Expanding Horizons

Will, Virtue, Pleasure

2012-01-29T07:03:00.001-08:00

Kant ascribes to Spinoza the following argument: 1. Pleasure is the consciousness of Virtue; 2. The degree of pleasure involved in the consciousness of Virtue is greater than any involved in the satisfaction of some need; 3. Therefore, Virtue suffices without Happiness, i. e. without the satisfaction of needs. Kant challenges the conclusion by denying #2, i. e. by observing that the pleasure of self-control does not suffice to offset circumstantial miseries. However, #1 is erroneous ascribed to Spinoza. For, the latter's concept of Pleasure is that it is identical to Virtue, i. e. he innovatively conceives it to be itself an energizing process, rendered here as Will, and is not an extrinsic receptive representation of one, as Kant construes the concept to be. It follows from that concept that the greatest Virtue and the greatest Happiness are identical, not that Virtue suffices without Happiness, e. g. that virtuous eating, i. e. eating according to a regimen, is more pleasurable than compulsive eating, not that self-controlled hunger is more pleasurable that yielding to some tempting aroma. In other words, Spinoza is a non-teleological Eudaemonist proposing an a priori defintion of Pleasure, and not, as Kant takes him to be, a Stoic offering an a posteriori utilitarian evaluation of Virtue.

Will and Mirth

2012-01-28T06:04:00.000-08:00

Mirth has a distinctive status in Spinoza's system--it is a pleasure of the whole of an entity, as opposed to localized pleasures that he characterizes as 'stimulation' or 'titillation'. Now, the relation between that distinction and his general definition of 'pleasure'--an increase in the strength of an entity--is unclear, since it leaves unexplained how a localized pleasure can constitute an increase in the condition of an entity as a whole. In any case, the characterization of pleasure as stimulating, even with a derogatory connotation, demonstrates that pleasure is not for Spinoza, as it is often elsewhere taken to be, a termination of a preceding process, but an origination of an new one. Here, Will is the source of all novelty, so Pleasure is a concomitant of Will. Furthermore, on this model, the primary function of Comprehension is homeostatic, so insofar as it effects balance in the exercise of Will, the resulting action can be called 'mirthful', or, 'exhilarating', a more common contemporary synonym.

Will, Self-Preservation, Magnanimity

2012-01-27T07:04:00.000-08:00

For Spinoza, there are two main species of Virtue--Courage, the effort to preserve one's being, and Magnanimity, the effort to aid and befriend others. However, this concept of Magnanimity seems inconsistent with his principle that all behavior is an effort to preserve one's being. For, on the basis of the latter, generosity seems reducible to a means to self-preservation, and, hence, does not seem to merit the distinction of being 'high'-minded. In contrast, here, Magnanimity is not fundamentally problematic in the context of self-oriented behavior, because the fundamental personal principle is not Self-Preservation, but Evolvement, i. e. growth. So, since Evolvement entails Will, the extending of oneself towards others, Magnanimity is co-extensive with the fundamental personal conatus, and is not, as it is for Spinoza, a problematic surd for the system.

Will, Freedom, Adequacy

2012-01-26T07:01:00.000-08:00

One and the same meal can be eaten for one of two reasons--either as a response to an irresistible aroma, or as an application of a general regimen, informed by nutritional principles as well as by sensory appeal. While for some, the former is 'free', i. e. is not interfered with, for Spinoza it is the latter which is truly 'free', i. e. is the product of an adequate idea. In addition, according to the theory of Will, as presented here, the latter case entails more Volition than the former. For, a response to even the strongest external compulsion still entails at least some Will, i. e. at least the Motility to pursue the lure, but without the possibility of an alternative course of action. In contrast, a general dietary plan opens up alternatives, e. g. tonight's fish might have been chosen in combination with the choice of chicken tomorrow. Similarly, the 'freedom' that some invoke to justify compulsive economic behavior is an idea that Spinoza classifies as 'inadequate'.

Will and Self-Determination

2012-01-25T05:10:00.000-08:00

Spinoza's denial of the existence of 'free will' often gets him classified as a 'determinist'. However, a more precise rubric comes from a notion often associated with contemporary political theory--'self-determination'--because Spinoza believes that all behavior has a prior cause, in some cases internal, in others external. Furthermore, as a word that is relatively fresh to the traditional 'free will vs. determinism' debate, 'self-determination' helps reveal how that opposition is typically misbegotten. For, 'self-determination' more clearly connotes a transition from indeterminacy to determinacy, and, with 'term' literally meaning 'limit', not 'choice', a transition from formlessness to formed, not from undecided to decided, as it commonly is taken to be. Now, while traditionally, inert 'matter' has been taken as the recipient of 'form', here, Matter, as has been discussed, is construed dynamically, e. g. in personal experience, Will is the recipient of Form. Hence, 'self-determination' is the process of supplying oneself with a structure for the exercise of one's energies, and, more, generally, Will and Determination are not antagonistic alternatives, but are complementary principles of action. Spinoza's focus on Efficient Causality, to the neglect of both Formal and Material, perhaps prevent him from arriving at a similar conclusion.

Will, Master, Slave

2012-01-24T07:08:00.000-08:00

A main inspiration for some contemporary Oligarchical ideology is Nietzsche's analysis of Democracy as the revenge of the weak many against the strong few. That analysis is presented under the rubric of 'slave morality vs. master morality', an apparent evocation of Hegel's 'master-slave' dialectic. However, in the latter, the 'slave' triumphs not by diminishing the 'master', but by discovering self-sufficiency, i. e. the efficacy of one's own personal Will, as it as been rendered here. Consequently, the Hegelian slave no longer needs the master, in the same way, ironically, that the Nietzschean 'master' does not need the 'slave'. So, regardless of Nietzsche's own actual ambitions, today's Oligarchical critique of Democracy often resembles the revenge of a weakened ex-master against his erstwhile possessions.

Will, Equalization, Pluralization

2012-01-23T05:11:00.000-08:00

The addition of a new element to a given set can be represented as an equalization of the newcomer to the original members. However, it can also be interpreted as an increase to the set, as well as as a pluralization of it. Likewise, the granting a person the same powers that some others have already enjoyed, can be represented as a process of equalization of the former to the latter, but on the other hand, it can also interpreted as both an increase in the strength of the society, as well as as a pluralization of it. Thus, Democratization, often represented by Oligarchs as a process of equalization, can also be interpreted as a strengthening pluralization of a society, i. e. by the empowerment of all the individual Wills that constitute it.

Will, Democracy, Equality, Plurality

2012-01-22T10:04:00.000-08:00

Spinoza offers two derivations of Democracy--one from the universality of Natural Rights, the other from the commonality of Reason. The weakness of the former is the potential of Democracy to degenerate into an arena of self-indulgence, while that of the latter is the factual variability of rational capacity, each of which exposes the vulnerability of Democracy as an Egalitarian principle. However, his system includes the grounds of a different derivation. For, he asserts that every entity endeavors to increase its strength, and that a composite entity is itself an entity, from which it follows that a polity seeks to increase its strength. Now, one way that a polity can accomplish that is by maximally empowering the Wills of each of its participants, i. e. by a process of Democratization. In other words, Democracy can perhaps be more soundly conceived as the product of pluralization than as one of equalization.

Will, Democracy, Friendship

2012-01-21T06:07:00.000-08:00

The Straussian interpretation of modern political theory as a morally degenerate version of its ancient counterpart, i. e. the subordination of Good to Right, misses a more fundamental development. For, Spinoza's concept of Democracy pioneers an extension of the ancient concept of Reason, an extension that becomes more fully formulated in Kant's system. The central thesis of modernized Reason is the equivalence of distinct 'I's which Aristotle classifies as 'friendship', but not necessarily as 'rational', a category which, following Plato, is exclusively intra-psychic in his system. In other words, Spinoza's concept of Democracy is a universalization of the Aristotelian good Friendship, a derivation which is, therefore, independent of any concept of Right. Here, whether localized or universal, the recognition of a distinct I as another 'self' entails the recognition of another entity as alterior to oneself, a process which is effected by Will, the principle of Externalization in personal experience. On the basis of that model, the Straussian critique of modern Democracy is that its universal Equality trivializes Friendship, one response to which is that that critique expresses a small-mindedness that is unequal to the ardors of modern Morality.

Will, Democracy, Empowerment

2012-01-20T05:17:00.000-08:00

For Spinoza, Democracy is empowering, because, as an adequate idea, behavior in accordance with it can only be active. The framing of the U. S. Constitution was empowering, because, in the process, its framers were authoring their own lives. Dewey's notion of a Democracy as an ongoing process of Reconstruction attempts to refresh that original empowerment. In contrast, the notion of the Constitution as sacrosanct reduces Power to an abstraction, bestowed by the document, and passively received by subsequent citizens. Here, Democracy is not merely empowering, but a potentially maximally empowering form of government. For. interaction with others is a potential occasion for extending Will, i. e. to learn from others, so the latitude in experience enjoyed by each citizen is potentially beneficial to every other one.

Will, Democracy, Heteronomy

2012-01-19T07:05:00.000-08:00

Spinoza's recognition of the natural right to heteronomous behavior, in conjunction with his contention that Democracy violates no natural right, compromises his concept of Democracy in three ways. First, the conjunction conflicts with the status of Democracy as an adequate idea, i. e. as one which does not accommodate heteronomous behavior. Second, it encourages the interpretation of Democracy as an economic system that is primarily a means to the satisfaction of every wish. Finally, it, therefore, leaves his concept of Democracy vulnerable to the Straussian charge that it fundamentally promotes self-indulgence. In contrast, the interpretation here avoids that compromise, by emphasizing that Democracy is primarily an ongoing collectively active process, rooted in the exercise of the Will of each of its participants. The entailed denial, on Spinozist grounds, of natural right to heteronomous behavior, has previously been discussed.

Will, Divine Right, Democracy

2012-01-18T05:14:00.000-08:00

Spinoza's equation of God and Nature entails one of Divine Right and Natural Right, and, hence, that a Democracy is a Theocracy. Thus, the immediate context of his theory of Natural Right is the doctrine of the 'divine right of kings', not the ancient priority of the Good, as Leo Strauss has it. However, it theory does entail a mediate challenge to the latter--whereas that idea of the Good is a source of enlightenment accessible to only a few, Spinoza's doctrine re-conceives Ethics as program of universally accessible empowerment, i. e. available to any entity possessing what is here defined as Will. In other words, Spinoza's Pantheistic transformations of Political Theory and Ethics elude Strauss's interpretive scheme, and the Oligarchical purposes to which the it is sometimes put.

