Saturday, November 30, 2013

Description and Indexical

Any description is necessarily subsequent to its object, as is implied in the term 're-present'.  Thus, what is commonly formulated as 'S is P' is, more accurately, "It was the case that 'S is P'", or, simply, 'S was P'.  Now, Verb Tense is classified in contemporary Logicist Philosophy of  Language as an 'Indexical', i. e. as an indication of an orientation from the perspective of a speaker.  Hence, in all presumed 'impersonal' descriptive Logicist Propositions, e. g. the 'Language' that 'pictures' the 'world' in the Tractatus, their origin in interpersonal Communication is suppressed.

Friday, November 29, 2013

Proposition, Impersonal, Third-Person

Respect for Subject-Verb agreement in the standard Propositional formulation, i. e. 'S is P', not 'S am P', implies acceptance of the classification of its Subject as a grammatical 'Third Person'.  But Thirdness implies priority of Firstness and Secondness.  Thus, likewise, any grammatical Third-Person Subject implies the priority of an 'I' and a 'You' to it.  It therefore indicates that a presumed 'impersonal' Proposition, e. g. that of Logicism, is the product of an abstraction of a Third-Person formulation from the context of First- and Second-Person interaction, i. e. from Communication.

Wednesday, November 27, 2013

Reliability and Truth

A 'true' friend is a 'reliable' friend.  Likewise, a 'true' utterance can easily be defined as one which reliably serves to accomplice a purpose.  In contrast, the latter meaning is difficult to derive from the Logicist meaning of 'true'.  But, the bigger problem for that orientation is the formulation of any definition of 'true'.  For, the primary aim of Logicism is to distinguish appropriate concatenations of symbols from inappropriate ones, i. e. to define 'Validity', with respect to which not only the determination of the correct application of that criterion, but the very concept of the application of it, is extrinsic.  In other words, a concept of Truth can be derived from that of Reliability, but not conversely.  That conclusion likely aggravates Logicists, but it is a consequence of the insularity of their own program.

Tuesday, November 26, 2013

Language-Games and Truth

The Logicist concept of Language, i. e. that of Russell and of the Tractatus, is more than a rival  to his Pluralism, which Wittgenstein suggests in #23 of the Investigations--it is one among a multiplicity of Language-Games.  That Game can be called 'Determining the Truth-Value of Utterances', by, first, representing any utterance as a bivalent Proposition, as he proposes in #36, and then submitting it to a procedure which determines whether or not it preserves the Truth of antecedent propositions, i. e. to a Proof.  So, his demonstrating that Truth is irrelevant to many Language-Games suffices to challenge the status, accorded by Logicists, of Logic with respect to Language, e. g. that Logic is the 'essence' of Language.  Still, that challenge is weaker than the one that has been advanced here, which begins with the classification of an Utterance as a Consent-seeking Proposal, on the basis of which the Logicist concept of Truth is derivative, not merely irrelevant.  Wittgenstein's characterizations of Language as a 'tool' to be 'used', suggest a similar subordination of that concept, but one that seemingly remains underdeveloped.

Monday, November 25, 2013

Utterance, Context, Meaning

In #23 of the Investigations, Wittgenstein names as one of those advocates of the concept of Language that he opposes--"the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philsophicus".  Now, the only uncertainty about the referent of that phrase is if it is a person living in 1922, or one living in 1945.  However, the Fregean Sense of it varies according to context, with the utterer of it a significant factor in its meaning.  For, while, from a publisher, it could connote simply a relation between a person and a book, in #23, it understates "I have come to repudiate a thesis which I once espoused', to which some readers might affix "thereby profoundly influencing contemporary Philosophy".  So, #23 is an example of how every utterance might constitute its own Language-Game, i. e. have a meaning that is unique to the context.

