Will, Utilitarianism, Economics

It is generally recognized that Mill's Utilitarianism diverges from Bentham's by asserting that the 'good' consists in collective, and not personal, happiness. However, if, as is commonly accepted, Bentham conceives the doctrine on the model of Capitalist economic behavior, then Mill is revealed as also grounding it. On the economic interpretation, Bentham conceives 'happiness' as analogous to 'profit'. In contrast, on that interpretation, Mill is offering a theory of Evaluation that the notion 'profit' presupposes, namely, that the value of a product is determined by what one would pay for it, i. e. its 'exchange' value. Hence, the Marxist critique of Utilitarianism is analogous to the Ethical one that has been presented here--the Utilitarian suppression of 'intrinsic' value. Now, according to Marxism, the intrinsic value of a product is a function of the processes that transform its raw materials. Furthermore, according to the model of Experience being proposed here, Will is the basis of any variation of the given, and, hence, of the transformation of raw materials. Thus, contrary to pervasive stereotypes, a notion usually classified as 'individualistic', Will, is aligned with one usually classified as 'collectivistic', in opposition to an economic model usually associated with 'individualism'.

Will, Utilitarianism, Prejudice

Utilitarianism entails uncritical respect for the face-value authority of expressions of like or dislike. It thus is incapable of recognizing prejudice, i. e. it cannot distinguish judgment from pre-judgment. More generally, it cannot distinguish conditioned responses from spontaneous ones. Hence, 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' can amount to a reinforcement of prejudices, possibly harmful ones. Since prejudice, and pre-conditioned behavior in general, is a species of Heteronomy, the corrective requires appreciation of the Moral significance of Autonomy, entailing the cultivation of Will, the principle of spontaneity in conduct. However, such appreciation requires the jettisoning any commitment to Teleology, which Mill seems unwilling to do.

Will and the Refutation of Utilitarianism

An Ethics of Empowerment not only presents an alternative to Utilitarianism, it refutes it. For, the self-activation process that the former proposes to cultivate, as the initiation of action, is irreducible to the end states which, according to Utilitarianism, are the bearers of Moral value. Hence, it stands as a counter-example to the Utilitarian claim that all Morality is fundamentally end-oriented. Furthermore, the implication that only the results of action are praiseworthy tends to stifle the liberation of Will from its subordination to Purposiveness. Thus, the refutation of Utilitarianism serves not merely to defend one rival doctrine from it, it is a substantive phase within that alternative doctrine.

Will, Teleology, Freedom

The effectiveness of Utilitarianism derives from the continued predominance of Teleology in Moral doctrines, and the Psychological models that they presuppose. The best evidence of that predominance is the pervasiveness of, as the standard focal problem of Morality, the coordination of the ends of subjects. That pervasiveness thus entails a concept of Subjectivity as constituted exclusively by the pursuit of ends. Hence, those doctrines ignore the volitional facet of Subjectivity, i. e. Will, the process of self-activation, which, as has been previously discussed, is independent of Purposiveness. Kant's Rational principle offers a brief glimpse of a non-teleological Moral doctrine, i. e. as the formulation of the cultivation of personal Freedom, before he eventually compromises it with concerns about Ends and Happiness. Similarly, the promotion of Creativity is another possible non-teleological Ethical program. Furthermore, insofar as the pursuit of ends compromises self-activation, anti-teleological arguments are part of the content of the promotion of Rationality, Freedom, Creativity, etc., and not merely an aspect of its validation.

Will, Freedom, Consequentialism

According to Atomistic Empiricism, to which Mill subscribes, 'B is the consequence of A' is an example of Efficient Causality. Thus, Mill's teleological formulation 'The value of A is determined by B' presupposes Consequentialism, but supervenes on it. So, one difficulty for a Utilitarian interpretation of interpersonal interaction is when 'A' is an exhortation to someone to act freely, and B is free action', because a reduction of the sequence to Efficient Causality requires a question-begging abstraction from its entailed 'freedom'. Thus, insofar as Kant's Rational Principle is such an exhortation to act freely, his doctrine, minus its teleological elements--that a rational being is an 'end-in-itself' whose Happiness is a 'good'--eludes reduction to Utilitarianism. However, it remains susceptible to the latter insofar as it continues to classify its exhortation as either Efficient or Teleological Causality. Now, an alternative has been proposed here--Material Causality, i. e. the process of Becoming-Diverse, the instance in personal experience of which is Will, the process of self-activation. Thus, the promotion of the Freedom of another can be Causal without being reducible to Utilitarianism.

Will and Swerve

'Swerve', for Lucretius, is a principle of Variation in Nature. Hence, Swerve is a manifestation of what has here been introduced as the 'Material Principle', i. e. the process of Becoming-Diverse. One important distinction between Swerve and the Material Principle is that while the former is an exception to the rule of regular motion, the latter, following Deleuze's demonstration that Repetition is a special case of Differentiation, conceives all motion as varying what precedes it, to a greater or lesser degree of similitude. Aside from that distinction, the two principles agree that spontaneity is not to be confused with unconditionality--an occurrence of Variation can be spontaneous, and, yet, its effects are conditioned by what precedes them, i. e. Difference is always relative to some given. Now, since Will is the Material Principle of Experience, it can be characterized as 'self-Swerve'. In contrast, most traditional concepts of 'freedom', notably Sartre's, fail to appreciate Swerve, since they equate spontaneity with unconditionality, and, hence, are processes more of escape than of variation.

Will, Utilitarianism, Asceticism

A significant limitation of Utilitarianism is exposed in a comparison with Nietzsche's criticism of Asceticism. While Nietzsche can argue that an incorporeal ideal is the product of merely minimal Will to Power, Mill has no response to Asceticists who assert that a 'kingdom of heaven' is the unique realization of the 'greatest happiness for the greatest number' Utilitarian principle, nor, seemingly, is any Consequentialist doctrine capable of such a response. In contrast, a Eudaimonism based on the concept of Pleasure proposed here, i. e. that it is the feeling of Will, is irreducible to the a priori supernaturalistic Morality that Mill seems keen to challenge.