Thursday, January 31, 2013

Communicability of Pleasure

A central concept of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment is the 'communicability of pleasure'.  However, it is unclear what Kant means by that.  For, on the one hand, the communicability of the judgment "I like Aesthetic object X", does not logically entail that a listener derive pleasure from hearing the judgment, nor is it reasonable, in most circumstances, at least, for its speaker to expect a posteriori that others would find the hearing of such a mundane expression pleasurable.  On the other hand, insofar as Aesthetic object X communicates ideas in the contemplation of which an audience derives pleasure, that pleasure is caused by X, not 'communicated' by it.  Now, in #41, Kant proposes that "sociability" is a factor in Aesthetic pleasure, and, hence, is a motivation to share one's enjoyment with others.  However, he subsequently dismisses that influence as of "no importance" to a priori judgments of Taste.  Furthermore, that proposal neither takes into account the possibility that sociability itself is a source of a pleasure that is independent of the pleasure of contemplating X, plus, how the communicability of pleasure is entailed in such sharing remains unresolved.  So, both the meaning of  'communicability of pleasure', and its role in Kant's theory, are problematic.

Wednesday, January 30, 2013

Communicability, Vocabulary, Beauty

Communicability entails commonality of content, i. e. of vocabulary, which, once manifold, requires structural, i. e. grammatical, commonality, as well.  Now, in Kant's system, the a priori status of cognitive faculties guarantees the universal commonality of grammatical structures, as Chomsky, notably, appreciates.  In contrast, the universal commonality of vocabulary, remains lacking, despite the availability of Esperanto, and the ongoing efforts to establish a universal algebra.  Thus, Poetry, in whatever language, lacks universal communicability, and, hence, lacks the capacity to universally communicate Pleasure.  Likewise, the vocabularies of Music and Painting, even where once assumed to be universal, have been proven to be culturally and/or historically relative, in which case they, too, lack the capacity to universally communicate pleasure.  But, Kant's definition of Beauty is in terms of the universal communicability of Pleasure.  Hence, in his system, Beauty is a perhaps unrealizable ideal.

Tuesday, January 29, 2013

Communication and Causality

Interpersonal communication is among the commonest of processes, yet a Causal analysis of it in Kant's system seems problematic.  For, Communication entails more than the issuing of a sound and a subsequent neural irritation, as Mechanical Causality is limited to recognizing.  Nor does construing the issuance as 'free' Mechanical Causality, since it does not distinguish a 'boo!' that is merely designed to startle, from a meaningful utterance.  Likewise, conversely, the 'understanding', in Kant's terminology, of a manifold of sounds, does no more than recast them as an 'effect' of which the issuer is a 'cause'.  In contrast, since to 'understand', in the common sense of the term, a message entails a sequence of processes eventuating in a kind of satisfaction, the receiving of a message seems best classified as a 'Teleological Cause'.  Now, any interpretation of an event as 'teleological', in Kant's system, is heuristic, requiring Reflective Judgment.  But, then, Reflective Judgment is itself a processing of data, eventuating in a kind of satisfaction, and, hence, is seems appropriately classified as a 'Teleological Cause', thereby suggesting an infinite regress.  So, at best, it is unclear how Kant's system can accommodate Communication.

Monday, January 28, 2013

Technical Reason, Practical Reason, Morality

As previously proposed, 'Technical Reason' recasts empirical causal knowledge for use.  Hence, Technical Reason is the source of maxims, i. e. it recasts 'A causes B' as 'A is a means to B'.  Now, insofar as the exercise of human skill is the Ultimate Purpose of Nature, as Kant argues in the 3rd Critique, all of Nature is potential raw material for Technical Reason.  However, included in Nature are physical human beings, which are, thus, likewise, susceptible to the healthy exercise of Technical Reason.  It is this susceptibility that Pure Practical Reason implicitly corrects by conditioning maxims, and explicitly addresses when it requires that humans not be used as mere means.  In other words, his Moral doctrine is primarily a product of an internal self-modification of Reason, and not a marshaling of Reason against indifferent or hostile external forces--self-love, the senses, etc.--as the conventional dimension of his exposition often seems to suggest.

