ulterior purpose it might serve. Kant's account of the nature of such detachment is typical--that it entails the achieving of an impersonal standpoint that is equivalent to a universal response to an object. Likewise, Beauty is traditionally conceived of as an object of universal appreciation, so, insofar as Morality is Universalistic, Aesthetics serves as a cultivation of Morality in many Systems, not only Kant's. However, the rarely considered point that dancing is type of Aesthetic experience, i. e. a response to Music, and a very primitive one, leads to different conclusions regarding the nature of such detachment. Dance, too, entails disinterest, namely it is locomotility for its own sake, not for any ulterior organic purpose, resulting in what has aptly been called a 'joy of movement'. This enjoyment of Music is thus not Universalistic, but to the contrary, is entirely personal, from which Formaterialism draws the conclusion that purposeful behavior is only a special case, even if the most common one, of locomotility, and, of Conduct, in general. Furthermore, even when an organism, as a whole, is purposelessly moving, the special senses are still purposefully guiding its movement. Hence, the fundamental detachment involved in e. g. the contemplation of a painting, is only intrapersonal, e. g. a detachment of vision from its normal function of guiding locomotility, and not at all impersonally universalistic. So, with Dance as exemplary, Aesthetics illustrates the Idionomic nature of Experience, and, hence, can help cultivate Phronesis for the Formaterial System.