Monday, October 31, 2016

Contradiction and Exploitation

In Dialectical Materialism, Contradiction is Conflict.  Now, Confict is a situation in which there is at least one less good than there are parties that desire it.  In nature, Conflict is usually constituted by Scarcity, and resolved by either the elimination of the excess claimants, or by a distribution of the good among all the claimants.  Artifactual Conflict, e. g. sports competition, is usually resolved in the former manner.  Now, the fundamental target of Marxism, Exploitation, consisting in the enjoyment, by the owner of the means of production, of the product of someone else's labor, can be conceived as a case of Conflict--between those two parties, over the product, resolvable by either exclusive possession or sharing.  However, neither solution in itself addresses the essence of Exploitation--that it is stealing, resolvable, according to Marxism, only by the elimination of private ownership of the means of production.  So, Dialectical Materialism is irrelevant to both the ill that Marxism diagnoses of Capitalism, and its proposed cure.

Sunday, October 30, 2016

Division of Labor and Dialectical Materialism

Contradiction is a special case of Differentiation, e. g. red and blue are different, but they are not in conflict with each other.  However, in any Dialectical system, all Differentiation is Contradiction.  Now, Division of Labor entails Differentiation, but not necessarily Contradiction.  Thus, insofar as Marx-Engels adhere to Dialectical Materialism, they cannot adequately represent Division of Labor.

Saturday, October 29, 2016

Labor, Theory, Oracle

Marx-Engel's concept of "pure" theory, e. g. "theology, philosophy, ethics", as embodying non-material mental labor, abstracts from one dimension of the production of them--they are communicated, which requires physical exertion of some sort.  Thus, the producers of them have less in common with the priest who performs rituals in order to harness higher powers that can benefit a tribe, e. g. bring rain, than with the oracle, who is a medium of communication between the former and the latter.  But, such communication is still a material act that serves a social function, even if it is merely to prepare for the inevitable.  So, if the purpose of the exposition in these passages in the German Ideology is to correlate fundamental Division of Labor and Mind-Matter Dualism in some way, the presentation is less than convincing.

Friday, October 28, 2016

Division of Labor, Mental, Material

As is the case in several sections of the German Ideology, Marx-Engel's attempt to derive a separation of mental labor from physical labor is methodologically sloppy.  For, it presupposes a distinction of "material" and "mental", that, especially in the context of an apparent subscription to a Materialist concept of Mind, itself requires further elucidation.  Now, one approach to such a derivation that is seemingly consistent with some of the principles of Marxism, is to begin with the concept of Labor, and analyze it as "intelligent motion".  Accordingly, the separation, and its hypostasization, of the latter two terms produces a 'mental-'material' duality, plus, it is also produces a division of Labor.  However, as rigorous and potentially fruitful for Marxism as such a derivation might be, that it is adequate without the concept of Dialectical Materialism likely disqualifies it from serious consideration among Marxists.

Thursday, October 27, 2016

Division of Labor and Opposable Thumb

Marx-Engels recognize the sexual act as constituting both the original Division of Labor, and the nucleus of exploitative relations.  Now, regardless of whether or not each of those attributions is accurate, another equally primitive Division of Labor can be found in the human hand, specifically in the distinction between the thumb and the fingers.  More precisely, that distinction is generally characterized as opposition, i. e. the thumb is generally classified as 'opposable'.  But, unlike other oppositions in Marxist Dialectics, this one is not at all antagonistic, nor is it exploitative.  Rather, it is the source of the capacity that makes most of human labor even possible--the grip, without which most tools would not even exist.  So, the exploitative antagonism that they try to attribute to Division of Labor, is not, as they try to establish, inherent in it.

Wednesday, October 26, 2016

Labor and Contemplation

Marx-Engel's division of material labor from mental labor entails that an activity such as the contemplation of an Idea is a variety of Labor.  However, that classification conflicts with a definition of Labor that seems to govern most Marxist works--'a modification of some matter'.  Furthermore, it prevents Marx-Engels from conceiving a corresponding Class distinction the way Dewey does--that between the Working Class and the Leisure Class.  So, their thesis that the separation of mental labor from material labor is the origin of Division of Labor is not only, as has been previously discussed, poorly grounded, it is systematically incoherent, and undermines some fruitful further development.

