Religion and Religiosity

In 'A Common Faith', Dewey elaborates on his concept of 'religion', deriving it from what he calls 'religiosity', which seems synonymous with the more traditional 'piety'.  By 'religiosity', he means 'holistic conscientiousness'--an awareness of one's entire being, in a macrocosmic context--applicable to all behavior, from which 'religion' is a ritualized abstraction.  Thus, in that piece, he diverges from his other efforts, and from James', to systematize Religion and Experience in terms of primarily cognitive methodology, i. e. uncertain hypothetical causal propositions.  Accordingly, he, in this context, conceives 'God' as an idea that functions as an immanent influence on action, not as a transcendent object of worship.  This concept of Religiosity is thus closer to Spinozism than Dewey seems to recognize, possibly because he seems to not appreciate the fundamental practical character of a Spinozist 'idea'.  Regardless, such Religiosity remains Functionalist behavior--a self-modification that is an adjustment to circumstances, rather than purposeless self-creativity.

Religion and Probability

By 'God does not play dice with the universe', Einstein seems to mean: 'God exists.  God's activity is governed by rigorous Reason.  Therefore, the laws of Nature are necessary.'  However, since dice-throwing evinces statistical regularity, the proposition is also consistent with: 'God exists.  God's activity is spontaneous and singular.  Therefore, statistical regularity in Nature is the product of artificial construction.'  Now, each interpretation, on its own, can be dismissed as dogmatically arbitrary.  But, in conjunction, they show the implausibility that both God exists, and Nature is inherently probabilistic.  In other words, Dewey's ambition to reconcile Religion and Probabilism seems to underestimate their antagonistic, if not antithetical, relation.

Religion and Experimentalism

Dewey advocates an extension of the Experimentalism that governs the Natural Sciences, to the Human Sciences.  Such extension would entail applying the trial-and-error method that establishes Truth in the former cases, to the determination of Value in the latter, i. e. experimenting with Pleasure, in the Moral Sciences, with different Economic and Political systems in the Social Sciences, etc.  However, the application that he foresees to Religion is less focused, i. e. he does not recommend, analogously, trying out different doctrines, but merely urges less supernatural dogma, and, thus, greater flexibility, in the pursuit of natural ends.  Now, Dewey also asserts that an artist is "born an experimenter", but without considering the implications of that formulation for the Experimentalist revolution that he proposes.  For example, perhaps the quintessential experimental artist is the jazz musician, for whom improvisation is not a means to some ulterior discovery, but is performed for its own sake.  On that basis, an Experimentalist revamping of Religion would begin with a concept of a deity as an improvising creator.

Religion, Morality, Certainty

Even the most rudimentary Religion involves two theoretical propositions--one pertaining to the effects of a deity on humans, and the other, the converse.  The first can be classified as 'Theology', the second, as 'Morality'.  Now, in even those rudimentary situations, there is an interplay of Theology and Morality--practices that are designed to influence a deity are determined by propositions regarding the latter, though, as, ultimately, a means to Moral ends, i. e. human goods.  Thus, Dewey's thesis that Philosophy emerges from Religion in Ancient Greece, as an improved 'quest for Certainty', by replacing primitive Theology with highly refined Metaphysics, misses its radical divergence with respect to Moral theory.  The Euthyphro formulates this divergence precisely--Piety is independent of Theology--from which it follows that Morality is, as well.  Aristotle codifies this independence by establishing Certainty, achieved in 'Thought thinking itself', as the Highest Good,  This status of Certainty is implicitly re-affirmed by Kant, under the rubric 'apodictic necessity', the ultimate criterion of his Moral theory.  Still, Dewey never quite seems to recognize Certainty as a Moral, rather than as an Epistemological, principle.  So, while his proposal that Probability replace it, with respect to the pursuit of Knowledge, is compelling, he remains vague about the implications of that replacement for Morality and Religion, e. g. while suggesting general modifications of religious practices, he does not seem to address the continued prevalent recognition of a deity that offers Certainty in the guise of Omnipotence, Eternity, etc.

