Mill, Induction, and Morality

Just as Kant applies Deductive Logic to Morality, Mill applies Inductive Logic to it. He argues that 'X is desirable' is no more than an Inductive generalization of factual cases of X being desired. And, since what is ultimately desired, according to him, is Pleasure, 'X is Pleasing' = 'X is Good', and 'Good' means nothing more than that. Moore charges Mill with committing a 'Naturalistic Fallacy', i. e. with equating a 'natural' quality, Pleasure, with a non-'natural' one, Good. But Moore's charge is unnecessarily burdened by his potentially question-begging invocation of a Nature vs. non-Nature Platonistic Dualism. So, a more straightforward version of this line of criticism is that Mill confuses Fact and Value, that a Value cannot be derived from a Fact. Another is that what ought to be the case cannot be derived from what is the case. But, if Mill is steadfast, he can insist that non-Nature, Value, and Ought, are as much products of Induction from Nature, Fact, and Is, as Desirable is from Desired. Still, he faces a more formidable challenge from the internal limitations of Induction itself. Generalization can apply only to what has been the case, so Induction can present no grounds for asserting that Pleasure will continue to be what is desired, anymore than it can for deriving a possible future Fact from a past Fact or pattern of Facts. Furthermore, the behavioral regularity that Mill's Inductive Morality presumes upon cannot accommodate the Evolvemental thesis that Conduct is intrinsically a variation of what precedes it.