Sunday, January 27, 2013

Communication and Reflective Judgment

According to Kant's system, the Understanding cognizes a phenomenon as a mechanistic effect, while the Reflective Judgment interprets the effect as a deliberate product.  Thus, the sounds coming from someone's mouth, even when taken in combination, e. g. with the direction of their eyes, is, in the absence of Reflective Judgment, not characterizable as an 'act of communication'.  So, to merely represent some phenomenon as a 'message' is a judgment that precedes any other judgment involved in the cognitive processing of the content of the message.  Hence, is it distinct from the judgment that the content of a message is 'universalizable'.  Now, to judge a message as 'universally communicable' entails that anybody else who hears it will, likewise, judge it as 'universally communicable', which entails that they, in turn, etc.  In other words, Kant's Aesthetic theory, which  is based on the 'universal communicability' of the judgment 'I like X', presupposes a theory of Communication, which, upon examination, seems to dissolve that presumed basis into an infinite regress.

Saturday, January 26, 2013

Technical Reason and Practical Reason

In the Critique of Teleological Judgment, Kant seems to conceive Nature as beneficial to humans in two ways--as promoting scientific knowledge, and as offering raw material for the exercise of free causality, i. e. of skill.  But, these are one and the same, for, skill is applied scientific knowledge.  Now, the term 'Technical Reason' can be used to characterize such implementation of scientific knowledge, one type of objects of which are empirical behavioral patterns.  Thus, Technical Reason is the source of maxims, which formulate, for implementation, possible behavioral patterns, and, so, can be distinguished from Practical Reason, which requires the universalizability of those formulations.  Similarly, while the human exercise of skill is the natural 'Ultimate Purpose' of existence, human obedience to the principle of Pure Practical Reason is the supernatural 'Final Purpose' of existence.  In other words, the subordination of Technical Reason to Practical Reason in his Moral doctrine, and their hierarchical relation in his Teleological system, are congruent.

Friday, January 25, 2013

Nature, Signs, Reflective Judgment

The standard Academic classification of Berkeley--as part of sequence with Locke and Hume--tends to obscure how anomalous he is in it.  For, unlike either of the other two, as well as traditions to which they have given risen, e. g. Positivism and Pragmatism, Berkeley can interpret the occurrence of a rainbow as a 'covenant from God', and, in general, reads Nature as a system of divine signs.  Now, while the cognition of Nature as such can be classified in Kant's system as 'Reflective Judgment', he never considers that possible application of that faculty, though he needs to.  For, that application combines Aesthetic Judgment and Teleological Judgment, as he presents them--the former conceives natural Beauty and Sublimity as singular phenomena seemingly addressed directly to a subject of experience, while the latter conceives Nature as organically interconnected, in order to promote scientific research.  In contrast, the application of Reflective Judgment to the interpretation of a phenomenon as a divine sign, conceives it as both singular and as teleological.  Furthermore, Kant's doctrine requires that combination of Aesthetic Judgment and Teleological Judgment, because, as has been previously discussed, the thesis, entailed by the doctrine, that Happiness can be a divine reward, is no different than that which interprets a rainbow as a divine sign..

Thursday, January 24, 2013

Virtue, Reward, Communication

In ordinary contexts, what distinguishes a reward from a random occurrence of good fortune is some kind of accompanying expression, usually verbal, characterizing it as such..  So, similarly, for a virtuous person to conceive a happy experience as a divine reward for that Virtue, Reflective Judgment must interpret it as entailing some kind of message characterizing it as such.  Hence, to whatever extent Kant's Moral doctrine, and its complementary theory of Teleology, are concerned with the rewarding of Virtue, a concept of Communication is presupposed.  However, his only explicit treatment of the topic of Communication appears in his Aesthetic theory, and there at only a remove from a happy experience itself, i. e. from the pleasurable contemplation of Beauty.  Still, there is an implicit communicative dimension in his analysis of that Aesthetic experience--the object of Beauty seems personally addressed to the subject of contemplation, and it has an ulterior meaning, i. e. it is a symbol of Morality.  So, Kant's Aesthetic theory contributes an implicit concept of Communication, thought not an explicit, developed theory of it, to his Moral doctrine, and, therefore, to its associated Moral Theology, which is based on the concept of God as a rewarder of Virtue.