Will, Right, Might

2012-01-17T07:05:00.000-08:00

Spinoza advocates the thesis that 'Might is Right'. For, he holds that natural right is co-extensive with natural power, i. e. with the endeavor to persist in one's being, in general, and with the exercise of one's talents, in particular. However, his unabashed application of that principle to violent or foolish behavior seems ungrounded. For, on his analysis, such behavior entails, at least in part, inadequate ideas, and, hence, it is, at least in part, heteronomous, i. e. it entails external influences such as compulsion, social conditioning, etc. Thus, violent or foolish behavior is not entirely a product of one's own powers, and, therefore, is not co-extensive with natural right. In contrast, here, the irreducibly personal element of any behavior is Will, the principle of exertion that activates any endeavor to persist, in general, and any exercise of talent, in particular. On that model, degree of volition in behavior is a function of the expansiveness of the ideas that impart determinacy to Will, on the basis of which violent or foolish behavior is exposed as typically compulsive, i. e. as typically with little scope for deliberation. Hence, it is not that Might is not Right, but that on Spinoza's own definition of 'adequacy', behavior constrained by external influences is not truly personal Might.

Will, Idea, Empowerment

2012-01-16T06:13:00.000-08:00

Spinoza's definition of Circle--the figure described by drawing in which one end is fixed and the other end free--both formulates what a circle is, and explains how to produce one. Hence, it is an empowering idea, but not because it somehow imparts energy to the muscles that perform the drawing. Rather, as has been previously discussed here, it empowers because it facilitates the exercise of Will by supplying indefinite Motility with determinacy. There is nothing arcane about this analysis; to the contrary, as is plain from its formulation, the definition is first and foremost a definition of the drawing of a circle, i. e. it imparts determinacy to a presupposed physiological process.

Will, God, Self-Causality

2012-01-15T10:08:00.000-08:00

Since, for Spinoza, God = Nature, it follows for him that natural power = divine power, and that natural 'right' = divine 'right'. In other words, taking into account Spinoza's political theory makes it difficult to interpret the intuition of God as either a moment of Leibnizian enlightenment, or as one of Schopenhauerian resignation, rather than as one of personal empowerment, i. e. as one of the discovery of one's divine powers. Now, one divine power is self-causality, one aspect of which is, therefore, expressed in Extension. Hence, the intuition of God entails the discovery of Will, i. e. of Motility, a discovery which thereby exposes as inadequate the traditional idea that one's Body is essentially inert.

Will and Democracy

2012-01-14T07:01:00.000-08:00

Insofar as the idea of Circle is, for Spinoza, a common idea, its adequacy is independent of any personal possessor of it. Similarly, his ideas of common goods, including the one that entails them all, i. e. the idea of Democracy, are all impersonal. Hence, his political theory runs the risk of Totalitarianism, i. e. of abstracting from all personal differences. Now, while examining the possession of idea of Circle, he does not consider the process of actualizing a circle, i. e. the drawing of a figure in accordance with that idea, a process which entails the personal Will of the drawer. Similarly, his idea of Democracy abstracts from the ongoing, and, possibly, unending, process of constructing a Democracy, a process which eludes reduction to Totalitarianism, because individual participation is essential to it.

Will, Preception, Actualization

2012-01-13T05:19:00.000-08:00

As has been previously defined here, 'Preception' is the 'process of carrying out some plan of action'. Since that process combines indefinite Motility and some representation, it combines Will and Comprehension. Furthermore, because the products of Preception are actual, the process can also be called 'Actualization'. For example, insofar as a circle is actual, the process that produces it--physiological motions guided by the plan formulated as 'the drawing of a figure in which one end is fixed and the other is free'--is Actualization. Now, any such formulation is, according to Spinoza, an adequate idea, and, hence, is one aspect of divine creativity. In other words, Spinoza's 'natura naturans' is the process of Actualization.

Will, Actuality, Actualization

2012-01-12T07:04:00.000-08:00

In some passages, Spinoza defines the 'actuality' of a Mode as its endeavor to persist in its being, while in others, he proposes that it consists in a specific configuration of its various parts. However, he does not elaborate on the relation between these two characteristics, which must be more fundamental than that between Body and Mind in his system, because he ascribes the endeavor to the Body-Mind conjunction, and he proposes that Body and Mind are parallel composites. In contrast, here, exertion and structure are expressions of the two principles of personal experience--Will and Comprehension, respectively--the combination of which constitutes the process of Actualization. On that basis, the endeavor and the configuration of Spinoza's Modes are each a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of actuality, i. e. of the product of Actualization.

Will, Motion, Rest

2012-01-11T05:11:00.000-08:00

According to Spinoza, Extension consists of two primary characteristics that he sometimes calls 'infinite modes'--Motion and Rest. Now, insofar as Extension is a dynamic divine Attribute, the derivation of Rest from it is unclear. Furthermore, the concept does not explain how Motion can become Rest, or vice versa, the former of which is entailed in any completion of creativity, e. g. the completion of the creation of a finite Mode, and the latter of which is entailed in divine self-causality, i. e. in which God sets himself in motion. In contrast, here, Motion and Rest are conceived as abstractions from more primitive originating and terminating processes, i. e. from the Material Principle and the Formal Principle, respectively, of the system, e. g. Will and Comprehension in the context of personal experience. Accordingly, Motion and Rest are just as much infinite modes of Spinozist dynamic Thought as they are of Spinozist dynamic Extension.

Will, Eternity, Ubiquity

2012-01-10T07:03:00.000-08:00

According to Spinoza, Mind expresses its actual essence--its endeavor to persist in its own being--in two ways. First, qua the idea of its Body, it promotes the maintenance of the integrity of the latter via the acquisition of adequate ideas, e. g. adequate knowledge of nutrition. Second, qua merely idea, it seeks its eternality as a mode of divine Thought. Now, as has been previously discussed, Spinoza does not seem to ascribe an actual essence to Body, thereby missing how it, too, can endeavor to persist in its own being. In contrast, Will, as presented here, entails processes that are analogous to those that Spinoza ascribes to Mind. First, as a principle of Variation, Will, alone, explains how a Mode, as Spinoza recognizes, endeavors to increase its strength, i. e. Mind can only maintain a given degree of strength. Second, Will, qua Motility, is an impulse to an indefinite elsewhere. So, just as Mind, a mode of divine Thought, seeks Eternity, Body, a mode of divine Extension, seeks Ubiquity.

Will, Matter, Extension

2012-01-09T05:09:00.000-08:00

Wolfson proposes that Spinoza conceives the Extension-Thought relation as one of Matter-Form, with the innovation that Extension is as dynamic as is Thought. Now, while that interpretation explains how Extension and Thought can be two aspects of the same entity, it also gives rise to three further problems. First, it leaves unexplained how, as Spinoza contends, other Attributes are possible, i. e. how Matter and Form can admit of other complementary aspects. Second, the traditional notion of Form entails that of Formal Causality in relation to its corresponding Matter, thus entailing a violation of the non-interactionism of Spinoza's Extension-Form relation. Finally, neither Wolfson nor Spinoza elaborates on how Matter, traditionally conceived as inert, can be dynamic. In contrast, the 'Formaterial' system being developed here assumes Spinoza's insight, and attempts to resolve those problems. In general, the system conceives Matter-Form as Multiplicity-Unity, so, analogously, it defines, respectively, as a dynamic Material Principle, Becoming-Diverse, and a dynamic Formal Principle, Becoming-the-Same, with everything comprised of some combination of the two principles. Thus, for example, personal action combines Will and Comprehension, the Material and Formal Principles of personal experience. Accordingly, the system jettisons Spinoza's non-interactionism, as well as the possibility of additional equiprimordial Attributes, a thesis of little consequence anyhow in his system.

Will and Causal Chain

2012-01-08T10:03:00.000-08:00

Spinoza's denial of 'free will' is based on his thesis that each idea in a Mode, adequate as well as inadequate, is part of some causal chain or other. However, like most traditional concepts of 'causal chain', his entails an unnoticed profound lacuna--the gap between an idea qua, first, effect of a preceding cause, and, then, qua cause of a subsequent effect. In other words, Spinoza accepts the traditional suppression of the distinction between two moments ascribed to one and the same element. In contrast, the distinction between the terminal moment of one episode, i. e. an effect, and the initiation of another, i. e. a cause, is here one of fundamental principle, i. e. that between the Formal and the Material Principles, respectively, of the system. In the context of personal experience, the Material Principle is Will, an origination of a novel episode that is irreducible to any of its conditioning antecedents. So, whatever the merits of Spinoza's arguments against 'free will' may be, they seem to be oblivious to this volitional dimension of behavior.

Will and Emotion

2012-01-07T06:02:00.000-08:00

Sartre's theory of Emotion diverges from Spinoza's in one significant fundamental respect--whereas in the latter, an emotion is an undergone modification, in the former, it is a type of nascent action. In other words, for Sartre, an emotion is 'magical thinking', i. e. is a vicarious action in response to a situation, e. g. 'love' and 'hate' are vicarious attempts to preserve, or to eliminate, respectively, some influence. Here, even such vicarious exertion is a manifestation of Will. Accordingly, the effectiveness of Spinoza's program, which is based on the thesis that understanding an event as 'necessary' suffices to quell any emotion attached to it, is, on Sartre's analysis, due to the neutralization of vicarious action by depriving it of a specific target. Sartre's theory thus has the further advantage of being better equipped than Spinoza's to propose concrete alternative action as an effective corrective to an emotion, i. e. for Spinoza, the acquiescence arising from a moment of self-control does not suffice to generate a potentially reinforcing redirection of one's active powers. But, despite those differences, each doctrine implicitly rejects the kind of glorification of Emotion promoted by e. g. popular culture.

Will, Existence, Actuality

2012-01-06T05:04:00.000-08:00

'Existence' seems equivocal for Spinoza, e. g. both an undrawn rectangle that is inscribed in a circle and a drawn one 'exist' in his system. Now, since each of those types of rectangle possesses extension, the latter cannot be the criterion of the distinction between the two. Instead, one way of characterization the difference is as 'virtual' vs. 'actual', given that Spinoza often uses the latter in reference to living Modes, to contrast them with their immortal essences, which are in God in the way a virtual rectangle is implicit in a circle. However, seemingly still lacking in Spinoza's system is an account of the process of actualization, e. g. 'causality' is insufficient, since it applies to virtual essences as well to actual things. In contrast, here, the nature of the process of actualization is clear from Spinoza's own genetic definition of a Circle--a combination of Will, i. e. indeterminate Motility, and structuring in accordance with the terms of the definition. Given Spinoza's recognition of virtual Extension, it is difficult to project into his system any analogously decisive notion of 'actualization'.

