Time and Personal Identity

Kant's main counter to Hume in the Critique of Pure Reason--that Causality is not merely a 'constant conjunction', but a pair that is ordered--is implicitly prepared for by his concept of Time. For, what Hume renders as a 'bundle of perceptions', Kant casts as a 'succession', thereby exposing the flimsiness of the notion 'bundle', which expresses only a vacillation between some bare unification of those perceptions, and none at all. However, the Kantian notion of Successiveness nevertheless inherits Hume's thesis that its moments are mutually independent. Thus, the critique of Successiveness that has been presented here also bears on Hume's theory of Selfhood--it agrees with Hume that there is no 'I' which is the same at different moments, without accepting his further inference that any two I's are independent. For, on the cumulative theory of Time, an I at a later stage is different from one at an earlier one, but it is not independent of what is a part of it.

Temporality and Pragmatism

Insofar as a criterion of the possession of Knowledge is Certainty, each attainment of some knowledge is independent of that of others, i. e. subsequent discoveries cannot call it into question. Hence, the Temporality entailed by Epistemological theories that subscribe to that criterion is Successiveness, i. e. a sequence of self-sufficing moments. In contrast, insofar as Knowledge is regarded as provisional, as in e. g. Pragmatism, the entertainment of every new hypothesis, whether singular, i. e. a 'fact', or general, i. e. a 'law', is conditioned by its antecedents. In other words, the Temporality of an Epistemological doctrine like Pragmatism is cumulative--for it, Knowledge is constituted by the progressive seeking to formulate the most comprehensive thesis to date.

Temporality and Organism

One of the cardinal characteristics of any organism is growth, which plainly entails cumulative Temporality. But, the fundamental pattern of Whitehead's 'Philosophy of Organism' is Concrescence--a transition from Multiplicity to Unity. In contrast, Cumulation is a transition from a less comprehensive unity to a more comprehensive unity, entailing both a discrescent dimension, i. e. the generation of a Multiplicity via further diversification, as well as concrescent reunification. But, as has been previously discussed, Whitehead's system neglects Discresence. Hence, the notion of cumulative Temporality helps expose one of the shortcomings in Whitehead's concept of Organism.

Modification and Temporality

In Spinoza's concept of Experience, 'affection' is sometimes rendered as 'affect', but more frequently as 'modification', an apparent interchangeability that obscures a significant distinction between the two. Whereas an 'affect' usually connotes a discrete event, a 'modification' entails a transition from one status to another, i. e. the latter, but not the former, is conditioned by the antecedent state of the affected entity. But, Spinoza, in other contexts, attributes to the sources of affections the capacity to increase or decrease the strength of an affected body. Hence, in his system,'modification' is more appropriate than 'affect'. The implicit structure of Perception in his system therefore distinguishes his theory of it from the Lockeian tradition--which, as has been previously discussed, pervades beyond Empiricism--because that tradition treats every new mental datum as independent of what precedes it. Accordingly, Spinoza's concept of Experience implicitly entails a concept of Temporality as cumulative, i. e. it conceives the new mental datum M as the idea of a modification of bodily condition A, by influence X, producing new bodily condition B. In other words, it conceives every new condition to be in part constituted by its antecedents.

Tabula Rasa and Temporality

'Tabula rasa' is best known as a cardinal thesis of Locke's Empiricism, a characterization of the human mind at birth. Less appreciated is how it is a thesis that has been generalized to other phases of experience, by not only Locke, but by most rival theories, as well. For, wherever a mental event, regardless of its genesis--an effect, a representation, a proposition, a phenomenon, etc.--is treated as a datum that is independent of others, mind is presupposed as receiving it as a blank slate, even beyond the moment of birth. For example, the independence of the datum 'cold' becomes plain when contrasted with the datum 'cooler', which is clearly conditioned by its antecedents, and it is difficult to find a theory, even Bergson's, that does not treat every new mental datum as similarly independent of what has preceded it. Such recursive Tabula Rasa thus entails a Temporality that consists of a sequence of unrelated moments, thereby preempting the possibility of a concept of Temporality as fundamentally cumulative.