Wednesday, January 23, 2013

Why Do Good Things Happen to Good People?

The answerability of the familiar question 'Why do bad things happen to good people?' presupposes the answerability of the less common question 'Why do good things happen to good people?'  The answerability of the latter, in turn, presupposes the objective distinguishability between something good happening to a good person BECAUSE they are good, from it happening coincidentally.  However, neither empirical observation, nor faith, nor Kant's Reflective Judgment, i. e. a heuristic hypothesis, can adequately draw that distinction.  Hence, there are always at least two possible explanations for something good happening to a good person, which means that there is no definitive answer to the question 'Why do good things happen to good people?'  Accordingly, there is no conclusive answer to the question 'Why do bad things happen to good people?'  Furthermore, because a virtuous person can only speculate as to whether or not some good fortune is a reward, even granting Kant the possibility of his Highest Good, the actualization of it remains unknowable to a Moral agent, which means that complete Moral satisfaction remains impossible in his doctrine.

Tuesday, January 22, 2013

Nature as a Moral Phenomenon

Kant's concept of Nature as a purposive system is the correlate of Reflective Judgment as the link between Understanding and Reason.  However, Reason is more than a faculty of Purposes--it is, in his doctrine, the source of his concept of the Highest Good, which entails the existence of a God that rewards Virtue.  Hence, the fully developed concept of Nature, as the correlate of the link between Understanding and Reason, is as a Moral phenomenon--in which, i. e. Happiness is interpreted as a divine reward, and, analogously, Unhappiness is interpreted as a divine punishment--and, hence, as a Theological phenomenon, as well.  Now, a significant influence on Spinoza's critique of Teleological Reason is that he conceives it as a breeding ground of superstition.  Likewise, Kant's attribution of Teleological Reason to Reflective Judgment is an opportunity to similarly debunk any interpretation, in conventional Morality, of the events of Happiness and Unhappiness as Theologically significant, i. e. to expose it as the superstitious product of mistaking a Reflective Judgment for a Determinative Judgment, i. e. of mistaking a heuristic fiction for objective fact.  However, his ambition to reinforce conventional Morality, and its implicit Theological premises, results in a squandering of that opportunity. 

Sunday, January 20, 2013

Experimental Reason and Reflective Judgment

The formulation, testing, and evaluation of hypotheses are all functions of what has been previously introduced here as 'Experimental Reason'.  These processes are involved in ordinary experience as much as in rigorous, specialized, contexts.  Now, the formulation of an hypothesis consists in the seeking of some general proposition under which to subsume some given datum.  But, the seeking of a general proposition under which to subsume some given datum is an operation of what Kant calls, in the Critique of Judgment, 'Reflective Judgment'.  Accordingly, not only is the Critique of Judgment a study of some of the applications of Experimental Reason, i. e. 'thought experiments', but that Kant also evaluates Reflective Judgment as a promoter of Morality and Knowledge suggests that the Critique is itself an expression of Experimental Reason.

Saturday, January 19, 2013

Purpose, Cause, Effect

In part IV of the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, Kant defines 'purpose' as a "concept of an object", whereas in #10, he presents it as an "object of a concept", with, in each case, Concept classified as a Cause of an Effect.  So, the #10 formulation avoids the previously discussed problems, entailed by the part IV formulation, of construing a Purpose as a Cause.  However, the alternative, that a Purpose is an Effect, poses a different challenge to Kant's system.  For a Purpose, like an End, as an effect, is without any subsequent effects, a possibility which seems to disrupt the posited, in the 1st Critique, infinitude of Time, without the benefit of the exemption from that infinitude, enjoyed by supersensible causes, as established in the Transcendental Dialectic. That exemption is not available to Purposes, since they entail the possibility of sensible causes having supersensible effects, which unlike its inverse, is not admitted by even Practical Reason.  So, given that, in Kant's system, a 'Cause' necessarily precedes its 'Effect', a Purpose seems classifiable neither as a 'Cause' nor as an 'Effect'.