Religion and Certainty

Dewey interprets Religion as functioning as a quest for Certainty, which, as he goes on to argue, neither it, nor its more rigorous descendant, Philosophy, can achieve.  So, he proposes that Probability is the more realistic alternative, an end to which Experimentalism is the best means.  He, thus, implicitly accepts the pre-philosophical premise that Uncertainty is an undesirable condition in need of a solution.  However, in his study of Art he expresses glimpses of a recognition that Uncertainty is not inherently an ill, e. g. when he praises variety as a vital correction to monotony.  Such observations imply that the deeper criticism of Religion is not that its quest for Certainty is unrealistic, but that it is unwelcome in contexts where creativity, novelty, adventure, etc. are called for, and, hence, lacks presumed universal scope.  Now, whether or not that is a criticism that can be formulated in Functionalist terms, i. e. as an adaptation to an environment, is unclear.  If not, then perhaps his study of Art reveals Dewey's abandonment of Functionalism.

Functionalism, Religion, Technology

While on Dewey's Functionalist interpretation, Technology supplants Religion in some respects, i. e. as a problem-solver, the former no more escapes the fundamental influence of the latter than does eating the fruit from the tree of knowledge of good and evil eliminate God from the lives of Adam and Eve.  For, insofar as Functionalism presumes the human condition to be inherently diminished, it remains embedded in the same tradition that interprets that condition to be governed by a Fall-Salvation theme.  In contrast, Nietzsche shows how human creativity precedes function, a conclusion at which Heidegger similarly arrives when demonstrating that Technology is primarily an instance of Ontological Poesis, a demonstration which is often mistaken for a Luddite critique of Technology.  So, from that perspective, Dewey's promotion of Technology is only apparently at the expense of Religion.

Functionalism, Religion, Mysticism

While James conceives Functionalism as a principle of adjustment, Dewey distinguishes between adaptation to, and adaptation of, i. e. between self-modification, and modification of one's environment, as a response to a discordant situation.  That contrast, in turn, grounds for him an analogous opposition between Religion, e. g. deity-appeasement, and Technology, a contrast which tends to expose the Functionalist inferiority of the former.  Still, Dewey's version inherits from its predecessor the reduction of all behavior to a stabilizing process, thereby sharing with the Religion that it criticizes the premise that the human condition is inherently awry in some fundamental respect.  Accordingly, it cannot account for inverse processes, i. e. for de-stabilizing behavior.  Now, one type of de-stabilizing behavior is creativity, i. e. the introduction of novelty, one example of which, as has been previously discussed here, is mystical experience.  Thus, despite the more rigorous genealogy of Religion that Dewey's Functionalism offers, it can explain mystical experience no better than can James' version.

Religion and Functionalism

Early in his career, James develops the thesis that all human behavior is fundamentally an effort to adjust to one's environment, a Psychological principle usually referred to by others as 'Functionalism'.  Thus, when he later proposes that 'religious' experience be characterized as an 'adjustment' to unseen forces, he is offering a Functionalist definition of 'Religion', even if he presents it in that context as the generalization of a survey of a variety of practices.  However, he more than defines Religion in Functionalist terms: he sometimes grounds a defense of it on them, as well.  For example, he argues that the value of Prayer is that it serves as a psychological boost.  But, value depends on more than satisfaction of a definition--it entails comparison with alternatives on the basis of a similar criterion.  Thus, the value of a prayer as a confidence-booster during, say, an illness, entails comparison with that of a medical procedure with a long history of success.  In other words, James does not seem to consider the potential of Functionalism to expose the insufficiency of Religion.

Faith and Hypothesis

James attempts to reconcile his Pragmatism--for which only empirically verifiable propositions are meaningful--and his belief that an unseen God exists, by conceiving Faith as a working Hypothesis., one the verification of which may just happen to come later rather than sooner.  This effort to rationalize Hope is thus a variation on Pascal's 'wager', i. e. a calculated anticipation of a possible eventual outcome.  Accordingly, it shares with its predecessor a neglect of some of the possible adverse practical consequences of adhering to his belief--e. g. psychological, political, economic, and intellectual deprivation, as has been previously discussed here--which tend to falsify the hypothesis that a beneficent God exists.  Furthermore, that Faith might remain staunch in the face of such adversity indicates that it is independent of the criteria governing hypothetical reasoning, as Kierkergaard, notably, argues.  So, James' assertion, at p. 508 of Varieties, that philosophy is "propped up" on religious faith, seems to acknowledge that the success of his attempted reconciliation entails a subordination of Pragmatism to Theology.

