Labor, Punishment, Salvation

The punishment, according to Genesis III, of the human race includes Labor, in two senses.  Thus, the salvation from that condition promised by Christianity includes the liberation from toil.  So, because Christianity is the predominant Religion of the era, that liberation is very likely part of the "illusory happiness" to which Marx opposes Socialism.  Now, implicit in the Biblical scenario is the status of Labor as inherently an accursed condition for humans.  But, if so, that status complicates Marxism in several respects.  First, insofar as Socialism is a rival to Religion as a means to Happiness, it accepts the denigration of Labor, thereby varying from the dignifying of it in some cardinal passages.  Furthermore, if having to toil is a divine punishment, then not having to toil can only have divine blessing, either on a priori grounds, or as a by-product of Salvation.  In either case, the reality of the existence of the ownership classes as a liberated condition needs to be addressed by the Socialist critique of Religion, the simplification of which as an illusion leaves unaddressed.  

Religion and Labor

According to one of the most influential passages in Western civilization, Genesis III, Labor is a curse on Humanity.  Thus, Religion is as much scourge as opium, and the promise of happiness that it offers, real or not, obscures the reality of the misery that it has codified.  In that context, the exploitation of Labor is a relatively trivial injustice.  More generally, Marxism occasionally seems to be at cross-purposes--dignifying Labor vs. promoting the elimination of it via Technology.  If there is a confusion in that respect, it is rooted in a relatively benign diagnosis of the influence of Religion in Western civilization.

Religion, Happiness, Power

While according to Marx, Religion seeks Happiness, according to the other major 19th-century critic of it, Nietzsche, it seeks Power.  Thus, Heaven, for the former, consists in the satisfaction of all wants, while for the latter, a necessary, if not a sufficient condition of it, is the achievement of superiority over hitherto dominant forces, natural as well as political.  Implicitly, therefore, while for Marx, it is the alienation from the fruits of one's labor that is the breeding ground of Religion, for Nietzsche, it is the alienation from one's labor itself.  But then, insofar as Socialism achieves a maximum of Power, as Trotsky proposes, contrary to Nietzsche's concept of it as the actualization of the traditional Religious ideal, it is the antithesis of the latter.  For, that ideal is passively received from 'God', whereas the Marxist goal is a product of human self-determination.

Religion and Hierarchy

The term 'hierarchical' derives from the Greek for 'sacred'.  Thus, even without the spatialization of the Sacred-Profane contrast as High-Low--perhaps a consequence of the Above-Below contrast of Geocentrism--non-Pantheistic Religion is inherently inegalitarian. Now, there are no doubt other grounds of social domination, e. g. superior weaponry.  But because of his inattention to Religion as Practical, Marx's characterizations of it as "opium" and "illusory happiness" offer only superficial diagnoses of social hierarchies involving it.

Religion, Opium, Steroids

Marx's characterizations of Religion as "opium" and "illusory happiness" are as experienced by sufferers in a society.  They, thus, do not include the ways that it informs the status of the overclass.  In a Theocracy, it is the explicit basis of Power.  In other systems, it can effectively reinforce a hierarchy by the thesis that such a social arrangement expresses a 'divine will', in any of several ways, e. g. a thesis of pre-determination, a theory that income distribution is determined by a superhuman force or by deservedness, etc.  In these cases, Religion enhances Power, suggesting that for some of the people, at least, the appropriate pharmaceutical metaphor for it is one with which Marx has no acquaintance--steroids.

Religion, Power, Nature

The concept of Religion as Practical bears out that the fundamental Marxist criticism of it is, as Trotsky puts it, "power over nature".  In those terms, the advantage of Marxism over Religion, given the Technological boom of the Modern Era, is one of efficacy, rather than of truth.  On the other hand, Religion retains one asset for which Marxism has no rival--the possible existence of an omnipotent deity.  Even in the decline of Religion during the rise of Technology in recent centuries, the persistence of the former reflects the continued popularity of 'Pascal's Wager', i. e. of the willingness to believe in the existence of a power over nature that far exceeds any attributable to Technology.  Marxism can easily dispute the truth of that existence, but not of its possibility.