Will, Objectivity, Eternity

2012-01-05T07:02:00.000-08:00

In some passages, Spinoza seems to suggest that the telos of the Ethics is the attainment of an intuition of God, but in others, that attainment is presented as implicated in the cultivation of adequate ideas, i. e. as a necessary means to the achievement of liberation from the influence of the Emotions. In that context, an adequate idea is analyzed as knowledge from a God's-eye view, that Spinoza characterizes as 'the aspect of eternity', a perspective that seems equivalent to the more contemporary classification 'objective', e. g. his analysis of the feeling of pleasure as an increase in strength. Now, as has been previously discussed here, the attainment of 'objectivity' entails a process of Externalization, e. g. an 'objective' perspective on oneself is one from the 'outside', a process that is effected by Will. Furthermore, self-objectification entails an hypostasization of the processes that are under observation, thereby eternalizing them. In contrast, Spinoza offers no explanation of what he means by 'eternity', especially as it pertains to a God which is presumably an indefinitely ongoing dynamic force.

Will and Acquiescence

2012-01-04T05:16:00.000-08:00

As the reference in the proof of V, xxvii indicates, by 'acquiescence', Spinoza means personally pleasurable 'self-approval'. Hence, for him, the intuition of God that gives rise to acquiescence is not to be confused with a moment of Schopenhauerian self-denial. Still, the nature of the selfhood that such self-approval entails is unclear. For, the personal identity of a Mode, for Spinoza, is, ultimately, an a priori idea, and the specific object of the approval is a power of action, the source of which, in his system, are impersonal adequate ideas. So, in the absence of a principle such as Will, as defined here, to explain the personal a posteriori exertion involved in the cultivation of that power, any satisfaction that ensues remains seemingly unearned.

Will, Body, Essence

2012-01-03T05:16:00.000-08:00

At III, vii, Spinoza defines 'essence' as a thing's "endeavor to persist in its own being", a definition which, in his note to II, ix, he indicates applies to Mind, and to the Mind-Body conjunction. Hence, he implies that the definition does not apply to Body, i. e. he implies that the essence of Body is not its endeavor to persist in its own being. Instead, at V, xxii, he suggests that the essence of Body is, more precisely, the essence of "this or that body", which implies that the essence of Body consists in its individuality. That implication is reinforced by his general thesis that Modes are distinguished by corporeal differences, i. e. that adequate ideas are common to different modes, while inadequate ones are contingent on physical differences. However, he stops short of explicitly defining the 'essence of this or that Body' as a 'principle of Individuation', a principle which, as has been previously discussed here, entails Will, the principle of Differentiation in personal experience. On that definition, personal identity is a product of self-cultivation, not an eternal essence that both precedes and survives the existence of its associated body, as it is for Spinoza, in apparent contradiction to his Thought-Extension Parallelism.

Will, God, Writing

2011-12-30T06:01:00.000-08:00

According to Spinoza, every adequate idea has causal efficacy, and, so, initiates some action. Hence, his highest good, the intuition of God, is no terminal moment of disembodied contemplation, as he sometimes seems to suggest, and as he is sometimes interpreted as asserting. Rather, some action must ensue from that intuition, and, in Spinoza's case, it is likely that that action is the process of the writing of the Ethics, which is, thus, a product of that peak experience, and not a mere extrinsic representation of it. Now, a process of writing is impossible without what Spinoza calls 'Extension', or what here is the principle of Motility, Will. Hence, the Ethics demonstrates that the highest good consists in empowerment, not in enlightenment, i. e. consists in the performance of an action that has the characteristics of a divine performance, which would explain why a deity is sometimes credited with the writing of religious scripture. Of course, Spinoza is a unique Mode, so the writing of the Ethics is only one example of divinely-inspired action. More generally, the intuition of God transforms a Mode into an active participant in a divine/natural work-in-progress.

Will, God, Humpty Dumpty

2011-12-29T07:04:00.000-08:00

Despite its originality and idiosyncrasies, e. g. its Pantheism and its Parallelism, Spinozism exemplifies a traditional paradigm that has been previously called here 'Humpty Dumptyism'--a program of first demeaning, and then overcoming, fragmentation. The pattern is evinced by Spinoza's diagnosis of corporeal individuality as the source of human suffering, with the mental integration with the rest of God/Nature as the cure. Implicit in that diagnosis is the judgment that the differentiation of Substance into discrete physical Modes constitutes a cosmic deterioration--i. e. substance is perfect, while Modes are imperfect--if not a calamity, a judgment shared by most systems, 'Eastern' and 'Western', Ancient and Modern. A more pious alternative would respect that differentiation as a positive cosmic development, a respect expressible in an associated ethical program by a cultivation of variation, not an escape from or a suppression of it. For example, here, the Material Principle, i. e. Becoming-Diverse, is equiprimordial and equi-valent with the Formal Principle, i. e. Becoming-the-Same, so the ethical program involved promotes a balanced combination of Will and Comprehension, the Material and Formal Principles, respectively, of the sphere of Personhood. An adjustment of Spinozism along analogous lines would begin with the recognition that the divine attribute Extension, understood as the dynamic process of Extending, is such a Material Principle.

Will and Immortality of the Soul

2011-12-28T06:10:00.001-08:00

Despite his thesis of Mind-Body Parallelism, which holds that to every mental sequence there is a corresponding physical sequence, Spinoza allows for the survival of at least some ideas in a Mode on the occasion of corporeal death. However, he does not similarly acknowledge the survival of at least some bodily parts, each of which has its own 'mind', on that occasion, e. g. the skeleton. Thus lacking in his argument that Mind survives corporeal death, is any elaboration of the possessive pronoun, e. g. 'our', with which he qualifies 'Mind', thereby avoiding a possible trivialization of the purportedly most profound moment in his doctrine. In contrast, here, possession is a product of what has previously been called 'propriation', i. e. the process of interiorization effected by Comprehension. On that model, as has been previously discussed, the immediate matter of Comprehension is always Will, i. e. Motility. In other words, here, possession is a relation that is peculiar to a specific combination of the Formal and the Material principles of the system, namely, to the Comprehension-Will combination that constitutes Personhood. Thus, in contrast with Spinoza's line of reasoning, from the fact that possessiveness is the product of a combination of instances of impersonal processes, it does not follow that it transcends that combination, i. e. it does not follow that the combination that the produces it is a priori 'one's own', a point made in other terms by Kant, Heidegger, and Sartre, among others.

Will and Passivity

2011-12-27T07:03:00.000-08:00

While in common parlance, 'passive' means 'inactive', for Spinoza, it means 'partially active', i. e. in definition II of book III of the Ethics, he asserts that being passive means "being only the partial cause". This concept of passivity thus entails that all behavior includes at least some contribution that originates in the performer, the degree of which can vary indefinitely, as the qualifier 'partially' connotes. Here, that irreducible variable factor is Will, i. e. even the most deeply ingrained habit is at least partially voluntary. For Spinoza, that factor is conatus, which is independent of its degree of contribution to some specific course of behavior.

Will and Adequacy

2011-12-23T06:07:00.000-08:00

Spinoza's definition of an 'adequate' idea is seemingly paradoxical--such an idea has "all the marks of a true idea", independently of any correspondence to its object, which is the mark of a 'true' idea, according to the first book of the Ethics. Some prominent interpretations of this definition, e. g. Wolfson's and Deleuze's, speculate that the marks of adequacy are internal features such as certainty, clarity, distinctiveness, or expressiveness. However, none of these seems relevant to the distinctive internal structure of at least one example of an adequate idea that Spinoza presents--the genetic definition of Circle. Furthermore, those interpretations seem to ignore a fundamental respect in which an idea is 'true' in Spinoza's system--as an aspect of God's creativity. Accordingly, the distinctive mark of a true idea in a genetic definition is its formational role in the production of an object, a role which is independent of any correspondence to that object. So, since such production requires Motility, to which the formulation applies, one mark of a true idea in a Spinozistic adequate idea is its applicability to Will, the principle of Motility.

Will, Parallelism, Causality

2011-12-22T07:02:00.000-08:00

Spinoza's Parallelism entails not only the simultaneity of the mental and the corporeal sequences, but their non-communication, as well. In other words, it entails, for example, that Mind is never the origin of Motility, which, he suggests, always has a physical cause, even if the mechanism involved remains undiscovered. In contrast, here, that explanation is not adequate enough to override the plain and familiar evidence that one can initiate a physiological process with a mental command, i. e. that Will, the principle of Motility in Experience, originates mentally and eventuates physiologically. Furthermore, Spinoza leaves unexamined how, in either sequence, one and the same element in the concatenation can be both cause and effect, i. e. can be first the effect of a prior cause, and then the cause of a subsequent effect. In contrast, here, a fundamental significance of the distinction between cause and effect is that the former initiates a sequence, while the latter terminates it, an irreducible distinction that is derived from that of the two principles of Experience, Will and Comprehension, respectively. So, insofar, as each of Spinoza's two sequences are causal concatenations, his Parallelism of Body and Mind presupposes, and abstracts from, a more fundamental interaction of the two.

Will, Mode, Alterity

2011-12-21T05:16:00.000-08:00

For Spinoza, inter-Modal alterity is a potential source of harm to a Mode, correctable by Reason, which promotes inter-Modal commonality. In contrast, here, inter-personal alterity is an opportunity for personal growth, accomplished by the incorporation of a novel perspective into one's experience. That incorporation is a two-stage process, combining Will and Comprehension--the former effects an extending of oneself towards another, while the latter integrates what one encounters with the products of past experiences. Hence, such personal growth entails a process of active extending. In other words, Spinoza's lack of appreciation of the value of inter-Modal alterity is one consequence of his failure to develop a notion of active Modal Extension.

Will, Mode, Extension

2011-12-20T07:05:00.000-08:00

For Spinoza, 'Ethics' is a program of a Mode's realization of its divine nature. That realization consists not, as it sometimes taken to be, in the cognition that it is natura naturata, i. e. a created being, but in its actualization of its creativity, i. e. as part of natura naturans. Now, since there are two aspects to one and the same process of God's creativity--Thought and Extension--Modal creativity, too, consists in both Thought and Extension. Thus, for example, the cultivation of active intellectual processes, i. e. Reason and Intuition is one dimension of a Mode's realization of its creative nature. However, Spinoza devotes little attention to the corresponding physiological dimension, a neglect typified by his continued rendering of that dimension of a Mode as 'Body', i. e. as a created static entity, with no consideration of the processes of the active extending aspect of creativity. In contrast, for example, here, Will, the principle of Extending in Experience, has been developed and examined in detail. So, in the absence of an analogous exposition, the culmination of Spinoza's program reduces to the achievement of a moment of immobile, if not disembodied, contemplation.