Mystical Experience and Inspiration

James' characterization of mystical experience as a type of 'deliverance' implicitly classifies it as an end state, which prevents him from recognizing it as the initiation of a creative process.  Thus, he cannot appreciate, as, e. g., artists can, that that experience can be a moment of inspiration.  Furthermore, since to 'inspire' means to 'breathe into', he cannot entertain the possibility of a kinship between mystical experience and God's Genesis 2 animation of Adam.  Similarly, the traditional theological interpretation of God-human interaction as a supernatural end state, i. e. as 'salvation', obstructs the consideration of such moments as inspirational in the same way that natural mystical experiences are.

The Transience of Mystical Experience

James notes the 'transience' of mystical experience, without offering an explicit theory that explains that characteristic.  However, by classifying such experiences as 'deliverance', he implicitly encourages the theological criticism of their transience as proof of their inferiority, in that respect, to the permanence of divine salvation.  Now, according to Pragmatism, the locus of Meaning is in verifiable consequences.  Hence, a truly Pragmatist study of mystical experience would examine the consequences of that moment, including those subsequent to the transient peak of the experience.  In those terms, 'mystical experience', would denote both a transient peak moment and subsequent phases.  Thus, James' attribution of 'transience' to mystical experience expresses an abandonment of his erstwhile Pragmatist principles, possibly in the service of a theology that benefits from that attribution.

Mystical Experience and Evolution

James cites, and accepts, a description of 'mystical experience' as paradoxically consisting in both an internal and an external aspect.  Furthermore, he cites, and accepts, the interpretation of that paradox as a combination of an imperfect natural subject, and an objective, perfect, supernatural entity.  In the process, he does not consider the possibility of alternative interpretations of the data, thereby revealing himself, as has been previously discussed here, as more theologically orthodox than his project seems to suggest.  One such possibility--the principle of 'Will', that has been presented here--is not likely one with which he would be familiar.  But, he is acquainted with the concept of an 'evolutionary leap', one in terms of which a mystical moment can be interpreted, i. e. as a transition from a lower level of complexity to a higher one.  In other words, mystical experience can be interpreted as a manifestation of a prevalent natural phenomenon, and, hence, not necessarily as a supernatural visitation, which James arbitrarily espouses.

Mysticism and Intuition

James proposes that two of the characteristics of mystical experience are possession of a noetic quality, and passivity.  Bergson sums these up with a term that James curiously does not use--'intuition'.  However, Bergson eventually discerns that at least some mystical moments are more than passive, i. e. that they are creative, e. g. artistic moments.  Still, he falls short of appreciating that the mystical 'feeling of unity with a deity' is a process of empowerment, in which a power source is noetically posited as a 'deity'.  In other words, neither James nor Bergson achieves the insight into 'mystical experience' that Spinoza does, i. e. as a moment of an individual's intuition of itself as a mode of dynamic natura naturans.  Nor does James seem to achieve an insight into Spinoza's insight, incorrectly interpreting the latter's 'idea of God' as a rational representation of a static totality.

Mysiticism and Theology

Decades after the death of James, Bergson asserts that mystical experience has a different "source" than traditional religion, thereby implicitly criticizing his friend's concept of them as varieties of one and the same process.  However, he, too, fails to decisively distinguish the posited sources.  For, his interpretation of 'mystical experience' as a recovery of Spirit from a fall into Matter, is only a special case of the perdition-salvation theme of orthodox theology.  In contrast, one approach to sharpening the dichotomy has been previously proposed here--the characterization of 'mystical experience' as a surplus process, i. e. as 'ecstatic', establishes it as independent of any presuppositions about its antecedent conditions, including the still prevalent theological interpretation of humans as ontologically deficient in some respect.

