Genealogy of the Moralist

Nietzsche's use of the term 'genealogy' to characterize the development of Morality is anticipated by his assertion, in #45 of Human, All Too Human, that in the earliest Master 'castes', it is considered that "goodness is inherited".  Now, it is possible that he regards himself as the heir to the philosopher-king line, i. e. with Schopenhauer as his 'father', and, similarly, that his future values-creators are his descendant 'progenitors'.  But such imagery only borrows from concrete inter-generational transmission, and, perhaps, overextends it.  For, instead, by his own analysis, in Beyond Good and Evil #212, for example, the emergence of a new philosopher is as a product of the "bad conscience" of the time.  So, the 'genealogy of the Moralist' is not only not to be confused with the 'genealogy of Morals, but 'genealogy' is an inappropriate characterization of the former process.

Will, Volition, The Future

The English language includes the peculiarity that 'will' both connotes Volition, and functions as verb tense auxiliary.  So, in the former case, i. e. in which one initiates an attempt to effect X,  the 'future' is conceived as the provisional product of one's own efforts, while, in the latter, i. e. in 'It will be the case that X', it is conceived as inevitably befalling one.  Now, this distinction--active/uncertainty vs. passive/certainty--suggests a 'Master' vs. 'Slave' contrast that seems implicit in many of the passages of Beyond Good and Evil.  Thus, embedded in one of the most common linguistic formations is a Moral prejudice.

Value-Creation and Social Engineering

A society is shaped by its values.  Thus, Nietzsche's value-creators are creators of societies.  Now, such creativity is, according to Beyond Good and Evil #212, informed by the concept of a "new greatness in man", with 'greatness' constituted by "wholeness in manifoldness".  Thus, the creativity aims at the construction of a "more comprehensive" (#257) society.  However, these value-creators are also experimenters, so the success of their projects is never guaranteed in advance.  Thus, Nietzsche's concept of History, at least as expressed in these passages, contrasts, on the one hand, with various Determinisms--Mechanical, Teleological, Dialectical--and, on the other, with randomly successive Oligarchisms.  Instead, it anticipates the Progressivism of Dewey, a doctrine more recently often characterized by some opponents as 'social engineering'.

Philosophy and The Future

In some passages of Beyond Good and Evil, the phrase 'philosophy of the future' seems to mean 'philosophy at some later date'.  In contrast, in #212, Nietzsche's characterization of the philosopher as "being, of necessity, a man of tomorrow", is instead suggesting that the 'future' is an essential dimension of philosophical activity, and, hence, is 'of' the latter, rather than the converse.  More precisely, as creators, these "furtherers of men", who "know of a new greatness of men", are not merely inhabitants of some future, they are its makers.

Future Values

Nietzsche's characterizations of 'philosophers of the future' as 'value-creators' and as 'experimenters' seems indeterminate in two respects.  First, he does not specify what those values might be, presumably because they would be the choices of individual creators.  Second, he does not address whether or not those creators would instantiate their choices.  Thus, he does not seem to consider that, simply by virtue of their efforts, regardless of the formulations that they produce, they might exemplify a departure from traditional values.  For, among the highest values of that tradition is Certainty, while, as has been previously discussed, Creativity and Experimentation involve Uncertainty equally.  So, whether or not he intends it, his projections of the 'philosophy of the future' are potentially more determinate than they seem, and, perhaps, are sufficiently so. 

Will to Power, Certainty, and Uncertainty

Experimentation combines controls and unknowns.  Music improvisation combines structure and novelty.  Games combine rules and choices.  So, each example involves both a Will to Certainty and a Will to Uncertainty.  They, thus, illustrate that the Will to Power, in general, can be conceived as incorporating both drives, in varying proportions, ranging from an emphasis on Certainty, e. g. tyranny, to one on Uncertainty, e. g. escape.

