Rule-Writing and Theory

The concept, previously proposed here, of Philosophy as a Rule-Writing activity, might seem less obviously applicable to theoretical fields than to practical ones.  However, once it is accepted that a Theory is essentially interpretive, then its legislative dimension is easier to recognize.  For, in such cases, Rule-Writing defines how elements of Experience are to be interpreted, e. g. classified.  Thus, for example, Locke's theory of Cognition proposes that colors be distinguished from shapes, while Berkeley's proposes that they not be so distinguished.  Similarly, a theory of Metaphysics offers rules for the identification and classification of the most general features of Experience, while that of Physics focuses on Motion, with the thesis that 'All Motion is absolute' one rule of interpretation, and that that 'All Motion is relative', another.  So, that Logic is a 'theoretical' discipline does not immunize it from the possibility that it is the product of a Logician's Rule-Writing.