Sunday, November 24, 2013

Language-Games and "Language-Game"

By Wittgenstein's own definition of it, the meaning of the term 'Language-Game' varies according to the Language-Game in which it appears.  For example, in the Language-Game 'Refuting Russell', it is defined as a relation between words and actions.  However, in the Language-Game' The Origin of Language', it can be defined as a relation between people and words.  To put it less obliquely--it is a familiar fact of experience that the meaning of words can be a function of the degree of intimacy of those conversing, with the possibility that every new interaction constitutes a unique Language-Game.  On that basis, Wittgenstein's concept of Language depersonalizes Communication as much as does Russell's, regardless of how effectively it debunks the privileged status of Logic entailed by the latter.

Saturday, November 23, 2013

Language-Game, Signal, Rule

In #7 of  Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein defines a 'Language-Game' as a process constituted by "language and the actions into which it is woven", his primitive example of which is "one party calls out the words, the other acts on them".  Thus, the fundamental structure of a Language-Game is, as has been proposed here, that of Signal-Response.  However, thereafter, he seems to gloss that interweaving of Language and Action as the "use" of Language,  consequently apparently losing sight of that underlying structure,  e. g. as he begins, at #143, his examination of the Game that is often characterized as 'Following a Rule'.  As a result, he seems to miss the isomorphic relation between 1. fetching an object upon hearing the name of the object, and 2. writing out an infinite numerical series as an application of a mathematical formula--while he does classify the latter as a 'use' of Language, he fails to recognize that the former is as much a rule-governed activity as is the latter.  In other words, any Signal is implicitly a rule, and any Response is Rule-governed behavior, i. e. the section beginning at #143 is not an examination of a specialized Language-Game, but a making explicit what is implicit in all such contexts.

Friday, November 22, 2013

Communication and Commonality

Common in any Communication are that a phenomenon is recognized as functioning as Signal, and the meaning of the Signal.  Hence, Commonality in Communication is a function of those involved. For example, a thumbs-up or a green light may be more common than the word "Go!", or the word "Allez!", i. e. they are signals the meanings of which are more widely accepted than those of those two words.  Furthermore, in some ideologies, any Art functions as a provocation to Action, while in others, it provides passive entertainment.  Plus, apparently escaping even Nietzsche's notice is that while the opening notes of the Dithyrambic chorus might be a signal to Dionysian celebrants to begin an ecstatic dance, such a response to one of Wagner's pieces would likely get one escorted out of a concert venue.  So, in contrasr with either Nietzsche's implication, in #810 of the Will to Power collection, that Words are more "common" than Music, or its contrary, Commonality is not an inherent property of one medium as opposed to another.  Rather, it is established only by those involved in Communication. 

Thursday, November 21, 2013

Music, Words, Commonality

In #810 of the Will to Power collection, Nietzsche asserts that "Compared with music all communication by words is shameless . . . words depersonalize, words make the uncommon common".  Now, it is unclear how this formulation applies to the relation between Finnegan's Wake and catchy pop jingles, but, regardless, it seems inconsistent with his earlier rhapsodizing, in section 2 of Birth of Tragedy, over the democratizing capacity of Dionysian music.  Nor can the later passage be easily interpreted as a mature supplanting of youthful naivete.  For, in the contemporaneous #809, his "The aesthetic state possesses a superabundance of means of communication . . . it constitutes the high point of communication and transmission between living creatures--it is the source of language", echoes his analysis, from that section of BT, that the Dithyrambic chorus inspires the "collective release of all the symbolic powers."  Furthermore, if it is that 'superabundant' condition that is what he, with more justification, is trying to indicate as being 'uncommon', he still misses that the function of that state is the production of Language, and, hence, of Commonality.  So, in the absence of a better elucidation, #810 is one of those passages in his oeuvre the provocativeness of which is merely superficial.