Will, Parallelism, Disembodiment

2011-12-19T05:07:00.000-08:00

Spinoza seems to distinguish the process of intuiting that a circle is 'the figure described by the line whereof one end is fixed and the other free' from the process of drawing a circle in accordance with that intuition. It is perhaps such a distinction that informs his speculation that a Mind can survive the death of the Body, i. e. because the contrast exhibits the possibility of a disembodied mental act. However, the relation between such possible disembodiment and his Parallelism thesis--that a mental sequence and a physical sequence are two aspects of one and the same process--is unclear. One interpretation of the apparent inconsistency is that it demonstrates that the parallel of the two sequences is happenstance, and not necessary. For example, here, as has been previously discussed, Will and Comprehension, the two principles of Experience, occasionally coincide, but often do not. Thus, on that model, the drawing of a Circle in accordance with the idea of a Circle, combines two fundamentally distinct processes, one of which can produce an idea of a Circle without its necessarily being implicated with the Motility of drawing one.

Will, Parallelism, Joy

2011-12-18T10:06:00.000-08:00

Spinoza's 'Parallelism' proposition, that 'the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things', is, in his system, fundamentally a cosmological thesis, following from the status of Thought and Extension as two aspects of one and the same Substance. However, he, and many of his successors, tend to present it as an Epistemological principle, i. e. as a characterization of an 'adequate idea' as a representation that accurately corresponds to its object. The implicit de-emphasis, in the latter version of Parallelism, of the role of Body in experience, i. e. of the body of the subject of representation, becomes more blatant when he later proposes that a Mode can achieve joyous unity with God via a possibly incorporeal Intuition. In contrast, a notion of monadic Joy that is more consistent with Cosmological Parallelism is the achievement of exact Mind-Body coincidence in an experience. For example, here, peak experiences are constituted by the occasion of a balance, e. g. of simultaneity, between Will and Comprehension, the two fundamental principles of Experience, a balance that is exemplified by some artistic or athletic performances, ones that are sometimes characterized as 'divinely inspired'.

Will, Comprehension, Parallelism

2011-12-17T06:00:00.000-08:00

Some events seem to exemplify Spinoza's 'parallelism' thesis that ' the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things', e. g. the process of drawing a circle in accordance with the definition of a 'circle' as 'the figure described by any line whereof one end is fixed and the other is free'. However, other events seem to fail to exemplify the thesis, e. g. the sequence of events that transpires while the ideas 'praying to god' and 'it is raining' are successively occurring. Spinoza's accommodation of the latter possibility involves qualifying the thesis as applying to only adequate ideas, but another approach is to treat both the proposed rule and its apparent exception as special cases of how the two orders can be related. For example, here, Will and Comprehension, the two principles of Experience, can combine in an infinite variety of ways--often with either preceding the other, but, occasionally, they occur simultaneously, therein achieving what can also be characterized as 'parallel' ordering. Similarly, what Spinoza considers to be a necessary archetype may be only a contingent, albeit important, special case.

Will, Denial, Beneficial

2011-12-16T05:03:00.000-08:00

Spinoza's use of 'will' seems equivocal insofar as he classifies conceiving an idea, and conceiving an idea as beneficial, each, as volitional. However, the two processes are apparently united by the implicit thesis that a true idea is necessarily a beneficial idea, so that to conceive an adequate idea is to conceive it as beneficial. However, remaining unexplained is, as has been previously argued, his classification of Denial as both volitional and an alternative to conceiving, which he identifies with Affirmation. That is, he leaves unexplained how it is possible to deny an adequate idea, a process which is not merely a systematic possibility, but is entailed as actual in the process, which he recognizes, of rejecting one beneficial idea in favor of a more beneficial one. In contrast, here, Will is the principle of Diversification. So, insofar as denial is abstracted from the process of positing an alternative, it is volitional. In contrast, because to conceive is to synthesize, it is an inverse of Will, and hence, is not volitional. Furthermore, to conceive an idea as beneficial entails the adoption of it as a plan of action, and, hence, presupposes Will qua Motility, as a distinct process. Finally, the conceiving of one idea as more beneficial than another entails the denial of the less beneficial of the two. So, the difficulties with Spinoza's theory of Will begin with his attempt to classify conceiving as a volitional process.

Will, Individuation, Mode

2011-12-15T07:02:00.000-08:00

As has been previously discussed, Individuation is a two-stage process--indefinite diversification from some given, and specification. So, for example, on the Formaterial model, Individuation in Experience consists in an exercise of Will, i. e. in Motility, in combination with some determining plan of action. Similarly, Descartes' 'I am' is an Individuation of an entity--indeterminate 'I doubt' in combination with its representation as 'thinking being'. Accordingly, Spinoza's rejection of the first stage, i. e. of spontaneous volition, entails an undermining of a possible process of Individuation, thereby rendering his notion 'Mode' problematic. For, in the absence of a theory of Individuation, his modes are Schopenhauerian illusions, not concrete expressions of his 'substance'.

Will, Affirmation, Denial

2011-12-14T05:14:00.000-08:00

Spinoza argues, apparently against Descartes, that a dubious perception is only an inadequate one, i. e. it is not the product of some power of 'free will' that has the capacity to suspend judgment regarding the truth of a perception. On the other hand, he elsewhere classifies the capacity to affirm or deny as 'volitional'. Hence, the relation between the power that he rejects and the capacity that he recognizes is unclear, as is the basis of the "or" that relates affirmation and disjunction. Furthermore, his equating of affirmation with conceiving, a synthesizing process that, fundamentally, represents bodily modification, leaves unexplained the constitution of a corresponding process of denial. Hence, he does not consider that, as is proposed here, 'denial' is an abstraction from Will, the process of diversification in Experience, and is, therefore, volitional, whereas affirmation is not. Accordingly, he does not consider that affirmation and denial are alternatives only insofar as denial is the generation of an alternative to some affirmation.

Will and Questioning

2011-12-13T07:03:00.000-08:00

The process of Questioning has more in common with Descartes' procedure than does the common notion of doubting, i. e. it is intellectually methodical, as opposed to a vague feeling of unease. Questioning also exhibits some of the characteristics of Will, as conceived here. First, it spontaneously diverges from some given. Second, it is not necessarily a teleological process, i. e. while in many cases it eventuates in an answer, in others it does not, and need not. Third, on the other hand, it more immediately admits of formal causality, i. e. insofar as some interrogative pattern provides it with a definite structure. Finally, it often activates further processes, e. g. inquiry. As such, Questioning has more in common with Lucretian Swerve than with Heideggerian Ontological Call.

Will and Soul

2011-12-12T05:27:00.000-08:00

Descartes' characterization of 'thinking being' as 'mind' or 'soul' constitutes, conversely, a re-definition of the traditional concepts of the latter. At the same time, the term that he uses for it, 'animus', perhaps inadvertently indicates that he is less conscientious than are his philosophical and theological forerunners in explaining how mind animates body, e. g. the Meditations lacks any discussion of Motility. Deriving 'I think' from 'Agito', i. e. from 'I activate' is a promising step in providing such an explanation, but one that is ultimately abortive insofar as he adheres to a separation of mind and body. In contrast, for example, Will, the principle of Motility here, is a unitary process that originates mentally and eventuates physiologically, i. e. is a process that is prior to any mind-body severance. Thus, while Descartes' concept of soul is innovative, it is also enervated.

Will, Existence, Essence

2011-12-11T07:01:00.000-08:00

The contrast between Existence and Essence is often presented as that between 'that one is' and 'what one is'. As such, therefore, they stand in a Matter-Form relation. Now, in Formaterialism, the Material Principle of Experience is Will. Accordingly, 'I exist' is equivalent to 'I will'. Furthermore, in the system, the Material Principle and the Formal Principle are equiprimordial. Hence, in it, unlike in some others, neither Existence nor Essence in principle precedes the other.

Will, I Think, I Am

2011-12-10T07:06:00.000-08:00

'A, ergo B' usually signifies a relation of inclusion obtaining between a property represented in A and a property represented in B. Accordingly, Descartes' 'I think, therefore I am' actually expresses a relation of inclusion between two attributes of 'I'--'a thinking being' and 'am'--which he derives from the sundering of the unitary process 'I think' into 'I' and 'think'. If so, then though the explicit sequence of his project is, first, the establishment 'that I am', and, then, the determination of 'what I am', the latter implicitly precedes the former. One alternative case in which the inference is valid is when A and B are identical. For example, insofar as Cogito is, as has been previously discussed, a mode of Will, the assertion that 'I am' and 'I think' are equivalent could be an expression of the thesis that to Exist is to Will, i. e. that to Exist is an indefinite dynamic process, a 'that' that indeed precedes, in the order of Descartes' presentation, its 'what'. However, it seems unlikely that this is the interpretation that he intends.

Will and Teleological Doubt

2011-12-09T05:11:00.000-08:00

Peirce conceives the relation between Doubt and Belief as teleological--the former is a condition of cognitive dissonance, the latter one of cognitive consonance, and the former seeks the latter. Now, Descartes seems likely to be suffering from a theological crisis, at least part of the root of which is the cognitive dissonance occasioned by the irreconcilability of dogmatic Medieval Cosmology and Copernican Heliocentrism. So, given that that dissonance motivates a procedure that eventuates in his affirmation that God exists, it can be classified as 'Teleological Doubt'. In contrast, his methodological Doubt can be classified as 'Material'. For, that method is implicated in a second procedure, one that is a descendant of Stoic Detachment and a forerunner of Husserlian Epoche--the process of self-dissociation from the world. That process, as has been previously discussed, is effected by Will, the principle of Diversification in Experience, and, hence, by a Material Principle, in a system in which 'Material' means 'becoming-diverse'. Accordingly, the arrival of the belief 'I am a thinking being', in the context of Descartes' exercise of Material Doubt, is not a teleological outcome, but is an intervention effected by a distinct principle, the Formal Principle of the system. In other words, the Meditations entails two projects--the resolution of theological confusion, and the search for an epistemological foundation--which do not coincide as well as Descartes presumes them to.