Friday, January 18, 2013

Purpose, Causality, Means

In # 65 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant suggests that the Efficient-Teleological contrast of Causalities be recast as Real-Ideal.  Though he does not cite it, one reason that he might prefer the latter is that his revision of the tradition concept of Teleological Cause eliminates one of its fundamental differences with that of Efficient Cause, which is that in the former, the 'Cause' terminates a sequence, while, in the latter, it initiates one.  In contrast, an 'ideal' cause', like not only a 'real' cause, but every other Cause in his system, initiates a sequence.  Now, one awkward consequence of this revision is that it leaves little room for the traditional concept of 'means'.  For, if a 'purpose' is both a concept of an effect and its cause, then it also functions as a means to that effect, as well, in which case his characterization of each part of an Organism as both a "purpose" and a "means" is trivial.  Perhaps, he might accept this modification of the concept of Purpose--'an effect that is represented as part of a sequence which is the execution of the representation of the sequence'.  Still, the potential difficulty for him in that modification is that it is the representation of the entire sequence, e. g. a maxim, that is the cause of the entire sequence, so there is no direct causal connection between the represented effect and the actual effect.  Thus, his attempt to conceive Purpose as isomorphic to the concept of Mechanical Causality remains problematic for his study of Teleology.

Thursday, January 17, 2013

The Limits of Mechanical Causality

In #65 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant proposes that better classifications of 'Efficient' Causality and 'Teleological' Causality are "real" and "ideal", respectively, Causality.  Presupposed in his suggestion is the acceptance of the concept of Mechanical Causality, established in the 1st Critique, as 'real', with respect to which the Causality that is the central topic of the 3rd Critique, like that which is the central topic of the 2nd Critique, i. e. 'free' Causality', is a variation.  However, the same material could be presented as part of another 'critique', namely, a critique of the concept of Mechanical Causality, i. e. a demonstration of the inadequacy of the latter to explain either Rational conduct or Organisms.  As Kant acknowledges, the concept of Crystallization, like that of his earlier 'Nebular Hypothesis', in which a definite concrete formation emerges at the end of a natural process, pushes mechanistic explanation to its limit.  But, a third isomorphic example breaks that limit, and exposes a more fundamental limitation of Mechanical Causality.  That process is Gestation, in which, according to Mechanical Causality, 'the birth of a baby is a cause of gestation' is not an objectively valid proposition.  Instead, given that it is objectively valid, not only is Mechanical Causality  inadequate to it, but the implicit Atomism of that structure, i. e. that Cause and Effect are distinct events, not different moments of the same process, is exposed.

Wednesday, January 16, 2013

Organism and Kingdom of Ends

In #65 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant defines an Organism, a concept of Reflective Judgment, as an entity in which "everything is a purpose and reciprocally also a means."  He also proposes in the Groundwork, that according to Reason, a member of the Kingdom of Ends is an end whenever it is a means.  Now, both an Organism and the Kingdom of Ends are comprised of a plurality of integrated parts.  However, as has been previously discussed, according to the comparison of Reason and Judgment that is presented in #40, only the latter entails the existence of a plurality of entities.  Thus, there are grounds for deriving the concept of the Kingdom of Ends from that of Organism, in which case it is a product of Reflective Judgment, not of Reason.

Tuesday, January 15, 2013

Organism and Causality

In #65 of the Critique of Judgment, referring to Efficient Causality and Teleological Causality, Kant asserts that "there cannot be more than these two kinds of causality", which implicitly challenges Aristotle's thesis that there are four kinds.  On the other hand, the free purposeless causality of the principle of Pure Practical Reason seems reducible to neither category.  Furthermore, later in #65, he characterizes an Organism as being constituted by a "formative force".  So, his insistence on adhering to those two causalities preempts any consideration of a potentially third Aristotelian possibility--Formal Causality--which, if incorporated into his system, could help demonstrate that Rational conduct is one of the processes of an Organism.

Monday, January 14, 2013

Organism, Art, Morality

In #65 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant distinguishes an Organism from a work of Art, on the grounds that the former is a "self-organizing being", while the latter is the purposive product of an external cause, e. g. an artist.  However, he does not seem to consider the possible application of that characterization of Organism to his assertion, in #46, that via Genius, "nature gives the rule to art."  For, on the basis of that formulation, both the creative process, and its product, can be self-organizing.  In that case, the defining characteristic of preeminent Art is Vitality, which can easily explain why it stimulates the cognitive faculties of an audience, and animates an eagerness of the latter to share the experience.  So, where Kant describes the contemplation of Beauty as "restful", e. g. in #24 and #27, the rule that nature gives to the object of contemplation must be other than that of Self-Organization.  Likewise, insofar as, as has been previously proposed here, Well-Being consists in optimum Organistic vitality, including socializing functions, it is artistic Vitality that is the symbol of Morality.