Wednesday, November 20, 2013

Art, Communication, Mediation

By definition, Communication entails Mediation, i. e. expression and reception do not coincide, even the voice and hearing of one and the same person.  So, when Dewey characterizes some Communication, i. e. Art, as "unhindered", he can only mean 'least mediated'.  Now, among the factors that complicate Mediation are personal, cultural, and historical.  Thus, for example, the appreciation of most of Picasso's works is conditioned by familiarity with non-representational Painting.  Likewise, the impact of Hamlet on the contemporaries of Shakespeare may be beyond the grasp of some 21st-Century scholars--a problem that is analogous to that which is the basis of Nietzsche's effort to recover the original cultural function of Tragedy.  In contrast, probably the least contingent Language is Mathematics, from which it follows that the least mediated Art is the most Mathematical--Music.  Still, as is evinced by the greater general acceptance of Dissonance in the century after Wagner's innovations, Tonality can also be a variable in the communicability of Music.  But, Rhythm, apparently, less so, i. e. Dance Music is the least hindered Art, and, thus, is the paradigm of Communicability.

Tuesday, November 19, 2013

Art and Communication

While Kant conceives Communication as tangentially related to Art, i. e. integral to the judgment of it, Nietzsche and Dewey each suggests a more intimate connection.  For, in "compared with music all communication by words is shameless", from #810 of the Will to Power collection, and in "works of art are the only media of complete and unhindered communication", from the end of ch. V of Art as Experience, Art is conceived as a species of Communication.  However, further development of that classification is complicated by two shortcomings.  First, though just prior to that passage, Nietzsche also observes that "one never communicates thoughts: one communicates movements" (#809), he, in that context, does not explicitly recognize such "movements" as Dancing, as he does in section 2 of birth of Tragedy.  Likewise, Dewey's denial of the assertion, in the preceding paragraph, that "communication to others is the intent of an artist", is certainly false in the case of a Dance Band.  Second, neither of the two seems to subscribe to the thesis that has been proposed here--that verbal communication is essentially a signal seeking a responsive action.  In contrast, accepting the latter concept, in combination with the overlooked example, Art, specifically Music, can be appreciated as not merely a species of Communication, but as its exemplar.

Monday, November 18, 2013

The Semantics of Fiction

With his focus on some purportedly 'paradoxical' speeches in Carroll's writings, Deleuze overlooks a more fundamental problem for Semantic theory--the Meaning of Fiction.  Now, a Meinongian theory seems well-suited to such cases--according to it, Carroll's 'Alice' means some non-existent but 'absistent' entity, as does 'Hamlet' and the 'round square'.  However, 'Hamlet' is more than an inhabitant of that realm--the name denotes a physical entity that frequently appears on a theater stage, just as 'Alice' now sometimes denotes a physical entity in cinematic and television productions.  So, as is clearer in the case of a playwright or screenwriter, words of 'Fiction' are, at bottom, instructions for performance, and, hence, are, like any other utterance, signals for possible enactment.  On that basis, the process of reading a novel is one of nascent staging.  So, while it is not impossible that 'Godot' could, in a sequel or a prequel, say, join 'Hamlet' and 'Alice' in becoming physically embodied, the 'round square' remains nothing more than an internally incoherent signal, i. e. 'draw a two-dimensional figure that is both round and square'.

Sunday, November 17, 2013

Nonsense, Falsity, Parody

An increase of the distance between X and Y can be sufficiently effected in any one of three ways: 1. X moving away from a stationary Y; 2. Y moving away from a stationary X; or, 3. X and Y each moving away from an initial point of coincidence.  Now, Parmenides, as Plato represents him, constructs an apparent 'paradox of motion' by analyzing 'P is aging' as #3, with 'P' as both 'X' and 'Y'.  Deleuze likewise analyzes "Alice becomes larger" as #3, with Alice as both 'X' and 'Y', from which he concludes that the proposition is nonsensical.  But, each of those representations is simply false--for #1 is the only correct interpretation in each case.  So, granting Deleuze the ontological thesis that Meaning is an 'Event', he still fails to also show that it is therefore essentially nonsensical, i. e. that its structure is necessarily represented as #3, in which case Alice's adventures are a playful dramatization of ambiguous Language, not an ontological excursion, i. e. Parody, not Paradox.