Religion, Illusion, Passivity

Right after characterizing Religion as "opium for the people", Marx adds that it is an "illusory happiness", thereby implicitly attributing to the experience a cognitive error.  A contrasting diagnosis begins with the concept of Religion as Practical, as it is in its most primitive manifestations, constituted by action in accodance with a causal hypothesis one term of which is a deity, e. g. a dance that appeals to a god to bring rain.  So, in simpler cases, Religion can be evaluated on the basis of its efficacy, i. e. whether or not the wished-for result occurs.  But, in more complicated Religion, the effect is deferred indefinitely, replaced more immediately by a promise, e. g. that of inheriting the earth as an effect of meek conduct.  Now, the promise itself is not illusory, so, nor is the hope that can be derived from it.  But, the adoption of that causal hypothesis cultivates passivity as a response to unhappiness, whereas the Marxist remedy, revolution, is active.  So, on the Practical diagnosis of Religion, the Real-Illusory contrast is replaced by that of Effective-Ineffective and/or of Active-Passive, in which 'Real' and 'Illusory' are exposed as characteristics of a passive condition.

Religion and Opium

The medical value of an opiate is as a suppressant of pain, while its dangers include addiction, and a distraction from removing the cause of a pain.  Likewise, Hope can offer a temporary respite from psychic distress, but, as a continuous condition, it can be malign.  So, Marx's famous phrase, the actual wording of which, in the Introduction to his projected Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, is "Religion is the opium of the people", involves a two-fold over-generalization, i. e. of Religion and of opium.  For example, Religion qua healing via prayer can concretely alleviate despair by offering, after all else has failed, the hope of a one-time success, but its value is more dubious as a regular preemption of established surgical methods.

Religion and Means of Production

In its more primitive manifestations, Religion consists in the performance of rites designed to appeal to a deity for favorable treatment, e. g. for bountiful crops.  Such rites thus function as Means of Production, and the performers as laborers.  Accordingly, therefore, insofar as the reading of scripture is an essential rite, it functions as a Means of Production, with its reader as a laborer.  Thus, Religion can function as both Base and Superstructure in a society.  Furthermore, in such conditions, the number of copies of scripture in existence determines the political structure--few copies creates an Oligarchy, and an indefinite number creates a Democracy, though, in the latter case, the need for experts to advise in the operation of the Means of Production, i. e. in how to read the scriptures efficaciously, can involve an Oligarchical dimension.  So, the relation of Religion to Economics is more complicated than Marx seems to conceive, due, perhaps ironically, to his neglect of the Practical aspect of the former.

Individual. Atom, Cell

A defining characteristic of an Atom, in the purest sense, is that it is essentially discrete with respect to its surroundings, a property formulated by Atomists as the 'externality of relations', which entails that an Atom remains unchanged by a relocation.  Thus, insofar as a Soul survives the death of a body that it inhabits, it is an Atom, as are a Capitalist Individual and Private Property, i. e. because of their independence from the rest of a society.  In contrast, a Cell is separated from its surroundings by a permeable membrane, i. e. a medium of interaction, which means that it is essentially of that location.  Now, the contingency, in Marxism, of an Individual with respect to their environment, is an indication of a repudiation of Atomism.  However, it is unclear if it goes further and accepts the Cellular concept of the Individual.  For, that concept entails permeability, and, hence, an interpenetration of Individual and environment, whereas Dialectical Materialism entails only their interaction, which can transpire merely in between them.  So, Marxism can be interpreted as constituting a partial transition from Physicism to Biologism.

Atom, Cell, Socialism

In his dissertation, ostensibly a comparison of the Atomism of Democritus with that of Lucretius, Marx introduces Dialectical Atomism as an alternative to the standard Mechanical Atomism.  This precursor of Dialectical Materialism thus reflects the predominance in the era of Newtonian Physics.  Now, decades later, incorporating more recent discoveries in Biology in his attempt at a Dialectical Materialist Science, Engels recognizes that the basic unit of life is the Cell.  However, he offers no derivation of the Cell from the Atom, other than to briefly note its relatively late emergence into Nature.  Absent such a methodical derivation, insofar as Socialism is a Biological formation, i. e. is a condition of the Human species, it is not a product of Dialectical Materialism.

