Examplification, Empowerment, Education

Examplification is empowering insofar as it shows others that something can be done.  Furthermore, when the presentation of the example is articulated, what is shown is how something can be done, and when that articulation is represented as a formula, it is as a Method that something is being Examplified..  In each of these cases, Examplfication is, in other words, Education.  Thus, showing students how to conduct research is Education.  On the other hand, merely passing information on to them, despite the prevalence of that process in many classrooms, is not.

Potentism and Scope

The scope of the exercise of Power in an act of Self-Control is the individual performer, but that in an act that is also intended as setting an example is the target audience, as well.  Thus, 'Scope' is a significant variable in evaluation according to Potentism.  Furthermore, any factor of repeatability in Examplification can extend its Scope beyond its immediate audience.  So, the verbal representation of an act can increase its Potency, which is how the lives, and deaths, of Socrates and Christ continue as among the most powerful determinants of the course of Western history.

Potentism, Slave Morality, Master Morality, Morality of Self-Mastery

The representation, previously proposed here, of the Will to Power as the Moral doctrine 'Potentism', with the maximization of Potency its principle, facilitates evaluations of three types of doctrine that Nietzsche entertains, two of which it is sometimes identified with.  Slave Morality is deficient insofar as it stifles the creativity of exceptional types.  Master Morality is deficient, conversely, insofar as it exploits, abuses, or neglects the lower classes.  And, while the Morality of Self-Mastery might promote the maximum Potency of an individual, the scope of that exercise of Power is limited to that locus, e. g. a moment of Self-Control is deficient in comparison with a moment of Self-Control that is intended to, at the same time, serve as an example to others.  So, none of the three, despite apparent textual support to the contrary, especially in the cases of Master Morality and the Morality of Self-Mastery, is equivalent to Potentism.

Wil to Power, Morality, Potentism

Two of Nietzsche's innovative insights are: 1. A Moral doctrine is a product of the Will to Power, i. e. it is a model primarily designed to influence behavior, and 2. A Moral doctrine is the most potent expression of the Will to Power, i.e. the impact on human history of the deeds and words of Moses, Christ, Buddha, Socrates, Mohammed, etc. is unsurpassed by an other endeavor.  Together, the two imply the fundamental proposition of his later oeuvre--the Will to Power is a Moral doctrine, i. e. it formulates a model designed to invigorate the course of European civilization as hitherto constituted.  For want of a better terminology, that doctrine can be called 'Potentism', with the promotion of maximum Potency its fundamental principle.  Now, two tasks integral to any introduction of a new doctrine are a critique of rival doctrines, and a demonstration of its application.  Nietzsche's version of the former is his 'revaluation of all values', e. g. in the Anti-Christ, he exposes Christian Pity as a debilitating emotion.  However, an explicit systematic presentation of the application of Potentism is absent, thereby contributing to the general lack of recognition that the Will to Power is itself a Moral doctrine that is the underlying theme of his post-Zarathustra oeuvre.

Will to Power, Morality, Examplification

In 'Of the Bestowing Virtue', in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the image of the Will to Power is "gold", which "always bestows itself".  Now, the process of perpetual bestowal seems paradoxical, if not impossible, since it involves giving without subtraction.  However, there is a familiar experience that is constituted by that pattern--what has been called here 'Examplification', i. e. setting an example.  Now, to set an example is to establish a paradigm for some specific conduct, which, when generalized, is the act of creating a Moral doctrine.  Thus, the introduction of the Will to Power and the study of Morality are not two independent features of Nietzsche's later oeuvre--they are different facets of one and the same project, intersecting in the process of Examplification.

Empowerment and Overpowering

In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche introduces the Will to Power as a principle of Empowerment in 'Of the Bestowing Virtue', while later, in 'Of Self-Overcoming', it emerges as a principle of Overpowering.  Subsequently, he vacillates between the two, but with the heavy emphasis on the latter.  At the heart of the dichotomy is a structural problem that he seemingly neither recognizes nor addresses--that both a whole and each of its parts is governed by its own Will to Power, according to the formulation "Everything is the Will to Power" (from #1067 of the Will to Power collection).  Hence, a part of a whole is governed both by the Will to Power of the whole of which it is a part, and by its own Will to Power.  Accordingly, Empowerment is a promotion, by a part, of the Will to Power of the whole, while Overpowering is a promotion, by a part, of its own Will to Power, in conflict with that of other parts.  Now, the fundamental problem of both Morality and Political Philosophy is to systematize the relations between Whole and Parts, a problem which Nietzsche effectively avoids with his reductive opposition of Master Morality and Slave Morality.  In turn, the isolation of the former from a Wholistic Morality facilitates the abstraction of the process of Overpowering from the more comprehensive one of Empowerment, resulting in much of his post-Zarathustra oeuvre.

Beyond Good and Bad

In I, 17 of the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche asserts that 'beyond Good and Evil' "does not mean 'Beyond Good and Bad'".  Now, according to a narrow interpretation of the assertion, he is simply distinguishing Master Morality from Slave Morality, from which it easily follows that being an 'immoralist' according to the latter does not mean being one according to the former.  However, it is more problematic to more broadly infer from that inequality that Slave Morality being subject to revaluation by the Will to Power entails that Master Morality is exempt from it.  For, in general, as an original principle, all preceding doctrines are alike subject to reconsideration by a Will to Power order of rank, regardless of their established relations to one another.  And, specifically, as has been previously discussed, what is "healthy" according to the Master Morality in Beyond Good and Evil #258, i. e. aristocratic Morality in that passage, is exposed as self-destructive according to the Will to Power.  In others words, 'Good and Bad' are no more 'beyond' that principle than are 'Good and Evil'.