Power and Uncertainty

In #10 of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche diagnoses that underlying an apparent Will to Uncertainty, e. g. Skepticism, may be a deeper Will to Certainty, e. g. Dogmatism.  Still, he expresses admiration for the initial instinct of its advocates "to get away.  A little more strength, flight, courage, and artistic power, and they would rise--not return", imagery that corresponds to other passages in which he illustrates the Will to Power as 'defying Gravity'.  Likewise, it anticipates the Value-creators and Experimenters who he later in the book introduces as 'philosophers of the future'.  So, plainly, he here conceives the Will to Power as a Will to Uncertainty, involving an adventurousness that seems difficult to reconcile with the earthbound domination, self- or other-directed, that he elsewhere derives from it.

Power and Certainty

Nietzsche's characterization, in Beyond Good and Evil #10, of "nihilism" as consisting in a preference of "a certain nothing to an uncertain something", seems to anticipate his formulation, at the end of Genealogy of Morals, of Asceticism as that "man would rather will nothingness than not will". Perhaps he would explain the implied correspondence between Certainty and Power as expressing that the Will to Certainty is a special case of the Will to Power.  But, if so, then he would also need to explain his apparent advocacy, suggested in BGE #1, of the Will to Uncertainty, which he assimilates there to the Will to Falsehood.  Now, one possible explanation of that latter that is inadequate in that regard is the proposition that Uncertainty is a means to Certainty, since the theme of #1 is the elevation of Uncertainty and Falsehood over Certainty and Truth.  Furthermore, the value of Uncertainty is plain in the event of boredom or stagnation, examples that suggest that the relative value of Certainty and Uncertainty is not constant.  So, if the value of Power is constant, there is no correspondence between Power and Certainty, which poses to Nietzsche the challenge of deriving both a Will to Certainty and a Will to Uncertainty from the Will to Power.

Technical Reason, Experimental Reason, Fallibility

Just as Know-How is preceded by Learning-How, Experimental Reason, i. e. a process of deliberate trial-and-error, is implicated in Technical Reason.  Thus, insofar as Technical Reason is the source of the evaluation of human, all too human things, Experimental Reason is involved in it, as well.  But if passages such as #42 and #210 of Beyond Good and Evil, in which Nietzsche characterizes the 'philosophers of the future' as 'experimenters', are any indication, then Experimental Reason is the essence of that evaluation, thereby suggesting the concept of an historical scenario that is better developed by Dewey via Peirce than by him.  In that scenario, 'human, all too human' means 'fallible', which is conceived by traditional doctrines as a weakness, the correction of which they provide, e. g. the word of a deity, the knowledge of Forms, etc.  In contrast, Nietzsche's doctrine affirms Fallibility , and, instead, codifies it.  But, if so, then the interpretation of the Will to Power as a program of Domination, exemplified by the control freaks that he often praises, conceives it as no more than a surrogate for the traditional doctrines of Certainty that it presumes to overturn, thereby grouping it with them as a 'philosophy of the past'.  In that case, the 'philosophy of the future' is also beyond the Will to Power.

Technical Reason and the Measure of Human, All Too Human Things

Evaluation is always in terms of some criterion.  Thus, decisive to any process of Measurement is the selection of a Measure.  Now, Nietzsche's evaluative criterion, Power, surpasses those of Kant and Utilitarianism, Consistency and Pleasure, respectively, because it is derived from the act of Evaluation itself, which he analyzes is an exercise of the Will to Power.  But, his product betrays the process that produces it.  For, what distinguishes his process of selection from those of his rivals is that it is methodical.  Thus, the product that better expresses that process is not mere Power, but Methodical Power, i. e. Know-How.  But Know-How is the exercise of Technical Reason.  In other words, in Nietzsche's doctrine, Technical Reason is the source of the measure of human, all too human things, as well as its measurer, and its highest value.