Sunday, January 13, 2013

Organism, Happiness, Well-Being, Morality

The traditional concept of 'Happiness'--the aggregate of the satisfactions of desires--to which Kant subscribes, is that of an entity that is a private bundle of sensory inclinations.  In contrast, the 'Well-Being' of an Organism can be defined as the 'optimum harmonious functioning of all vital processes'.  So, plainly, Well-Being is a more comprehensive Good than is Happiness.  Furthermore, included in those vital processes are not only Motility, but Intellect and Sociality, as well.  Thus, in an Organism, Well-Being and Doing-Good are synonymous, as are, thus, 'Health' and 'Morality'.  Accordingly, since Kant's Highest Good includes and preserves, as is, traditional Happiness, it is, qua a Good, inferior to Organistic Well-Being.  Likewise, since Organism, in his system, is a concept of Reflective Judgment, the latter is the ground of a greater Good than is Reason.

Saturday, January 12, 2013

Organism and Happiness

Though Kant himself does not use the term, 'Organism' can serve as equivalent to the purposive concept of 'organized being' that he introduces and examines in the Critique of Teleological Judgment.  As a dynamic whole of a multiplicity, Organism is sharply contrasted with the concept of 'individual' being as a passive aggregate parts.  Likewise, the concept of 'happiness' as the passive sum of all desires is inadequate to the concept of Organism.  Thus, the involvement of that concept of Happiness as a 'purpose' in his organistic system of Nature, and his recognition of it as a 'good' of an individual, are significantly inconsistent with his concept of Organism.

Friday, January 11, 2013

Ultimate Purpose, History, Morality

Kant's system of Natural Teleology includes an historical dimension.  For, as he explains in #83 of the 3rd Critique, the achievement of the "Ultimate Purpose" of Nature--"Culture"--entails progress towards the "cosmopolitan" ideal that informs his earlier Idea for a Universal History.  Thus, various stages of social formation are preparatory to that ideal, and, hence, are eventually superseded.  Specifically, therefore, Kant's contemporary society is likewise transient.  Now, as is clear in the Groundwork, at least part of his Moral doctrine abstracts a formal structure from his contemporary society, independent of any derivation from Pure Practical Reason.  Furthermore, as has been frequently proposed here, his characterization of 'Happiness' as a 'Rational' Good is, at best, questionable, in which case, so, too, are his 'Highest Good', which entails that Happiness, and his 'God' the existence of which follows from that Highest Good.  Accordingly, those Goods of his doctrine seem to derive from the concept of his contemporary Morality, but not from Reason.  Thus, he does not consider the possibility that his Highest Good reflects a transient conventional Morality that is among the social formations that are superseded en route to the Ultimate Purpose.  Of course, Hegel and Marx are among those who do consider that possibility.

Thursday, January 10, 2013

Happiness, Skill, Discipline, Morality

According to #83 of the Critique of Judgment, all of the following: the "ultimate purpose" of Nature is "culture"; "happiness", i. e. the sum total of satisfactions of all desires, is not the ultimate purpose of Nature; culture combines "skill" and "discipline"; and, discipline "consists in the liberation of the will from the despotism of the desires".  Systematized, these four yield the following structural relations: 1. Happiness is a means to Culture, i. e. because the latter is the ultimate purpose of the rest of Nature; 2. The fundamental natural psychological drive in an individual human is towards skilled activity; and 3. Pure Practical Reason, as the source of the discipline of skilled activity, is a natural principle.  However, none of these relations are entailed in the actual settled version of his Moral doctrine, especially insofar as in the latter, the liberation of the will from the despotism of desires is the effect of a non-natural principle, and Happiness is an end that is subordinate to Virtue only.  These discrepancies are further evidence of an ad hoc supervention in Kant's doctrine, on methodically generated structures of his system, by extrinsic Deontological and/or Theological influences.