Materiality, Corporeality, Socialism

As has been previously discussed, Smith's system is populated by de-corporealized Atoms, equivalent to a Theologically typical aggregation of spiritual souls, e. g. 'Heaven'.  Now, restoring Materiality to those Atoms does not suffice to render them Human, since mere Materiality is not equivalent to Biological Corporeality, even if governed by a Dialectical principle, as Engels' theory of Physics proves.  In other words, absent a grounding in a Biological principle, e. g. a Species, Socialism remains abstract collectivism.

Capitalism and Spiritualism

The concept of the incorporeal soul is Atomistic in two respects.  First, absent a body, it is free of the reproductive organs that tie it to the other members of the species, and, second, insofar as a soul can be 'saved' or reincarnated, its fate is isolated from the fate of the souls of other members of the species.  Now, as Berkeley shows, Phenomenalism is equivalent to Spiritualism.  Thus, Smith's Capitalism, which is a system of Phenomenalist Atomism, is essentially a spiritualization of Economics, as the concept of an Invisible Hand that mediates relations in that realm only underscores.

Socialism, Base, Dialectical Materialism

The cardinal characteristic of Socialism--the collectivization of property--can be expressed as 'Our', and Our presupposes We.  Thus, the Base of Socialism is We.  Now, there is nothing Philosophically arcane about We, a familiar feature of everyday experience.  But, what distinguishes the Socialist version is its potential universality.  So, since the loci of the everyday instances are finite groups, e. g. family, nation, club, class, etc., the Socialist We cannot be derived from them alone via an historical process.  Rather, since the Universe entailed in the concept is that of the race, that We must presuppose the species as its ground, and as the origin of the process that leads to it.  Thus, the process is one of what is implicit becoming explicit.  But, that is not a Dialectical pattern.  Thus, Dialectical Materialism is inadequate as the Base of Socialism.

Socialism, Ground, Base

Marx's Base-Superstructure image signifies a construction, the logic of which presupposes a pre-construction ground, with respect to which the edifice is stable.  Now, one of the charges against Socialism is that even if achievable, it is unstable, because it suppresses 'natural' differences in ability.  But, that charge is inapplicable to the principle "From each according to one's abilities . . . "  Still, the construction of Socialism on a sound basis, which can be subsequently diversified in accordance with that principle, requires a concept of We that is in some respect contiguous with its antecedents.  Three scenarios in which that concept can be established are: 1. As an actualization of some potential in the species; 2. As an unprecedented product of a dialectical process; and 3. As an unprecedented product of an evolutionary process, e. g. the Will to Power.  Marxism entails #2, though without addressing the non-identity in the image of the natural ground and the Base of the edifice, i. e. the non-identity of an aggregate of individuals and a We.

Base and Superstructure

Marx uses the image of a Base-Superstructure contrast to explain how Economic relations determine Political ones.  On that analysis, for example, institutional conditions in the U. S., such as the impunity of illegal activity of the financial sector, and the codifications of a corporation as a "person", and spending money as "free speech", reflect the inequalities at the Base.  More concisely, the thesis disputes, for two reasons, the popular identification of Capitalism and Democracy.  First, since the former is an Economic system, and the latter is a Political one, they are distinguished as Base and Superstructure.  Second, and more important, since the latter, unlike the former, entails Equality, they do not even correspond as Base and Superstructure.  Rather, the Political system that is the Superstructure of Capitalism is Oligarchy, or, more precisely, Plutocracy, while the Base of Democracy can be only the system which entails Economic Equality, namely Socialism.

Will to Power, Dialectical Materialism, Socialism

The concept of a 'second nature' entails that of a transition from a 'first nature', one which, as the intentional acquisition of any new skills evinces, is deliberate.  Hence, underlying the two 'natures' is a more fundamental process, which Nietzsche calls Self-Overcoming.  But, Self-Overcoming is one manifestation of Will to Power.  So, insofar as Marxist Revolution consists in a transition to a second nature, as has been previously discussed, it can be attributed to the Will to Power, which is consistent with Trotsky's formulations, and avoids the difficulties entailed in deriving Socialism from Dialectical Materialism, e. g. the conflict between Necessity and Voluntary.