Evaluation and Technical Reason

While Platonism holds that the Circle has a supernatural origin, it has difficulty explaining the derivation of the concept of Wheel from that source.  Likewise, Know-How seems independent of Pure Reason--of both the Theoretical and the Practical varieties.  Thus, the evaluation of Artifactuality, i. e. the world of what humans make, has an exclusively human, all too human source--Technical Reason, i. e. is opaque to any supernatural forces.  So, it may not be until his late, and brief, consideration of Architecture, in Twilight of the Idols, that Nietzsche entertains a clear exemplar of the scope of his theory of Evaluation. 

The Measurement of Human, All Too Human Things

Kant's response to Protagoras focuses primarily not on the measuring, but on the measured--his innovative thesis restricts the range of what is measurable by humans to phenomena.  In other words, his alternative dictum can be expressed as 'Man is the measure of only some things.'  However, he does not propose more strongly that 'Man is the only measure of phenomena', since he allows that they may be conditioned by noumena.  Likewise, Nietzsche, for the most part, allows that the measure of human, all too human things may be Dionysus or an Overman.  The one notable exception for him is Architecture, which he considers too late in his career for it to be a touchstone to a doctrine that can be more decisively formulated as 'Man is the only measurer of human, all to human things.

Evaluation, Measurement, Relativism, Subjectivism

'Relativism', according to which the locus of a value is an individual, is not to be confused with 'Subjectivism', according to which the individual is the only one qualified to determine its values, i. e. the former denies that one necessarily is the best judge of what is good for oneself.  Now, the grammatical subject of 'Man is the measure of all things', is not an individual man, so Protagoras' dictum is not easily classifiable as either 'Relativist' or 'Subjectivist'.  Instead, it expresses the thesis that values are indigenous to the human race, i. e. they have no independent existence--cosmological, ontological, metaphysical, supernatural, etc.  So, Nietzsche can be interpreted as continuing the Protagorean tradition, by providing the act of measurement with a ground, i. e. the Will to Power, which is the source of the criteria of evaluations.  In its implementation, the Will to Power is Relativist, but not Subjectivist, i. e. what is 'good' for a strong person is not necessarily what is 'good' for a weak one, while such weakness disqualifies the latter as a worthy evaluator of anything, starting with their own 'good'.  However, Protagoras might argue that Nietzsche overreaches, perhaps when extending the Will to Power as an explanatory principle of all biological phenomena, and certainly as one of mechanical events.

The Measure, and the Measurer, of All Things

Since Nietzsche seems to nowhere engage his famous anti-Platonist predecessor, Protagoras, it can only be speculated that his doctrine includes the grounds for three disagreements with the formulation 'Man is the measure of all things'.  First, it follows from the doctrine that an Overman can also be such a measure.  Second, it qualifies 'man' as 'some men', i. e. distinguishes those strong enough to be a source of Evaluation, from those who are not.  Finally, it suggests that a man might be the 'measurer', but not the 'measure', i. e. someone who creates a normative ideal, but who himself is not that ideal.  Arguably, Nietzsche classifies the following as notably exemplifying that Measurer-Measure relation: Moses-Decalogue, Plato-Form of the Good, and Kant-Law of Reason.  None of the three disagreements is easily reducible to Protagoras' formulation.

Evaluation, Description, Master Morality, Slave Morality

As has been previously discussed, Nietzsche's development of the 'Master'-'Slave' distinction is complicated by some problematic psychological and sociological suppositions.  Instead, a simpler derivation of those classifications can be based on the Evaluation-Description distinction.  For, the thesis that normative language is fundamentally descriptive casts a value-term as dependent on its object, and, so, functions as a 'slave' with respect to the latter.  In contrast, the thesis that such language is fundamentally evaluative casts a value-term as determining its object, and, so, functions as a 'master' with respect to the latter.  Accordingly, classical Zoroastrianism, Manicheanism, Platonism, and Christianity--the main targets of Nietzsche's Revaluation--are all 'Slave' Moralities, while Zarathustra's Will to Power is a 'Master' doctrine, and, perhaps, one of 'Self-Mastery', as well.  Thus, even though Slave Morality is logically opposed to Master Morality, the proper evaluation of it in terms of the latter is as 'worse than' it, not as 'bad' simpliciter.  So, this alternative derivation can also more clearly formulate a distinction that elevates Nietzsche's doctrine above the Ressentiment of Opposition--that between 1. describing the difference between Master and Slave Moralities, and 2. evaluatively contrasting them.

