Innerness and Time

Despite being sometimes called 'peripatetic', Aristotle's characterization of his God as 'unmoved' places him squarely in the Pythagorean-Parmenidean-Platonist tradition of privileging Rest over Motion. In contrast, one of the significant innovations of Newtonian Physics is the centrality of Force and Acceleration to the System. Constant Motion and even Inertia are defined in those terms. But Philosophy has been slow to catch a hint, continuing to treat Corporeality in static terms. With the Kantian revolution, there is the beginning of dynamic treatment of Corporeality, one which two hundred years later continues its slow development. The 'Body' is still frequently promoted as the essence of individual corporeality, whereas from a dynamic perspective, it is an hypostasization, derived from a homeostatic representation used to guide movement. 'Inside the body' is thus, likewise, a derivative representation. Given a static notion of the Body, the 'inside' is what is contained by the periphery, i. e. the epidermis, and 'internalization' is simply a relocation of something from beyond that periphery to within it. But in the dynamic concept, it is not merely that the bodily image is constantly getting reconstructed, but that such reconstruction is one of the phases of Internalization. To put it more generally, in the dynamic concept of the Individual, Inner Sense is a feeling of a part by a whole that is itself a product of that feeling, the static image of which only being subequently generated. The Kantian, and Formaterial, association of Innerness with Time primarily, not Space, is one expression of a commitment to a theory of the Individual as dynamic.

Some Spatio-Temporal Confusions

One of the main purposes of the foregoing analyses of Space and Time is to expose some confusions that have prevailed in some prominent traditional theories, and that are at the root of some common attitudes. The theory of Time presented here challenges the thesis that the Past does not exist. The latter is typically based on a conception of Time as a succession of instants, in which, once surpassed, an instant ceases to exist. One practical expression of such a theory is Irresponsibility, i. e. that one's actions are of no consequence to one beyond their occurrence. In contrast, if, as presented here, the Past is part of the Present, then all one's previous actions are always part of one. Furthermore, if Time exists, and, as tradition has it, the Future is part of Time, then the Future exists. Thinking along such lines is at the root of some of the most common of fatalistic attitudes, e. g. the resignation that the Future is already written, and is only waiting to befall one. In contrast, here the 'Future' is actually a Future Present, and a Present is only first produced by a Propriation-Propriated relation. But in that relation, the Propriated is an Exposition, e. g. is some locomotility that will have preceded the reflection upon it. In other words, the 'Future' must await the performance of some action, meaning that it cannot be 'already written'. So, just as the Formaterial theory of the Past demonstrates that Individuality entails Responsibility for one's actions, its theory of the Future demonstrates how Individuality entails a certain Freedom of action.

Temporization and Time

Just as 'Space' for Kant is 'the Form of Outer Sense', for him 'Time' is 'the Form of Inner Sense'. The following example illustrates what for him is 'Inner Sense'. One perceives the front of a house, and then one perceives the side of the house. Now, if the house is rotating, the connection between the two perceptions is first and foremost 'outer'. But, it is also 'inner', which can be more easily discerned if the house is not moving at all, but one has walked around to the side of the house. In the latter case, the connection is privately experienced as a succession of perceptions, and it is the privacy that constitutes for Kant 'innerness', while 'Time' is that successiveness. But, in order for a series of perceptions to be in 'Inner Sense', it plainly needs to first be referred to it, as opposed to some outer object, e. g. the house. In other words, it must be preceded by a process of Internalization. What, in Kant's analysis, precedes the arrival in Inner Sense is a representing of the original perception, so the original perception needs to have already occurred in order for it to be represented. So, the very process of representation itself entails successiveness--first the original perception, and then the representation of the latter. Furthermore, just as a photo includes its object, representation internalizes what it represents. Thus, 'Inner Sense' is the product of Internalization, and, similarly, Time is the product of a process of Temporization. In the Formaterial System, Propriation is that process of Internalization, so Temporization can be defined as the 'structure of Propriation'. So, Kant's definition of Time is not inaccurate, but insufficient. Now, the foregoing demonstrates that the single fundamental 'dimension' of Time is 'inside of'. That is, the immediate object of any representation is always an action articulated in the present perfect progressive tense, e. g. I am aware that I have been looking at a house--even if one continues to look at the house as one makes the articulation, the articulation can represent only what has already actually occurred. The representation treats the represented as terminated, more precisely, as having led up to the terminating representation. So, in more tradional temporal terminology, 'inside of' is a relation between past and present. In other words, 'future' is not a fundamental Temporal dimension, to be discussed subsequently in more detail.