Socialism, Second Nature, Technology

Since what Human Nature is has long been in dispute, so, too, is what a Second Nature constitutes unsettled.  However, since the use of tools is unarguably an acquired activity, it seems difficult to deny that Technology is part of any Second Nature of Humans.  Now, according to Marx, Technology is what differentiates the Human species from all others.  Thus, Marxist Socialism is a Second Nature doctrine.  In contrast, Capitalism is not, not so much because Technology is not an essential factor in it, but because one of its essential features, the Invisible Hand, is conceived as independent of Human artifice.  Furthermore, that concept of Socialism functions as a means to the organization of society.  Hence, it is part of the Technology that constructs that organization, not a mere Nominalist characterization of it.

Socialism, Superman, Will to Power

In 'On the Philosophy of the Superman', Trotsky strongly opposes Nietzsche's concept, on the grounds of its privileging Individuality.  However, that judgment is significantly complicated by the passage from Their Morals and Ours that has been previously discussed.  For, his characteristization, in the latter work, of a Human "power" over Nature, that includes that over the natural "power" of one human over another, plainly expresses an adoption of Nietzsche's Will to Power principle.  He thereby diverges from traditional Marxist analysis, by attributing Capitalist exploitation as for its own sake, not as a means to economic profit.  He also extends the principle in a direction that is generally unconsidered by Nietzsche.  For, he ascribes power over Nature to the species, not to an individual, thereby entertaining the possibility of the former as possessing a Will to Power of its own, which Nietzsche never seems to do.  Similarly, therefore, the Superman can be interpreted as the species with respect to individual humans, and, hence, as equivalent to the Dionysian principle.  Thus, Trotsky shows, wittingly or not, how Socialism can be derived from the Will to Power, or, in other words, that Marxism intersects with Nietzsche's doctrine.

Nature and Second Nature

While the expression 'second nature' has no precise definition, at minimum, it connotes a transcendence of a 'nature' that is not necessarily incorporeal.  Now, in a pivotal passage in the Philosophy of Right, Hegel uses the term to characterize the relation of Will to Mind, i. e. the actualization of the freedom of the latter in the former.  So, Marx is plainly familiar with a concept of a Second Nature, and while he might not accept the implied characterization of incorporeal Mind as 'natural', there would be no such problem in adopting the contrast to Materialism.  So, the transcendence of 'nature' by voluntsry activity, in the German Ideology, and by a "power", in Trotsky's Their Morality and Ours, can be explained as a Second Nature, though the status of Dialectical Materialism in the immanent Dualism remains unclear, i. e. insofar as it precludes the exercise of Free Will, it, too, is transcended by the Second Nature.

Nature, Humans, Power

As has been previously discussed, Trotsky's conjoined goals of Socialism--the promotion of the power of humans over Nature, and the elimination of the power of humans over humans--appear to conflict, insofar as humans are part of Nature.  Now, an alternative interpretation of his formulation is suggested by passages from the German Ideology, in which intra-human exploitation is classified as "natural", and is overcome in a communist society.  On that basis, the power over Nature, expressed in the first clause, consists in the power over intra-human exploitation.  However, that interpretation requires the existence of a super-Natural power, e. g. Kantian Reason, though there is no evidence in any of the cardinal Marxist literature of the kind of systematic Philosophical exposition that would adequately explain the dualistic relation between such a super-Nature and Dialectal Materialism.

Technology, History, Weaponry

While Marxists conceive Technology as integral to the emergence of Socialism, they do not explain how the history of Technology coincides with the history of Economic relations.  Now, the Means of Production is not the only aspect of society that is influenced by Technology.  Communication is, too, i. e. Gutenberg's invention has plainly helped shape society, without any obvious derivation from Economic relations.  But, a perhaps more decisive impact of Technology on the course of human history, beginning with the necessity of its adequacy if a Revolution is to succeed, is weaponry, a topic absent from Marxist analyses of the transition from Capitalism to Socialism.  Especially troublesome to a Marxist theory of History is the apparent defeat of the Soviet Union by the U. S., because of its military inferiority.  But, even granting Communism a more favorable outcome of the Cold War, confirmation of Trotsky's thesis, that technological progress conduces to the ascendance of Socialism, requires a more rigorous, generalizable, derivation of that result, from Einstein's moment of inspiration regarding the relation of Energy and Matter, via its application to the development of nuclear weaponry, in the forefront of which has been the U. S.