Temporality and Measurement

Both the ordinary concept of Time and the classical model of it construe it as a pattern of objective events. In contrast, Kant conceives it as primarily the form of inner experience, and as a pattern of objective events only by analogy. Whitehead's notion of Process implies a third locus of Temporality--the the process of becoming aware by an organism of some influence from its environment. Remaining underdeveloped in this model is that such incorporation is cumulative, since the past of the organism is part of its environment. The thesis here, as has been discussed, takes the cumulative model a step further, by proposing that the immediate environmental influence on an organism is always, first and foremost, its own motility. An advantage of this thesis is that it explains the measurement of Time as derived from the Temporality of Measurement, i. e. measuring is a motile act. For example, a line used to represent a time-span is itself the direct expression of the Temporality of the drawing of it--the ink or lead retains the movement--thereby befitting the line for application, via the proportionality of their respective units, to the Temporality of some other motion.

Successiveness and Cumulation

On the thesis that Experience is cumulative, in a successive sequence A-B, A and B are not discrete data, but not because they are moments of a seamless flux, as Bergson argues. Rather, as the later datum in a accumulating progression, B includes A. That is, B is the resultant of some novel influence X that combines with the hitherto achieved culmination A. So, it is not so much because of the structuring role of human cognitive faculties that X cannot be experienced directly, as Kant argues. It is because beyond the moment of birth, the human mind is never again a tabula rasa, as even Locke fails to recognize as he propounds his Empiricist Epistemology. Likewise, Bergson, even when acknowledging that the flux of Duration in Consciousness is cumulative, continues to treat each current datum as an entirely novel datum, thereby missing how it is in part constituted by the data that have preceded it.

Memory and Retaining

According to Bergson, when Memory is not supplying stored information to current activity, it subsists as an independent Spiritual substance. But, the Past that inhabits Memory can only be constituted as such in relation to current activity. Conversely, the Continuity that he attributes to Locomotion cannot be immediately given to Intuition alone--the Consciousness of that Continuity furthermore requires a Retaining of the data of the surpassed phases of a Locomotive process. In other words, Bergson's presentation of Memory as a Spiritual substance effects an abstraction from the role that Retaining plays in contributing Temporal coherence to Experience.

Successiveness, Excession, Retaining

A Whiteheadian concept of Successiveness, which any theory of Experience as cumulative seems to entail, construes the sequence of moments A-B as A as an incomplete stage of which B is the completion. But, if B represents a moment of closure, for C to succeed it, the arrival of C must effect a re-opening, via a surpassing of B. Hence, the generation of a new sequence, B-C, requires what can be called a process of 'Excession', by which C goes beyond the hitherto closed moment B. But, the constitution of the succession B-C entails more than a flight of C that leaves B behind--the Excession must be accompanied by a Retaining of B, as well. In other words, Successiveness combines Excession and Retaining. But, Excession is a species of Externalization, and, hence, of Spatialization. Therefore, Successiveness is not a purely Temporal structure.

Successiveness and Teleology

The classical model of it formulates an experience as a transition from S is P to S is Q. Variations on the model include the observation that every such transition entails continuity between P and Q, or the analysis that each P and Q itself signifies a transition. Whitehead's main innovation in this respect is to challenge the substratum-modification structure of all these varieties, by proposing, instead, that every new experience is constituted by the creation of a new subject, a creation which becomes complete at the termination of the experience. Hence, on Whitehead's model, Experience can be formulated as a teleological transition from S to S-prime. Similarly, in terms of that model, Successiveness is not merely a transition from moment A to moment B, but one in which A becomes B, i. e. one in which A is an incomplete stage of B. In other words, in Whitehead's model of Experience, Successiveness, and, hence, Temporality, is teleological.