Will and the Doubting of Doubt

2011-12-08T07:03:00.000-08:00

The logical soundness of Descartes' pivotal assertion 'I cannot doubt that I am doubting' entails simultaneity, i. e. that 'I doubt' and 'I am not doubting' cannot both occur at the same time. So, insofar as Descartes does indeed make the assertion on logical grounds, the proposition is vulnerable to the phenomenological challenge that doubting, and the attempt to doubt that doubting, are, in fact, successive, not simultaneous, events. However, the phenomenological report is inaccurate, so the challenge is flawed. For, as previously discussed, the proper object of doubt is a belief, i. e. the actual experiential sequence is: 1. doubt the belief of X, 2. believe not-X, 3. doubt the belief that not-X, rather than: 1. doubt X, 2. doubt the doubting of X, as the standard phenomenological report has it. Thus, a third interpretation of Descartes' assertion is that it unwittingly expresses his discovery that he cannot doubt in the absence of some affirmation. On that interpretation, underlying the discovery is the realization that Doubting, as a mode of Will, the principle of indeterminate Diversification in Experience, lacks the capacity to generate a determinate Belief. Accordingly, the lacuna in Descartes' procedure is his transition from 'I doubt' to 'I am a thinking being', which requires straying from the method to which he has adhered until that point.

Will, Doubt, Ontological Difference

2011-12-07T05:10:00.000-08:00

Descartes' assertion, 'I cannot doubt that I am doubting', can be interpreted either as phenomenological or as logical, i. e. either as 'Despite all my efforts . . . ', or as 'It is contradictory that . . . '. That he does not, in the course of his project, submit Logic to Doubt suggests that the latter is his ambition. If so, then Heidegger's interpretation of him as a 'subjectivist' misses the mark, i. e. Descartes is not, contrary to that interpretation, asserting that he is the measure of his existence, or of any existence that can be inferred from it. That interpretation misses the mark because of the one-sidedness of the criterion on which its is based, i. e. Heidegger's 'Ontological Difference', the attention of which is to the appropriation of beings by Being, to the neglect of, and, perhaps, with the suppression of, the inverse, namely, the differentiation of beings from Being. Hence, Heidegger does recognize Will, the principle of Differentiation in Experience, of which Cartesian Doubting is an example.

Will, Comprehension, I

2011-12-06T07:04:00.000-08:00

Descartes' assertion 'I am' seems to beg the question, since 'I can doubt' is one of his premises. Regardless, it is his other conclusion, namely 'I am a thinking being', that has generated controversy over the subsequent centuries. As, perhaps, Kant best shows, the problem is not whether or not the I exists, but what the I is, for, e. g. in his system, it can denote a synthesis of appearances, the synthesizer of appearances, or the initiator of a physiological process. Similarly, Formaterialism's recognition of two I's--the origin of Will and the terminus of Comprehension--on the grounds that there are some irrefutable features of ordinary experience that 'I' denotes, the nature or natures of which are open to further clarification, suffices to establish the existence of an I.

Will, Comprehension, Habit

2011-12-05T05:10:00.000-08:00

According to the Formaterial model of Experience, Will exceeds its antecedents, while Comprehension, in its fundamental homeostatic function, restores connection of the novelty with the given, e. g. via a plan of action the first moment of which is the given situation that Will exceeds. Now, Repetition, as has been previously discussed, can be analyzed as a case of minimal differentiation, i. e. because a second cycle is distinct from a previous one. It can, thus, also be understood as a combination of Difference and Sameness in which the latter predominates. Now, 'a' habit is, in fact, a generalization of a repetition of a behavioral sequence. Hence, Habit is an experiential episode constituted by a predominance of Comprehension over Will.

Will and Individuation

2011-12-04T07:02:00.000-08:00

While adolescence is typically characterized as a general rebellion against upbringing, adulthood is achieved by the subsequent assumption of some definite social role, perhaps one that had previously been the target of rebellion. Similarly, Descartes' general doubt is followed by his commitment to a specific set of beliefs. Formaterialism recognizes, in each case, the two-stage pattern of 'Individuation'--the first stage effecting indefinite divergence from the given, the second achieving determinacy by the selection of one of the alternatives opened up by the indefinite divergence. Furthermore, the system recognizes Individuation as more than a phase of personal development or as the structure of a pivotal work in the history of Philosophy. Individuation is a fundamental rhythm of Experience--Will exceeds given circumstances, and becomes concrete action with the choice of a plan of action.

Will, Doubt, Pain

2011-12-03T07:02:00.000-08:00

It seems easier to doubt the existence of a distant, contained fire than of that consuming the stake to which one is tethered. To someone in the latter plight, the most immediate likely options are to either recant one's heresy or to resist the compulsion. In contrast, the exercise of Cartesian Doubting, is, in the context, at best a feeble third possibility. But, if so, then it is revealed as a volitional alternative to either eliminating or enduring the cause of suffering. So, if Descartes had applied his method to the extreme agony, he might have arrived at the indubitability of 'I will'.

Will, Certainty, Autonomy

2011-12-02T05:12:00.000-08:00

While Descartes presents his project as a quest for Certainty, it can also be interpreted in Ethical terms--a quest for, in Spinozistic terms, Adequacy, or in Kantian terms, Autonomy--an interpretation encouraged by Descartes' own ascription of Doubting to a process derived from 'Agito', i. e. 'I activate'. Accordingly, the pivotal transition from the certainty of 'I think' to that of 'I am a thinking being', can also be interpreted as autonomy-preserving, i. e. as a transition from an active process to an active idea. Hence, insofar as a belief that Descartes proceeds to derive from that foundation maintains Certainty, the adoption of the belief for practical purposes is guaranteed to be autonomous, though Spinoza and Kant, as well as Aristotle, develop other principles of Autonomy, i. e. the idea of God, the law of Practical Reason, and the Golden Mean, respectively. Here, the thesis that 'Will is the immediate matter of Comprehension' is an analogous attempt. For, the positing that Belief functions fundamentally in combination with the exercise of Will, establishes it as primarily at the service of the Voluntary principle of Experience.

Will, Impulse, Habit, Doubt

2011-12-01T07:02:00.000-08:00

For Dewey, Impulse is both a constituent of, and a breaker of, Habit--as a plastic force Impulse can be organized into a repeatable behavioral pattern, but as fundamentally independent of any organizational influence, it can break free of any established pattern. Now, Descartes' ascription of Doubting to Cogito, derived from Agito, suggests that it is a species of Impulse. Furthermore, here, Impulse is interpreted as Will, and is classified as a Material Principle, with the imparting of determinacy to it the effect of its accompanying Formal Principle. In those terms, the system of beliefs that Descartes eventually establishes and develops--starting with 'I am a thinking being', and proceeding to 'God exists', Mathematical propositions, etc.--are adoptable Formal Causes. Hence, the arc of the Meditations can be interpreted in terms of Impulse--from the Habit-breaking of Doubting to the Habit-formation that begins with 'I am a thinking being'.

Will, Doubt, Habit

2011-11-30T05:14:00.000-08:00

Descartes' exercise in Doubt is offered, and is usually interpreted, in Epistemological and Metaphysical terms, i. e. as a demonstration that 'I think' is the basis of Knowledge, and that Mind and Body are separate. However, with a different set of premises, the project takes on Psychological and Moral significance. For, given that sense-experience is belief about sensory input, that such belief is part of the formation of a plan of action, and that doubt is effected, as Descartes himself implies, by Agito, then such Doubting effects a disruption of behavior, i. e. it is nascent digression from a course of action that would begin with one's current circumstances. More precisely, insofar as Action combines Will and Comprehension, i. e. combines indeterminate Motility and some cognitive representation that imparts structure to it, Doubting disengages the former from the latter, thereby dismantling Action. Thus, insofar as Doubting can disrupt behavior, it can disrupt habitual behavior, which has Psychological significance, and insofar as habitual behavior is undesirable, Moral significance.

Will and Belief

2011-11-29T07:03:00.000-08:00

James' notion 'Will to Believe' is often regarded as conflicting with his Pragmatism. For, while the notion entails a leap of faith, without evidence, to the affirmation of the proposition 'God exists', the Pragmatist concept of Truth requires the verifiability of an assertion, the possibility of which seems lacking in James' expression of religious belief. His main defense, that that proposition is a working hypothesis, still does not explain how it can be tested, but, furthermore, it reflects a deeper problem for him--that while he and his pioneering colleagues have formulated a distinctive Pragmatist criterion of Truth, they, nevertheless, continue to accept, from a tradition from which they otherwise divergence, the concept of 'belief' as fundamentally truth-aspirational. In contrast, here, a Belief functions primarily as structurer of Will, i. e. it provides indeterminate Motility with organization, thereby resulting in concrete action. Thus, on this model, to believe that 'God exists' is to adopt it as a plan of conduct, one that might, e. g. influence how one treats others. So, a Belief, in this sense, can be evaluated in terms of, for example, effectiveness, but whether or not it is 'true' has no meaning in the context. Hence, Belief, as a determinant of Will, is more authentically pragmatic than a psychological state that aspires to Truth.

Will and Non Sequitur

2011-11-28T05:09:00.000-08:00

'Non sequitur' literally means 'does not follow', but in some contexts, e. g. in Logic, it means, more precisely, 'does not follow according to the rules'. By contrast, in other contexts, it is not necessarily a lapse, for a well-placed non sequitur can enhance an artistic or a comedic project. Furthermore, where it is taken intellectually seriously is as a Zen Koan, by which a teacher attempts to stimulate the wakefulness of a student. This provocative capacity of a non sequitur is not as extrinsic as it can seem. For, it is a pure expression of Will, the principle of Variation in Experience, and, hence, as such, it can occasion the disruption of automatic thinking patterns, and of mechanical behavior, in general. It is thus a virtue of a non sequitur that it eludes formularization.

Will and Negation

2011-11-27T10:08:00.000-08:00

In systems of Dialectics, doubting is a species of Negation, which, in coordination with a synthesizing process, i. e. Sublation, produces Absolute Knowledge. For Dialectical Materialists, thinking is, essentially, negative--it negates existing 'material' conditions, i. e. it expresses a conflict with them. Implicit in this Materialist concept of Negation is the notion of obliteration. Now, while obliteration can be glossed as the absolute elimination of its object, in actuality, the destruction of something does not effect its complete disappearance, but consists in the transformation of it into another state, e. g. to ashes or to dust. In other words, obliteration in experience is never more than a variation of conditions, which requires Will, the principle of Diversification. Accordingly, Dialectical 'Negation' is a mode of volitional thinking, just as 'the negation of X' always means ' other than X'.