Socialism, Nature, Humans

As has been previously discussed, Trotsky, reflecting the essentiality to it of technological development, characterizes Socialism as constituted by both a progressive power of Humans over Nature, and the abolition of the power of humans over humans.  However, he does not recognize the potential contradiction between the two that is made explicit by the introduction of the unarguable proposition that humans are part of Nature.  Furthermore, that all the parts of Nature are systematically related makes difficult a modification of the first clause that would decisively distinguish Human Nature from non-Human Nature.  That difficulty has been repeatedly illustrated by the adverse consequences of technological development on vital environmental features such as air, water, and climate, which are independent of Economic distinctions, as their occurrences in the U. S., Chernobyl, and the atmosphere of China, alike, demonstrates.  Nor, given the role of Technology in the concept of Marxist Socialism, can Trotsky simply jettison that clause.  Instead, the proposition can be respected as instructive--that in a Naturalist concept of Socialism, Economics cannot be isolated from Ecology.

Socialism, Technology, Power

In 'Their Morals and Ours', Trotsky declares that Socialism serves two purposes: 1. "Increasing the power of man over nature"; and 2. "Abolition of the power of man over man".  Now, it is easy to take the latter as the essential clause, since it invokes the fundamental Marxist focus on the elimination of the source of that power--Private Property.  But #1 is the decisive one of the two.  For, it is an allusion to the achievement of the stage of technological development that enables the transcending of exploitation, i. e. because machines can perform the work of the Proletariat, and can produce enough goods to satisfy the needs of all.  At the same time, it therefore jettisons one of the cardinal premises of traditional Marxism--that Socialism is a stage of the Dialectical Historical development of human society.  Rather, according to #1, it is a function of the species' relation outside of itself, to the rest of nature.  Thus, contrary to the title of the piece, Trotsky's use of the word "power" in relation to the rest of nature suggests what Nietzsche calls an "extra-moral" context.

Two Invisible Hands

Marx-Engels do not deny the existence of Smith's Invisible Hand; rather, they interpret it as a manifestation of a General Will in alienation from its origin in the members of a society.  Now, that diagnosis provides evidence for a hitherto unexplored implication of Smith's image.  For, since hands come in pairs, if there is one Invisible Hand, there must be two.  In other words, the metaphor suggests that a society is governed by two principles not one.  So, the condition of alienation is one in which the two are distinguishable.  Accordingly, they can be characterized as a principle of Unity and a principle of Multiplicity, or, equivalently, Form and Matter.  Furthermore, the two can be conceived as interacting dialectically.  But, if so, then one error of Marxist analysis is to not recognize that Class Conflict is not an instance of a primary Dialectic, and that, instead, it is a symptom of a Multiplicity lacking Unity.  Furthermore, since, as the metaphor of two hands entails, the problem is to coordinate them, not to fuse them, the second error of  Marxist analysis is the concept of Synthesis, not coordination, as the resolution of a Dialectical pattern.  Likewise, on the basis of the premise of the existence of two Invisible Hands, insofar as Socialism is the result of a resolution of a Dialectical antagonism, the sublation involved is constituted by a coordination of the two principles, not by the negation of each..

Slave Morality and Capitalism

As has been previously discussed, Nietzsche's fundamental criticism of Marxism is not, as it is often taken to be, of its Egalitarianism per se, but of its concept of the latter as an objective Value.  The misinterpretation has contributed to the assumption, e. g. Rand's, that Nietzsche is, therefore, an advocate of Capitalism.  To the contrary, Human, All Too Human #45, and #33 of the Expeditions of an Untimely Man section of Twilight of the Idols, indicate that the Atomism that Smith promotes is itself an expression of Slave Morality.  Instead, any ascription to Nietzsche of an endorsement of an Economic system requires a methodical derivation from the Will to Power, not cherry-picked agitprop slogans.