Sense Experience

The thesis, previously presented, that the functioning of the sense organs is primarily motile, effects a sharp distinction between Consciousness and Sense Experience. Instead of the traditional interpretations of Sensation either as an immediate object of Consciousness or as itself a mode of Consciousness, on this thesis, Sensation is primarily implicated in the causal interaction between a subject and its environment, an interaction that can subsequently become an immediate object of Consciousness. Thus, 'I sense red' is, more precisely, 'I am aware of my having been looking at a red object', just as 'I feel the ground' is, more precisely, 'I am aware of my having been walking'. So, on this thesis, the immediate object of representation is an immediately prior activity of the subject. But, any such activity is not contextless--it constitutes a variation in the ongoing course of a subject's life. Likewise, any sense datum that is implicated in an immediate object of activity is not opaque, but expresses a variance with respect to a prior sensory condition.

Sense Experience and Motility

Contributing to the long tradition of treating Consciousness as disembodied is the general agreement among various schools that sense experience is likewise incorporeal. Typical of that contribution is the Empiricist positing of a 'sense datum', e. g. a color, as the basis of experience, in independence of any supposition of the existence of a sense organ, e. g. an eye, a premise subscribed to by Kantianism and Phenomenology, as well. So, one of the significant achievements of Whitehead's system is to re-incorporate the sense organs into empirical processes. However, Whitehead, nevertheless continues the tradition of conceiving the functioning of those organs as fundamentally passive, which still permits a Bergsonian interpretation that sense organs function as filters of immaterial energy en route to immaterial mind, and, hence, as not a positive part of the concrete data of Consciousness. Like his predecessors, he does not appreciate sense experience as active--looking at, listening to, and touching, in contrast with seeing, hearing, and feeling. Plus, as, the sniffing by a dog, or a 'taste test' demonstrates, even the other two of the five sense are active processes. When interpreted as active, the sense organs can be appreciated as as much sources of outward-directed motility as the legs. On that basis, the incorporealization of Sense Experience, and of Consciousness, in general, seems to difficult to accomplish.

Time and Corporeality

Kant's theory of Time is open to two interpretations. First, the definition of it as the 'form of inner sense' can be construed as referring to the successiveness of the flow discovered by self-intuition. Second, a reading to which Kant seems to give greater prominence in the B edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, is that successiveness is a structure of the act of self-intuition itself, because in self-intuition, the intuiting self and the intuiting self do not coincide, but the latter is necessarily subsequent to the former, thereby establishing a relation of necessary successiveness between them. Now, while Bergson's theory of Durational flux aligns itself with the first of the two interpretations, his too casual treatment of Intuition as virtually, but not exactly, coinciding with its object, opens him to the criticism that his analysis of the successiveness of Consciousness is superficial, and, so misses the active role of the subject in producing it. On the other hand, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, better appreciate that Temporality is a product of the circuit of Selfhood. However, since they each seem to present the object of self-intuition as a previous act of Consciousness, they join with Bergson in proposing a theory of Time that is independent of corporeality. In contrast, on the construction that has been developed here, the intuited self is an appearing self, and the process of appearing is irreducibly physiological. It thus diverges from those various post-Kantian incorporealizations of Temporality.

Being Boring and Vice

If an Ethical principle promotes a balance in Conduct between Variety and Sameness, a predominance of one or the other constitutes a Vice, according to that principle. Being boring is Conduct in which Sameness predominates over Variety. Therefore, according to that principle, being boring is a Vice. Such a judgment is rarely to be found in traditional Ethical systems, but it is plainly entailed by any Vitalistic principle.

Precognition

'Precognition' connotes 'awareness of a future of event'. It is not a mere imaginative anticipation of an occurrence that eventually does come to pass, but the mental recording of a concrete fact. However, as the recording of a fact, it must be preceded by the occurrence of that fact. Hence, an event that is the object of such an awareness must be in past with respect to the awareness. In other words, 'precognition' is a contradictory notion, and the burden is on someone who insists otherwise to explain how it is even possible, let alone to demonstrate that it is actual. Plainly, that a 'vision comes true', does not disprove that the correspondence between imaginative anticipation and eventual occurrence is, perhaps enhanced by a canny projection of an ongoing trend, is not coincidental. And, a claim of immunity from that burden, on the grounds that such a phenomenon defies rational explanation, is indistinguishable from an acknowledgment of the unsoundness of the assertion that the phenomenon exists.

