Reflection and Idionomy

Theories that portray 'Consciousness' as disembodied still characterize it as as much a response to a stimulus as embodied responses are often taken to be. As such, its process is likewise heteronomous, i. e. subject to a law that is external, natural, or otherwise. Consciousness of color is determined by optic laws, and, even where removed from the natural world, e. g. in Berkeley's theory, it is determined by the God who communicates it to the perceiving mind. Other theories, which attempt to evade the problem by designating sense-data as simply 'given', are still heteronomic, because the 'given' is still subject to some law of 'giving' or another. As previously argued, these theories are not outright wrong, just limited in scope--they are best suited to unreflective processes. In contrast, outer perception, like behavior in general, is transformed in the context of Reflection. Reflective behavior does not preclude the awareness of a color, but it takes it as having transpired following the opening of the eyes, and the opening of the eyes follow a decision to look for something, etc. So, rather than the awareness of color being characterizable as an instance of optic laws, it is an autobiographical event, characterizable as an instance of whatever theme one has chosen. As such, it is part of an idionomic process.

Experiment

The trying of something new is often called 'experimenting'. Frequently, we experiment in order to attain knowledge that can be put to some further use. But sometimes we simply attempt something just to 'see what will happen'. Involved is a basic movement-awareness structure, the movement producing the 'happening', and the 'seeing' of it being achieved in the awareness. Often, such experiences are merely whimsical, but even without the awareness gained being put to some further use, experimenting can be serious and urgent. Any movement whatsoever can be the subject of deliberate experiment, the potential seriousness of which can be seen in physical rehabilitation processes, in which the very attempt to move a limb may be fraught with uncertainty. In fact, every movement, at every instant, is uncertain at the outset, even if that uncertainty is obscured by the comforts of routine--the outcome may be highly probable, but absolute certainty is impossible. What is often underappreciated in Hume's scepticism regarding Causality is that the fundamental uncertainty of causal connections lies not between 'cause' and 'effect', but between previous sequences of events and future possible outcomes, because any propensity to link 'cause' and 'effect' is grounded upon the assumption that the future will repeat the past. The word 'experiment', like 'experience', comes from 'peril'; and, insofar as every movement is uncertain, all behavior is experimental.

Stimulus-Response and Reflection

The main problem with the Stimulus-Response model of behavior is not that it never applies, but rather that it does not always apply. There are undeniably cases, e. g. when the arrival of rain is responded to by the seeking of protection, when it holds. However, e. g. when rain arrives in the course of a walk that one has been taking, the question is not what to do about the rain, but about the walk. Now, the latter still seems to easily lend itself to S-R interpretation, but not if the entire situation is fully reflective. If one has reflectively gone out for a walk, and it starts to rain, what occurs is not a stimulus, but a variation of, in the form of an addition to, what one had been doing, i. e. I have been out walking, and now I am feeling the rain as well. What occurs next will be any one of a number of possible variations--stopping the walk completely, e. g. running to shelter, stopping the feeling of rain, e. g. putting up an umbrella, or continuing on, e. g. walking in the rain. Again, it might still be argued that these are only possible reponses to the rain. But what eliminates the rain/stimulus entirely from the structure of the situation is that those three possibilities--stopping completely, continuing with variation, or simple continuation, are available at any instant of any activity, regardless of whether or not some new stimulus enters the situation. So, the S-R model is inadequate specifically to reflective behavior. Or, to put it another way, Individual behavior is not of an S-R structure.

Self-Consciousness and Self-Appearance

Since there is awareness of every new corporeal movement, the latter can also be said to 'appear'. Such appearance is so fundamental to the functioning of the organism that it remains hidden, especially insofar as consciousness tends to be directed to outer stimuli. But once awareness internalizes the perspective of others in general, it becomes explicitly aware of its motions objectively, and Self-Consciousness, i. e. Reflection, is attained. In Reflection, one is both subject and object, appeared-to and appearing, but, contrary to the long tradition that treats them as otherwise, subject and object therein are not identical. In one's Consciousness that, for example, 'I am walking', what actually appears is 'I began walking', in which what is more precisely entailed is a new movement, walking, that is a variation on the previous condition, 'I'. So, in 'I am conscious that I am walking', the two 'I's are not identical. Rather, the conscious I emerges in the process of Consciousness, as what the appearing I has become through the variation of walking, the grasp of which is impossible insofar as 'consciousness' is construed as an instantaneous passive information-gathering. Thus, in Reflection, a new I is formed, which itself becomes the point of departure for subsequent variation. In other words, every new I is the culmination of what a previous I initiated, in which case, it is the culmination of not only the most recent activity, but of one's entire history.

