Intuition, Immortality, Reflection, Detachment

Though he does not use the term, Spinoza introduces what is often called 'Reflection', in a sequence beginning at II, xx of the Ethics.  Now, though he also does not draw the possible connection, the structure of Reflection--the idea of a mind, equivalent to the idea of the idea of a body--seems similar to the "idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the form of eternity" (V, xxii), and which is the part of the mind that is not "absolutely destroyed with the body" (V, xxiii) at death.  In other words, it may be Reflection, not his problematic, as has been previously discussed, Intuition, that provides him with better evidence of an idea that is both associated with a specific body, and, yet, is detachable from it.  Furthermore, in Reflection, one takes an objective perspective on oneself, the same vantage point of Reason and of Adequate Ideas, the achievement of which is the primary goal of the Ethics.  Now, idea-idea Reflection still seems inconsistent with idea-thing Parallelism.  Regardless, if by "under the form of eternity" he means 'objectively considered', then Intuition is Reflection, without some of the neo-Medieval connotations that bog it down in Part V of the Ethics, and the possibility of a Mind surviving the death of its Body is an inference from the experience of detachment.  Accordingly, that inference is a variation of one of Descartes'--from the dubitability of corporeal existence and the certainty of the Cogito, to the immortality of the latter.

Mind, Parallelsim, Immortality

The possibility of a Mind surviving the death of its associated Body, broached by Spinoza at V, xxii-xxiii, seems more consistent with traditional Theological Dualism, than with the innovative Parallelism that he introduces at II, vii.  Now, the previously proposed reconciliation of the passages--the distinguishing, based on the example of 'non-existent' rectangles, from II, viii., between actual and non-actual entities--is unsatisfactory, because it does not adequately explain that distinction, i. e. each is equally a modification of Substance in his system.  Otherwise, the closest that he offers to a concrete grounding of the possibility of a disembodied entity is the example of an intuited ratio, in II, xl.  However, a ratio, disembodied or otherwise, is common to an infinite number of pairs of  numbers, whereas, the object of Intuition posited by him as surviving the death of its Body, is individual, i. e. is of "this or that human body" (V, xxii).  So, the best explanation of this concept of Immortality may be Wolfson's exhaustive analysis, which confirms that the concept is more closely aligned with Medieval Theology than with Spinoza's innovative Parallelism, an allegiance that, as Spinoza acknowledges at V, xli, is inessential to the main arc of the Ethics.

Extension, Existence, Actuality

While the existence, proposed by Spinoza in II, viii of the Ethics, of "ideas of particular things, or modes, that do not exist", seems to contradict the Idea-Thing correspondence proposed in the previous proposition, he argues that, to the contrary, it is "evident" from the latter.  Now, the example--'non-existing' rectangles--that he presents in the included Note may be more illuminating than he seems to be appreciate.  For, what he seems to mean by 'non-existent', is 'non-actual', i. e. nevertheless both existing and possessing extension.  In other words, in his system, all the modifications of the Deity's attribute of Thought both exist and are ideas of an extended entity, though not all of them are actualized, a distinction more recently classified by a term to which Spinoza has precluded use, namely 'modal'.  The Theological significance of that distinction emerges later, since it grounds the apparent separation of Mind and Body, proposed in V, xxiii, which, rather than amounting to a reversion to the traditional Supernaturalism that his system challenges, is, more precisely, the separation of a possible Mode from an actual one.    

Matter, Life, Deity

Though Spinoza does not directly address the topic, his attribution of Extension to Deity seems to entail that Matter is essentially not inert, a thesis at odds with that of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, among many, as well as with the imagery of Genesis 2.  The significance of the disagreement with the latter is that is preempts the ensuing drama that has dominated Western culture for millennia.  For, without the antithesis of Life and Matter, the distinctive characteristic of the 'tree of knowledge of good and evil', i. e. that it is potentially death-causing, dissolves, as does, therefore, the subsequent Fall-Redemption arc.  Instead, as Spinoza shows, Knowledge of Good and of Evil is conducive to Life, and, hence, is not at all a divergence from the ideas of a Deity the essence of which is its vitality.

Deity, Existence, Life

In the 5th Meditation, in his version of the Ontological Argument, Descartes uses the phrases 'God exists' and 'There is a God' interchangeably.  So, when, by virtue of the definitions of Part I of the Ethics, Spinoza asserts that the essence of Deity entails its eternal existence, he is more than recapitulating the conclusion of that Argument.  Rather, he is anticipating III, vii, in which he proposes that the "endeavor . . . to persist in its own being is nothing else but the actual essence of the thing in question".  For, the latter proposition is more than a Psychological thesis--it is Theological, insofar as that persistence is a mode of the eternal existence of Deity.  In other words, when he attributes existence to Deity, he is asserting not that it 'is', but that it 'lives', just as does any of its modes.  In this respect, Spinoza is a forerunner of Bergson and other Vitalists.

Will, Understanding, Deity

As has been previously discussed, Descartes' concept of Deity entails the existence of Evil, which, in turn, requires the thesis that Will and Understanding are not identical.  In contrast, Spinoza's concept does not entail that existence, which, allows him to posit that every Perception is Volitional, i. e. involves an affirmation of the existence of its object.  On that basis, error is due to incompleteness, not to unclarity and indistinctness.  Accordingly, while Descartes seeks, via convincing proof, the free assent to the proposition that his God exists, Spinoza's project, via exhaustive explanation, is that the Deity the existence of which is affirmed, is one that is adequately understood.  Implicit in the latter is, therefore, the contention that Descartes' concept of Deity is inadequate.

Deity, Substance, Principle

From the outset of the Ethics, Spinoza makes it clear that his concept of Deity is equivalent to a concept of Substance.  However, given some traditional connotations of 'substance'  either as static or as Teleological, he thereby runs the risk of undermining his concept of God as an Efficient Self-Cause.  Now, one less encumbered alternative to 'Substance' is 'Principle'.  That replacement has the advantage of suggesting the association of his 'natural naturans' with other Principles, e. g. Schopenhauer's Will, Nietzsche's Dionysus, and Bergson's Elan Vital.  As result, Spinoza's system can be appreciated as having more in common with Vitalism than with the Rationalist Theisms, i. e. Descartes', Leibniz's, and Kant's, with which it is more usually classified, plus, the God of each of those can be better recognized as a Principle.