Reading and Representation

In #156 of the Investigations, Wittgenstein initiates an examination of "reading" by defining it as "the activity of rendering out loud what is written or printed".  Two results of what ensues are that 'reading' has multiple uses, and that in each of those instances, a mysterious influence is exerted on a 'reader'.  Now, conspicuously absent in the definition is any consideration of what is arguably the essence of the process--that its object is taken to be a representation of some sort.  Furthermore, to take an object as a representation of any kind involves being directed by it to whatever it represents, i. e. it functions as a signal to make an association, which  easily explains the felt influence that intrigues Wittgenstein.  So, in that significant absence, his conclusions, as is, seem to have little value.

Reading and Communication

In #156-71 of the Investigations, Wittgenstein examines the process of Reading, with special attention to the seemingly mysterious influence that its object exerts on it.  A little later, in #180, he briefly entertains a potential explanation of that influence, but without fully exploring it.  There, he considers that that object might be a "signal", but without pursuing the implication that it is produced by a 'signaler'.  That bypassing is part of his general relative neglect of the process that is complementary to Reading, i. e. Writing.  Now, if he had devoted equal attention to the latter, he might have recognized that the two originate as phases of Communication, with Reading, therefore, as essentially a response to its object, and, thus, as inherently influenced by it.

Philosophy as Therapy

The concept of Philosophy as 'therapy', suggested by Wittgenstein in #133 of the Investigations, has had appeal to opponents of Logicism, in which Philosophy is conceived as regulating, if not constituting, the ordinary use of Language.  However, the image is only superficially helpful to his agenda.  For, 'therapy' is commonly associated with Psychoanalysis and related practices, the rise to prominence of which originates with Nietzsche's novel insights, at the center of which is his discovery of the Will to Power, and his efforts to supplant the Will to Live as the fundamental conatus of human conduct, the far-reaching implications of which are only slowly being explored.  So, to reduce such potentially epochal Philosophical activity to one of its consequences only illuminates how constricted Wittgenstein's range is, regardless of how effective he is against Logicism.

Contemplation, Empowerment, Language

A certain experience of exaltation has prevalently been characterized by Philosophers as a moment of Contemplation, and, hence, as private, with respect to which any subsequent description of it is extrinsic.  In contrast, in recent centuries, there has been slowly emerging, e. g. in the works of Spinoza, Kant, and Nietzsche, an alternative interpretation of the experience--that it is a moment of Empowerment, an excitation the continuation of which is an attempt to communicate it, and, hence, that it is a phase of a fundamentally social experience, in the second phase of which the initial datum may be transformed, e. g. by a process of articulation.  So, despite Wittgenstein's perhaps unprecedented attention to Language, in #133 of the Investigations, when he alludes to "stopping doing philosophy" while not ceasing to discuss the stoppage, he reveals his concept of Philosophy to be in the Contemplationist tradition.  In that regard, his invocation of silence at the end of his philosophizing in the Tractatus is more conscientious.

Writing, Cogito, Certainty

As has been previously discussed here, the scenario that Descartes describes in the Meditations is not quite as he presents it, i. e. he is plainly at a desk writing, not conducting a thought-experiment while sitting in front of a fire.  Still, it might be argued that the discrepancy is extrinsic to the described procedure and its results.  However, on the other hand, the non-coincidence is perhaps fatal to the entire project.  For, the pivotal proposition in the exercise is 'I cannot doubt that I am doubting', on the grounds that 'One cannot simultaneously doubt and not doubt'.  So, the presumption of that simultaneity is essential to procedure.  But, that Descartes is merely reporting it only amplifies what critics since Kant have argued--that doubting that one doubts consists in two, successive, acts.  In other words, in the writing of the Meditations, Descartes cannot attribute Certainty to any Cogito that he is reporting, unless he somehow identifies it with that process of describing.

Using Language

That a dog can respond to the sound "ball" by fetching a ball is no indication that it can use the English language, nor that the issuer can, either, i. e. any other oral signal might have been equally effective.  Thus, Wittgenstein's call-and-response scenario, in #2 of the Investigations, does not necessarily involve the use of the German or English Language, and, hence, is not necessarily a Language-Game involving either of them.  Furthermore, that "block" from the assistant might be nothing more than mechanical mimicry of an issuance from the builder, suggests that it might not be an instance of Naming, and, hence, does not suffice, contrary to what Wittgenstein proposes in #7, to distinguish the scenario as a Language-Game.  In contrast, the assistant's "yes, sir" in response to "block", would be a better indication that he has learned to use the same Language of which "block" is a part.  Thus, more generally, the 'use of Language' begins only with an independent speech-act, and, likewise, a Language-Game involves at least two players, i. e. at least two participants who have learned to use the relevant Language.

Philosophy, Cartography, Language

In cartographic terms, the Meditations can be conceived as describing the drawing of a map from point A, siting in front of a fire, to B, the Cogito, and, thereafter, to the existence of God, Mathematics, etc.  Now, the primary dispute with this map in Modern Philosophy has been regarding point B, e. g. for some B is, instead, a sense-datum.  In contrast, it has been suggested here that A is, more properly, writing at a desk, a suggestion based on a shift of perspective--to the description itself as a map, i. e. in which B is the determination of a starting-point, C is a demonstration that other points can be reached from B, etc.  In other words, from that perspective, the book is fundamentally a primer in what might be called 'theory-construction', and it is in that respect that it has been most influential.  So, as Empiricism, Phenomenalism, etc. evince, the greater historical significance of the Meditations is its use of Language, not its attempted allusion to some non-verbal state.