Wednesday, January 9, 2013

Ultimate Purpose, Happiness, Morality

In #83 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant argues that the "ultimate purpose" of Nature, i. e. that part of Nature to which the rest is a means, is human "culture", a fundamental component of which is the skilled use of the rest of Nature, e. g. manufacturing.  A significant stage of his argument is the proposition that Happiness, qua satisfaction of all individual desires, is not that ultimate purpose.  Alternatively, he might have re-defined 'Happiness' as 'cultured activity', which entails 'skilled activity'.  In either case, insofar as his Moral doctrine is based on the premise that the fundamental natural motivation of individual behavior is the satisfaction of desire, the doctrine is inconsistent with his recognition of Culture as the Ultimate Purpose in his system.

Tuesday, January 8, 2013

Aesthetic Pleasure and Harmony

According to Kant, the source of Pleasure in Aesthetic experience is a "harmony" that is an ingredient in the contemplation of Beauty.  However, his analysis of the experience reveals two such harmonies--that between Imagination and Understanding, and that between that interplay and the object of Beauty.  So, his precise attribution of Pleasure likewise vacillates between those two possible harmonies, e. g. both possibilities are plainly cited in part VII of the Introduction to the 3rd Critique.  Now, regardless of how he conceives the two harmonies as systematically related, e. g. as identical, or as one derived from the other, it is latter type that is paradigmatic in his theory.  For, it is only a comparison of the object with subjective processes that is a representation that is exclusive to Reflective Judgment, and it is only insofar as the object is judged as designed to stimulate those processes that it is 'Purposive'.  But, if the main thesis of his Aesthetic Theory is 'The contemplation of Beauty is constituted by a Reflective Judgment that derives Pleasure from the seeming role of the object of Beauty as stimulating subjective cognitive faculties', it is unclear if the claim is factual or normative.  If factual, it seems plainly false, because Beauty has been contemplated over the centuries without that dimension entering into the enjoyment, and, if normative, the requisite criterion would convert all judgments of Taste to Determinative ones, contrary to the fundamental premises of the theory.  Furthermore, the particular implication that the enjoyment of human-made Art is Purposive is false--at least many artists devise their products with an audience in mind, which means that such objects of Beauty are 'purposeful', not 'purposive'.  So, the attribution of Aesthetic Pleasure to a Purposiveness that is conceived only in Reflective Judgment, seems to serve only one function in Kant's theory--as preparation for conceiving Happiness as a divine reward, a Theological function that, as has been previously argued, and as this analysis confirms, is extrinsic to Aesthetic appreciation

Monday, January 7, 2013

Undeserved Pleasure and Deserved Happiness

While the title of #59 of the 3rd Critique is "Of Beauty as the Symbol of Morality", in the body of the section it is, more precisely, the "morally good" that Kant characterizes as the object of that symbol.  But, the implicit equation between Morality and the Good, i. e. between the principle of Pure Practical Reason and Happiness Proportionate to Virtue, conflates two concepts that are sharply distinguished in the 2nd Critique, an imprecision that is typical of the entire section, e. g. the cryptic reference to God, and the scattershot explanation of the proposed analogy between Beauty and Morality.  Now, insofar as Pleasure is produced by the contemplation of random natural formations, it can be characterized as an 'undeserved', indeterminate, event.  However, if such Pleasure were conceived as a reward, then it would be a 'deserved', determinate, event.  So, absent an alternative explanation from the Kant, the precise analogy between Beauty and the Good that his doctrine systematically entails is that between Undeserved Pleasure and Deserved Happiness.

Sunday, January 6, 2013

Aesthetics Without Theology

In #58 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant explains how the process of "crystallization" can account for the production of natural Beauty, without the involvement of a "purpose" to serve as a concept in that production.  So, insofar, as "nature gives the rule to" (#46) the human production of Art, a human artist is, likewise guided, purposelessly and without a concept, in the creative process.  Finally, at #61, Kant cites the fundamental characteristics of Beauty as "diversity and unity".  So, these three passages, taken together, provide a basis for a theory of Beauty as objective and concept-less, i. e. 'X is beautiful' denotes the configuration of Diversity and Unity in X.  Thus, Aesthetic Judgment can be neither Determinative nor Reflective, which means, notably, that the Antinomy of Taste can be resolved without recourse to Reflective Judgment.  But, the latter is the entry in the presented theory to the supersensible realm, and, hence, to the theological premises that condition the theory.  So, from within Kant's system, there is the potential for an Aesthetic Theory that is independent of his theological commitments.

