Property and Socialism

Ownership is an abstract relation between two inert entities. Hence, even the terms of the collectivization of property are inert, and that fusion is no more than an abstract goal, no matter how derived. Furthermore, as a correction of dehumanizing exploitation it is a mere means to some better condition. Now, the collectivization of property is derived from the concrete dynamic collectivization of the operation of the means of production, according to the Marxist analysis. Furthermore, that collectivization corrects a dimension of dehumanization that even Smith recognizes--social fragmentation. Accordingly, the development of the We, which is essentially Agency, is the essential concrete dynamic feature of Socialism, which, as an improvement of preceding conditions, can therefore be specified as Ethical Socialism. Thus, either Scientific Socialism is essentially an inert abstract scheme, or else it is implicitly Ethical Socialism, to which it is a means.

Socialism, Idealism, We

Marx's personal derivation of Socialism from Hegelianism begins with an external critique of the latter, i. e. a Materialist inversion of the Idealism of the latter. However, a perhaps more direct route between the two begins with an internal critique of Hegel's system. Specifically, while Hegel conceives the terminal point of the Phenomenology of Mind, i. e. Absolute Mind, as an 'I', the overcoming of the Subject-Object opposition that preserves both moments is more accurately conceived as a 'We'. From there, it is easy to argue that 'We' must be a Materialist rather than an Idealist concept, i. e. because it entails a concrete multiplicity, and, furthermore, that it signifies agency. In turn, from 'We act' follows 'We own', i. e. the collectivization of property, the historical occasion of which, according to Marx, is the emergence of the consciousness of the 'we act' of the co-operators of a collective means of production. If Marx misses that derivation, it is perhaps because he fails to recognize that Idealism cannot accommodate Multiplicity, as is explicit in Parmenides' original version of it.

Scientific Socialism and Ethical Socialism

If the consciousness of Class-Conflict motivates a worker to revolt, it is not because they recognize in it a Contradiction. It is because the Conflict, more precisely, consists in the exploitation of workers. Furthermore, if that motivation includes its validation, it is on the basis of the principle that exploitation is unjust. Now, the system that is derived from that principled motivation is sometimes called 'Ethical Socialism', a variety of the same 'Utopian Socialism' that Marx and Engels regard as inferior to Scientific Socialism, i. e. in which Revolution is justified as a response to a moment of Contradiction in a Dialectical Materialist pattern. So, the variety of Socialism that is incipient in Class-Consciousness is not the one that Marx and Engels espouse, even if it is the better-grounded of the two.

Scientific Socialism and Practical Materialism.

Marx and Engels classify their program as 'Scientific Socialism', which they distinguish from 'Utopian Socialism'. By 'Science', they mean 'Dialectical Materialism'. Now, as articulated in the Theses on Feuerbach, the system is also 'Practical Materialism'. Thus required is how a Dialectical pattern governed by Necessity can also entail a voluntary phase. In particular, what is required is an explanation of how the transition from the consciousness of a Contradiction, i. e. of Class-Conflict, is followed by its resolution both necessarily and voluntarily. However, they offer no such account, in the absence of which Scientific Socialism and Practical Materialism remain apparently irreconcilable.

Materialism, Labor, Theory

In the German Ideology, Marx proposes that the foundational Materialist experience is the Labor that produces the means of subsistence, on the grounds that such a process distinguishes humans from other animals. He thereby contrasts himself from both Feuerbach, whose Theoretical Materialist correlate is Contemplation, and Smith, for whom the Propensity to Barter is the specifically human characteristic. However, since many animals clearly exert themselves in the acquisition of food, the formation of shelter, etc., mere Labor does not suffice as a differentiation from them of the human species. Instead, sharper in that respect, is the use of tools in Labor. But, if so, then Theory precedes Practice, as is illustrated in the temporal relation between the rise of modern Physics and the subsequent industrial Technology of his era. So, his Materialism requires a systematic account of the relation between Theory and Practice, and not merely a devaluation of the former in favor of the latter.

Theory, Practice, Contemplation

The main theme of the Theses on Feuerbach is Theory vs. Practice, with Interpretation and Change the species of each, respectively, in #11. Now, as has been previously discussed, Marx's classification of Interpretation as Theory is questionable, since, like Translation, it involves a modification of some given material, and, hence, is a Practical process. Instead, the theme of #5, Contemplation, involves no such modification, and, furthermore, its esteemed status in the preceding Philosophical tradition is well-established, thereby affording him a better example of what he is trying to contrast with Change in #11. However, the primary reason for that esteem is that it is usually conceived as an elevated state consisting in subject-object unity. Accordingly, to justify a devaluation of Contemplation, and, hence, of Theory, he needs to do more than insinuate that it is only a reinforcement of the status quo. More effective, for example, would be to argue that Cognition, including Contemplation, is, organically, nascent Action, from which it follows that Theory in isolation from Practice is only an arrested stage of development of the latter.

Contradiction and Revolution

One Philosopher that Marx is certainly targeting in the 11th Thesis is Feuerbach himself, for reasons that he explains in preceding Theses. The specific 'interpretation' in question is Feuerbach's Materialist proposition that the presumed Spiritual realm of Religion is no more than a projection of, and grounded in, mundane human experience. To that, Marx argues that Feuerbach stops short of questioning the generation of that dualism itself, which, if pursued, exposes the contradictions in social conditions, thereby prompting revolutionary action, i. e. to "change" the world. However, Marx thus reveals only the shortcomings in Feuerbach's Interpretation, without explaining the relation between the cognition of a Contradiction and subsequent Revolution. In other words, by contrasting Interpretation and Change in the 11th Thesis, he severs them, leaving Change groundless, a problem which he addresses only with the presumed Dialectical 'Necessity' that effects the transition from Cognition to Action.