Aggregation, Organism, Language

According to the Atomism to which Russell and the early Wittgenstein subscribe, the World consists in Atoms, and their contingent associations, aka 'external relations', in the formation of Aggregations.  Thus, for example, it follows from that principle that the 'human species' is no more than an Aggregation of Atomic humans, communication between which is extrinsic to their fundamental natures.  Now, one shortcoming of such Atomism is suggested in #47 of the Investigations--it cannot distinguish between the relation of chair-leg to a chair and that of a branch to a tree, which, despite Wittgenstein's gloss in the passage, is more than a linguistic distinction, i. e. severing a leg from a chair will not affect it internally in the way that snapping a branch off of a tree will, e. g. it will cease to grow.  Likewise, Atomism lacks the capacity to recognize the possibility that a species is itself an Organism, not an Aggregation, so that the possibility of communication between its parts, i. e. inter-personal communication, is intrinsic to their fundamental natures.  At minimum, the Atomistic rejection of the thesis that Language is fundamentally an intra-species phenomenon can be only on extra-linguistic grounds, just as the advocacy of a theory of 'external relations', can be only on extra-logical grounds.

Language and Individual

In #46-7 of the Investigations, Wittgenstein criticizes Russell's concept of 'Individual', on the grounds that whereas it entails Indivisibility, all his examples plainly have parts.  Now, implicit in the Tractatus is a converse criticism--that an Individual is not a fundamental element of the World, but merely a component in what are its Atoms, i. e. Facts, which are nexuses of Russell's Individuals.  The latter criticism can also be applied to Social Individualism, i. e. that the fundamental human unit is not necessarily an individual person, but a collective, e. g. a family, a nation, or, perhaps, the entire species.  So, if Language is essentially a collective phenomenon, Russellian Individualism will falsify it by, e. g. conceiving it as extrinsic to an individual person.

Language, Biology, Species

Like Reproduction, Communication is fundamentally an intra-species biological process, e. g. when people converse simply in order to socialize.  That is, in humans, Language fundamentally is interpersonal, not any of the following: 1. an inert impersonal entity; 2. an elective individual activity; 3. about the World, either as a description of it, or as a means to the modification of it.  Thus, Logicism strays from the outset when it abstracts Language from its biological context, as does the later Wittgenstein, when he conceives it as mediating an activity, rather than as coordinating the participants in an activity.

Language-Games and Biology

Communication that seeks to simply commune with another is as much a part of a 'Language-Game' like builder-assistant dialogue, as is lifting weights is a use of one's wrists like the use of a saw.  Rather, Communicability is a dimension of the preconditions of any Language-Game, just as the strength and coordination of wrists is a precondition of the ability to grip a piece of wood with one hand in order to saw it with the other.  In other words, Language is fundamentally biological, which the definition of it as an element in a Language-Game tends to obscure.

Language, Use, Tool, Instrument

The 'use' of a saw as a 'tool' or an 'instrument' is as an inert object, by an animate being.  On that basis, to say that one 'uses' one's hand, as a 'tool' or an 'instrument', e. g. to grip and to cut with a saw, is inappropriate.  Likewise inappropriate is to characterize smiling that is an expression of happiness, as a 'use' of a smile to express happiness.  Now, while oral and handwritten speech are immediately and animatedly expressed, the printed word seems, by contrast, inert.  Hence, it is by the misleading example of the latter that Language is characterized as a 'tool' or an 'instrument' that one 'uses', which Wittgenstein fails to discern.

Dialogicism and Language-Game

While presenting his concept of Language-Game as Pluralistic, Wittgenstein does not seem to consider the possibility that some Games are more comprehensive than others, and, thus, that some might be contained in others, as well as determined by them .  For example, if the builder and the assistant in #2 of the Investigations are father and son, then that particular Builder-Assistant Game may be one episode in, and determined by, a Father-Son Game.  Likewise, some will argue, any Builder-Assistant interaction is a function of more general economic conditions, and, thus, varies under Feudalism, Capitalism, and Socialism, for example.  Indeed, a Marxist, following Hegel, would likely argue that all human society is governed by a Dialectical principle, on the basis of which, therefore, the concept of Language can be called 'Dialogicism'.  Thus, while Russellian Logicism is easily classified as one among many Language-Games, Dialogicism is, by implication, the fundamental universal Language-Game, i. e. in which every verbal exchange is a moment in an overarching Dialectical development.  But, if so, the concept of Language-Game is Monistic, a thesis that Wittgenstein could not challenge without confirming it, or by remaining silent.

Constructivism and Language-Games

Wittgenstein's choice, in #2 of the Investigations, of the example of a building activity, as an introductory illustration of his concept of Language-Game, may be more than arbitrary.  For, preceding this phase of his transition from the Logicism of the Tractatus, he explicitly breaks with Russell regarding the structure of Mathematical Propositions--that they are 'Synthetic', rather than, like those of Logic, 'Analytic', in Kantian terms.  Furthermore, like Cassirer, he recognizes in the concept of Synthetic Propositions potential Constructivism, e. g. "the mathematician is an inventor, not a discoverer", from I, 168, of Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics.  But, 'Constructivist' can apply to more than Propositions--all human activity can be interpreted as governed by that principle, i. e. can be classified as what has here been called 'Artifactual', signifying that it is an expression of an active 'second nature', rather than as given as derived from 'Natural' or 'Supernatural' sources.  So, the image of building, in #2, can be appreciated as not merely a familiar simple example of a human activity, but as a symbol of all Language-Games.