Will, Thinking, Counter-Example

2011-11-26T07:02:00.000-08:00

While Descartes holds that volition and thought are distinct processes, for Spinoza, they are one and the same. Now, insofar as, Will is a principle of Diversification, as it is defined here, and 'thinking' is a process of synthesizing, volition and thought are not only distinct, but are inversely related. On the other hand, insofar as Exteriorization is, following Levinas, experiential Diversification, and Cartesian doubting is a departure from the given, 'thinking' qua 'Cartesian doubting' is volitional. Likewise for Spinozistic 'thought', insofar as it is conceived as deduction, emanation, or expressive, each of which entails the explication of what is implicit in God, i. e. explication is a type of exteriorization. However, both varieties of thinking remain circumscribed by the scope of the given that they modify. In contrast, a more decisive transgression of the given is effected by the thinking that generates counter-examples, a truly agitative process that not only introduces a rogue element, but often provokes a subsequent quest for a more comprehensive theory that can better accommodate the novelty. Such 'thinking' better exemplifies the concept of Will than does that of either Descartes or Spinoza.

Will, Doubt, Belief

2011-11-25T05:21:00.000-08:00

While walking, one might pause because one suddenly suspects that the pavement directly ahead might be covered in black ice. Entailed in that hesitation is--an impulse to step, a belief that the pavement ahead is as stable as that behind has been, and a doubt that the pavement ahead is as stable as it appears to be. By comparison, Descartes' doubt that his situation is as it appears to be is exposed as abstracting not only from some ongoing Motility, but from the context of the appearance--that it is the content of a belief. In other words, the immediate object of Cartesian doubt is not some data, but some belief regarding that data, a belief that is in the service of Motility. Thus, by suppressing the role of Belief in his meditative scenario, Descartes effects the abstraction of Intellect from its more fundamental function as a structurer of Will. Similarly, just as the hesitancy to step is a prelude to skirting the patch, the doubt of given data is an abstraction from nascent variation of Motility, and is not the effecting of detachment from corporeality, as Cartesianism and other doctrines have it.

Will, Epistemology, Foundationalism

2011-11-23T05:12:00.000-08:00

Many of Descartes' successors disagree with his thesis that 'I am a thinking being' is the basis of Knowledge. Nevertheless, they remain Cartesians insofar as they conceive Philosophy fundamentally as a project of Epistemological Foundationalism, and insofar as they accept sedentary meditation as the prototype of Philosophical activity. Now, just as every sound itinerary begins with one's current location, every sound plan of action entails a perception of one's given situation. In other words, sedentary meditation is abstracted from its organic involvement in Motility, i. e. from its role in supplying the intellect with information that is essential to its structuring of Motility. Thus, the tradition of Epistemological Foundationalism--Rationalism, Empiricism, Phenomenology, etc.--presupposes and abstracts from the functioning of Will, the self-activation principle of Experience.

Will, Intellect, Praxis

2011-11-22T07:02:00.000-08:00

To prove, against Hume, that Causality consists in more than a conjunction of images, Kant contrasts an 'objective' succession of images with a 'subjective' one--the former can not be experienced as otherwise, while the latter can be. In other words, the order of the objective succession is necessary, while that of the subjective one is not, and, that order is determined by a rule. However, he does not entertain that the objective succession might have been otherwise, e. g. something that rotates clockwise, rather than counterclockwise. Furthermore, he does not consider how the subjective succession per se is rule-governed--even if I might have walked counterclockwise around an object, insofar as I do walk clockwise around it, my Motility is rule-governed, i. e. is governed by the plan of action 'walking clockwise around the object'. This neglect is characteristic of the entire Cartesian meditative tradition--the failure to consider the role of Intellect in ordering Will qua Motility. If he had been interested in the intellectual structure of Action, Kant might have devised a set of Categories for Practical Reason.

Will, Doubt, Aporia

2011-11-21T05:10:00.000-08:00

Descartes' demonstration of the unreliability of the senses is easily interpreted as a continuation of the Platonist tradition. However, a more careful examination of his philosophical DNA suggests a different genealogy. His 'I am certain that I am a doubting being' is more immediately akin to Socrates' 'I know that I know nothing', which might have become more generally recognized if he, too, had maintained his original impiety, i. e. doubting theological dogma, in the face of a likely stake-burning. Entailed in that recognition is a possible comparison of Cartesian Doubt with Socratic Aporia, revealing, for example, the former as an active version of the latter. It also involves the reminder that the immediate matter of Cartesian Knowledge is the process of Doubting, i. e. that the foundation of Knowledge is Will, the source of Doubting.

Will, Method, Meditation

2011-11-20T07:01:00.000-08:00

Any plan of action, just like any itinerary, begins with one's current circumstances, and provides a structure to Will, i. e. to the Motility involved in the action. Now, a method is just a generalized plan of action, and an analysis of a method could be called a 'discourse' on it. In contrast, to 'meditate' connotes to 'calmly reflect', which can thus be sharply distinguished from 'cogito', derived from 'agito', i. e. from Descartes' original characterization of his method. In other words, Descartes' project can be divided into two phases--the first, in which he analyzes the structures of action, and the second, in which he calmly reflects on those structures. Subsequently, the rubric 'Cartesian' becomes attached to those structures insofar as they are objects of meditation, not insofar as they are structures of Volition.

Will, Doubt, Practical Reason

2011-11-19T07:03:00.000-08:00

Kant's 'I think', meaning 'I synthesize', is the inverse of Descartes' 'I think', meaning the dissociative 'I doubt'. On the other hand, his 'I reason', meaning 'I detach myself from an intention', parallels Descartes' 'I detach myself from a perception'. These, more precisely, are based on the possibility of doing otherwise, and of perceiving otherwise, respectively. So, while Kant shows more explicitly than does Descartes that Doubting is an expression of Will, Descartes' accepts the validity of his principle as self-evident, i. e. he adopts it as a method without either defending its possibility, or casting it as an objective rational law, as Kant does.

Will and Skepticism

2011-11-18T05:05:00.000-08:00

The ancient Skeptics, e. g. Zeno, were Parmenideans whose methods were in the service of Stasis and Unity. That Cogito is rooted in Agito reveals that Descartes is not one such Parmenidean, but a bold adventurer with allegiances elsewhere. For, he can be regarded as a Heraclitean attempting to determine if one can swim in the same water twice, with the discovery that one remains the same swimmer even if the water does not remain the same water. What follows from that discovery is the establishment of the seaworthiness of other stable structures, especially of beliefs such as the existence of God and the principles of Mathematics. He thus demonstrates that Skepticism is rooted in dynamic Will, not in static Cognition.

Will, Doubt, Modality

2011-11-17T07:02:00.000-08:00

Descartes' unquestioning acceptance of logical principles, in combination with his methodological emphasis on 'can' doubt and on certainty, suggests that his deity is a modalized version of the Logos. For example, the various objects of doubt are Possible, the ongoing 'I think' event is Actual, and the hypostasized 'I am a thinking being', of which he is certain, is Necessary. These classifications are derived from the previously discussed modality of Volition, in which Will opens up indefinite possibilities of Motility, one of which determinate structure actualizes, and the settled past, as immutable, is a necessary precondition of all that ensues. One implication of this analysis is that the 'God' that Descartes proves to be the cause of his existence is Necessary only insofar as it is part of his immutable past, i. e. he proves only that that God must have once existed, not that it exists eternally. This implication conforms to one involving the more conventional concept of Necessity, i. e. Descartes does not show that this 'God' exists at a world where no thinking transpires.

Will, Doubt, Logic

2011-11-16T05:04:00.000-08:00

With his doubt of Mathematics, Descartes' investigation surpasses the sphere of sensory information. However, he leaves unquestioned at least some of the principles of Logic. The thesis that he cannot doubt that he is doubting presupposes the validity of the Law of Contradiction, as does his reliance throughout on inferences, including those involved in his proofs of the existence of God. Without such presuppositions, his method illustrates the Logic of Will--indefinite diversification.

Will. Cogtio, Mathematics

2011-11-15T07:03:00.000-08:00

As previously discussed here, the quantification of Will is not an extrinsic contrivance, but is an expression of the essence of Volition. For, quantification is a product of Counting, and Counting entails the generation of novel units, which is effected by Will, the principle of Diversification in Experience. Now, to doubt is to diversify, i. e. 'I doubt X' means 'X may be otherwise than it seems to be'. Hence, Cogito is, likewise, intrinsically quantifiable. Thus, Descartes has the resources to derive Mathematics without the mediation of the belief that God would not deceive him about the truth of its propositions.

Will, Doubt, God

2011-11-14T05:04:00.000-08:00

Descartes' eventual assertion that God is not a deceiver, leaves his previous Doubting without a divine source. In other words, his proof that God is the cause of his existence does not suffice as a proof of that God is the cause of his self-evident ability to originally doubt that God is not a deceiver. In contrast, Spinoza distinguishes God qua natura naturans from God qua creator of Modes, and Nietzsche distinguishes Dionysus from Apollo. Common to each of the former of the two pairs is that they entail volition, in one sense or another. Likewise, Cartesian Doubting is a mode of Will, as defined here--a process of diverging from the given, which, as has been previously discussed is accurately expressed in the literal meaning of 'cogito', i. e. 'I activate myself'. However, here, Will is a special case of the Material Principle of the system, whereas, without a demonstration of how doubting the honesty of God is a gift of God, Cartesian doubting remains impious.

Will, Certainty, God

2011-11-13T07:01:00.000-08:00

Since valid proof is truth-preserving, it is also certainty-preserving. Thus, Descartes adheres, at least in principle, to his method, as he first certifies 'I am', and then, derives from it 'God exists'. At that juncture, however, he abandons any method, by first affirming that 'God is good', and, then, that 'A good God would not deceive me'. The first is problematic, since he has not submitted 'is good' to any methodical examination. The second is problematic, since, even granting the first, that a good God would not deceive him for his own good is groundless. Now, it is unclear whether Descartes' acceptance at this juncture of dogma that he had previously called into question is sincere or is an expression of prudence under hostile conditions. Regardless, what he demonstrates is that what he henceforth accepts--the laws of Mathematics, the existence of the physical world, etc.--are meaningful only as the beliefs of an cogitating 'I', i. e. as structures that supply Will with determinacy.

Will and Certainty

2011-11-12T07:02:00.000-08:00

Descartes' inference from 'I think' to 'I am' suppresses a transition from 'I think' to 'I am a thinking being', a transition which plainly entails a reification of the preceding process of Doubting that 'I think' denotes. Now, reification fixes what it refies, and, hence, makes it certain. In other words, in the suppressed transition, Descartes demonstrates a power to certify that is as native as is the ability to doubt. These two powers are manifestations of the two fundamental principles of Experience--Will, which effects Uncertainty, and Comprehension, which, as the example shows, effects Certainty.