Saturday, November 16, 2013

Nonsense and Equivocation

Upon closer examination, the example that serves Deleuze, in the Logic of Sense, as his prototype of 'nonsensical' language is, in fact, merely equivocal.  That example is from the Parmenides, not from Lewis Carroll, so a serious analysis of it is not inappropriate.  There, according to Plato's 'Parmenides', and likely historically accurate, someone can simultaneously become older and younger, because, while one is aging, the one that one was is becoming less old than the one that one now is, a scenario that Deleuze believes Carroll represents analogously in the case of Alice growing simultaneously larger and smaller.  However, Parmenides' exposition is merely equivocal--the older 'self' and the younger 'self' are distinct entities, as the applicability of the underlying symmetrical principle 'A > B = B < A' entails.  So, regardless of Carroll's intentions while playing with ambiguity, Delueuze's primary ambition--to demonstrate that Nonsense is an inherent positive property of Language, i. e. is not merely an original lack--fails.  Nor does invoking Meinong here, as he occasionally does elsewhere in the book, salvage the project, for, to argue that some Lekta, e. g. that of 'X is becoming both older and younger', are contradictory, does not suffice to prove that all Lekta are so, and, hence that all Language is fundamentally nonsensical.

Friday, November 15, 2013

Lekton, Meaning, Nonsense

In Logic of Sense, Deleuze argues that the ancient Stoic 'Lekton'--rendered in the English translation of this work as 'Sense', not to be confused with the Fregean term--is the substratum of all varieties of  'meaning' presented by rival theories, including Frege's.  Furthermore, by showing how Lekta function in the writings of Lewis Carroll, he concludes that Meaning originates in Nonsense, thereby subverting the rationalistic ambitions of those rivals.  However, he does not examine the process by which a Neologism only gradually acquires Meaning through repeated usage, e. g. 'copacetic', or, more tellingly, his own idiosyncratic stipulations.  So, he does not consider that the 'nonsensicality' that he attributes as a positive property of a Lekton, derives from the inherent meaningless of a mere sequence of sounds or script.  So, perhaps a headless grin is an apt Carrollian image of the concept of 'Meaning in-itself'.

Thursday, November 14, 2013

The Liar Paradox

The so-called 'Liar Paradox' neither involves Lying nor is a Paradox.  Rather, its object is a nonsensical utterance that is the product of a faulty construction.  According to the standard account of it, it is the problem that the proposition "This sentence is false",, in violation of the principle that every well-formed Proposition has a unique truth-value, is either both true and false, or neither true nor false, depending on the formulation of the problem.  However, as has been previously argued here, a 'Lie' is an utterance that is a deliberate attempt to take advantage of an addressee, whereas it is difficult to conceive how anybody could be harmed by believing that that proposition is 'true'.  Furthermore, it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which the utterance of it is not anomalous.  In other words, the uncertain status of its truth-value is not paradoxical, but a symptom that it is mere Nonsense.  Now, that diagnosis can lead to the further analysis that the construction is, contrary to what is seemingly generally taken for granted, not well-formed, on the grounds that any use of 'this' presupposes the pre-existence of its referent, an impossibility in the case of self-reference.  However, insofar as the treatment of the problem abstracts the meaning of any Proposition from Purpose, as Russell and his followers do, it lacks an adequate definition of 'Lying', and, hence, lacks the capacity to distinguish Lying from Nonsense, thereby getting trapped in a True-False problematic, as most of the recent prominent literature on the topic seems to be.