Tuesday, October 25, 2016

Division of Labor, Geometry, Architecture

One of the earliest recorded examples of a separation of what Marx-Engels call, in the German Ideology, "mental" from "material", is Pythagoras' conversion of applied Geometry, e. g. land measurement, to pure Geometry.  But Pythagoras does not maintain that duality.  Rather, he further proposes that 'matter' is nothing but 'mental' entities, i. e. combinations of pure Geometrical figures, a thesis that continues to have influence, from Plato, to Leibniz, and lately among Fractal Geometers.  Now, one prominent recent Pythagorean is Buckminster Fuller, who not only conceives 'matter' to be constituted by triangles, but extends that vision into his own artifacts, i. e. geodesic domes, structures that are actualized by builders. So, Marx-Engels' claim that Division of Labor begins with the separation of mental labor from material labor is far-fetched in several respects.  First, it is sheerly speculative, whereas according to a better-evidenced account, pure mental activity is first separated from applied mental activity, not from merely material activity.  Second, it is not the case that perhaps the most influential Mental ontology in history is part of a Dualism--it is Monistic. And, third, the Architect-Builder division of labor, in which the former is inspired by a purely Mental ontology, is one that is complementary, not antagonistic.  In other words, its history of Division of Labor is another less than compelling theoretical feature of Marxism.

Monday, October 24, 2016

Division of Labor and Geometry

In the German Ideology, Marx-Engels assert that "Division of Labor only becomes truly such from the moment when a division of material and mental labor appears. From this moment onwards, consciousness can really flatter itself that it is something other than consciousness of an existing practice, that it really represents something without representing something real."  However, a significant gap in this account, which is sheerly speculative, is suggested by the word 'geometry'.  For, the term analyzes as 'the measurement of the earth', thereby suggesting that prior to becoming a purely mental object, Geometry is a practical enterprise, e. g. involving the measurement of land for agrarian purposes, in which case it is both mental and material.  Accordingly, Marx-Engels skip a stage in the purported genesis of Division of Labor--that constituted by a distinction between the organization of material Labor, and its execution.

Sunday, October 23, 2016

Drudgery, Exploitation, Socialism

'Drudgery' encompasses a variety of tasks--sanitation, waste disposal, any toil in unpleasant circumstances, mechanical physical motions, etc.  Now, these are tasks that no one voluntarily performs.  But they are needed.  Thus, any Drudgery-class is one that is exploited, though, since Drudgery is non-productive, its Labor-value is zero, and, hence, can not be something the value of which is alienated from its source.  In other words, such exploitation is not adequately remedied by the collectivization of property.  Thus, if Socialism aims to rid society of class-exploitation more completely, the performance of Drudgery must be universally shared.

Saturday, October 22, 2016

Polity and Orchestra

There are three main contributors to the production of a typical piece of what is usually termed 'Classical Music'--the composer, the conductor, and the orchestra.  There are others--the instrument-makers, the managers of the venue, etc.--but those three are the central ones.  Correspondingly, there are three main contributors to a polity--a theorist, e. g. a policy-formulator, a ruler, and the citizenry.  Now, the dysfunctions of each of those three are familiar factors in the development of a Political Philosophy--too abstract theorizing, self-serving ruler, oppressed citizenry, etc.  However, analogous problems seem peculiar, at best, in the context of the production of a piece of music, e. g. that the orchestra is oppressed because they are being told what to do, and even how to do it.  So, the dysfunctions that usually constitute the primary instigation to the development of a Political Philosophy are contingent ones, as are, therefore, their solutions.