Ecstasy and Theology

'Mystical' experience is often characterized as 'ecstatic'.  Now, 'ex-stasis' connotes a transcendence of a given condition, without qualifying the latter in any way.  Thus, to conceive some given condition as in-itself ontologically 'deficient', from which a moment of ecstasy is a 'deliverance', is to impose an extrinsic interpretation on that moment.  Accordingly, James' analysis of 'mystical experience' as exhibiting the same deficiency-deliverance pattern of orthodox theologies, e. g. perdition-salvation, only propagates the dogma expressed by them.

Empiricism and Religious Experience

One challenge to James' Empiricist study of 'religious experience' has already been discussed--its incapacity to distinguish religious phenomena from a religious interpretation of phenomena.  Now, the notion of 'experience' itself presents his methodology with a similar, perhaps, deeper, problem.  For, what constitutes 'experience' is systematically related to a concept of a subject of experience, and a concept of a subject of experience is systematically related to a more general ontology, which includes an object of religion, an entity which may be  presupposed by the existence of the subject of experience, as, e. g., the human soul is a creature of God, according to many theories.  Hence, James cannot distinguish experience qua given, from experience qua religious interpretation of some given.  Accordingly, while he innovatively classifies a wide variety of experiences as 'religious', he still interprets them all in terms of the traditional deficiency-deliverance pattern.

Empiricism and Religion

Two weaknesses of Empiricism, as a recording of the given, are a blindness to given prejudice, and to the possibility of an alternative.  For example, James proposes that the proper relation of Philosophy to Religion is not to supply the latter with rational resources by which a theology can be reinforced, but to represent and evaluate religions on the basis of their empirical features.  Now, according to his own empirical survey, one such common feature is a deficiency-deliverance pattern, in terms of which a religion can be evaluated, i. e. with respect to the verifiability of its claims of efficacy in that respect.  Thus, as the descriptive phase of his methodology, the gleaning of that pattern is beyond reproach, so that, e. g., the overwhelming of a content person by artistic sublimity cannot be recognized as a 'religious' experience by James.  In other words, Empiricism's can abet religious dogma just as much as Rationalism's systematization of it, by its propagation of prejudice.

Platonism and Ascension

Following his proposal that 'religion' entails the belief that there exists an "unseen" power that can influence human experience, James only briefly entertains one potentially illuminating application of that characterization.  He goes on to note that Christ meant something different to contemporaries, for whom he was a visible presence, than to the devotees for whom he posthumously became an object of worship.  The distinction is thus a reminder of the centrality to Christianity of the death and resurrection of Christ.  That centrality explains why Platonism is significant to Augustine in a way that it is not to Philo--its dualism, which entails the existence of an incorporeal realm, provides a setting for Christ's 'Ascension'.

Philosophy and Medieval Theology

Nietzsche's assertion, 'Christianity is Platonism for the masses', is inaccurate in one historical respect.  For, the application of the Timaeus to Biblical events--the fundamental ambition of the projects of Medieval theologians--is not pioneered by Augustine, circa 400 AD, as the standard concept of the era has it.  Rather, not only 4 centuries prior to that date, but even preceding the death of Christ, Philo attempts to reconcile Platonism and Judaism, by proposing that the philosophical Logos functions as the Timaeus demiurge for the Judaic God, in the construction of the universe.  So, the original Platonization of Biblical texts attempts to systematize the latter, but not necessarily to propagate the religions based on them.  In any case, Philo's innovation underscores the implication in Nietzsche's assertion--that Medieval Theology is only a derivative intellectual endeavor, the standard characterization of which as 'Philosophy' is a mis-classification.

Logos and Religion

Probably the best-known use of the term 'logos' in a religious context is the apostle John's assertion that 'Christ is the logos', with 'logos' meaning 'word'.  However, preceding that thesis by several centuries, by e. g. Heraclitus and the Stoics, is the use of it as connoting 'rational animating principle of all existence', the modern version of which is the 'Reason' of many Rationalists.  Now, James defines 'religion' as any 'belief that some unseen force, greater than humans, exists', and most Rationalists hold that Reason is such a force.  Hence, while 'logos' might denote a deity for Christians, it refers to a different deity for many philosophers.  In that respect, Philosophy can be regarded as a rival religion to Christianity, rather than as an intellectual resource for its propagation, as some continue to take it.