Wednesday, November 13, 2013

Meaning, Stipulation, Neologism

Practitioners of contemporary Philosophy of Logic Semantics tend to characterize 'Meaning', e. g. 'Sense' or 'Reference', as a  property a-temporally possessed by a linguistic unit, possibly on the model of some concept of Mathematical terms.  However, if they were to examine a procedure with which most of them are likely familiar, one which is the origin of Frege's categories themselves, they might reconsider that characterization.  That procedure is Stipulation, i. e. that by which they themselves produce many definitions, e. g. that by which Frege first fixes his uses of 'Sense' and 'Reference'.  Now, a Stipulation confers Meaning on a term by formulating conditions for its proper use.  In other words, a Stipulative Definition is a Proposal, the efficacy of which is dependent on a continued accepting response to it.  Furthermore, Naming, which some distinguish from Defining, is likewise stipulative, i. e. the 'necessity' that some attribute to a Name is contingent on the Name gaining consensual adoption following its introduction.  So, if these theorists were to examine their own operations, they might discover how contrived their resultant theories are.  In other words, an examination of a construction of a Meta-language reveals that the underlying structure of Language is neither that of Proposition Logic nor of Modal Logic, but, is, rather, Neologistic.

Tuesday, November 12, 2013

Signal and Truth

A green light is neither 'true' nor 'false'; rather, it is either appropriately used, or not, according to commonly-accepted practice.  Likewise, 'P is true', for proposition 'P', means 'the sequence of symbols that constitute it is used appropriately, according to commonly-accepted practice'.  Mathematical propositions are no exception: 'A + B = C' formulates the interchangeability of the symbols 'A', 'B', and 'C'.  Kant's thesis that Mathematical propositions are 'synthetic' verges on that Semiological thesis, and Principia Mathematica is, at bottom, a program for the construction of a system of symbols.  Formal Logic implicitly recognizes that Truth is not an intra-symbolic relation when it distinguishes Vocabulary and Syntax from Semantics, and Validity from Soundness.  So, Leibniz' axiom 'A = A' vs. Hegel's 'A = not-A' is a Semiological, not an Epistemological or a Metaphysical, disagreement.  Of course, these words are no exception to the analysis.

Monday, November 11, 2013

The Noble Lie and the Naked Emperor.

In Plato's discussion of the 'Noble Lie', the falsehood is known to only the Liar.  Part of Nietzsche's historical significance is theat he, perhaps uniquely, tackles the problem of the exposure of the Noble Lie.  What he wrestles with in his mature period is the profound corrosiveness of the discovery that the 'Emperor is naked', i. e. the discovery that 'God is dead' undermines the institution of any substitute Noble Lie, and, therefore, threatens to undermine any basis for future civilization.  In other words, that exposure initiates an era of what he calls 'Nihilism', which he can combat only ironically, given that his own words--the teachings of Zarathustra, the Will to Power, evaluations, the  formulation of 'Atheism', and even the thesis that civilization needs no myth--are as suspect as the expired ideology.  So, the development of that Nihilism exemplifies what has here been characterized as the process in which Lying undermines Communication, and which Kant glosses as the contradictoriness of False Promising.

Sunday, November 10, 2013

The Value of Lying

Perhaps when defined as 'deliberately uttering a falsehood for the purpose of taking advantage', Lying can easily be classified as 'Evil'.  However, even with that specification, Plato and Nietzsche might still disagree with the valuation, e. g. in cases in which they justify a Lie as for some greater good, i. e. that of the state, or that of a superior being, respectively.  Still, neither of those judgments recognizes the characteristic of Lying that is the source of its potential positive value.  For, the very possibility of Lying is derived from the essential conventionality of any 'Language', i. e. any system of commonly-accepted signals, an origin that gets obscured in dogmatic rhetoric that oppresses or mystifies.  In other words, Lying is a reminder that the value of any utterance is, like that of any tool, a function of that of the purpose to which it is put.

