Tragedy and Dancing

According to Nietzsche, Tragedy combines the Dionysian Art, Music, and an Apollonian Art, Drama, with his main innovation the thesis that the former gives rise to the latter.  In section 2 of Birth of Tragedy, he describes the precise moment of transition, a reaction to dithyrambic Music: "The essence of nature is now to be expressed symbolically; we need a new world of symbols; and the entire symbolism of the body is called into play, not the mere symbolism of the lips, face, and speech, but the whole pantomime of dancing, forcing every member into rhythmic movement.  Then the other symbolic powers suddenly press forward . . ."  In other words, Dancing, qua pantomimetic, functions as a transition to dramatic action, which is the former, now fully articulated, under the auspices of the Apollonian principle.  Thus, for example, dialogue is derived from song lyrics, which are refinements of pantomimetic vocalizations.  His innovative thesis is that the Apollonian principle does not supervene on the process from without, but, as a source of symbolization, is itself generated out of the Dionysian Art.

Birth and Tragedy

As has been previously discussed, Nietzsche finds in the Dionysian experience that is a phase of Tragedy, both Rapture and Rupture, which are seemingly incompatible, since in the former, two people can become "fused" (BT, sect. 1), while in the latter, they suffer, inversely, "dismemberment into individuals" (BT, sect. 2), a process of Individuation not to be confused with that governing Schopenhauer's concept of Representation.  However, allowing that the two events do not occur simultaneously, but sequentially, they are easily recognizable in the examples of sexual congress, followed by reproduction.  In other words, insofar as Rapture and Rupture are two stages of Tragedy--the third being Apollonian Vision--not only is Tragedy an Art-form that has a birth, but Birth is the central event of what Tragedy portrays.  Thus, his 'Birth of Tragedy' is also 'Birth as Tragedy'.

Rapture and Rupture

As has been previously discussed, in the first section of Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche diverges from Schopenhauer's concept of the noumenal realm, by characterizing the Dionysian experience as one of "ecstasy".  However, starting in section 3, he suddenly reverts to agreement with Schopenhauer, by describing that experience as "suffering and contradictory".  Now, he does not explain the apparent inconsistency between the two characterizations, but one way that they would be compatible is if they refer to two distinct, inverse, moments in the experience, that can be termed 'Rapture' and 'Rupture'.  For example, as applied to Schopenhauer's system, Sympathy and Contemplation are rapturous, while Rupture is the source of the various noumenal differentiations--Reproduction, Character, 'I Will', etc.--that, as has been previously discussed, is not adequately explained.  It is unclear if either Schopenhauer or Nietzsche would accept that analysis of the noumenon, but if not caused by such a Rupture, suffering is as irreal as is the individual that bears it.

Harmony and Unity

While Nietzsche's Dionysian principle is explicitly derived from Schopenhauer's concept of Will, it departs significantly from it.  Whereas that Will, according to Schopenhauer, is the source of universal suffering, the Dionysian realm, as Nietzsche describes it in the first section of Birth of Tragedy, is one of "universal harmony", in which each "feels himself not only united, reconciled, and fused, with his neighbor, but as one with him, . . . in ecstasy."  However, Harmony and Unity are not equivalent--the former entails a multiplicity, while the latter does not.  Hence, Nietzsche also inherits from his predecessor the problem of the existence of noumenal plurality, a problem which remains unaddressed in that section.

Harmony and Collectivity

Harmony entails a balance between Unity and Multiplicity, i. e. the differentiation of its components is as essential as is their integration.  Thus, to whatever extent Schopenhauer regards Harmony as intrinsic to Music--he does not to agree with Rousseau that it is a gimmick--he is committed to recognizing that Music is an inherently collective Art.  Now, in his system, Will is the principle of Unity, and Individuation is the principle of Multiplicity.  Thus, a musical performance qua collective, does not "copy" Will, as Schopenhauer proposes, but effects a combination of Will and Individuation.  However, the inferior status in his system of Individuation prevents him from appreciating that capacity of Music, and from recognizing that Music might be an inherently collective Art.

Will and Polyphony

Schopenhauer's pioneering appreciation of Music does not seem to extend to Polyphony.  For, when he does examine a plurality of synchronic sounds, e. g. his analysis of Harmony, he subordinates their diversity to their unity.  Furthermore, that privileging is inadequate to multi-melodic music, e. g. the 'free jazz' of recent decades.  Now, proper appreciation of Polyphony, in conjunction with his thesis that Music is a direct copy of Will, yields the insight that Will is inherently Pluralistic.  On that basis, a doctrine, such as his, that promotes the dissolution of individual differences, is not one derived from Will as its fundamental principle.

Courage and Complacency

At the beginning of Schopenhauer as Educator, Nietzsche offers what might be construed as an explanation for the previously discussed absence of  Courage in Schopenhauer's doctrine: "Men are even lazier than they are timid, and fear most of all the inconveniences with which unconditional honesty and nakedness would burden them".  By implication, 'Courage' is, at bottom, Effort, according to Nietzsche in the statement.  However, that classification mistakes Effort as the genus of Courage for Effort as a necessary condition of Courage.  Furthermore, even granting the mistake, the formulation does not apply to Schopenhauer's system, which, as has been previously discussed, does not accommodate individual Effort in any way.  However, a bigger problem with Nietzsche's analysis is one that a later Nietzsche might detect--what Bruno, for example, likely fears and resists is not an 'inconvenience', but a lethal threat.  In other words, this younger Nietzsche trivializes Courage by reducing mortal danger to an 'inconvenience', a reduction which is itself an expression of the culture of Complacency that he casts Schopenhauer as overcoming.  Still, that is not to dismiss that reduction as unworthy of Schopenhauer.  For, the Asceticism of the latter is a luxury that similarly trivializes involuntary hardship and deprivation, as does his reduction of courageous self-sacrifice to the penetration into an illusion.  Thus, Nietzsche's own apparent complacency at this stage of his development bespeaks an accurate insight into a Complacency to which Schopenhauer's doctrine is no exception, the full implications of which he only later better understands.