Will, Cogito, Dualism

2011-11-11T06:10:00.000-08:00

Descartes cannot doubt 'Cogito', which, as has been discussed, means 'I set myself in motion'. Thus, the only corporeality that he can doubt is a representation of body, not any involved in Motility. Similarly, the duality that he establishes is that of Will, the source of Motility, and Representation. Thus, to characterize that duality as Body-Mind entails the problematic classification of Thinking as a non-mental process. In contrast, on the model being developed here, the duality of Will and Representation is that of Material Cause-Formal Cause, with each entailing both a Mental pole and a Corporeal pole.

Will, Doubt, Think

2011-11-10T07:03:00.000-08:00

Descartes' project in the Meditations is based on the premise that Doubting and Knowing are both species of Thinking. In contrast, according to the model of Experience being developed here, they are incommensurate with one another--Doubting is a discrescent process, while Knowing is concrescent. That is, according to this model, Doubting is a mode of the Material Principle of Experience, i. e. of Will, and Knowing is a mode of its Formal Principle, i. e. of Comprehension. On that basis, Descartes' inferences, first from 'I doubt' to 'I think', and then from 'I think' to 'I know', entail an equivocation. In particular, insofar as 'cogito', derived from 'agitare', as has been previously discussed, means 'I set in motion', the second inference, which initiates the constructive phase of the Meditations, remains ungrounded.

Will and Cogito

2011-11-09T05:10:00.000-08:00

'Cogito' derives from 'co-agitare', with 'agitare' meaning 'to set in motion'. But, setting oneself in motion is Motility, and Motility is Will. Thus, 'cogito ergo sum' , at bottom, means 'I will, therefore I am', with the standard 'I think' losing the dynamic connotation of 'I cogitate'.

Will, Doubt, Morality

2011-11-08T07:04:00.000-08:00

According to the standard modern interpretation of the passage in the Republic best known as 'Plato's Cave', its main theme is Epistemological, i. e. it demonstrates the unreliability of sense information. However, given the contrast in the passage between the Good and the chains of conditioned behavior, the broader topic is plainly Moral. The progenitor of that modern interpretation is Descartes, when, instead of pursuing a Moral theme in the Discourse and the Meditations, he concerns himself with the establishment of Knowledge. That is, instead of 'I can doubt that X is true', he might have examined 'I can doubt that X is good', by which he could have detached himself from heteronomous influences, e. g. from received dogma, as well as from external stimuli. The two projects have the same basis--Doubt is an expression of the ability to do otherwise, i. e. of Will, as has been previously discussed. So, with a subtle inflection he could have explored detaching himself from a set of practices, rather than from one of cognitions.

Will, Dubitability

2011-11-07T05:06:00.000-08:00

As Sartre, notably, emphasizes, what Descartes asserts is not 'I doubt', but 'I can doubt'. Hence, what he establishes as indubitable is not that he doubts but that he can doubt. Now, an ability to doubt entails an ability to consider that a situation is otherwise than it is given to be, which entails an ability to modify the situation, e. g. that one may be dreaming entails that one can wake up and discover oneself to be lying in a bed, and to be not sitting in a chair in front of a fire. So, Descartes' 'method of Doubt' entails Will, i. e. an ability to change a given situation.

Will, Method, Power

2011-11-06T06:59:00.000-08:00

Descartes' establishment of a foundation of Knowledge is preceded by his adoption of a method that empowers him to effect that establishment. Like, any method, his supplies the raw energy of Will with determinacy, thereby facilitating concrete performance. In other words, the fundamental principle of his doctrine is 'I can, therefore I am', from which he abstracts his more famous thesis. His empowerment is the real inception of Modern Philosophy--a liberation from Medieval dogmatism, even if not necessarily from the theological substance of that dogma. But, it is not Doubt per se that is the source of that liberation--that freedom is already accomplished by his adoption of and commitment to his own method.

Will and Method

2011-11-05T07:02:00.000-07:00

Though Descartes is widely recognized as the 'father of Modern Philosophy', probably a majority of his successors do not accept his principle 'I think, therefore I am'. Under-appreciated is that that principle is the product of a more fundamental innovation--his making Method an explicit Philosophical topic. Indeed, his true legacy seems to be his 'Methodism', which is pervasive in Rationalism, Empiricism, Criticalism, Dialecticism, Phenomenology, Pragmatism, etc., regardless of the status of 'I think, therefore I am' in a doctrine. Now a method is opposed to haphazard procedure, or, in other words, it supplies otherwise indeterminate Will with structure. Furthermore, since a commitment to a method supersedes any results, Methodism is independent of Teleology. Thus, the Formaterial model of Experience being developed here codifies what has perhaps been the central implicit theme of the post-Cartesian era.

Will, Schematization, Intelligent Behavior

2011-11-04T05:12:00.001-07:00

Traditional concepts of intelligent behavior seem to have it as consisting of a conjunction of two distinct components, a means and an end, derived from two different sources, reason and instinct, respectively. Now, while a journey might be casually characterized as consisting of a route and a destination, it is inarguable that, in actuality, it originates with a first step from a given location, guided by some plan, the initial stage of which is a representation of that location. Likewise, intelligent behavior, in actuality, combines Will, as originating Motility, and a Schematized Intention, the first moment of which is a representation of one's given situation. Furthermore, just as travel entails these initial components whether or not some pre-set destination is arrived at, the achievement of a pre-set goal is extrinsic to intelligent behavior. In other words, the traditional teleological model of intelligent behavior abstracts from the Will-Schematization combination of actual intentional conduct.

Will, Intention, Schematization

2011-11-03T07:03:00.000-07:00

An Intention is a plan for Motility, and a plan, at some point is originally devised. Any such process of devising is, at least in part, improvised, and, hence, as has been previously discussed, entails Schematization, for its coherence. Hence, any intentional behavior, premeditated, or otherwise, combines Will, i. e. Motility, and Schematization.

Will, Schematization, Experience

2011-11-02T05:11:00.000-07:00

Kant's Schematism 'temporalizes' his Categories, thereby facilitating their application to empirical cognitive processes, which he also temporalizes. Those Categories are, thus, presumably applicable to similarly temporalized 'spatial' representations. However, his temporalization of 'space' does not touch upon the Spatialization that, as has been previously explained here, first produces Space, and cannot touch upon it, because Spatialization and Temporalization are inverse processes. Accordingly, the Schematization of Will, the process of Spatialization in Experience, involves not a mediation, but a coordination of two independent principles, a coordination that is part fortuitous, part cultivable. Unlike the Kantian concept of 'experience', which is merely cognitive, the model of Experience being developed here entails Motility, and is truly binary, combining, without mediation, Will and Schematism, with neither, in principle, reducible to nor subordinate to the other.

Will and Schematization

2011-11-01T09:10:00.000-07:00

Will indeterminately diversifies the course of Experience, requiring, in order to become actualized as a concrete performance, structuring. Usually, the representation of a purpose serves as such an organizing influence, thereby encouraging the traditional subordination of Formal Causality to Teleological Causality. However, the example of an improvising musician demonstrates the independence of the former from the latter--the player produces new notes while, concomitantly, organizing the flow, without any prepared arrangement to satisfy--an example that can be generalized to the performance of any type of act. This process of creative structuring can be called 'Schematization', evoking the Kantian Schematism, which, as either subordinate to the Understanding, or as 'free', is, however, cognitive, only. In other words, Kant does not consider that Schematization is effective in a motile context, combining with Will to produce concrete action, nor does he consider that cognitive Schematism might be a special case of motile Schematization.

Will, Voluntary, Retribution

2011-10-29T07:04:00.000-07:00

'Voluntary', as distinguished from 'involuntary', is primarily a category in a system of Retributive Justice, i. e. the drawing of the distinction functions as a determination of class of culpability, and, hence, of the type of punishment to be meted out. In contrast, 'voluntary', as admitting degrees of variation, is an element in Ethical evaluation, with Ethics understood as a program of self-cultivation. Self-cultivation produces what has previously here been termed Evolvement, i. e. personal growth, which entails the exercise of Will, the principle of Excession in Experience. Since one can evolve to a greater or lesser degree in a specific experience, Will can be exercised to a greater or lesser extent in it. So, since 'voluntary' pertains to the exercise of Will, an act can, for purposes of Ethical evaluation, be characterized as more or less voluntary. Thus, insofar as jurisprudential assessment recognizes the possibility of mitigating circumstances in the performance of an act, its use of 'voluntary' acknowledges its Ethical sense, but simplifies it for the convenience of retributive processes.

Will, Voluntary, Variation

2011-10-28T05:22:00.000-07:00

According to the traditional concept of 'free will', any exercise of 'will' is ex nihilo, and, hence, the sufficient cause of any ensuing act. In contrast, here, Will is the Material Principle of Experience, i. e. its principle of Diversification, and, hence, effects a variation of given circumstances. In other words, an act that ensues from an exercise of Will incorporates the variation into those circumstances. So, unlike a 'free' act, a 'voluntary' act does not preclude the contribution to it of preceding conditions, which might complicate an attempt to attribute responsibility, but accurately reflects the details of Experience.

Will, Voluntary, Spinozism

2011-10-27T07:03:00.000-07:00

According to Spinoza, Reason is volitional, and is free of external influence. Hence, the standard characterization of him as denying the existence of Free Will is inaccurate. What he does reject is the possibility of Will qua Motility, as well as that of the voluntariness of any apparent spontaneity of locomotion. However, he does allow that a Mode can, via an Adequate Idea, cause not only the maintaining of its strength, but of its increase of strength, as well. Hence, God/Nature must possess the capacity to increase strength. But, an increase entails a novelty in relation to what precedes it, while Reason can only derive what is implicit in its antecedents. Now, one source of such novelty is Modal Motility. So, in the absence of a better explanation, Spinoza's system can be interpreted as entailing personal non-rational voluntary processes.

