Extension, Intention, Intension

Brentano's doctrine 'Intentionality', primarily via Husserl, has had a strong influence on Contemporary Philosophy.  Now, while his use of the term is consistent with that of common parlance, i. e. with 'intend', the structure of the connoted process is actually one of extending, i. e. one of a projection from a thought to an external object.  Furthermore, this 'intentionality' and 'intend' are antithetical to the term 'intensional', which, in Semantic Theory, pertains to a purely internal characteristic, as does the common use of 'intense'.  However, at the root of this inconsistencies is not some Philosophical Babel, but the etymological anomaly that 'tend' is virtually synonymous with 'extend', i. e. both are equivalent to 'stretch out'.  Still, the Philosophical program, i. e. Analytic Philosophy, the mission statement of which is to clear up mental confusion caused by imprecise language, has only perpetuated the disorganized use of this family of terms.  In this respect, it carries on a tradition that Descartes initiates, with his careless, as has been previously discussed, use of 'extension'.