Evaluation and Description

Platonism does not necessarily oppose the thesis that Axiology is fundamentally comparative--it simply holds that expressions in which one-place terms, such as 'good', 'true', and 'beautiful', are predicates, are descriptions, not evaluations.  However, that classification is challenged to explain how or why the cognition of such properties even comes to verbal formulation to begin with.  Platonism thus has difficulty accounting for the dimension of Judgment that Kant discerns in the Aesthetic variety, and is generalizable to all Evaluation--the communication of some recommendation or another.  But, such communication includes, as has been argued, value-terms that are essentially comparative, e. g. 'X is beautiful' is a species of 'It is better to experience X than not'.  Accordingly, Platonism lacks the grounds for classifying the expressions 'X is good', 'X is true', and 'X is beautiful' as 'descriptions'.

Axiology and Comparison

Nietzsche's distinction between a Whence and a Whither, which he draws in his analysis of Volition in Beyond Good and Evil #19, implies that among the rejected alternatives to a chosen Whither are not only competing Whithers, but their common Whence, as well.  In other words, that choice always entails the evaluation that the Whither is 'better than' its Whence.  On that basis, the traditional attribution of a one-place value-term, e. g. 'is good', to a volition always falsifies the latter, by abstracting from its Whence.  furthermore, a volition judged to be 'unconditionally good' is no exception--such an evaluation means, more accurately, 'better than any Whence'.  In contrast, an apparent counter-example that actually affirms the analysis is Spinoza's doctrine, in which 'good' and 'bad' denote an increase and a decrease, respectively, in strength, and, hence, implicitly compare a Whither to a Whence.  More generally, because any Experience consists in a Whence-Whither span, the Axiology that is appropriate to it is one of Comparison, if Nietzsche's analysis is correct.

Evaluation and Comparison

In his analysis of the process of "Willing", in Beyond Good and Evil #19, Nietzsche distinguishes between an "away from which" from a "towards which".  Furthermore, he focuses on the "aim, the unconditional evaluation".  So, plainly, on this analysis, Evaluation functions, once a volition is in motion, to specify its whither.  In other words, it has no influence on the "away from which" phase, which precedes its influence on the process.  But, to specify a Whither is to choose it from among other possibilities, a selection involving an order of rank among all of them.  Accordingly, implicit in this analysis is the concept of Evaluation as essentially comparative, in which the fundamental Value-term is 'is better than', a concept that seemingly remains undeveloped elsewhere in his oeuvre.

Evaluation, Language, Experience

Implicitly agreed in the traditional dispute in Aesthetic Theory--whether a Value is a Primary Quality, a Secondary Quality, or a Tertiary Quality, i. e. a property of an object, a property of a subject, or, a property of the relation between an object and a subject--is that the paradigmatic scenario of Evaluation is a reaction of a subject to a given object.  Furthermore, none of the disputants, even the Nominalist variety of the second party, seems to explain why a verbal formulation of an evaluation is not extrinsic to the fundamental scenario.  Hence, that traditional dispute fails to consider that as a linguistic construction, the verbal formulation of an Evaluation is a social act functioning in a different paradigmatic scenario.  That is, qua verbally formulated, an Evaluation is commendatory, i. e. it advises whether or not it would be better to believe some proposition, whether or not it would be better to perform some action, or whether or not it would be better to observe some Artwork.  Implicit in such advice is that the fundamental locus of a Value--Truth, Goodness, Beauty, respectively--is in the determination of some prospective course of experience, with respect to which a previous reaction to an object can play an instructive though subordinate role.

