Dialectic and Voluntary

Implicit in the Marx-Engels concept of 'Voluntary' is Individuality, i. e. it is each individual member of post-Revolutionary society that has freedom of choice. Now, they leave under-determined whether in pre-Revolutionary society, i. e. in Capitalism, some activity is voluntary, e. g. that of members of the overclass, or none is, i. e. every member of the society is under the sway of some impersonal force, e. g. History. In either case, the pattern of the transition as such can be clearly characterized as either Individuation or Pluralization, i. e. with respect to Volition. But, how that pattern is inscribed in the posited Dialectical process is unclear, and to reduce it to an instance of 'Negation' only underscores how overworked the latter is in the system. Furthermore, Voluntariness itself does not explain Collective-Consciousness, which requires a further transition from I to We. So, the emergence of the Voluntary moment from the process of Revolution is an indication of the inadequacy of Dialectic Logic, even if Materialist, to the process.

Nature, Voluntary, Dialectic

As has been previously discussed, the Marxist concept of Capitalism as a natural condition, and that of Socialism as a voluntary one, leaves unexplained the status of the revolutionary process that constitutes the transition from one to the other. Now, Marcuse distinguishes the preconditions of Revolution, which are governed by a naturally destructive Dialectical Necessity, from the voluntary involvement of the proletariat in pushing the destruction to its conclusion, and replacing it with a Socialist system. More precisely, on his account, the moment of transition is constituted by a certain combination of material and intellectual conditions, but he is no more definite than that. Furthermore, he leaves unexplained the laws governing the moment of transition itself, i. e. he provides no principle that explains the transition from natural laws to liberation from them. Perhaps, as he suggests in places, it is the Dialectic itself that, at the moment of extreme negation of existing conditions, negates its own Necessity, resulting in the liberation from that Necessity. But, that analysis leaves unexplained how that negative moment gives way to positive voluntary action, as well as how such a general law applies to the experience of an individual worker. Hence, it remains as much a capricious speculative device as is Smith's Invisible Hand, and, hence, a flaw in a presumed "scientific" a Socialism.

Voluntary, Involuntary, Revolution

According to Marx and Engels, activity in a Communist society is "voluntary", while activity in a Capitalist society is "natural", and, thus, by implication, involuntary. Now, separating a Capitalist society from a Communist society is, in their theory, Revolution, but whether or not that activity is voluntary seems undetermined. For example, if Revolution is conceived as a calculated means to a voluntary end, then it, too, is voluntary, while if it consists in mob hysteria, then it is not. Likewise, if it is an inevitable moment in a Dialectical process, it is Rational, not Natural, and, hence, voluntary, while as general History, in which individuals are caught up, it is involuntary. But, perhaps the conclusive factor has emerged in actual events--the recourse in some revolutions to totalitarian measures, which is an indication that Revolution is, in principle, not voluntary.

Voluntary and Communism

Kant demonstrates that there is a systematic relation between a psychological state, Autonomy, and a political structure, his Kingdom of Ends. Now, Marx and Engels make an analogous claim, i. e. between Voluntariness and Communism, but without any supporting argument. In other words, they do not explain why someone would freely choose Socialism over Capitalism, and, conversely, subsequent historical evidence seems to show that Communism can be totalitarian. It may be no coincidence that the fundamental principle of Kant's system--Reason--receives no attention in the German Ideology, and, perhaps, can receive no attention in an Empiricist "Material Method".

Material Method, Voluntary Action, Socialism

As Kant argues, mere observation alone does not suffice to distinguish some behavior as either 'voluntary' or 'involuntary'.  But, the more important application of the thesis is to internal observation, i. e. to introspection, which, as Spinoza, also, contends, cannot alone distinguish a motivating idea that is the product of conditioning, from one that is freely adopted.  Now, Marx and Engels implicitly agree with them when noting that an "illusory" motivation can be taken as a "real" one.  But, then they are acknowledging that their "material method", observation of concrete practice, lacks the capacity to distinguish voluntary from involuntary action.  Hence, they cannot recognize Socialism when they see it, and, furthermore, can derive no concept of Socialism from that method.

Possession and Private Property

Private Property is a species of Possession, which, as Hegel reminds, is the product of a process of Acquisition, of which there are two kinds--grasping and form-imposition, the former ephemeral, the latter permanent.  Now, in the case of the former, derivative devices function to maintain possession, some physical, e. g. a fence, some abstract, e. g. a deed, as well as a law that underwrites it.  But, as the physical examples illustrate, Possession has two dimensions--it keeps the object from leaving, and defends against acquisition from without.  Now, any codification that reinforces the status of a wife as the slave of a husband is an instance of the first dimension, whereas the concept of 'private' connotes exclusivity, and, hence, is an instance of the second dimension, i. e. it is a defense against any acquisition from without.  Hence, contrary to what Marx and Engels posit in the German Ideology, the family is not a foundational example of Private Property.

First Property and Labor

One definition that Marx and Engels do offer is that of 'property': "the power of disposing of the labor-power of others", on the basis of which they equate Private Property and Division of Liberty. Furthermore, "first" property is that of wife and child for the husband. However, entailed in the definition is "the labor-power of others", e. g. of the wife, the products of which elsewhere in Marxism are conceived as the property of the producers. So, right in front of their methodically observing eyes is an example of Property that is presupposed by their definition of "first property", thereby undermining the soundness of the exposition in this section.