Exertion

There are occasions on which when, in the middle of some activity, we realize that we are merely 'going through the motions'. At that point, one might resolve to exert oneself. For example, one might be casually ambling along, anddecide to 'pick up the pace', following which there is an acceleration of the walking. More precisely, first, there is the awareness of what one has been doing. Second, there is a decision to exert oneself. Third, there is the feeling of the beginning of an impulse. Finally, we find ourselves walking faster. This is a common example of Variation for Variation's sake. Furthermore, it demonstrates Motility originating as an internal impulse, and eventually externalizing itself. More precisely, one's awareness is of the impulse quickly radiating from a point to the extremities, and then generating more motion in them. As, 'Epiphenomenalists' maintain, it is not the awareness that generates the motion. On the other hand, contrary to what some of them seem to further insist, it does not follow that self-motivation is indemonstrable.

Awareness of Variation

An explanation of how Awareness of Variation is achieved is a classic Philosophical problem, often presented under the rubrics 'Perception of Change', 'Consciousness of Motion', etc. Zeno's 'Paradox' attempts to dismiss the question, by concluding from the difficulties entailed in trying to solve it, that Motion, Change, Variation, etc. are all illusory to begin with. Hume argues that we never directly experience Variation. For, for example, we might hear an A note, and then a B, but that the latter is a variation on the former requires a side-by-side comparison, impossible after the A has been replaced by the B, and possible only in abstract analysis. Kant replies that the A is reproduced and retained upon the arrival of the B, and that some C that persists through the transition is a necessary point of reference for B to be cognized as different from A. Kant's discussion is unclear as to whether he means that the comparison occurs only in abstraction from the live experience of the notes, or that all these elements are integrated into one live experience. But even if the latter, it still stands susceptible to an challenge from Santayana, that when the B arrives, the A is no longer actually there, in which case, variation is still not an immediate object of awareness. On the other hand, Santayana's scepticism regarding Change does not seem to address Bergson's objection that Consciousness is not, as all these others positions seem to presume, instantaneous. Rather, it is in flux, with the, for example, distinction between A and B itself the product of an arbitrary abstraction. Instead, we possess Intuition, which directly perceives Motion. Now, while this objection to the instantaneity of awareness is sound, his notion of Intuition seems to overshoot the mark. For, while it explains how we directly perceive the transition from A to B, it seems to lack an account of how we perceive A or B themselves. Furthermore, if Intuition is itself in flux, then the Intuition of Motion cannot distinguish between the flux of Intuition and the flux of the intuited Motion. One thing shared by all these theories of Awareness is that it is fundamentally receptive information-processing. On the hand, if it is fundamentally homeostatic, then it is easier to grasp that it functions fundamentally as a complement to new bodily movement, which it is fundamentally structured to accommodate. In other words, it structures its object as a new movement, which means that that its object is a variation on a previous condition is intrinsic to the awareness. For example, my current awareness that I am writing these words entails that my writing of these words is a variation on my previously not having been writing these words. Even if my awareness is of my STILL writing these words, entailed is that I am doing more of what I had been doing, which is another type of variation on the latter. So, rather than the immediate Awareness of Variation being either impossible to experience or difficult to explain, it is, quite to the contrary, tautological, because the object of awareness is always a variation.

Varieties of Variation

When considering a sequence of movements, e. g. putting on a nicotine patch and chewing some gum, to be behavior-modifying, there can be the tendency to casually analyze it as a variation with respect to the sequence that it thwarted, e. g. smoking a cigarette, namely, with respect to what could have occurred, but did not. Such an analysis, favored by some contemporary Philosophical schools, misplaces the object of comparison. The new sequence is first and foremost a variation with respect to habitual sequences that have already occurred, not to some non-occurring counterfactuality. But variation is not restricted to transpiring with respect to some previous general theme. Taking a walk after having been reading is a variation with respect to the latter. Furthermore, variation is not necessarily a relation between sequences of movements. An improvising musician might, only upon hearing the previous note, play the next one, and if the artistry involved is accomplished enough, the seamlessness of the transition can absorb that the new note is a variation on the preceding note or notes. In other words, continuation entails variation, even if the new note is a repetition of the previous one. As Deleuze has profoundly noted, the chronic tendency to understand Repetition as a mode of Identity has obscured that it entails Differentiation--the simple addition of the same type of item is a variation in quantity. Even Nietzsche seems to have missed that Recurrence is a mode of Differentiation. In other words, more of the same actually varies 'the same'.