Monday, August 2, 2010
Individual and Person
Formaterialism has hitherto been showcasing the distinction, generally ignored in the Philosophical tradition, between the literal meaning of 'individual', i. e. 'undivided', and its common usage, i. e. meaning 'separate', which are not equivalent. As applied to behavor, the difference is significant--while the former type of 'individual' is one who freely seeks consistency in conduct, i. e. acts according to a Principle, the latter is one who does the opposite of some prevailing behavorial pattern. The latter might be considered 'principled', but the range of its freedom is constrained by its being no more than a function of what it opposes. Furthermore, it precludes any association with others. The relevance of the distinction is that the predominant type of American 'individuality' is the latter, which, from the perspective of the Formaterial notion, is an underdeveloped stage of Individuality, in danger of being an arrested development where it is idealized by some 'individualistic' and 'libertarian' doctrines. Unfortunately, the conventional meaning is too ingrained for confusion to be avoided in the proper use of term, so what has previously been called here 'Individual', will now be termed 'Person'. Thus, a 'Person' is one whose conduct is based on a freely chosen Principle, either an 'Autonomous' Person, whose Principle has an external origin, e. g. the Kantian Principle, or an 'Idionomic' Person, whose Principle promotes self-creativity, e. g. the Evolvemental Principle, a distinction which has been previously explained. Accordingly, any conditioned behavior lacks 'Personality', while conventional 'individuality' constitutes a transition from conditioned behavior to free conduct, which is nascent Personhood where it is not stunted. This notion of Person is not to be confused with the legal definition of it. Indeed, that a corporation qualifies as a legal 'person', on the sole basis of its status as a self-interested economic entity, demonstrates the de jure status in America of immature Personhood.
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Indeed, provisions for subsidization and maintenance of the struldbrugs haven't evolved since inheritting our legal system from Luggnagg.
ReplyDeleteps - If it were more defined, women couldn't be as choiceful as they are today.
ReplyDeletePlato, "Statesman"
ReplyDeleteStr. Very good, Socrates; and, if you continue to be not too particular about names, you will be all the richer in wisdom when you are an old man. And now, as you say, leaving the discussion of the name, -can you see a way in which a person, by showing the art of herding to be of two kinds, may cause that which is now sought amongst twice the number of things, to be then sought amongst half that number?
Y. Soc. I will try;-there appears to me to be one management of men and another of beasts.
Str. You have certainly divided them in a most straightforward and manly style; but you have fallen into an error which hereafter I think that we had better avoid.
Y. Soc. What is the error?
Str. I think that we had better not cut off a single small portion which is not a species, from many larger portions; the part should be a species. To separate off at once the subject of investigation, is a most excellent plan, if only the separation be rightly made; and you were under the impression that you were right, because you saw that you would come to man; and this led you to hasten the steps. But you should not chip off too small a piece, my friend; the safer way is to cut through the middle; which is also the more likely way of finding classes. Attention to this principle makes all the difference in a process of enquiry.
Y. Soc. What do you mean, Stranger?
Str. I will endeavour to speak more plainly out of love to your good parts, Socrates; and, although I cannot at present entirely explain myself, I will try, as we proceed, to make my meaning a little clearer.
Y. Soc. What was the error of which, as you say, we were guilty in our recent division?
Str. The error was just as if some one who wanted to divide the human race, were to divide them after the fashion which prevails in this part of the world; here they cut off the Hellenes as one species, and all the other species of mankind, which are innumerable, and have no ties or common language, they include under the single name of "barbarians," and because they have one name they are supposed to be of one species also. Or suppose that in dividing numbers you were to cut off ten thousand from all the rest, and make of it one species, comprehending the first under another separate name, you might say that here too was a single class, because you had given it a single name. Whereas you would make a much better and more equal and logical classification of numbers, if you divided them into odd and even; or of the human species, if you divided them into male and female; and only separated off Lydians or Phrygians, or any other tribe, and arrayed them against the rest of the world, when you could no longer make a division into parts which were also classes.
Y. Soc. Very true; but I wish that this distinction between a part and a class could still be made somewhat plainer.
Str. O Socrates, best of men, you are imposing upon me a very difficult task. We have already digressed further from our original intention than we ought, and you would have us wander still further away. But we must now return to our subject; and hereafter, when there is a leisure hour, we will follow up the other track; at the same time I wish you to guard against imagining that you ever heard me declare-
Y. Soc. What?
Str. That a class and a part are distinct.
Y. Soc. What did I hear, then?
Str. That a class is necessarily a part, but there is no similar necessity that a part should be a dass; that is the view which I should always wish you to attribute to me, Socrates.
Y. Soc. So be it.
The proper way to divide an "individual" is "down the middle".
ReplyDeleteJust as the Greek's would divide a map of "Athena's brain".
ReplyDelete