Friday, October 21, 2016

Legitimacy, Inegalitarianism, Egalitarianism

One of the distinctive features of Political Philosophy, that distinguishes it from Political Theory, is the attempt to legitimize a proposed model.  Thus, in Ancient Political Philosophy, the source of legitimacy is Nature, while in the Medieval era, it is a Deity.  Now, in the Modern Era, there is a return to Nature as the foundation, but with a significant difference.  Among the Ancients, the specific Natural characteristic is some ability that is posited as not necessarily shared by all, e. g. Reason, whereas for the Moderns, it is universally attributed Freedom.  Accordingly, debates between advocates of Ancient doctrines vs. those of Modern ones tend to reduce to an Inegalitarianism vs. Egalitarianism dispute.  But, tending to corrupt that antithesis is the insinuation into it of extrinsic normative considerations.  As a result, a contrast of 'better suited to rule or to choose a ruler' vs. 'less well-suited to rule or to choose a ruler', morphs into a 'superior human being' vs. 'inferior human being' one, thereby corrupting a perhaps modest and inoffensive Inegalitarian proposition.  Furthermore, the corrupt version has become the widely accepted one, which makes it difficult to criticize, even where presumed Democratic processes are a shadow puppet show.

Thursday, October 20, 2016

Political Philosophy and Drudgery

In his positing of Class Conflict as the motor of History, Marx never quite explains why one class exploits another.  He implicitly seems to believe that such exploitation is a necessary means to the acquisition of wealth, though Nietzsche argues that it is motivated by a Will to Power that is more fundamental then profit-seeking.  However, another explanation is one that is seemingly never addressed in the major works of Political Philosophy, though it is implicit in Marx's hope that technological advances can eliminate the need to exploit Labor.  Conspicuously absent in Plato's cataloguing of what is 'necessary' in a polity is a familiar dimension of every society hitherto known--drudgery, which is not to be confused with the skilled Labor that is the foundation of Marxism.  Accordingly, what Marx and Nietzsche, along with Plato, miss is that power relations are required to ensure that necessary drudgery, e. g. waste disposal, is carried out, since no one voluntarily does so, i. e. requiring if not slavery, at least a class that has no alternative to being consigned to it.  Indeed, the accumulation of wealth can be understood as not for its own sake, but in order to distance oneself from menial work.  Thus, one method of Political Philosophy is to return to Plato's, which has been abandoned by his successors, both Ancient and Modern, and Polbegin with the fundamental premise that the performance of drudgery is necessary, and develop a model on that basis.

Wednesday, October 19, 2016

Happiness: Ancient and Modern

Aristotle conceives Happiness as activity in accordance with Virtue.  In other words, it consists in the exercise of one's talents.  In sharp contrast, the standard Modern concept is that Happiness is constituted by the satisfaction of all one's desires, i. e. something that is pursued, which is not the case with Aristotle's version.  Modern thinkers thus have difficulty appreciating that citizens of Plato's Republic are happy, not because they are ignorantly inured to its inegalitarianism, but because they are each functioning in accordance with the best of their abilities.  Thus, both Ancient and Modern polities are conceived as achieving general Happiness, the difference being how Happiness is conceived in each case.  So, one anomaly is Marx, who is closer to Plato and Aristotle than to Hobbes, Locke, etc. in that regard.

Tuesday, October 18, 2016

Justice: Ancient and Modern

In the Republic, Justice consists fundamentally in the fulfillment of a natural ability, whether a part of the Soul or a member of a Polity.  Similarly, Justice in Modern Political Philosophy can be conceived as the fulfillment of a person's natural desire to be happy.  Now, that fulfillment is more commonly known in that era as Natural Right, though the latter is usually misattributed to the subject of Happiness, rather than to the experience of fulfillment.  Thus, the main distinction between the two concepts is that Plato's concept of natural potential is more determinate than its Modern correlate, i. e. implicit in the former is that happiness consists in the exercise of some natural characteristic, while no such specification limits the Modern concept of Happiness.  So, Strauss's formulation of the Ancient-Modern contrast--The Good vs. Right--is superficial, at best.