Saturday, November 9, 2013

Lying and Philosophy

The previously proposed characterization of Lying as 'sending mixed signals', presupposes, like Kant's example of False Promising, the discovery of the falsehood.  In any case, Kant's silence, in the course of that presentation, on the topic of Lying, of which False Promising is a special case, is a reminder that there has been no systematic Philosophical attention to the topic since Plato.  Now, the treatment of it in The Republic can characterized as 'sending mixed signals'.  For, on the one hand, he asserts, at 3.389b, that "the rulers of the city may . . . lie . . . for the benefit of the state", which, according to 3.414b, is a "noble lie".  However, on the other, in his later discussion of Philosophy, which he esteems as the "noblest pursuit" (6.489a), the Philosopher is one who will "hate" (6.490a) Lying.  Furthermore, in neither discussion is there attention to the variable of a lie being discovered, in sharp contrast to his Ring of Gyges example of  2.359d.  So, in the closest approximation to a systematic examination of the topic, there is no definitive moral judgment of Lying, let alone any univocal definition of it.  

Friday, November 8, 2013

Communication, Lying, Immorality

As has been previously discussed, an internally inconsistent signal can be self-defeating, since a response to it is difficult, if not impossible.  In some cases, the inconsistency is not immediate, but reflects prior irregular usage of the signal.  And, in some of those cases, the irregularity is deliberate--Lying.  So, Lying not only deceives an addressee, and  potentially backfires on the Liar, i. e. damages their credibility, but is, further, an abuse of Communication.  Now, insofar as Communication functions as the basis of social cohesion, such abuse can be classified as 'immoral'.  So, it is the immorality of self-defeating communication that Kant attempts, arguably awkwardly, to formalize as the 'contradictoriness' of False Promising.

Thursday, November 7, 2013

Negation, Contradiction, Miixed Signals

As has been previously discussed, the fundamental dialogical Negation is a refusal to respond to a request, with respect to which a refusal to consent to a request is derivative.  Similarly derivative is a refusal of a proposal to subscribe to some belief, i. e. a disagreement.  Now, a disagreement is literally a 'contradiction', and, that in a disagreement, either one of the parties may be wrong, or there is a third belief that entails both beliefs, corresponds to the Analytical Logic and Dialectical Logic, respectively, representations of it.  In contrast with both representations, there is what is commonly described as 'sending mixed signals', an attempted communication that includes both a request that some action be preformed, and a request that some action be not performed.  In other words, such a signal can be classified as 'self-contradictory'.  But, more fundamental than that 'logical' problem is that the signal cannot be responded to, i. e. it is a self-defeating communication, a condition that neither formalization adequately accommodates.

Wednesday, November 6, 2013

Dialogue and Dialectical Logic

An utterance requests a response from an addressee.  So, even a refusal to execute what is proposed in the utterance constitutes a consent to respond, in contrast with the refusal expressed in ignoring the utterance.  Likewise, in more refined contexts, a contradiction of an assertion is a negation of it that is distinct from the negation expressed by silence.  Hence, 'Dialectical Logic', with its Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis structure, does not adequately represent the pattern of ordinary dialogical communication.

Tuesday, November 5, 2013

Consent, Refusal, Freedom

The two basic responses to a Request are Consent and Refusal, each of which is independent of the Request.  Now, the negativity entailed in a Refusal is immediately with respect to corresponding Consent.  Thus, the example illustrates the flaw in Sartre's thesis that Freedom is essentially Negation.  For example, he infers from the fact that the Consciousness of X is not X, that the Consciousness of X is equivalent to the Negation of X.  But, the example suggests his inference suppresses the positive content of the Consciousness of X, i. e. a representation of X, resulting in the infinite hall of negative mirrors with which he struggles in his analysis of Reflection.  Instead, the more modest characterization of Consent and Refusal as each 'free' because 'different' from Request, avoids that futile labyrinth.

