Hand, Tool, Form

To modify Aristotle's analogy, the hand is not only the "tool of tools", it is the "Form of Forms", as well.  For, the most primitive occurrence of Formal Causality is the shaping of some material so that it can be grasped by the hand, i. e. the hand is the original Shape, prior to geometrical figures.  Thus, the aptly named handle, adapted to the contours of the hand in order for a tool to be usable, is the link between the two characterizations of the hand.  Now, Comprehension is distinguishable from other seemingly synonymous Mental operations, e. g. Understanding, as etymologically related to the functioning of the hand.  Thus, Comprehension, in its proper meaning, connotes a concept of Mind as fundamentally Practical, e. g. the Comprehension of the Idea of the Good is equivalent to knowing how to use it, rather than to merely looking at it.  Similarly, Spinoza's Adequate Idea, which entails Causal knowledge, is a product of Comprehension.

Form and Grasp

For most Philosophers, starting wth Plato and Aristotle, 'Form' may have a variety of meanings, but the fundamental one is Shape.  Now, Aristotle classifies Shape as a Common Sensible, i. e. it can be an object of any of the Senses.  However, he does not explain how any of them can be the source of the circumambience required to cognize, either via direct surface contact or via a synthesis of direct surface contacts, a solid object.  Instead, that source can only be Grasp, i. e. the enfolding hand.  Accordingly, if analogy is involved in the Knowledge of any Form, it can be only with the hand, not the eye.  Thus, Aristotle's likening of Mind as the Form of Forms, to the hand as the tool of tools, is more literal than he appreciates.

Idea of Good, Acting Wisely, Contemplation

In book VII of the Republic, Plato's metaphorical Sun, the Idea of Good, is presented as a necessary condition if one is to "act wisely".  The analogy thus suggests two ways that it might function as such.  One is that is guides one to an appropriate action, just as the Sun makes some object visible.  The other is that it empowers one to such action, just as the Sun, via photosynthesis and carbohydrates, energizes one.  But, neither of these is how he conceives the requisite interaction with the Sun.  Rather, the attitude that he exalts is Contemplation, for which there is no clear justification.  For, since Contemplation is distinct from the Idea of Good, there is nothing inherently Good about it.  Furthermore, in the absence of a systematic account of the relation between the Contemplation of the Idea of Good and acting wisely, the former can be an impediment to the latter, as Schopenhauer brings out in his concept of Platonic Contemplation as quelling any Action.  So, the traditional Philosophical privileging of Theory over Practice begins in a lacuna at the heart of Plato's solar metaphor.

Weakness, Individuality, Strength in Numbers

The Christian promotions of Pity and Meekness are antithetical to the promotion of Strength by the Will to Power.  Furthermore, the Christian promotion of individual Salvation is antithetical to the collectivity of the Dionysian festivals, described at the beginning of Birth of Tragedy.  So, Nietzsche's opposition to Christian values targets both Weakness and Individuation, each an antithesis to the principle of strength in numbers.

Sun, Enlightenment, Empowerment

The solar metaphors of Plato, Plotinus, imply that it is as enabling visibility that the Sun is most important to humans.  Those Ancients must be aware of it as also a source of warmth, but they apparently find nothing philosophically significant about that function.  But, it is less likely that they are aware of the Modern discovery of the contribution of solar energy, via photosynthesis, to human nutrition, e. g. carbohydrates.  On that basis, perhaps more philosophically significant than as a source of Enlightenment, is a metaphorical Sun as a source of Empowerment, which even Nietzsche misses with his Sun-deity Apollo.

Dionysian, Will to Power, Political Philosophy

Nietzsche remains a Dionysian throughout his oeuvre, from which it can be inferred that the collective experience that he describes at the beginning of Birth of Tragedy is what, in traditional terms, he conceives to be the Highest Good for a person.  Thus, according to his doctrine of Will to Power, the experience is one of maximum Empowerment.  Accordingly, though it is rarely explicitly stated in his works, implicit in all of them is the concept of strength in numbers, i. e. numbers of a coherent collectivity, not in a dissolute rabble.  Conversely, a society is only as strong as its weakest member, from which it follows that a fundamental responsibility of a Ruler is the maximum empowerment of the Ruled.

Henosis, Dionysian, Communitarian

Nietzsche's version of Henosis, likely based on personal experience, described in the opening sections of Birth of Tragedy under the rubric Dionysian, is non-Cognitive and collective, with all social divisions dissolved.  The experience thus seems more conducive to grounding a Holistic or a Classless Political Philosophy, e. g. that of Aristotle, Rousseau, or Marx, than the Oligarchical or Individualist one often associated with his own later writings.  However, in #45 of Human, All Too Human, he makes it clear that it is the capacity for community that is a characteristic of superior types, while petty self-interest is characteristic of the fragmentary rabble.  So, contrary to the standard interpretation, he is both a Dionysian and a Communitarian, though not necessarily Egalitarian.