Spatialization and Space

While it represents an advance over its predecessors, Kant's definition of Space, 'the Form of Outer Sense', still obscures its essence in two respects. First, as has been discussed, it lacks an explanation of Outerness. Neither Stoic detachment nor Sartreian 'flight', while separating one from one's environment, fail to characterize the latter as 'outside' the Subject. Schelling more promisingly describes 'Space' as being created by the I pushing its environment away from it, but, again, this 'Space', as is, divides only two side-by-side realms. Instead, 'Outer' is meaningful only with respect to 'Inner', namely, as generated by a process of Externalization, which must arise from within. In one's experience, only 'locomotility', namely an internally generated change of position, seems to qualify as such. A more familiar example of locomotility is intentional action, namely the generation of motion by a thought, for which the general term here is Exposition. In other words, the objects of 'Outer' sense are all, first and foremost, objects that one might encounter in motion, which corresponds to the role that the senses play in everyday activities. So, Kant's first shortcoming is to associate Outerness with the cognitive, not the behavioral sphere. Second, as e. g. Schelling underscores, Space entails separation, but 'Form' entails linkage. In other words, Form is antithetical to the essence of Space, which Kant seems to overlook in his eagerness to present Geometry, and its closed figures, as the Science of 'Space'. Thus, instead, in the Formaterial System, 'Space' is the product of 'Spatialization', which is the general structure of Exposition, and the fundamental 'dimension' of Space is 'outside of'. The traditional 'dimensions' of traditional 'Space', not to mention further additions proposed by contemporary Physics, are all the products of projections of the one dimension, in combination with constructions that can only come from other resources, to be discussed soon. Finally, insofar as an 'Object' is anything outside the Subject, Spatialization is also Objectivization.

Kantian Space and Time

One of Kant's notable achievements was to de-mystify Space and Time without trivializing them. Time, i. e. Chronos, was an ancient diety, and Space, i. e. Place, had Metaphysical significance for Aristotle. Newton's physical universe is a contraption built by God, in which Space and Time are the ultimate conditions. In contrast, Leibniz' universe is as much God's creation, but it is pluralistic, meaning that experience in it is perspectival, entailing that there are multiple Spaces and Times, but no single absolute Space and Time of which they are all versions. If Leibnizian Space and Time are perspectival, but still objective, Hume subjectivizes them. For him, Space and Time are not objects of immediate experience, but are merely abstract mental comparisons. In his attempt to hit upon a middle ground between Objective Perspectivism and Subjectivism, Kant transcended both by revolutionizing the very conception of Experience. In contrast with the long tradition of treating Experience as an undergoing of a pre-given objective world by a passive subject, Kant anthropomorphizes the world by construing it as the product of one's active construction. In other words, what we immediately experience, we have constructed. That is not to say that it is a piece of fiction--sense information is raw material from the objective world, but it is shaped by subjective structures, so what we actually experience immediately is structured raw material. Now, two of those basic experiential structures are Space and Time. For Kant, Space is the 'Form of Outer Sense', and Time is the 'Form of Inner Sense'. Hence, the problems with his notions of 'Outer' and 'Inner' that I have previously addressed are entailed by his notions of Space and Time.

Formaterial Mind-Body

The Formal Principle, Becoming-the-Same, begins with Diversity and ends with Sameness. The Material Principle, Becoming-Diverse, begins with Sameness and ends with Diversity. Traditional Philosophical categories such as Identity and Difference are thus abstractions from the Principles. Likewise, the Formal Principle of the Individual, Propriation, begins with corporeal motions and ends with a thought. And, the Material Principle of the Individual, Exposition, begins with a thought, and ends with corporeal motions. Even casual attention can reveal these processes to be ingredients in one's everyday experience. Traditional Philosophical categories such as Mind and Body are thus abstractions from the Principles. In many Systems, Mind and Body serve as the fundamental Principles. But where their separation serves an ulterior notion, e. g. that Body is ontologically inferior to Mind, that there is incorporeal life after corporeal death, or that physical existence is a curse or contamination, then they are not fundamental Principles. A Mind and Body split that does not serve such a purpose, or is not an unexamined habit, is as difficult to find in any tradition as is their clear separation in everyday experience.

Externalization and Internalization

Kant's problems with his attempt to distinguish 'Outer' and 'Inner' begin with his apparent indecision as to whether or not the former is relative or absolute. On the one hand, it is natural to interpret 'outer' as meaning 'outside one's body'. But such an interpretation is difficult to sustain given that since any part of the body can be seen or touched, even the sense organs, the body itself would seem to be 'outside' as well, thereby committing Kant to a Cartesian position that the entire physical world is 'outside'. In contrast, his treatment of 'Inner' receives greater attention, and is thus more clearly developed. 'Inner' means 'inside Me', wherein experiences of all kinds are arranged successively. However, the unclarities pertaining to this 'Me' are amplified by his overlooking that while referring e. g. a sense-event to oneself entails its being placed subsequent to a previous e. g. sense-event, the process of referral is always subsequent to what gets referred. In other words, he misses that the very process of referral is itself a reference to 'Me', entailing relations that his account does not cover. The analysis of Propriation, previously presented here, shows how the 'I' is constructed, and how Interiority is created. But even given the emergence of an I, a fundamental problem with Kant's entire System restricts him from using that as a point of reference for Outerness. That problem is that it treats Outerness as pertaining fundamentally to sense activity, whereas, he might have more fruitfully assigned it to his theory of action, i. e. to treat it in his Critique of Practical Reason. For, 'Outer' can only be a product of a process like Exposition, in which the 'I' produced by Reflection is externalized. Otherwise, from the Inside, there is no cognitive ground for even positing the existence of an Outside, as his very denial of the knowability of a 'thing-in-itself' articulates. 'Outer' is fundamentally the relation of a motion to the 'I' in the intention that motivates it. That an object is given in Outer Sense only means that it is encounterable in a process of Exposition, e. g. the ball to which the 'red' datum is referred is something that I may kick, or trip over, or walk around.