Time and Boredom

According to Bergson, the vitality of experience derives from the flux of Duration. But, Boredom is a passage of Time in which 'nothing is happening', so it exemplifies such a pure flux. Hence, Durational flux is not a sufficient condition of vitality. Rather, vitality is a function of the variety of the contents of experiential flux, which can be supplied only by activity of some kind. In contrast, Boredom is passage constituted by minimal variety, or, in other words, it is Experience in which Temporalization, the principle of Internalization, and, hence, of homogenization, predominates.

Certainty and Uncertainty

A common manifestation of Temporalization in ordinary experience is the seeking of completion, while one of Spatialization is that of innovation. For example, experience is frequently constituted by the desire for closure, as well as that for novelty and variety. Nevertheless, Psychological theories have traditionally privileged concrescence over discrescence, perhaps not more prominently than in the significance they accord to Certainty, the attainment of which is the achieving of closure. That privilege is implicit even where the principle of Certainty seems to receive an explicit challenge, i. e. in Dewey's exposure of the 'quest for certainty' as underlying theological and philosophical systems throughout history. But, despite his criticism of the tradition, Dewey nevertheless accedes to the principle, by merely proposing a modification of it, i. e. a quest for probability. He thereby perpetuates the under-appreciation of the dynamic constructive role of uncertainty in experience, e. g. the seeking of novelty and variety, one which he does seem to briefly recognize in other contexts, i. e. its implication in creative activity, but which he ultimately denigrates as a destabilizing dimension of experience.

Selfishness and Altruism

On the basis the definitions previously proposed here, the 'Spatio-Temporality' of Experience consists in a combination of two processes--self-extending and self-retaining, with, as a special case of the former, extending oneself towards others. How the two processes happen to combine varies according to circumstance, so the primary function here of an Ethical principle is not to advocate one or the other, but to promote the achieving of a balance between self-oriented and other-oriented tendencies. An example of the potential value of this model is its application to the traditional Selfishness vs. Altruism debate, one which is not merely an academic exercise, but which continues to profoundly influence current affairs in this society. The resolution of the debate, according to the model, is to achieve a balance between the two principles, e. g. to be as generous as possible without overextending oneself. The model also exposes one chronic flaw of the debate--the lack of recognition, by both sides, that the tendency to extend oneself is a natural impulse, a lack which reinforces both the premise that Selfishness is the exclusive natural behavioral principle, and the premise that Altruism is a non-natural principle, both of which have regularly fueled the debate.

Heidegger and Levinas

Levinas' concept of 'Ethics' directly challenges Heidegger's devaluation of the notion as merely subjectivistic. The explicit context of the challenge is Phenomenological methodology, which, according to Levinas, does not distinguish things and persons, while the subtext is that of a French Jew confronting a German Nazi. In the process, Levinas, as much as Heidegger himself, loses sight of a problem that Being and Time proposes to correct, namely, that of losing oneself in the anonymity of the crowd. Consequently, any corrective to that loss is recognized by neither as an 'Ethical' principle. But, to classify such a principle as 'Ethical' is not necessarily an endorsement of Egoism. Rather, it can be to accept its role within Experience as a principle that is complementary to that which promotes the extending of oneself towards others, i. e. the promotion of a process which has tended to escape the notice of Phenomenologists, in general.

Time and Ethics

One of the central normative tenets of Being and Time is that one should remain true to one's ownmost self, with 'one's ownmost self' defined in terms of one's mortality. That definition has been challenged in a variety of ways, e. g. for Sartre, one's death is the most anonymous, not the most personal, of events, while Spinozism precludes the possibility of death inhering in Conatus. Here, a further objection is that 'one's death' is a completely contentless notion, thereby leaving the derived notion of Selfhood groundless. The position here is, instead, that what is 'one's ownmost' is everything that one has done, culminating in one's most recent experiences, or, in other words, one's Temporality, as has been previously explained. Hence, Time is Ethically significant, i. e. it is the sphere in which one is true to oneself, e. g. personal integrity in conduct. But, as has also been previously discussed, Space, too, is Ethically significant, as the structure of one's extending oneself towards others. Thus, Ethics is constituted by a combination of Space and Time, i. e. it concerns the achieving of a balance between extending oneself towards others and remaining true to oneself. Recognition of the former Ethical dimension is lacking in Being and Time, that of the latter, in Levinas' theory.