Monday, October 17, 2016

Right and Retributive Justice

A Right is generally conceived to be a simple property of its bearer.  However, what that property consists in is difficult to explain.  Instead, a Pragmatist analysis might be the essential one--a Right is a threat of punishment for interference with its bearer in some respect.  Accordingly, a Right is equivalent to a special case of Retributive Justice--the bearer existing in some way, in return for which they are not to be interfered with in some way.  For example, the standard concept of Natural Right is equivalent to the bearer existing as a human being, in return for which they are not to be interfered with in their pursuit of happiness.

Sunday, October 16, 2016

Justice, Retribution, Distribution

The concept of Retributive Justice is that of proportionality between what one gives and what one receives.  It, thus, involves two parties, each of which is both a giver and a receiver.  Now, in many cases, the two parties are each an individual person, but, in some, one party is an individual person, while the other is a totality, such as the World, e. g. when someone is deemed to 'deserve' what happens to them.  And, in some such cases, the totality is society, e. g. Marx's "From each . . . to each . . ." formulation.  However, the latter case is distinguishable from others, for, as Marx overlooks, what society gives one is not independent of what it gives anyone else.  For, what it gives out to one is contingent on the total of what is available to all.  In other words, Justice in a political context combines Distributive and Retributive calculations.  The example also suggests that in the cases in which Retribution seems to suffice, it is abstracted from Distributive considerations, often because the total quantity of what is given is presupposed to be infinite, e. g. when a deity is posited as rewarding behavior.

Saturday, October 15, 2016

Society and Organism

Proudhon shares with other Modern Political Philosophers, including Marx, the premise that the Individual human is the fundamental unit of society.  He, thus, shares with them a limitation of that premise--its inadequacy to the concept of Organism, in which an  Individual is re-conceived as a Part.  That inadequacy is a reflection, at least in part, of the ignorance of Biology in an era generally dominated by inanimate Physics, an era that begins to get transcended by the writings of von Humboldt, for example.  So, to apply the thesis of the latter--that the Earth is an Organism--to Political Philosophy, society is a whole of which its members are parts, thereby undermining one of the fundamental premises of the preceding era.  In other words, the application to Political Philosophy of the principles of the Ecologism that has been emerging over the past century or so potentially overrides all the main doctrines of the 17th-, 18th-, and 19th-centuries, and perhaps renders them obsolete.

Friday, October 14, 2016

Mutualism and Justice

Proudhon's concept of Mutuality is that of Retributive Justice, a term which, regardless of its common usage, can apply to any reciprocity, positive or negative.  Now, Retributive Justice entails two, and only two parties.  In contrast, Distributive Justice can apply to any situation involving two or more parties.  So, in the case of any division of labor among three or more parties, only Distributive Justice is adequate.  Now, Proudhon plainly recognizes the need for collective production involving more than two workers.  So, his Mutualism is inadequate to his own ambition of a just society.

Thursday, October 13, 2016

Organization and Association

Organization is no mere Association.  It is determinate in at least some respect, whereas the latter is not necesssrily so.  Now, Division of Labor is Organization, and, yet, Proudhon equates it with Association.  He, thus, avoids having to consider that a Socialist collective consists in a structure that, like the performance of a musical composition, entails a distinction between conductor and players, or, in other words, a ruler-ruled differentiation.

Wednesday, October 12, 2016

Anarchism and Orchestra

An orchestra is an example of a multiplicity that functions effectively, not only collectively, but individually, as well, under the direction of a unitary leader.  Thus, there is no a priori reason why, as Proudhon implicitly believes, a hierarchy necessarily adversely constrains an individual member of a society.  So, the value of Anarchism is contingent on circumstances, e. g. it might vitalize a hitherto sclerotic hierarchical society, but it might accelerate the de-vitalization of one that is already decaying.  That there are music collectives, e. g.  jazz combos, that perform effectively  without a conductor, and, hence, exemplify Anarchism, does not contradict the possibility of a healthy society in which ruler and ruled are distinguished, i. e. as a conductor and player are.