Logic and Medieval Theology

Like any logical structure, a sound theory includes premises which are self-evidently true.  Now, the premises of Medieval Theology, typically--1. God exists, and 2. God is one, transcendent, incorporeal, good, and omnipotent--may be true, but that they are self-evidently so is questionable.  For example, the standard grounds for their acceptance--that they are products of an interpretation of Biblical texts, that they are objects of faith--are hardly self-supporting.  So, the originality of Descartes and of Spinoza can be appreciated as logical critiques of Medieval theory--the former replaces both of its premises with 'I think', while the latter jettisons #2, in favor of 'God and Nature are identical'.

Potentiality, Actuality, God

One fundamental distinction between Plato and Aristotle concerns the relation between Potentiality and Actuality--Plato regards the former as prior, Aristotle, the converse.  Hence, for example, either incorporeal Forms are the transcendent basis of corporeal entities, or else, conversely, are mere mental abstractions from them.  Now, while Augustine is usually classified as the prototypical 'Platonist' Christian, Aquinas is typically posited as his 'Aristotelian' counterpart.  However, Aquinas agrees with Augustine that God is the transcendent incorporeal source of all corporeal entities.  Hence, in that respect, at the least, he is just as much a 'Platonist' as his Medieval predecessor.  Indeed, perhaps the only significant truly Aristotelian in the Western theological tradition may be Spinoza, though his idea of an eternal essence of a human body is a Platonist element in his system.

First, One, God

The following numerical sequence plainly appears in Genesis 1--"One day . . . second day . . . third day . . .", etc.  Likewise, God is unarguably the first entity of the account, but there is no evidence that he pre-exists it.  Furthermore, the 'first' does not entail the 'one' in the Platonic sense, i. e. that an entity is immanent and dynamic, even if privileged, does not entail that it is transcendent and static.  So, the theological tradition that models the God of Genesis 1 on Platonist structures falsifies, rather than systematizes, it.

The One and the First

While for Parmenides, the occupancy of the realm of Being is one--'The One'--for Plato it is multiple, including not only 'One', but other numbers, as well.  Still the Platonist One shares with the Parmenidean The One the characteristics of perfection and immutability.  So, even though usually classified as 'neo-Platonist', the 'One' of Emanationism is Parmenidean in at least some fundamental respects.  However, the immutability and perfection of the One preclude the possibility of other entities issuing forth from it.  In contrast, the number that is appropriate to the process of Emanation is 'the First', which not merely does not preclude the possibility of a generation of other entities from it, but entails it.  Indeed, as has been previously argued here, numerical cardinality is derived from numerical ordinality--e. g. Whitehead-Russell's Successor Function, which, in their system, generates the cardinal numbers, is an ordinal process--a derivation which is difficult to conceive in any system the focal point of which is a complete, static entity.

Emanation and The One

According to Emanationism, all entities issue forth from a single source, termed by Plotinus and others, 'The One'.  Hence, Emanationism is distinguished from standard Biblical Creationism, for which the world is created 'out of nothing', i. e. not out of its deity.  Now, The One is typically conceived as ontologically perfect, with respect to which, what emanates from it is of lesser degrees.  But, if so, then all entities are at least implicitly given in The One, i. e. 100% entails all lesser degrees.  Thus, 'Emanation' is, more properly, 'dissipation'.  Furthermore, if The One is given as 'perfect', then any variation of it can only be as much an extrinsic process with respect to it as would be any creation of other entities ex nihilo.  One root of such problems for Emanationism is its arbitrary commitment to the Parmenidean perfectionism of The One, which precludes the possibility of conceiving Emanation as Pluralization, i. e. as a surplus generation of entities that are not ontologically inferior to their source.

