Certainty, God, Mathematics

In #3 of the pre-Meditations Rules for the Directions of the Mind, Descartes offers a potentially clearer explanation for the priority of God over Mathematics than the problematic, as has been previously discussed, one of the later work.  In the earlier one, he conceives Mathematics to be an object of "intuition", a mode of Knowledge that is certain, plus, he allows that valid deduction is a certainty-preserving procedure.  Furthermore, he also recognizes the possibility of divine revelation, which is "more certain than our surest knowledge", i. e. knowledge of God is superior to that of Mathematics.  However, a problem with this scheme, that might have led to the eventual abandonment of it, is that it is unclear where in the hierarchy the Cogito is, and another is that in it, Certainty is conceived as admitting of varying degrees, and, hence, might be unsuitable to function as an absolute criterion in a formal Method.  Still, its flexibility accommodates the elevation of God over Mathematics, without the implausible doubt of the latter that he resorts to in the Meditations. 

Doubt, Mathematics, God

Descartes' contention that even the simplest Mathematical proposition is uncertain, because it could be the product of demonic deception, seems explainable in one of two ways.  First, that it is possible that all Mathematical propositions are fictions, or, second, that there exists some realm in which Mathematical relations are other than they have always appeared to be.  However, as Descartes acknowledges, that a mathematical proposition is merely imaginary does not falsify it, so, what it asserts is no less certain in that scenario.  Furthermore, the existence of a realm in which there subsist Mathematical relations that are other than have always been represented by a human being, is more implausible than whatever grounds for qualms that Descartes has about those representations, and, so, hardly suffices to even give pause about them.  So, his doubt of Mathematics seems itself a specious contrivance, perhaps designed to promote the questionable Theological thesis that God is more powerful than Mathematics, i. e. can ultimately override its propositions.

Doubt and Morality

One reason that Descartes does not submit Moral phenomena and judgments, e. g. the Ten Commandments, to Doubt might be that it would expose his method to the charge of 'demonic temptation', if not to outright 'apostasy' and 'heresy'.  But, even aside from the fate of Bruno looming over that application of his criterion, the project would seem to stall at the implication that the Cogito is 'Evil', a significant consequence of which would be that a 'Good' God would not likely be available to underwrite any further knowledge claims.  Progress from that juncture might, therefore, require, as Nietzsche shows two centuries later, a more radical Skepticism than what Descartes is willing to commit to.  Instead, the Moral dogma that he does not challenge becomes entrenched in the Epistemology-dominant tradition that he pioneers, i. e. even Kant and Mill ultimately accede to it, e. g. the Deontology of the former, and the 'high'-'low' distinction of the latter.

Deception and Temptation

The possibility, which Descartes arrives at towards the end of the first Meditation, of an "evil genius" deceiving an incorporeal entity that it has a body, makes little Theological sense.  In contrast, the prototype of Deception in the scriptures of his religious orientation is Temptation, i. e. the presentation of Evil as if it were Good.  On that basis, the concept of God as a non-deceiver is as a presenter of the Good, not, as Descartes portrays it, of theTrue.  But, the underlying problem, that he does not even begin to address, is the application of his method of Doubt to Moral judgments, en route to the establishment of at least one attribution of Goodness of which he can be certain.  In other words, in sharp contrast to The Republic and the Nichomachean Ethics, the Meditations not only enthrones Epistemology, but marginalizes Ethics, the legacy of which in subsequent Modern Philosophy is perhaps best exemplified by the currently pervasive reduction of Moral Reasoning to a branch of Modal Logic, under the rubric 'Deontic Logic'.

God and Epistemology

Descartes' introduction into the Meditations of the Moral predicates "good" and "evil" leads to that of a concept of a God the primary function of which is to intervene in Cognitive processes.  As, a result, Epistemology becomes Theologized, and, thereby, elevated to a predominance that is maintained even as Philosophy in subsequent centuries becomes more apparently secular, e. g. the justification of contemporary Analytic Philosophy as a corrective to conceptual confusion.  However, that introduction is ungrounded, and, so, violates his own method.  In contrast, for example, on the basis of, as has been argued here, the more rigorously established principle that he is a writing being, an appeal to God might be elsewhere directed, e. g. as an expression of his hope that a reader would not misunderstand him.  In more radical contrast, for example, he might have recognized the severe limitations of Certainty as a criterion, and abandoned it in favor of Probability, thereby obviating any need for involving God.  So, the implication of God in Epistemology is, at minimum, arbitrary and unnecessary, in both the Cartesian project and the tradition that it has spawned.

Mind and Soul

As has been previously argued, if the Meditations were truthful, its setting would be Descartes at a desk, writing the book.  Now, granting him that in the process of expressing himself, he could somehow, at the same time, carry out the detachment of his 'Mind' from the hand wielding a pen, and maintain that separation through various cogitations, e. g. proving the existence of God, re-embodiment, via the pineal gland, would re-attach that Mind immediately to not his senses, but to his motile Body, in which case the governing mental principle is 'I act, therefore I am.  Though while that formulation might have redirected subsequent Philosophy from the predominance of Epistemology, it is consistent with the tradition that precedes it.  For, Cartesian 'Mind' is a variation of the Platonist-Aristotelian-Medieval 'Soul', which, in each of those systems is an principle of Animation, and not merely one of Cogitation.  So, whatever Descartes' ambition for his 'I' is, at least part of it needs to include an explanation of how it initiates Motility.

Philosophical Reflection and We

As has been previously discussed, if Descartes were more rigorous, the Meditations would begin with him not--sitting in a chair gazing at a fire, but--at a desk writing, from which he might have arrived at the realization that "I am writing" is certain whenever it appears.  From there, he might have concluded that since he intends this act to be shared with others, in a common language, it is also certain that 'We exist'.  Such Reflection could provide the ground of a refutation to any scriptural, i. e. written dogma, i. e. that asserts the existence of a disembodied individual 'soul', for example.  Furthermore, it could serve as a reminder that the Socratic tradition begins as an act of civil disobedience, and continues as a body of literature.  In other words, any denial of a systematic relation between Philosophical Reflection and We, not merely has the preponderance of evidence against it, but, as an expressed assertion, is self-defeating.