Tuesday, October 11, 2016

Anarchism, History, Diversification

Regardless of the validity of Dialectical Materialism, Marxism surpasses most, if not all, of rival Modern social models by locating its version in an historical context.  Thus, while Proudhon's Direct Democracy might, in itself, constitute an extreme variety of a horizontal society, e. g. Egalitarianism, that interpretation potentially undergoes modification when, following Marxism, it is historicized, i. e. placed in the context of being preceded by the prevailing vertical models of the Medieval Era.  Now, one characterization of that modified interpretation is suggested by a main Anarchist criticism of Marxism--that it is too centralized.  So, if Proudhon values decentralization with respect to Marxism, then he must do so also with respect to any Theocracy, Monarchism, and Oligarchism, that precedes his model.  Thus, the latter can be more adequately conceived as reflecting an espousal of a diversification of power, and not merely one of Egalitarianism, which is only the product of an hypostasization of and abstraction from that dynamic historical pattern.

Monday, October 10, 2016

Anarchism and Direct Democracy

Proudhon's rejection of any society in which there is a distinction between Ruler and Ruled encompasses Representative Democracy, even though in it, representatives are, in principle, ruled by their constituents.  Instead, he conceives his Anarchism, not be confused with anarchy, requires only Direct Democracy.  Now, as is widely recognized, one of the potential weaknesses of Direct Democracy is what is sometimes characterized as the 'tyranny of the majority', i. e. in which Ruler and Ruled are sundered.  So, the presumed unique suitability of Direct Democracy to Anarchism is unclear.

Sunday, October 9, 2016

Sovereign and Representative

One well-recognized distinction between Hobbes' and Locke's Political Philosophies is that the former, but not the latter, conceives the State of Nature as a condition of universal conflict.  Another distinction, less well-recognized, but perhaps as significant, is that between Sovereign and Representative.  While Hobbes' Sovereign-Citizen power relation is downward, that of Locke's Citizen-Representative is the inverse, so Locke diverges further from Medieval hierarchy than does Hobbes.  Now, a parallel between that concept of Locke's with his Epistemological theory can be noted, but with one difference.  Representation is derivative in both cases, though, while the Epistemological one is a mere abstraction from the multiplicity of its represented, the Political representative, is, like those represented, a concrete individual entity.

Saturday, October 8, 2016

Anarchism, Socialism, Marxism

Proudhon's Anarchism is a variety of Socialism that diverges from Marxism in two respects.  First, it entails no Dialecticism, and, second, it rejects the centralization of Marxism.  Now, the failure of Marxists to establish an essential connection between Socialism and Dialectics leaves Proudhon's variety of the former deficient in no obvious respect with the absence of the latter.  However, the other divergence is not as clear-cut as it sometimes seems to be taken.  For, his Federalism entails at least some unity of the multiplicity of citizens, so its distinction from Marxist centralization is only one of degree, not kind.

Friday, October 7, 2016

Mutualism and Property

Proudhon's Mutualist theory of Property has two main principles: 1. The product of one's own labor is inalienably one's own, and 2. The means of production is collectively owned.  Now, while such an arrangement eliminates much exploitation, it is not completely coherent.  For, it leaves undeterminable the status both of the production of means of production, such as tools, and of the collective production of goods.  Common to the two problems is the absence of a formulation of the relation between My and Our, an absence that originates in that between I and We.

Thursday, October 6, 2016

Mutualism and Solidarity

Proudhon conceives his Mutalist Anarchism to be Socialist, i. e. an associative solidarity.  However, one problem with his concept is that there is no systematic relation between Mutuality and Solidarity.  For, the former is constituted by a multiplicity of Is, while the latter consists in a We.  Similarly, Kant's Kingdom of Ends is an aggregate of Rational agents that is outside the scope of Synthesis--Quantity in his system is applicable to only Phenomenal entities, not to Noumenal ones like Rational agents, and, hence the aggregate cannot be unified while retaining internal distinctions.  In other words, a Mutualist collective can never be more than a concatenation of Individuals, i. e. can never solidify as a We.