Time and Sameness

Just as Spatialization is a mode of Differentiation, as has been previously discussed, Temporalization is a mode of what might be called 'Identication', i. e. 'becoming-the-same'. While an association of Time and Sameness might seem counter-intuitive, it is the association of Time and Difference, implicit both in common notions and in specialized theories of the former, that is counter-intuitive. The association of Time and Difference relies heavily on a thesis that has, challenged here--that the Future is a fundamental Temporal feature. Acceptance of that thesis grounds both the common connotation of Time as ceaseless change, and Time as 'self-ecstaticing', as Heidegger and Sartre have it, grounding, therefore, in each case, the notion of Time as essentially self-varying. In contrast, the theory of Time as ending at the present moment, that has been proposed here, accords with the most patent evidence of everyday experience. On that basis, that Consciousness consists in a process of representation that both Temporalizes and appropriates as one's own, the object of representation, even that of the projection of a possible action, becomes easier to conceive, e. g. for Kant 'my' representations are each part of the temporal sequence of experience. In other words, Temporalization is a mode of Identication, in the context of personal experience.

Space and Difference

A relation between Space and Difference has occasionally been implied by Philosophers, e. g. Derrida's notion 'Spacing', but apparently never developed into an explicit theme of philosophical inquiry. That A and B being at separate locations suffices to show that A and B are different, evinces that Space and Difference are intimately related. Two formulations of that relation can be--'Space is the image of Difference', and, 'Difference is the concept of Space'. Accordingly, the notion of Space as a structure of Experience implies that Difference, too, is a structure of personal experience. In other words, 'Spatialization' is also 'Differentiation', or, as has been called here a while ago, 'Diversification'. Hence, insofar as Space has an Ethical significance, as has been recently discussed, self-differentiation is a locus of normative evaluation.

Space and Ethics

Space is typically treated as a theoretical category--as a topic in Epistemology, Mathematics, Physics, etc. Levinas suggests how it can also be conceived as implicated in Ethics, in his positing of Exteriority as the proper medium of Ethics, though he does not go so far as to equate Exteriority with Space. His thesis is that Experience becomes an Ethical context upon the intrusion of Exteriority, i. e. the Face of an Other, into Interiority, i. e. the egological sphere of phenomena for subjective consciousness. However, his classification of this event is indifferent to the nature of the response of the subject to whom it befalls, e. g. welcoming, hostile, indifferent, reifying, etc. In contrast, the thesis here is that the fundamental locus of Ethics consists in how one comports oneself towards others, whether or not one has been prompted by an encounter with an Other. In other words, it consists in the degree to which one extends oneself towards others, or, in Levinas' terms, in a process of Exteriorization from the Interior. By further equating Exteriority with Space, Space becomes a topic in Ethics.

Outer Experience

The distinction between 'outer' and 'inner', which is significant for Kant since it grounds his distinction between Space and Time, is one that he seems to take as self-evident. Even so, it is one that he effaces once he reduces spatial experience to temporal. Levinas suggests a different criterion for differentiating Outer from Inner--a perception of a thing is 'inner', while an encounter with the Face of an Other is 'outer'. However, this distinction is not as immediately self-evident as Levinas seems to take it to be. The aspect of the Other that is truly 'outer' to one is not its physiognomic features, but the projection of a subject beyond any immediate perception, of whom those features are an expression. That projection entails an exteriorization of the experiencer, which shows that, as is the case with Kant, outer experience for Levinas is not a function of Perception, but of Motility.