Slave Morality and Socialism

Nietzsche is often interpreted as arguing against Marxism on the basis of 'Master Morality': 1. There are those who are naturally strong, and those who are naturally weak; 2. Might is Right; 3. Therefore, the strong have a right to enslave the weak; 4. Therefore, there are Moral grounds for rejecting Marxism.  Now, while that interpretation has textual support, his stronger argument against Marxism is on the basis of 'Slave Morality': 1. Slave Morality expresses the Values of Slaves; 2. According to Slave Morality, Values are objective; 3. The positing of the existence of objective Values is an expression of a desire to submit; 4. Marxism posits the existence of an objective History the goal of which is Socialism; 5. According to Marxism, Socialism is 'good'; 6. Thus, Marxism is an expression of a desire to submit. 7. Thus, Marxism is self-contradictory, because its presumed liberation of Slaves only perpetuates Slave Morality.

Slavery and the Market

It follows from Hume's thesis--Reason is the slave of Passions--that any successful manipulation of a Passion constitutes enslavement.  For example, working out of fear of immediate physical harm, or of irretrievable loss of income, is Slavery.  Furthermore, so, too, is doing so in anticipation of being able to afford a product the desire for which is the result of an effective advertising campaign, especially in the context of the pervasive acceptance of the marketing of a concept of 'freedom' as the having a choice between alternative products.  In other words, Slavery is business-as-usual in Capitalism, an unsurprising reflection of Smith's adherence to Hume's behavioral model.  Indeed, his only break with the latter is his positing of an impersonal Invisible Hand as the ultimate adjudicator of market activity, which is tantamount to a positing of a concept of Reason as potentially liberated from the Passions, as Kant well realizes.

Dialectic, Dialogue, Slavery

The literal meaning of 'contradict' is 'speak against', a reminder that Dialectic, of which Contradiction is a decisive moment, originates as the species of verbal communication associated with Socrates, i. e. as Dialogue.  Likewise, Synthesis, as the resolution of a Contradiction, expresses the fundamental function of Communication as an integrative factor among the members of the species.  Now, Kant's representation of Dialectic, entailing conflicting propositions, reflects that root, from which Hegel's definition of Contradiction as mere 'opposition', the terms of which are any mental elements, is, therefore, a double abstraction.  Thus, Marx's Materialist counterpart, in which Contradiction is any social antagonism, retains one of those abstractions.  In other words, he misses that Materialist Dialectic is fundamentally Dialogue.  Now, if Slavery were, as Hegel depicts it, constituted by such properly Dialectical processes, a Thesis uttered by the Master would be met by an Antithesis uttered by the Slave.  So, since the latter would likely result in physical punishment, in that context, Dialectic falls apart.  Thus, the proper Dialectical Materialist response to Hegel's passage is that it distorts the Dialectical relation that obtains between Master and Slave.

Slavery, Dependence, Dialectic

In the section of the Phenomenology commonly characterized as the "Master-Slave Dialectic", Hegel conceives Slavery as essentially Dependence.  However, his attempt to classify it as a moment in a Dialectically determined Spiritual development gets complicated, because the transition to the next stage, i. e. the self-liberation from the Master of the Slave, necessarily involves Matter, upon which the Slave works.  With that concrete detail incorporated, the representation of the transition that emerges less abstractly resembles that of an employee's becoming self-employed.  But, implicit in that portrayal is that of the Master as a benefactor of someone who is weaker because dependent.  It is thus easy to conceive Marx as judging the suppression, by that portrayal, of the force entailed in Slavery as Bourgeois apologism, therby inspiring a Materialist alternative, updated with a class of Slaves, i. e. the Proletariat, and with an industrial Means of Production mediating the relation between the two parties.  So, with that genealogy, the relevance of Dialectic Materialism, even if flawed, to the exposition of Socialism, seems less contrived than if Marx is interpreted as adopting it for some less specific reason.