Evaluation, Language, Vitalism

Despite the significant role that etymological analysis, e. g. of the term 'good', serves in his 'revaluation of all values', Nietzsche seems to stop short of recognizing that Evaluation is fundamentally a linguistic performance.  So, a different revaluation might begin with drawing distinctions between, for any value V, 'X was V', 'X is V', and 'X would be V', i. e. between an evaluation of a past event, a timeless judgment, and the expression of a preference for some possible future action.  Now, from a Vitalistic perspective, to which he implicitly subscribes in his early study of the value of History "for life", only the third does not abstract from dynamic experience.  So, the paradigmatic case of a Vitalistic Revaluation of All Values that takes into account that Evaluation is a fundamentally linguistic performance, might be Evaluation as influencing potential conduct, a point of departure that precedes any distinction of 'Master' from 'Slave' evaluation.

The Value of Evaluation (Revised)

For all his examination of Value and Evaluation, Nietzsche never seems to directly formulate what the value of Evaluation is.  In some passages, he seems to suggest that to evaluate X is to express one's superior strength in relation to X, while elsewhere, he seems to suggest that to evaluate X is to recommend to others a course of action regarding X.  But, an Evaluation is a verbal formulation, and, as has been previously discussed, he seems committed to denying the possibility of a private language.  Hence, whether or not he explicitly recognizes it as such, the ultimate value of Evaluation in his doctrine is Social, i. e. it expresses a private moment--the feeling of Power--in a public medium.  Kant briefly arrives at a similar conclusion, when discerning how Aesthetic enjoyment stimulates Communication.  If he had pursued that insight, his eventual formulation might have been 'Aesthetic Judgment promotes Morality', rather than 'Beauty is the symbol of Morality'. 

Dissonance and Evaluation

While it may be debatable that Wagnerian dissonance is 'beautiful', it is less deniable that it has been influential.  Thus, the challenge that it poses to traditional Aesthetic Theory is: which between Beauty and Influence has higher value?  Plainly, according to the Will to Power principle, it is the latter, e. g. what is notable about the beauty of Helen of Troy is that it 'launched a thousand ships'.  Thus, that Dissonance excites, without necessarily being beautiful, is not only no argument against its Aesthetic value, but, in fact, can be the best argument for it, upon a revaluation of all values in terms of the Will to Power.  Similarly, the joining, if not supplanting, of Apollo, the god of Beauty, by Dionysus, in the Birth of Tragedy, can be interpreted as Nietzsche's earliest step in that revaluation.

Dissonance, Formalism, Representationalism

Probably the best textual evidence for the classification of Kant's Aesthetic Theory as 'Formalistic' is #14 of the Critique of Judgment, in which he seems to suggest that the evaluation of an Artwork as 'beautiful' is its "shape or play".  However, that interpretation does not explain the essentiality, according to him, of another factor in such judgments--the Purposiveness of the object, in which the shape or play is posited as a product of design.  In other words, the basis of such judgments is more than the mere internal structure of the object, though Kant never seems to explicitly explain what the additional factor is.  Most likely, it is a dimension of Art that he seems to take for granted--the representation of a supersensible object by the presented object, in a relation that entails design, and, hence, a designer.  Thus, the significance of shape or play in this theory is not of them per se, but qua functioning as analogous to something not immediately present, e. g. as a metaphor, and is evaluated on that basis, e. g. on that of the fecundity of the analogy.  But, if, so, then the proper classification of his theory is 'Representationalist', to which any 'Formalism' is ancillary.  In contrast, the concept of Dissonance that has been presented here is Formalistic, i. e. because the object of enjoyment is the internal structure per se of an Artwork.

Dissonance and Representationalism

Schopenhauer and Nietzsche each conceive Music as a representation--of Will and of the Dionysian, respectively.  Accordingly, Nietzsche's appreciation of Dissonance is as symbolic--of the Tragic human condition.  In contrast, the concept of Dissonance that has been proposed here is non-Representational, i. e. the Aesthetic experience of it has been adequately defined in terms of the inner structure of an Artwork.  Thus, that concept has more in common with the pioneering non-Representationalism of Picasso than with the post-Wagnerian Atonalism, which remains within the Representationalist tradition.