Continuum and Frame of Reference

'Continuum' and 'Frame of Reference' are notions commonly associated with Einsteinian Physics, but each has its application in Newtonian Physics. In the latter, Space and Time are each continuua, with the more contemporary development being the positing of a continuum between them. While frames of references are used in Newtonian Physics to calculate relational quantities, they remain subdivisions of a single absolute structure, in contrast with Einsteinian Physics which does not recognize either absolute Time or absolute Space. Nevertheless, the latter Physics persists in referring to 'the' Space-Time Continuum, implying the acceptance of some unitary structure that embraces the infinite multiplicity of frames of references that constitutes its universe. However, how it reconciles the notion of Continuum with a notion that entails an opaque terminal point is unclear. The more chronic problem that it inherits from Newtonian is to explain even the restricted use of frames of reference--that even as a local device, a frame of reference, as introducing a discontinuity into Space and Time, can only be derived from a source outside the purported universe, and which cannot be God, whose purview is not localized.

Space, The Body, Outside

For Kant, Space is the form of outer sense, i. e. that by which objects can be intuited as "outside of us". His 'us' is ambiguous, in two respects. First, even though it is literally plural, he likely means it as a singular pronoun. Second, of greater significance is that it can mean either 'one's body' or 'one's mind'. That it means the latter follows from his treatment of the body as subject to Newtonian principles, and, hence, as an occupant of objective Space just like any other item subject to those laws of Nature. In other words, he holds that the body is an object of intuition in Space, not that Space is outside the body. Therefore, his concept of Space presupposes one of one's body as an otherwise characterless entity the attributes of which are bestowed on it only via the intuition of it. Conversely, a different concept of one's body, e. g. as a center of action, could yield a different concept of Space, e. g. one it which Space begins at the periphery of the physical agent, and radiates outwardly.

Space, Motility, The Body

The title of one chapter in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception is 'The Spatiality of One's Own Body and Motility'. Despite the novelty of the study, the title expresses two of its flaws. First, it implies that a human body is distinct from its motions. Second, what distinguishes Motility from Mobility is that it is active, self-generating motion, and not merely passive moveability, which is what the latter connotes. But, to actively set oneself in motion requires Will, and Will entails an at least rudimentary mental component. Hence, Body alone is incapable of Motility. So, while Merleau-Ponty correctly attributes Spatiality to Motility, he compromises that attribution by deriving it from the Spatiality of inert, mindless Body, which reduces to the Spatiality of the sedentary Perception of Body, as the title of the whole book indeed articulates.

Space and Ethics

Space has traditionally been classified as a 'theoretical' problem, i. e. a topic of Epistemology, Physics, Mathematics, etc. Here, in contrast, because Space constitutes the structure of how one comports oneself towards, i. e. how one extends oneself towards others, it is a practical one, as well. The potential recognition of the significance of Space to Ethics can be found in Levinas' thesis that Exteriority is the medium of Ethics. However, for him, Ethics remains a passive experience, which precludes the possibility of his further consideration that active self-exteriorization, and, hence, Spatialization, is the originary locus of Ethics. But, it is not primarily because of the idiosyncrasy of such a concept of Space that its implication in Ethics is heterodoxical. Rather, what is more immediately heterodoxical is the thesis that Action itself, not its preconditions nor its consequences, its the fundamental locus of Ethics, i. e. that the actual performance of an action, and not its intention nor its effects, is the bearer of Ethical value. Thus, insofar as Space as defined in terms of Action, the heterodoxy of its implication in Ethics is, similarly, a derivative one.

Appearance and Space

Kant's 'Copernican Revolution' recasts things into appearances, i. e. into objects qua being perceived, regardless of what they might be in themselves, or even of that they might be in themselves. Concomitantly, the spatiality of those objects is recast as a structure of the process of intuiting them, and nothing besides. But, by defining Appearance in terms of cognitive processes, Kant suppresses another dimension of it, and, thereby, another notion of Space. He gives no consideration to the active process of Appearing, which transpires not merely e. g. when an actor emerges from the wings onto the stage, but, in general, in any kind of putting forth, e. g. the execution of an intention. Appearing, in this sense, thus, as has been previously discussed, Spatializes itself, producing a Spatiality that inheres it, and precedes any cognition of it. Accordingly, as a function of activity, the division of the Kantian architectonic that this notion of Space properly belongs to is not that devoted to Cognition, but to that concerned with action, i. e. the Critique of Practical Reason.