Monday, November 4, 2013

Subscriptivism

To 'subscribe' means literally to 'underwrite', and while those two terms are most commonly used in specialized contexts, i. e. when purchasing periodicals, or insurance, the essence of the former term is better illustrated in the legal standing of the signature, i. e. a piece of writing typically found on the lower part of a page.  For, a signature is accepted as an expression of free assent, and, concomitantly, as an assumption of responsibility.  Now, as has been previously discussed, if Kant's Categorical Imperative is a Prescription, then the free adoption of it, i. e. his 'willkur', is a Subscription to it.  Accordingly, it might be at least as accurate to classify his doctrine as 'Subscriptivist', than as 'Prescriptivist', as is more common.  Similarly, some of the subsequent 'Existentialist' tradition, because of decisive moments such as Nietzsche's 'affirmation', can also be characterized as 'Subscriptivist'.  In these doctrines, as is the case in Kant's, such moments are decisive because of their causal efficacy, in contrast with a mere Prescription, which, as occurs in ordinary pharmaceutical contexts, does not suffice to activate its wording, i. e. also required is a doctor's signature.  So, 'Subscriptivism' is one characterization of an influential contemporary Moral doctrine, and, perhaps, of any in which free assent is an essential element.

Sunday, November 3, 2013

Description, Prescription, Subscription

Corresponding to the Signal-Sign and Proposal-Proposition distinctions is that between Prescription and Description.  Furthermore, while a description can be characterized as 'informative', a prescription can be, more accurately, 'instructive', e. g. recipes, directions, etc. as well as how frequently to take some medication.  So, perhaps a more precise classification of the Kantian 'Imperative' is 'Prescription', because the Laws and Maxims of his doctrine do not merely indicate something to be done, but, further, how it is to be executed, i. e. by following the formulation of a causal relation, in the case of a Hypothetical Imperative, or by applying a test to the latter, as in the case of the Categorical Imperative.  Thus, with justification, his doctrine has often been categorized as 'Prescriptivism'.  However, as is the case with pharmaceutical prescriptions, even a Categorical Imperative is only an inert sequence of words unless it is freely adopted.  In other words, to be efficacious, Kant's Prescription additionally requires a Subscription to it.

Saturday, November 2, 2013

Reason, Morality, Internal Dialogue

By introducing verbal formulations--Laws and Maxims--into his Moral doctrine as active elements, Kant converts the Aristotelian struggle between the rational and irrational parts of the soul into an internal dialogue.  But, as has been previously analyzed here, any response to an utterance originates in an irreducible voluntary moment. So, it is that dialogical moment that Kant discovers as the 'freedom' to disobey the Rational Law, thereby undermining any thesis that Reason is a necessary condition of any Freedom.  Nietzsche, perhaps unwittingly, inherits that problem, when he interprets a relation of stronger-weaker as one of command-obey, leaving him without an adequate analysis of Obedience in such contexts, as has been previously discussed here.  So, Kant's innovation only complicates what Aristotle never adequately explains--why the irrational part of the soul submits to the rational part.

Friday, November 1, 2013

The Logic of 'Ought'

The two most prominent types of formalized Logic are Proposition and Quantification--the fundamental inference rule of the former is Modus Ponens, while that of that latter is Universal Instantiation.  Thus, Proposition Logic constitutes the inner structure of the consequentialist reasoning that fuels many attempts to persuade in concrete communication, i. e. that reasoning concatenates the propositions that link an entertained action to subsequent beneficial or harmful effects.  Now, insofar as it veils a threat, "You ought to do X", is a species of consequentialist reasoning, and, hence, is based on Modus Ponens.  However, Kant's insight is that in at least some cases, the 'ought' represents Universal Instantiation, i. e. entailing the concept of an individual agent as an instance of a Rational being.  Thus, contemporary Deontic Logic, derived from Modal Logic, often used to represent Kantian Pure Practical Reason, crucially distorts it.  For, Modal Logic is a species of Quantification Logic, ranging over 'Worlds', e. g. 'Necessarily P' = 'At all possible worlds, P'.  But, despite the semantic kinship of 'necessity' and 'ought', quantification in Kant's doctrine ranges essentially over agents, not over worlds.  So, whatever value Deontic Logic might have for its practitioners, it abstracts crucially from Kant's innovation.