Will, Voluntary, Imperative

2011-10-26T05:23:00.000-07:00

Central to Kant's doctrine is the distinction between a 'categorical' and a 'hypothetical' imperative--the adoption of the former can be only 'free', while that of the latter can be only 'unfree'. The unfreedom of the adoption of a hypothetical imperative derives, according to Kant, from the predetermination of the purpose that motivates it. In contrast, according to the Formaterial model of Experience, and the definition of 'voluntary', the acting on the basis of an adopted imperative is always voluntary, for a variety of reasons that have been previously discussed, starting with its thesis that Will, i. e. Motility is a principle that is independent of any other experiential factors. The contrast also illustrates the unwieldiness of the strict 'freedom-unfreedom' dichotomy that Kant inherits from Hume, if not from tradition, in general. Even granting that one is unfree to resist the drives that are the sources of one's purposes, as Kant seemingly agrees, the choice of means to those ends is free, so, to that extent, the adoption of a hypothetical imperative is also free. Thus, that adoption, on Kant's own interpretation of it, combines free and unfree elements, with the reductionism of the dichotomy forcing him to ultimately classify it as unfree, as a reflection of which element is the predominant one. In contrast, the 'more voluntary'-less voluntary' spectrum that has been proposed here more flexibly characterizes the adoption of a hypothetical imperative as simply 'less voluntary' than that of a categorical imperative.

Will, Voluntary, Habit

2011-10-25T07:03:00.000-07:00

Habitual behavior, as occurring automatically, might, therefore, be classified as 'involuntary'. However, 'automatic' does not clearly distinguish between rapidity of response and mechanical causality--while the latter might be involuntary, habitual behavior consists in the former. More important, the determining characteristic of Habit cannot be an aspect of a current actual process alone, but must lie in the relation of that process to previous sequences. In other words, Habit is defined by Repetition of behavior. But, as has been previously argued, following Deleuze, Repetition is a special case of Differentiation, i. e. it is minimal differentiation. Now, a voluntary act is an exercise of Will, and Will is the principle of Diversification in Experience. Hence, habitual behavior is not involuntary, but minimally voluntary.

Will, Voluntary, Compulsion

2011-10-24T06:06:00.000-07:00

According to Aristotle, a 'voluntary' act is one performed without 'compulsion', with 'compulsion' defined as movement originating outside the agent. However, he seems unwilling to, accordingly, deny that the tossing of goods from a ship, to lighten its load during a storm, has an involuntary dimension. In contrast, the unequivocal application of his classification distinguishes between pulling a trigger while another gun is pointed at one's head, and pulling it during sneezing as an allergic reaction to pollen. At bottom, Aristotle definition of 'compulsion' fails to distinguish between the perception of some external phenomenon and an external efficient cause of a physiological event. Even the direst of circumstances does not transform an exercise of Will into an involuntary act. Thus, any response to compulsion e. g. qua perceived threat is voluntary.

Will, Voluntary, Knowledge

2011-10-23T07:43:00.000-07:00

According to Aristotle, a 'voluntary' act is one in which the agent has knowledge of its consequences. On that formulation, if A serves B a dish that includes peanuts, and unbeknownst to A, B is allergic to peanuts, then the act is 'involuntary' if it is characterized as 'harming B', but 'voluntary' if it is characterized as 'feeding B'. Thus, Aristotle's definition leads to one and the same sequence of movements being both voluntary and involuntary. Plainly, his formulation conflates a volitional component, Will, with a cognitive one, Knowledge, thereby muddling the kinship of 'voluntary' with the former alone. In contrast, 'deliberate' or 'intentional' more appropriately characterizes the cognitive dimension of such acts.

Will, Voluntary, Somnambulism

2011-10-22T07:01:00.000-07:00

The traditional identification of 'voluntary' with 'deliberate' or 'intentional' reflects a conflation of two distinct types of mental process--volitional and cognitive, e. g. Sartre's 'Consciousness'. Rarely explored evidence of that distinction is somnambulism, which entails Motility with minimal awareness. Since Motility is Will, somnambulism is volition with minimal cognition. Furthermore, since 'voluntary' denotes volition, somnambulism is, therefore, voluntary, though not deliberate or intentional. Similarly, dreams sometimes seem to be 'unconscious expressions of a wish', because what they actually express is Motility that occurs during sleep, and Motility is Volition, i. e. it is wishing in general, not some specific wish, that a dream expresses.

Will, Voluntary, Matter

2011-10-21T05:09:00.000-07:00

The standard association of 'voluntary' with 'deliberate' or 'intentional' reflects the combined legacy of two theses--that Matter is inert, and that Consciousness is immaterial. Accordingly, only a perception, image, or thought can set one's body in motion, and can, therefore, be the source of voluntary action. In contrast, in Formaterialism, 'Matter' is an hypostasization of the Material Principle, and Will is the Material Principle of Experience. On that model, the self-activation that qualifies an action as 'voluntary' is independent of either a preceding perception, or a concomitant image or thought that guides its execution. As has been previously discussed, examples of one's formulating a goal simply to facilitate the exercise of Motility validate that model. They, therefore, also justify the distinction of 'voluntary' from 'deliberate' or 'intentional'.

Will, Voluntary, Deliberate

2011-10-20T07:04:00.000-07:00

A 'voluntary' act is often characterized as one the consequences of which are considered in advance, by the performer, as possibly eventuating. That notion presupposes another--the forethought of there being any consequences at all. The latter entails a process of externalization beyond any thought of the imminent performance itself, i. e. it entails Will. Hence, what is primarily 'voluntary' in some consequential act is not the anticipation of one or another specific consequence, but in the recognition of consequentiality, in general. In contrast, an act performed with a specific outcome in mind is, more accurately, a 'deliberate' one. Thus, a deliberate act is a species of voluntary act.

Will, Voluntary, Volunteer

2011-10-19T05:09:00.000-07:00

'Voluntary' behavior is typically characterized as one or more of the following: 1. 'Intentional', i. e. the outcome corresponds to some mental image that guided the performance; 2. 'Self-controlled', e. g. one was not intoxicated; 3. 'Chosen', i. e. the course of action was preferred to some feasible alternative; 4. 'Uncompelled', i. e. one was not forced to act by some external influence. Common to these concepts is that each is a retrospective characterization, and, hence, each is subtly teleological. In contrast, the related term, 'to volunteer', better expresses the essence of Will--self-activation, without ulterior motive. So, to formulate a 'voluntary' action as that for which one 'volunteers', while not suitable as a formal definition, still accurately emphasizes that the most focal feature of such a process is at its initiation, not at its termination.

Will, Voluntary Action, Dualism

2011-10-18T07:03:00.000-07:00

'Voluntary' is most commonly used in jurisprudential contexts, in opposition to 'involuntary'. However, the sharpness of that categorial polarity belies the indefiniteness of at least most of the cases under consideration, nor of behavior, in general, which is often similarly subjected to traditional 'Freedom-Determinism' dualism. Efficiency of classification might be justified in legal procedures, but the oversimplification of Philosophical issues is at least sometimes intellectually lazy. A theory of Experience that fails to recognize that actions can be more or less voluntary reflects a greater fidelity to some conceptual scheme, perhaps Manichean, than to the facts themselves--especially the plain fact that Experience is comprised of a combination of factors, including Will.

Will, Volition, Voluntary

2011-10-17T05:09:00.000-07:00

Just as the exercise of Will is 'volitional', it can also be characterized as 'voluntary'. Similarly, since, as has been previously discussed, Will can be quantified, and, thus, vary in degree of volition, an act can be more or less voluntary. The use of 'voluntary' thus has at least one advantage over that of a term such as 'free', the considerable baggage of which includes limitation to only two values.

Will, Utilitarianism, Common Good

2011-10-16T07:06:00.000-07:00

Berkeley's divergence from Locke's Epistemological theory has potential implications for the latter's Political Philosophy that have seemingly rarely been explored. For, Phenomenalism, by conceiving externality as irreal, completely privatizes Experience, thereby rendering as specious any concept of Commonality that Lockeian Democracy entails. Similarly, Utilitarianism privatizes the Good--evaluations are all private feelings, of which the 'greatest happiness of the greatest number' is an aggregate. In other words, Mill, like Berkeley, recognizes no Common Good, nor can he. For, the recognition of Commonality requires Will, i. e. the principle of self-exteriorization, which, as the moment of the origination of action, has no value in a teleological doctrine such as Utilitarianism.

Will, Utilitarianism, Phenomenalism

2011-10-15T07:05:00.000-07:00

The similarity of Mill's thesis 'To be valuable is to be valued' to Berkeley's 'To be is to be perceived' suggests that Utilitarianism involves an application of Phenomenalism. Accordingly, just as a Coherence Theory of Truth is the criterion of a non-representational cognition, such as a Phenomenon, the Utilitarian 'greatest happiness of the greatest number' principle is a Coherence Theory of the Good for non-representational valuation. In particular, just as Berkeley denies the Lockeian thesis that primary qualities exist in nature independently of a percipient, Mill denies the Lockeian thesis that Freedom is an intrinsic natural Good, i. e. that it has value independent of a valuer. Hence, the Utilitarian valuelessness of Will, the experiential source of Freedom, is, at least in part, a reflection of Mill's Phenomenalist orientation.

Will, Utilitarianism, Economics

2011-10-14T05:17:00.000-07:00

It is generally recognized that Mill's Utilitarianism diverges from Bentham's by asserting that the 'good' consists in collective, and not personal, happiness. However, if, as is commonly accepted, Bentham conceives the doctrine on the model of Capitalist economic behavior, then Mill is revealed as also grounding it. On the economic interpretation, Bentham conceives 'happiness' as analogous to 'profit'. In contrast, on that interpretation, Mill is offering a theory of Evaluation that the notion 'profit' presupposes, namely, that the value of a product is determined by what one would pay for it, i. e. its 'exchange' value. Hence, the Marxist critique of Utilitarianism is analogous to the Ethical one that has been presented here--the Utilitarian suppression of 'intrinsic' value. Now, according to Marxism, the intrinsic value of a product is a function of the processes that transform its raw materials. Furthermore, according to the model of Experience being proposed here, Will is the basis of any variation of the given, and, hence, of the transformation of raw materials. Thus, contrary to pervasive stereotypes, a notion usually classified as 'individualistic', Will, is aligned with one usually classified as 'collectivistic', in opposition to an economic model usually associated with 'individualism'.

Will, Utilitarianism, Prejudice

2011-10-13T07:03:00.000-07:00

Utilitarianism entails uncritical respect for the face-value authority of expressions of like or dislike. It thus is incapable of recognizing prejudice, i. e. it cannot distinguish judgment from pre-judgment. More generally, it cannot distinguish conditioned responses from spontaneous ones. Hence, 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' can amount to a reinforcement of prejudices, possibly harmful ones. Since prejudice, and pre-conditioned behavior in general, is a species of Heteronomy, the corrective requires appreciation of the Moral significance of Autonomy, entailing the cultivation of Will, the principle of spontaneity in conduct. However, such appreciation requires the jettisoning any commitment to Teleology, which Mill seems unwilling to do.