Wednesday, October 5, 2016

Mutualist Anarchism and Rationality

The derivability of Mutualist Anarchism from Kantian Morality, previously discussed, thus marks it as a model of a Rational social system.  However, it diverges from Kant's Kingdom of Ends in two respects--it is not necessarily constituted by laws, and it includes no King.  The very brief and oblique allusion to a King in the Groundwork seems to imply that the monarch in question is Kant's deity, the positing of the existence of which is justified only elsewhere, in the 2nd Critique, by a dubious proof, as has been discussed here a while ago.  And, Kant never shows that the process of Universalization entailed in the functioning of Pure Practical Reason is ever more than a mental operation.  So, Mutualist Anarchism can be conceived as a critique of Kantian Rationalism, separating its essential features--Autonomy and End-in-Itself--from its inessential legalist Monarchism.

Tuesday, October 4, 2016

Mutualism, Form, Content

As has been previously discussed, Mutualism can be conceived as an instance of Kantian Morality, i. e. voluntary fairness combines the concepts of Autonomy and End-in-Itself.  Conversely, as an instance of Kantian Morality, Mutualism exposes an inadequacy of one of the prominent criticisms of that doctrine.  The criticism is that it is merely abstract, deficient for guiding concrete behavior.  However, Mutualism shows why such under-determination can be regarded as a virtue.  For, beyond the formal requirement that an exchange be fair, its details are contingent, determinable by the parties involved, not a priori.  In other words, the formal requirement is not, as is charged in the criticism, abstract, but, rather, concrete, awaiting content that complements it.  So, Mutualism illustrates that the Abstract-Concrete contrast that is the basis of the criticism is actually one of Form-Content, each of which is concrete.

Monday, October 3, 2016

Anarchism, Mutualism, Kantianism

Mutualism can be conceived as an instance of Kantian Morality--of the feature characterized as the End-in-Itself Duty.  For, treating another as an End in that system entails both elements of a Mutualist exchange--voluntary participation, i. e. Autonomy, and fairness, i. e. respect for the interest of another.  Now, one of the looser transitions in Kant's system is that from the Fundamental Principle of Pure Practical Reason to this Duty, i. e. the latter admirably enriches the former, but is not rigorously derived from it.  Similarly, Mutualism enhances Proudhon's Anarchism, but it is not logically entailed by it.  That looseness can explain why Wolff's Kantian defense of Anarchism, based on the concept of Autonomy, bypasses the parallel Kantianism of Proudhon's Mutualism.

Sunday, October 2, 2016

Mutualism and Egoism

Mutualism entails the voluntary participation in equitable exchange, and, hence, that fairness is freely pursued.  However, Prouhon does not supply a principle that would ground such behavior, so it can only be an object of speculation.  Now, there can be little doubt that the principle is neither Psychological nor Ethical Egoism, each of which excludes Fairness as an immediate conative aim.  An alternative possibilty, one consistent with optimistic concepts of Human Nature, is the thesis of an instinct for Justice, though proof of the existence of such an instinct would seem difficult to establish, since that would require study of behavior under conditions that are completely abstracted from historical vicissitudes.  Instead, a more accessible possibility is Dewey's thesis that human behavior is essentually plastic, from which it follows that Mutualist conduct is the product of education.  In any case, at minimum, Mutualism is antithetical to any of the prominent traditional varieties of Egoism.

Saturday, October 1, 2016

Democracy, Capitalism, Mutualism

Democracy combines Equality and Freedom, the actualization of which is more Art than either Science or Dialectical Necessity.  Now, Capitalism entails Freedom, but not Equality.  In contrast, the fundamental element of Proudhon's Mutualism, the voluntary and equitable Exchange, entails both Freedom and Equality.  Thus, despite the deeply ingrained, especially in the U. S., synonymity of Democracy and Capitalism, it is Mutualism, not the latter, that is the Economic system that is more appropriate to the former.