Parmenides and the Holy Spirit

One feature of the concept of 'Holy Trinity' that transcends the context of Christian theology is its 'Holy Spirit', which, as 'God' qua creator, transgresses the Parmenidean absolute separations of Being and Becoming, and of Unity and Multiplicity, that are part of the ancestry of that doctrine.  However, qua Spirit, it does not suffice to explain the creation of Matter.  Still, as is, it can be classified as a 'Pluralization' principle, one from which 'God' qua immutable perfect Unity is an abstraction, and, hence, is a derivative aspect of the Trinity.  Resistance to such an interpretation of the Trinity might dogmatically express not only theological orthodoxy, but an implicit commitment to Parmenideanism, as well.

The Mystery of the Trinity

The 'Holy Trinity'  of some Christian sects--God, Christ, Holy Spirit--as a unitary entity that is also tripartite, can be regarded either as a paradoxical mystery, or as incoherent.  Perhaps the contemporary Sense-Reference distinction helps coherently solve the mystery, i. e. 'God', 'Christ', and 'Holy Spirit' are different senses of one and the same referent.  Augustine's thesis that Understanding, Remembering, and Willing constitute a writ small Trinity, at times approaches a similar linguistic solution, e. g. when he suggests that the three are different names for one and the same individual human Soul.  However, he goes further, e. g. when trying to explain that the three function interdependently, one weakness of which is the implication that a temporally-conditioned process such as Remembering is analogous to some aspect of a presumed eternal entity.  In any case, his linguistic analysis only exposes a more fundamental problem for Trinitarians--if Soul is distinct from Understanding, Remembering, and Willing, then, analogously, the Trinitarian deity is distinct from 'God', 'Christ', and 'Holy Spirit'.  In other words, either 'God' is not the Trinitarian deity, or else the word incoherently denotes both an entity and a part of that entity.

The One and the Good

Augustine follows Plato, in the Timaeus, by attributing mathematical structures to the process of creation.  So, his deity is subject to the Euthyphro-like question--do those structures express divine nature, or, is his God, too, governed by them?  In either case, even if that deity is richer than 'the One' of Platonism, Augustine clearly shares with that doctrine the thesis that Multiplicity is ontologically inferior to Unity.  Now, there is nothing in everyday experience that attests to either that ordering, or its inverse.  In other words, the superiority accorded in these systems to the One, with respect to the Many, is arbitrary.  Thus, Augustinian Morality inherits from Platonism the prejudice that associates 'the Good' with 'the One'.

Eternal Life

Perhaps the centerpiece of Augustinian theology, the concept of 'eternal life', is, if not incoherent, at least paradoxical.  For, one the one hand, the concept of 'eternity' that it entails is modeled on the immutability of Platonic Forms, which that system contrasts with transient Becoming.  On the other, Augustine's concept of 'life' is based on the image of the breath of God, which, in passages such as Genesis 2:7, is contrasted with inanimate dust.  Hence, his 'eternal life' is animated, and, yet, immobile, a notion which might accommodate deathlessness, but not Growth, which is one of the fundamental characteristics of Life.  In other words, his 'eternal' and his 'life' are inversely related, so while their combination might be theologically accepted as 'paradoxical', philosophically, it is incoherent.  Thus, the 'Christianity' that the self-described 'inverter of Platonism', Nietzsche, characterizes as 'Platonism for the masses', seems more the Augustinian tradition than a Biblical doctrine based directly on passages such Gen. 2:7.

In God's Own Image

Though according to Genesis 1:27, "God created man in his own image", the only reference to this kinship in subsequent passages seems to be at Gen. 3:22, with the common feature the knowledge of good and evil, that Adam has just attained.  In contrast, there is, notably, no obvious evidence that God is likewise constituted by the "dust of the ground", as Gen. 2:7 describes Adam.  Now, the God-human heterogeneity is more clearly expressed by the standard theological representation of it as incorporeal-corporeal.  So, the one prominent system that seems most faithful to the passage at 1:27 is, ironically, that associated with the pioneering of a metaphorical interpretation of these texts, namely Spinozism, in which humans are defined as 'modifications' of God's attributes.  Spinoza thereby solves a fundamental problem facing orthodoxy--explaining how an incorporeal deity can create corporeal existence, let alone how the latter can be "in the image" of the former.