Dissonance, Excitation, Mimesis

The concept of Dissonance as constituted by a balance of Attraction and Repulsion seems to conflict with the proposal that it 'excites' an observer, since that balance seems to result in a neutralization of any motion.  However, though that zero-sum calculation applies to mechanical interactions, the two forces are dynamically compresent in a human process--Mimesis, which combines an assimilation to an object, while distinction from it is maintained.  In other words, in Mimesis, the combination of Attraction and Repulsion does not  necessarily result in immobility, as illustrated by the notable counter-example of the "pantomime" occasioned by Dionysian music, examined by Nietzsche in Birth of Tragedy #2.  Likewise, Excitation-Mimesis causality does not reduce to a Stimulus-Response Behaviorist paradigm, which is essentially a mechanical connection.

Dissonance and Excitation

'Enjoyment' is commonly equated with 'Pleasure' and 'Satisfaction', and, hence, with 'Satiety'.  Now, as has been proposed here, Dissonance is constituted by a certain balance between Attraction and Repulsion.  So, because Satiety precludes Repulsion, the enjoyment of Dissonance is often reduced to a combination of Pleasure and Pain.  Thus, the common characterization of Dissonance as, at least in part, 'painful', reflects terminological inadequacy more than analytical acuity.  Instead, a more accurate characterization of the enjoyment of Dissonance is 'Excitation', a nuance that is consistent with Spinoza's definition of 'Pleasure' as an increase in strength, and with Kant's concept of it as a stimulant to both imagination and communication.

Dissonance, Discord, Sublimation

Dissonance, as constituted by a certain balance between Repulsion and Attraction, is not to be confused with Discord, in which Repulsion predominates over Attraction.  So, Repression, as a reaction to Discord, can be analyzed as a predominance of Attraction over Repulsion.  An alternative reaction is one that achieves the compresence of antagonistic components, and this is what Wagner accomplishes with his expansion of the traditional sonic palette.  But Dissonance is a compresence of antagonistic components.  Hence, Wagner's innovation can be conceived as illustrating that Dissonance is the sublimation of Discord.

Dissonance, Sublime, Sublimation

Despite the etymological kinship of the terms 'sublime' and 'sublimation', Nietzsche's influential introduction of the latter has apparently never been connected with the former, even in his own oeuvre.  But, they plainly intersect in his concept of Dissonance, as articulated in Birth of Tragedy.  For, his concept of Sublime there, inherited from Schopenhauer, is constituted by the joyous overcoming of suffering.  Furthermore, he conceives the production of Dissonance as itself the overcoming of that suffering, i. e. it neither merely represents nor expresses the latter.  In other words, on this account, Dissonance is both the Sublime and a sublimation of the suffering of the Artist.  So, his treatment of it in Birth of Tragedy is more significant as a prelude to his seminal naturalization of Psychology, crystallized in the Will to Power principle, than as a contribution to Aesthetic Theory.

Dissonance and Prejudice

Since the definition of Dissonance that has been proposed here entails that it is constituted by a contrast, it always involves at least two components.  Instances of common usages of the term that seem to denote simple phenomena, i. e. in which Dissonance is a one-place property, are no exceptions--they are all elliptical characterizations, in which a second component is implicitly involved.  In some of those usages, 'X is dissonant' actually means 'X is more dissonant than some Y'.  But, in other cases, the more significant ones, the second component is a pre-given term that is so pervasive that it eludes recognition.  Thus, as an analogous example, '12-tone' is often classified as 'atonal', simply because 'tonal' is prevalently accepted as equivalent to '7-tone'.  Such instances often express a cultural prejudice, in which a contingent norm is taken as an absolute principle.  Likewise, 'X is dissonant' often means 'In the context, X is unfamiliar', a characterization that abstracts from the internal structure of X, supplants a symmetrical relation, i. e. Difference, with an asymmetrical one, i. e. Familiarity, and then equates one of the terms of the latter with a presumed one-place property, 'dissonance'.