Saturday, January 5, 2013

Aesthetics and Theology

As has been previously discussed, Kant previews, in the 1st Critique, beginning at B833, the 3rd Critique as an answer to the question "If I do what I ought to do, what may I then hope?'  Now, that 'hope' is a cognition, the object of which is Happiness, a natural event that entail two references to the Supersensible realm.  First, it is proportionate to Virtue, and second, its cause is God.  So, a primary task of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, in particular, is to establish a transcendental basis for that synthetic cognition.  As it turns out, that basis is Reflective Judgment, from which both references are derived.  First, it isolates, in the contemplation of the analogical presentations of Beauty, a proportionality between Imagination and Understanding.  Second, it projects, via its concept of Purposiveness, God as the ultimate source of objects of Beauty.  For, God is the creator of Nature, and all Beauty, even human-made, to which "nature gives the rule", as he asserts, at #46 of the 3rd Critique, is fundamentally a product of Nature.  Thus, for Kant, the cultivation of Aesthetic appreciation is a part of religious training, as defined by his concept of Moral Theology.

Friday, January 4, 2013

Teleology and Theology

Kant's characterization of the concluding sections of the 3rd Critique, starting at #79, as an "Appendix", suggests that the main theme of that section, Moral Theology, is an extrinsic afterthought with respect to the study of Teleology that precedes it.  However, a preview of that Critique that he presents in the 1st Critique indicates that, quite to the contrary, the inverse is his priority.  For, there, he projects the completion of the Critical trilogy as answering the question "If I do what I ought to do, what may I then hope?" (B833), via a presentation of Nature as a system of the "purposive unity of all things" (B843), which "in its widest extension becomes a physico-theology." (B844)  In other words, as fascinating as it is, his examination, in the 3rd Critique, of the role that Teleology plays in the development of Natural Science, is, qua part of his system, no more than an extrinsic prelude to his explanation of how the object of Hope--Happiness, which is a natural event, can be conceived as purposive, i. e. as a reward, the cause of which is a God, the existence of which is necessarily posited by Reason, according to the 2nd Critique.

Thursday, January 3, 2013

Poetic Justice and Reflective Moral Judgment

While the object of the observation 'X deserved that', either a happy or an unhappy event, is often characterized as 'poetic justice'. and is a source of pleasure to the detached observer, it is a Judgment that cannot be classified as 'Aesthetic' in Kant's system.  For, regardless of the 'poetic' rubric, it is not an attribution of Beauty to a work of Art.  Furthermore, as pleasurable, and as referring to a singular event, it cannot be classified as 'Teleological' in the system, either.  Instead, it is a 'Moral' Judgment, but one that is distinct from 'X deserves such-and-such', in which a specific consequence is derived from a given general rule.  Thus, it is not a 'Determinate' Judgment, according to the system.  Rather, since it supplies a singular natural event with a possible purposive rule that governs its occurrence, the Judgment is 'Reflective', in the system.  In other words, so-called 'poetic justice' is the object of what, according to Kant's system is a Reflective Moral Judgment, even if he seems to overlook the possibility of that kind of Judgment.

Wednesday, January 2, 2013

Spirit, Art, Morality, God

Appearing in #59 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant's cryptic reference to "something that is neither nature nor freedom . . . in which the theoretical and the practical powers are in an unknown manner combined", seems a surprising development in a system that is generally presented as dualistic.  However, the referent of the passage is likely the 'God' of the 2nd Critique, the existence of which is posited in order to account for the possibility of Freedom having causal efficacy in Nature.  Furthermore, a similarly cryptic allusion to a "supreme understanding", in #78 of the 3rd Critique, tends to support that hypothesis.  Thus, in the context of an explanation that Art is conditioned by Morality, the passage can be interpreted as containing a veiled subordination of creative Spirit to theological premises, Kant's derivation of which from Reason is, as has been previously argued here, questionable.